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Chapter 1
Introduction: Talking about ‘Terrorism’
On Monday, July 22, 1946, a little after 12:30 pm, a huge blast ripped through the
prestigious King David Hotel in Jerusalem. 91 people died while another 46 were injured
and large parts of the hotel’s Southern wing were destroyed. At the time, this part of the
hotel was used as headquarters by the British authorities who had installed offices in the
building, immediately raising suspicions that the hotel had been targeted because of the
British administrative presence. The Irgun, a Jewish militant group, claimed responsibility
for the bombing which marked a bloody high point in the continuously escalating conflict
between the Jewish communities and the British forces in Mandatory Palestine. Back in
1922, Britain had received an official mandate by the League of Nations to administer
“the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly
understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights
of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (“Palestine”). In the years since then,
the conflict between the Arab and Jewish populations and the British forces concerning
the ownership and control of Palestine had been brewing, regularly erupting into violence
and destruction.1
Contemporary commentators were clear in their condemnation of the bombing.
British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, for instance, called what had transpired an “insane
act of terrorism.” Similarly, President Truman warned that “[s]uch acts of terrorism w[ould]
not advance, but on the contrary might well retard, the efforts that [we]re being made [. . . ]
to bring about a peaceful solution of this difficult problem.” The New York Times also
reported on the bombing on its title page the next day, writing that “terrorists, believed
to belong to either Irgun Zvai Leumi or the Stern gang, blew up a large part of the offices
of the chief secretary of the Palestine Government” (Meltzer 1). The article continued by
describing how rescuers “were bringing out bodies on stretchers, leaving a trail of blood
over the rubble” before ending on the note that a British White Paper was set to be
1For more on the history of Mandatory Palestine and the events which led to the foundation of Israel in
1948 and the Arab-Israeli War that same year, see, e.g., Bell, Terror ; Golani; and Sua´rez.
1
released which “detail[ed] evidence that, the Government said, linked Jewish leaders with
Palestine violence” (1, 3).
Meanwhile, George Metesky, angry that his former employer, the Consolidated
Edison power company, had refused to pay him compensation for an accident at work
which left him disabled and out of a job, had begun planting self-made pipe bombs in
irregular intervals in New York City. Between 1940 and 1956, Metesky deposited at least
33 devices in public spaces like restrooms and theaters. Two thirds of these pipe bombs
went off, injuring 15 people (“15 Were” 10). The police struggled to develop a lead on
the identity and whereabouts of the unknown perpetrator who was quickly nicknamed
the “Mad Bomber” by the media as people living in the city became increasingly anxious
and panicked about the bombings.2 In order to capture Metesky, the police had to adapt
its strategies, developing practices like criminal profiling with the help of a psychiatrist,
which would become a standard in police work from then on.3
There are some important similarities between the bombing of the King David
Hotel and the “Mad Bomber” of New York City. In both cases, bombs were the weapons
of choice and in both cases, a higher, more powerful institution was targeted. Moreover,
the perpetrators framed their acts as expressions of their anger, frustration, and feelings of
not having been treated fairly by the institution in question. Another similarity was that
the choice to bomb one’s opponent expressed a marked disparity in power; “the breakaway
groups” (141), as Motti Golani calls the Jewish underground resistance, acted explicitly
without the approval and support of the Jewish Agency, the official Jewish representation
in Palestine. Similarly, Metesky had also exhausted all other venues for complaints and
compensation and was left, in his view, with no other option to articulate his outrage. In
both cases, the bombers’ grievances are, to a certain extent, understandable and relatable,
even if the manner in which they acted them out is not.
Interestingly, however, while the bombing of the King David Hotel was labeled an act
of ‘terrorism,’ the reporting on Metesky’s hidden pipe bombs did not make use of the term
at all. Articles in The New York Times generally refrained from characterizing Metesky’s
deeds as ‘terrorism’ and the man himself as ‘terrorist.’ Instead, journalists described
2See, e.g., Salisbury as well as the pieces “Suspect” and “Bomber’s Grievances.”
3For more on George Metesky and his impact on police work, see the studies by Cannell and Greenburg.
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incidents in a matter-of-fact style, reporting, for instance, that “[a] home-made time bomb
exploded yesterday in a washroom on the lower level of Grand Central Terminal” (“Bomb
Injures” 33). That article also referred to Metesky, whose identity was still unknown then,
simply as “the man who had left the bomb in the washroom” (33), indicating that the
term ‘terrorism’ was not part of the semantic field from which journalists drew to describe
these incidents.
It matters immensely whether an incident of violence is categorized as ‘terrorism’
or not. Take, for instance, the mass shooting at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009.
Major Nidal Malik Hasan, an army psychiatrist working at the post, killed 13 people and
wounded another 20 before being shot and gravely injured himself by another officer on
the base. Investigations afterwards not only attempted to explain what had motivated
Hasan to plan and execute such an attack and what his objectives were, but also centered
around questions of how to classify the incident itself. As Robert McFadden reported
in The New York Times that day, army spokesman “General Cone said that terrorism
was not being ruled out, but that preliminary evidence did not suggest that the rampage
had been an act of terrorism” (“Army”). Similarly, President Obama called the event a
“tragic shooting” and a “horrible incident” (“Remarks at the Closing”). Two days later,
the President cautioned the public that “[w]e c[ould]n’t fully know what le[d] a man to do
such a thing,” equally eschewing references to ‘terrorism’ (“President’s Weekly”).
However, when it became publicly known that Hasan (whose parents had been
immigrants from the Middle East) was not only a devout, practicing Muslim but had
actually been in contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, “a radical cleric in Yemen known for his
incendiary anti-American teachings” (Johnston and Shane), the question of whether or not
Hasan’s mass shooting at the fort constituted a case of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ against the
United States was soon answered. President Obama initially avoided calling the shooting
an incident of ‘terrorism’ and stressed instead that Islam did not condone violence, stating,
for example, during the memorial service for those killed in the shooting: “It may be hard
to comprehend the twisted logic that led to this tragedy. But this much we do know: No
faith justifies these murderous and craven acts; no just and loving God looks upon them
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with favor. For what he has done, we know that the killer will be met with justice in this
world and the next” (“Remarks at a Memorial”).
But the president’s views and attempts to introduce nuance into the debate were
not echoed by other commentators. Even though army investigators who had been tasked
with examining the shooting “tentatively concluded that it was not part of a terrorist
plot,” they did explain that Hasan had “acted out under a welter of emotional, ideological
and religious pressures” (Johnston and Schmitt). Johnston and Schmitt’s article then
proceeded to discuss the role of Anwar al-Awlaki and described him as “a prominent
proponent of militant Islam,” suggesting that the shooter’s ardent faith as well as his
communications with al-Awlaki were key elements in what had motivated him. Moreover,
the journalists consistently evoked the ‘terrorism’ subtext by quoting Jarret Brachman, “a
terrorism consultant to the government,” as stating that al-Awlaki was “one of the most
popular figures among hard-line, English-speaking jihadis around the world.” The article
ultimately implied that, despite official denials, it was very much possible to interpret the
Fort Hood stooting as a case of ‘Islamic terrorism.’
Other news outlets made that claim openly. For instance, the conservative magazine
The National Review ran an article entitled “Still Willfully Blind” in response to Obama’s
comments in which it insisted:
After the carnage we’ve seen for two decades, and the high religious authorities that have
endorsed it, it is simply astounding that an American president – at a solemn memorial
service for soldiers killed just days ago by a jihadist acting on his rational, broadly accepted
understanding of his religious duty – could claim that ‘no faith justifies’ sneak-attack
murders, and that no religion teaches that ‘God looks upon them with favor.’ In fact, a
widely held interpretation of Islam holds exactly these principles. No one is saying that
all Muslims follow Hasan’s construction of Islam, but hundreds of millions do and they
have scriptures to back up their beliefs – scriptures we could all read if we’d just pull our
heads out of the sand. (McCarthy)4
Calling Hasan a “jihadist” clearly framed the shooting as a case of ‘Islamic terrorism’
against the United States. But the article went beyond that by maintaining that a significant
portion of Muslims around the world shared the shooter’s beliefs and insisted that Islamic
scripture did, in fact, support these violent beliefs harbored by “hundreds of millions”
of Muslims. Indeed, the fact that journalist Andrew McCarthy chose to emphasize this
4Throughout this study, unless it is stated otherwise, all emphases in quotations are taken from the
original source.
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particular noun phrase in his article for The National Review stressed the (supposed)
pervasiveness of the threat emanating from “a jihadist” like Hasan.
Eventually, in later years, even President Obama accepted the framing of the Fort
Hood shooting as case of ‘(Islamic) terrorism.’ On December 6, 2015, a good six years
after the incident, the president referred to the shooting in a speech on the current U.S.
‘counter-terrorism’ strategy and explicitly listed the incident in conjunction with other
‘Islamic terrorist’ attacks. In the speech, Obama acknowledged that ‘terrorism’ continued
to pose a grave threat to U.S. national security:
Over the last few years, however, the terrorist threat has evolved into a new phase. As
we’ve become better at preventing complex, multifaceted attacks like 9/11, terrorists
turned to less complicated acts of violence like the mass shootings that are all too common
in our society. It is this type of attack that we saw at Fort Hood in 2009, in Chattanooga
earlier this year, and now in San Bernardino. And as groups like ISIL grew stronger
amidst the chaos of war in Iraq and then Syria, and as the Internet erases the distance
between countries, we see growing efforts by terrorists to poison the minds of people like
the Boston Marathon bombers and the San Bernardino killers. (“Address”)
Here, references to, e.g., 9/11, the threat of the Islamic State (variously abbreviated as
IS, ISIL, or ISIS), or the Boston Marathon bombing clearly (re-)constructed the Fort
Hood shooting as ‘Islamic terrorism’ targeting and attacking the United States, suggesting,
at the very least, that the president had changed his mind about how to categorize the
incident.
However, while a consensus developed relatively quickly that the Fort Hood shooting
constitued ‘(Islamic) terrorism,’ public opinion was noticeably more divided in the case of
the Las Vegas shooting on October 1, 2017. Stephen Paddock, whose motives are still not
entirely clear, fired over 1,000 rounds out of his hotel room into a crowd of over 20,000
people who were attending a country music festival. 58 people died and 887 more were
injured (Turkewitz and Medina). Paddock then committed suicide in his room where police
officers found his body later. The next day, President Trump called the incident “an act of
pure evil” and studiously avoided any references to ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ (“Remarks”).
Meanwhile, Scott Shane wondered in The New York Times “What to Call the Las Vegas
Attack?” and discussed in his article whether it was possible to label the shooting a case
of ‘terrorism.’
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Shane’s ruminations on the issue are noteworthy, given that when he was writing (in
collaboration with his colleague David Johnston) about the Fort Hood shooting a few years
earlier, he appears to have been more easily convinced that Hasan’s actions constitued an
act of ‘terrorism’ while he clearly had some doubt about the term’s applicability in the
case of the Las Vegas shooting. Given that more than four times as many people were
killed and more than 44 times as many injured in the Las Vegas shooting compared to the
incident in Fort Hood as well as the fact that both perpetrators had used the same kind
of weapon, this inconsistency in labeling the incidents acts of ‘terrorism’ is remarkable
since it suggests that usage of the term is conditioned by additional, hidden connotations
and meaning components. Indeed, in his article on the Las Vegas shooting, Shane quoted
various acknowledged ‘terrorism’ scholars on the history and use of the term and noted
that “beyond that academic analysis, in political debate in a polarized country, the word
‘terrorism’ is also a verbal weapon, freely wielded – especially when the accused is Muslim.”
By all accounts, Paddock was not Muslim, but, importantly, Hasan’s actions had been
thoroughly explained as motivated by his faith in Islam. This clearly suggests, then, that
religious affiliation impacted the categorization of an incident of violence as ‘mass shooting’
as opposed to ‘terrorism’ in these two cases.
Yet, while Shane remained ambiguous about whether it was appropriate to call
the Las Vegas shooting an act of ‘terrorism,’ other groups affected by the incident had
made up their minds decisively. For instance, Sheriff Joseph Lombardo, the head of the
police team investigating the shooting, said during the presentation of the final report that
“I would personally call it a terrorist act” despite recognizing that “[t]he shooting d[id] not
meet the federal definition of a terrorist attack” (qtd. in Turkewitz and Medina). Likewise,
MGM, the company owning the hotel out if which Paddock conducted the shooting, also
argued that the incident constituted “an act of terrorism” (qtd. in Oppel). This formed
part of a larger legal strategy meant to protect MGM from law suits by victims of the
shooting. By appealing to the SAFETY Act, which was passed after the 9/11 attacks and
sought to insulate providers of security from liability should an act of ‘terrorism’ occur
despite the use of their products and services, lawyers for MGM hoped that “a federal
court [would] rule that it c[ould]not be held liable for the shooting” (Oppel), aware that
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they were setting a legal precedent. However, the applicability of the SAFETY Act hinged
on the question whether the Las Vegas shooting did constitute ‘terrorism,’ making debates
about the issue contentious as various groups sought to protect their interests.
As these examples demonstrate, then, the term ‘terrorism’ is a powerful political
tool whose application has real-life social, economic, and legal ramifications. Yet, it is not
entirely clear what the term actually means. As in the cases of the Fort Hood shooting
and, particularly, the tragedy in Las Vegas, its usage is at times contested. This is not
surprising, though, when considering the multitude of definitions of ‘terrorism’ which have
been circulating for decades. For instance, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research,
edited by Alex Schmid and published in 2011, contains an appendix, compiled by Schmid
in collaboration with Joseph Easson, of over 250 different definitions of ‘terrorism.’ Schmid
and Easson list definitions of ‘terrorism’ from the 18th and 19th century until today and a
first glance at the pages already reveals the distinct degrees of complexity with which the
quoted authors approach their topic. Some definitions, like the one provided by Michael
Walzer in 2004, are just a few sentences long while others, such as the one developed by
J. B. S. Hardmann in 1936, cover a third of the page or even more (144, 100). ‘Terrorism’
clearly means different things to different people. Indeed, no single author (or institution)
has held the definitional monopoly over the term, meaning that many different voices have
made public knowledge claims about the issue, further muddying the waters. What is
more, some scholars, like Brian Crozier, appear two or more times in Schmid and Easson’s
list because they adapted their original definition at a later point in time (e.g. 101, 106),
indicating that not only is there no widely accepted (and used) definition of ‘terrorism,’
the meaning of the term is also regularly subject to change.
We find this reflected in the cases I discussed at the very beginning. The King
David Hotel bombing was widely treated as an act of ‘terrorism’ while the “Mad Bomber,”
who was active at roughly the same time and who relied on the same kind of weapon,
was not. For one thing, this implies that in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the American
public overall did not perceive itself as victim of ‘terrorism.’ ‘Terrorism’ rather happened
in other, far-away places and not at home. It also suggests that the term ‘terrorism’ was
used in fairly specific circumstances at the time. The conflict in Mandatory Palestine took
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place in a colonial setting, so it is likely that this contributed to a conceptualization of
‘terrorism’ as a form of violent protest aimed at driving a colonial power like Great Britain
out of the country. By contrast, George Metesky’s bombing spree in the 1940s and 1950s,
while terrorizing the people of New York City, was not framed as ‘terrorism’ because it
simply did not fit the meaning of the term as it was used then. Most importantly, it was
not perceived as expression of political conflict and rather characterized as the work of a
“publicity-seeking jerk” and a “crackpot” (“Homemade” 28, “Bomb in Music” 1).
However, decades after the activities of the ‘Jewish terrorists’ in Palestine and the
“Mad Bomber” in New York City, the meaning of the term had clearly shifted once more.
While categorizations of the Fort Hood shooting as ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ remained relatively
unquestioned, the more contentious debates about whether the Las Vegas shooting also
constituted ‘terrorism’ indicated that, at this point in time, a perpetrator’s religious beliefs
were an important meaning component inherent to ‘terrorism.’ Likewise, political and
economic interests also significantly impacted this more recent conceptualization of the term
as demonstrated by the arguments between different interest groups involved in the Las
Vegas shooting. These debates actually testify to an increasingly expansive understanding
of what ‘terrorism’ supposedly means. Clearly, nowadays the term is applicable to a wider
variety of situations than in the past and it is less focused on the perpetrators’ political
motifs. The term also generally marks that the violence in question is illegitimate and
often discounts possible reasons for a ‘terrorist’ attack as irrelevant and non-existent.
These debates also attempt to frame the term conclusively, to determine its meaning
by establishing its conceptual boundaries. In that process, ‘terrorism’ is not only described
positively, e.g. by saying that a certain action is a form of ‘terrorism,’ but also negatively,
by stating what it is not. However, these conceptual boundaries are not stable and rather
contingent on the speaker’s status, the social, political, and cultural context out of which
he or she speaks, and the precise historical moment in which the knowledge claim is made.
Thus, debates about ‘terrorism’ actually function as sites in which complex negotiations of
power take place. Arguments about the topic of ‘terrorism’ become contentious struggles
about who gets to speak on the subject and whose voice is discredited, marginalized, or
even silenced.
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1.1 Project Description
As the discussion above has shown, ‘terrorism’ means different things at different times
to different people and these distinct conceptualizations have palpable, significant effects
on American politics, economy, media, and culture. However, so far, to the best of my
knowledge, no one has attempted to chart how understanding of the issue has developed
over time and what consequences these distinct conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ have
had on American politics and culture. While there are a few books (more on that below)
which have examined the importance of ‘terrorism’ at a particular historical moment in
the United States, there is no study available yet which takes a broader scope and traces
how ‘terrorism,’ understood as a far-reaching discourse, both affected political, academic,
media, and cultural debates in the United States about violence as well as being shaped
by these debates in turn.
This dissertation project therefore aims to close a gap in the existing research by
tracing and examining the turns and developments of the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the
United States from the 1940s and 1950s onward until the present day. In order to chart the
trajectory of the discourse, I analyze and discuss a variety of texts by different discursive
actors, namely the U.S. government, the academic field of ‘terrorism’ studies, the news
media, and, finally, cultural productions like novels, TV series, and films. These agents,
just like the texts about ‘terrorism’ they produce, engage in cultural work, a concept
developed by Jane Tompkins, meaning that they are not only influenced and shaped by
knowledge claims made by the discourse on ‘terrorism.’ They also actively contribute
to the discourse and mold it in turn in order to achieve a specific political end. Hence,
another objective of this project is to investigate what ‘terrorism’ actually means to these
different discursive actors and why a certain conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ is dominant
at a particular historical moment.
One crucial realization underpinning the entire project is that the Middle East is
central to the discourse on ‘terrorism’ – and the story about the discourse itself which I
tell in this project. In both narratives, the Middle East not only functions as a geographic
space, a region which one can study and know. The Middle East also operates as a
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cultural imaginary in both the discourse itself and the narrative about it, meaning that
U.S. culture and politics has continuously imagined and constructed a representation of
the Middle East colored by its own anxieties and desires.5 This imagined Middle East,
discursively constructed in much the same manner as ‘terrorism,’ functions as a space
onto which American culture projects its fears and aspirations, through which it expresses
its fascination with the Middle Eastern Other. It constitutes a space onto which one can
map out what it means to be an American, predominantly by expressing what one is
not – Middle Eastern. The imagined Middle East, much like the geographic one, is a space
in which the U.S. performs its power. As Melani McAlister has remarked in her study
Epic Encounters, “representations of the Middle East have been and continue to be a site
of struggle over both the nature of U.S. world power and the domestic politics of race,
religion, and gender” (xiv).
Indeed, in some ways, the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946,
with which I opened this chapter, marked the moment in which the American cultural
imaginary began to focus on the Middle East as a region which not only experienced but
actually produced ‘terrorism.’ Over the course of several decades, incidents of violence
involving the Middle East in some form or other were increasingly framed as ‘terrorism’
in discourses in the United States. Yet, depending on the historical moment in which
these incidents took place, they were categorized and framed differently. The King David
Hotel bombing, for instance, was called ‘Jewish terrorism,’ a concept which was frequently
used at the time and, as the analysis in the next chapter shows, evaluated in neutral or
even positive terms. After the foundation of Israel, the discursive focus slowly shifted
towards ‘Middle Eastern terrorism,’ specifying the concept with a geographical marker
and giving the concept an increasingly negative and pejorative connotation. The 1980s, in
turn, established ‘Arab terrorism’ as predominant threat, redirecting the attention to the
perpetrators’ ethnicity and nationality. This conceptualization was adapted once more
in the 1990s into ‘Islamic terrorism,’ i.e. an approach which stressed the perpetrators’
(assumed) belief as motivation for their actions. The events of September 11, 2001 and
5The notion of the “cultural imaginary” was first developed by Winfried Fluck in his 1997 study
Das kulturelle Imagina¨re: Funktionsgeschichte des amerikanischen Romans 1790-1900 (‘The Cultural
Imaginary: A Descriptive History of the American Novel 1790-1900’).
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the “war on terror(ism)” have only cemented this notion. Hence, the Fort Hood shooting
was quickly framed as ‘Islamic terrorist’ attack since the perpetrator not only stemmed
from an immigrant family from the Middle East but was a devout Muslim, thus seemingly
confirming that validity of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ paradigm. By contrast, Stephen Paddock,
responsible for the Las Vegas shooting, was a white American without clear religious
affiliation, making the application of the ‘terrorism’ label to this case more contentious.
This project, then, considers how different discursive actors imagined the Middle
East and how they drew on these constructions to produce a certain kind of knowledge
about ‘terrorism.’ One such important discursive actor is the U.S. government and I
examine how it, through presidential statements and official reports, slowly constructed
‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East as considerable threat to U.S. interests at home
and abroad while also adapting the term’s meaning to the political exigencies of the
moment. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, over the course of several decades, ‘terrorism’ became an
increasingly significant staple in presidential rhetoric. The numbers are taken from a search
in the online database of The American Presidency Project, conducted on September 24,
2018, and show how ‘terrorism’ rarely featured in presidential statements before the mid-
to late 1970s. Indeed, the year 1979 marks a first high point in the graph as President
Carter mentioned ‘terrorism’ in 29 statements. A year later, the president rang in the new
decade by referring to the issue 68 times, i.e. a surge of 134 %. The increased importance
of ‘terrorism’ for the U.S. government in the 1980s is also reflected in the higher average
for the decade: Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush spoke about ‘terrorism’ roughly 40
times per year. These numbers suggest that not only had the issue become more visible,
it had also attracted the attention of the U.S. government which, in turn, had begun to
construct it as a serious problem requiring heightened presidential attention.
The upwards trend then continued into the 1990s and early 2000s. On average,
Presidents Bush and Clinton spoke about ‘terrorism’ 86 times per year, more than doubling
presidential commentary compared to the previous decade. Similarly, for the first decade of
the new millennium the database records an average of 155 statements per year containing
the word ‘terrorism.’ Clearly, the issue of ‘terrorism’ had become a central topic on which
presidents commented regularly. It also signaled the dominance of the discourse itself as
11
Figure 1.1: Presidential references to ‘terrorism,’ 1940-2017
U.S. presidents could not avoid talking about ‘terrorism’ to their constituents who had
come to expect their leaders to make pronouncements on the issue and to provide context
and meaning for it.
Another central agent to the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the United States is the
academic field of ‘terrorism’ studies. Growing out of insurgency studies in the 1950s and
1960s, the scholarly approach to the issue of ‘terrorism’ has significantly contributed to the
discourse by developing knowledge about it and legitimizing and spreading it in the process.
However, the knowledge produced by scholars working in this particular field has often
circulated under the suspicion of having been politicized or willfully misconstrued. One
reason for these charges are the traditionally strong ties between the political establishment
and ‘terrorism’ scholars in the United States, not only through funding of research projects,
but also because experts on ‘terrorism’ have switched back and forth between working
in academia and taking on positions in the government where they actively shaped
anti-‘terrorism’ policy.
Over the course of several decades, a core group of scholars has formed who
are generally accepted and acknowledged as the field’s leading experts. These include,
among others, Yonah Alexander, Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman, Brian Jenkins, Walter
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Laqueur, Ariel Merari, Alex Schmid, Michael Stohl, and Paul Wilkinson.6 Their names
will reappear throughout this study, illustrating the plurality of voices in the academic
discourse on ‘terrorism.’ What is also noticeable about this list is that ‘terrorism’ studies
has been (and will likely remain so in the foreseeable future) a field dominated by male
researchers. Apart from Martha Crenshaw, all other significant ‘terrorism’ scholars are
men, a dynamic which has not changed in any way since the inception of the field in
the 1950s. Even more troubling, members of the field do not appear to perceive this as a
problem at all; in fact, it is not addressed or mentioned in any significant manner by those
participating in the field itself. Likewise, ‘terrorism’ studies is dominated by researchers
from Western nations, especially the United States, further tilting the balance in favor of a
particular perspective on ‘terrorism’ which privileges the knowledge claims made by male
scholars from ‘the West’ over all other voices. The academic field of ‘terrorism’ studies is
therefore an important and powerful contributor to the discourse on ‘terrorism’ which is
why I investigate it in more detail in this project.
A third agent participating in the discourse on ‘terrorism’ is the U.S. news media.
First and foremost, it functions as distributor of knowledge about ‘terrorism’ produced by
politicians and scholars and familiarizes the American public with it. In that sense, the
news media connects the various fields engaged in creating information about ‘terrorism’
and facilitates the exchange of ideas about it. At the same time, the U.S. news media
also contributes actively to the discourse by making meaning, i.e. selecting and framing
knowledge claims about ‘terrorism.’ It also has the power to amplify certain voices, to
privilege some conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ over others, and to marginalize and even
silence some speakers and their claims about the issue.
In order to illustrate the workings of the U.S. news media in the production and
distribution of the discourse on ‘terrorism,’ I have chosen to discuss the reporting of
The New York Times in greater detail throughout this study. The New York Times,
renowned for its high-quality journalism, is regularly lauded as “the newspaper of record
in the United States and one of the world’s great newspapers” (“New”). It is one of the
most widely read newspapers not only in the United States, meaning that its reporting,
6This list is adapted from Schmid et al. and therefore not complete.
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particularly the writing on ‘terrorism,’ reaches a global audience. Its reporting carries
additional weight because of the cultural capital of The New York Times and its preeminent
discursive standing. How The New York Times frames instances of ‘terrorism’ matters
therefore immensely and impacts the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in significant ways.
As part of my research into how The New York Times reports on ‘terrorism,’
I searched the archives of the newspaper via the online search function on its official
website. I counted the amount of hits a particular search term generated per calendar year
(January 1 to December 31) and conducted the online search for all the data used and
discussed in this project on December 6, 2018. Each hit linked to an article which had
appeared in the newspaper during the given time period and which contained the search
term in the text at least once. (I have included a table with all my data in the appendix of
this study.) Hence, the data I compiled this way gives us a good insight into how popular
a certain term was at any given point in time while also allowing conclusions about the
contexts in which it was used. Apart from this quantitative analysis, I also provide a more
qualitatively oriented interpretation of the news journalism on ‘terrorism’ by doing close
readings of articles and opinion pieces published in The New York Times during specific
historical events. This leads to a nuanced reading of how ‘terrorism’ became a staple in
U.S. news reporting and reflects the media’s active role in the process.
Generally speaking, then, reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the U.S. news media has grown
considerably over the course of the last several decades. As Figure 1.2 shows, ‘terrorism’
was not a particularly prominent concept to describe incidents of violence and political
conflicts in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. The first time that there were over 1,000 articles
per year containing the word ‘terrorism’ was the year 1973, marking the beginning of a
trend which became permanent only from the late 1970s onwards. Coverage of incidents
framed as ‘terrorism’ then increased steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s, culminating
in a remarkable spike in the early 2000s in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001
and the ensuing “war on terror(ism).” More recent years have seen a decrease in the
amount of writing in The New York Times which mentions ‘terrorism,’ but the overall
numbers continue to be high, suggesting that ‘terrorism’ has become a fixture in American
journalism in a way it had not been before.
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Figure 1.2: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, 1940-2017
The final discursive agents I consider in this project are popular responses to the
discourse on ‘terrorism.’ Contemporary popular texts engaging with the issue of ‘terrorism’
not only reflect but actively rework and shape the meaning of the term ‘terrorism.’ I follow
Jane Tompkins’ assertion that literary texts “offer powerful examples of the way a culture
thinks about itself, articulating and proposing solutions for the problems that shape a
particular historical moment” (xi). These cultural productions, she argues, engage in
cultural work and “provid[e] society with a means of thinking about itself, defining certain
aspects of a social reality which the authors and their readers shared, dramatizing its
conflicts, and recommending solutions” (200). I agree with Tompkins’ view that cultural
texts both “expres[s] and shap[e] the social context that produced them” (200). Hence,
I argue that the cultural texts under investigation here have the power to popularize
particular conceptualizations of the issue while marginalizing others. What is more, films
and TV series visualize ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists,’ evoking an emotional response from
audiences which, in turn, can serve a political purpose. Similarly, novels and other written
fictional texts tap into their readers’ imagination when describing ‘terrorists,’ ‘terrorism,’
and the fight against it.
‘Terrorism’ in popular texts is always more than a mere plot device meant to create
conflict and tension which is resolved in the end. Rather, these popular narratives do
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important cultural work by actively making meaning. By representing ‘terrorism’ in a
fictional space, these texts make it appear controllable, suggesting that the arbitrary
violence of ‘terrorism’ really follows a larger logic which can not only be understood but
actually managed. Hence, in this project I also analyze fictional texts which engage with
the issue of ‘terrorism,’ understanding these cultural productions to be both distributors of
central claims of the discourse on ‘terrorism’ as well as active participants in it. I examine
novels, Hollywood movies, and contemporary TV series in order to provide a fuller picture
of how U.S. society at a given historical moment imagined ‘terrorism’ and what purposes
these constructions fulfilled.
Indeed, it is important to keep in mind that these four pillars – politics, academia,
news journalism, and popular culture – interlink and continuously influence each other.
They all function as each other’s mirrors, reflecting and popularizing the others’ ideas
about ‘terrorism,’ but are also active discursive agents whose framings follow a political
and ideological agenda. Figure 1.3 visualizes the interconnectedness of all four discursive
agents. Political agents provide not only research material (e.g. in the form of the official
annual government reports on ‘terrorism’) to ‘terrorism’ scholars but also validate and
legitimize their knowledge claims about ‘terrorism.’ A similar dynamic is at play in the
relationship between political actors and the news media as government officials and
documents frequently provide sources for journalists writing about ‘terrorism.’ Discursive
agents from the political field also indicate to artists and other producers of cultural texts
which issues are important and thus provide inspiration for narratives about ‘terrorism.’
Overall, discursive actors from the political realm signal to the other three fields which
framings and meaning components are currently particularly relevant in political debates
about the topic, thus predetermining to a considerable extent what kind of knowledge is
produced in academia, news media, and culture.
In turn, the academic field of ‘terrorism’ studies provides crucial knowledge claims
about ‘terrorism’ to politicians and government officials who then develop and execute
political policies based on these ideas. Moreover, ‘terrorism’ scholars often function
as sources for ideas and information about the issue to journalists; they are regularly
interviewed and quoted by the news media as designated experts on ‘terrorism,’ meaning
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Figure 1.3: Knowledge production of the discourse on ‘terrorism’
that their claims carry significant discursive weight. Cultural productions equally benefit
from the knowledge produced by ‘terrorism’ scholars and the character of the ‘terrorism’
expert regularly appears in Hollywood movies and TV series in order to explain to the
other characters and the audience how ‘terrorism’ works.
The news media provides a public space both for government officials and ‘terrorism’
experts alike to introduce their knowledge claims about the topic to a wider audience.
Likewise, the news media amplifies and legitimizes certain ideas while silencing others, thus
functioning as powerful ‘selector’ and curator of the discourse. It confirms and reaffirms
the ‘expert’ status of both politicians and scholars alike. Journalistic writing on ‘terrorism’
also includes reviews and discussions of cultural products, thus institutionalizing certain
representations of ‘terrorism’ as ‘authentic’ and spreading particular cultural concerns and
anxieties among a larger audience.
Lastly, cultural texts engaging with the threat of ‘terrorism’ not only visualize and
narrativize knowledge claims about the issue produced by political and academic actors,
they also represent the threat scenarios reported on by the news media. They significantly
emotionalize the conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ by characterizing (and humanizing)
perpetrators and victims as well as depicting the consequences and aftermaths of ‘terrorist’
attacks. Furthermore, cultural texts offer spaces within which fictionalized representations
of political, academic, and journalistic agents can act out their roles in a particular manner,
thus fortifying and legitimizing these discursive positions.
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Ultimately, then, this dissertation project breaks new ground with its multi-pronged
approach to analyze the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the United States. It examines a
multitude of actors and brings to the fore how, as Figure 1.3 illustrates, these different
interest groups interact with and influence each other, pointing to the constructed nature of
the concept and its context-dependent meaning. What is more, this study takes a diachronic
perspective and traces the growth and development of the discourse over the course of over
six decades, allowing it to both provide detailed analyses of distinct historical moments
while also sketching more long-term evolutions. This enables the project to develop a more
nuanced understanding of what ‘terrorism’ means at different times and why particular
conceptualizations are more successful than others while, in the process, correcting common
misconceptions about the term’s meaning and function in American politics and culture.
What emerges is, hopefully, a fuller picture of how the discourse on ‘terrorism’ operates in
the United States, where these ideas come from, and why they have proven so resilient.
1.2 Theoretical Background
Underlying all these considerations is an understanding of ‘discourse’ in a Foucaultdian
sense. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Michel Foucault defines ‘discourse’ as “sometimes
[. . . ] the general domain of all statements, sometimes [. . . ] an individualizable group of
statements, and sometimes [. . . ] a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of
statements” (80). The notion of discourse, then, not only refers to a collection of utterances
about a topic but also denotes a practice through which a particular subject matter is
constructed and constituted. Following Foucault’s theory about discourse as both a space
and a practice which bring a concept into existence, I take a constructivist approach to the
study of the ‘terrorism’ discourse and treat ‘terrorism’ as an inherently flexible signifier
which responds to political, economic, cultural and historical developments in a particular
society at a specific moment in time. What is more, the discourse on ‘terrorism’ also
describes a variety of practices in which questions of ideology and power are acted out
and negotiated by different discursive participants.
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Importantly, to say that ‘terrorism’ is a discursive construct is not to deny the
real-life consequences of violence; it is also not a way to absolve the perpetrators of their
responsibility and blame for their actions. It is, however, an approach which lays bare the
ideological forces at work which underpin conceptualizations of incidents of violence as
‘terrorism.’ It allows us to acknowledge that it is a highly politicized term which has been,
time and again, exploited for specific purposes and hands us the tools to interrogate this
expression of power. This is also why I have chosen to put the word ‘terrorism’ and its
derivations into single quotation marks throughout the text, admittedly an uncommon
practice for works about this topic. However, I think that this is necessary because it
allows me to mark the term’s constructed nature and reminds myself and readers alike to
continuously question its usage and meaning.
In that sense, the discourse and its diverse practices and formations problematize
‘terrorism.’ The notion of “problematization,” as developed by Foucault, explicitly “doesn’t
mean representation of a pre-existing object, nor the creation by discourse of an object
that doesn’t exist. It is the totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces
something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought”
(Politics 257). ‘Terrorism’ thus becomes “an object for thought,” growing out of political,
historical, and cultural developments, about which true and false, accepted and disapproved
claims can be made. What is more, the ‘terrorism’ discourse is also considerably influenced
by what Foucault has termed “eventalization.” It stresses the importance of “the singular
event” for the development of a discourse whenever “there is a temptation to invoke a
historical constant” (“Questions” 77, 76). Thus, “events” take on a critical importance
for discourses when they create ruptures and breaks; these “events” force us to question
“those self-evidences on which our knowledges, acquiescences and practices rest” (76).
In my view, then, the ‘terrorism’ discourse is significantly shaped by crucial events
which, in a Foucaultdian sense, disrupt previous ways of making sense of – or rather,
problematizing – ‘terrorism’ in order to establish new ideas and knowledge claims about
the issue as ‘self-evident.’
From understanding and approaching ‘terrorism’ as a discursive practice
underwritten by the effects of problematization and eventalization follows that the
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knowledge and truth claims produced by the discourse and its participants are equally
constructed. This means that there is no ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ knowledge about
‘terrorism,’ rather; as Foucault put it himself, “there is no knowledge without a particular
discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it
forms” (Archaeology 183). Hence, knowledge claims about ‘terrorism’ are informed by the
speaker’s position within the discourse (which is in turn influenced by his or her gender,
race, class, age, education, etc.) and the historical moment within which he or she speaks.
Moreover, these knowledge claims are shaped by the interplay of power and ideology,
marking them as distinctly political, social, and cultural constructs.
As a consequence, the ‘terrorism’ discourse not only regulates who can speak about
what, it also designates certain knowledge claims as ‘true’ and acceptable and privileges
them over other, alternative approaches which are then deemed ‘false.’ In this regard,
Foucault has unequivocally stressed that “in every society the production of discourse is at
once controlled, selected, organised and redestributed by a certain number of procedures
whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers” (“Order” 52). Indeed, in his view, “not
all regions of the discourse are equally open and penetrable; some of them are largely
forbidden [. . . ] while others seem to be [. . . ] put at the disposal of every speaking subject,
without prior restrictions” (62). This means not only that discourses distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate knowledge based on ideological forces, but also that these
practices of knowledge production are influenced by delicate configurations of power.
Nevertheless, it is also important to be aware that this strict separation between a
legitimate, powerful discourse on ‘terrorism’ and marginalized alternative approaches is,
to a considerable extent, artificial. Even Foucault himself has acknowledged that dividing
“a world of discourse [. . . ] between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between
the dominant discourse and the dominated one” is too rigid (Will 100). He notes that
discourses are marked by “a multiplicity of discurisve elements that can come into play in
various strategies” (100), meaning that there is also always room for dissent and criticism.
As the analysis in this study shows, throughout the period under investigation here, voices
challenging the dominant conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ existed and made themselves
heard. Without overstating their effect in undermining the status quo, it is vital for a fuller
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understanding of how the ‘terrorism’ discourse operates in American politics and culture
to acknowledge these interrogations of power.
1.3 State of the Art
In the endeavor to chart the trajectory of the ‘terrorism’ discourse in American politics
and culture since the late 1940s, this dissertation project could draw on the work already
done by other scholars in the field. One such vital reference point is Lisa Stampnitzky’s
superbly researched Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented “Terrorism.” In her 2013
study, Stampnitzky analyzes how the academic field of ‘terrorism’ studies developed from
the 1950s and 1960s, when it grew out of insurgency studies, until the “war on terror(ism)”
years. She offers a fascinating reading of how experts came to constitute the field as well
as its subject matter, tracing the changing academic conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’
throughout the decades. Notably, Stampnitzky understands ‘terrorism’ as “not a stable or
fixed category” but rather as a term which marks violence as illegitimate (4). In her view,
‘terrorism’ is a social construct which actively participates in the practices and processes
of making meaning (6).
Stampnitzky’s work is particularly useful for my project because of her complex
constructivist approach to the subject matter. However, she focuses exclusively on the
academic discourse on ‘terrorism’ and does not include more perspectives as well as the
cultural and political context within which the academic community operated, leaving
open the question of whether and, if so, how her findings can be applied to other contexts.
Moreover, I disagree with her analysis of the post-9/11 years. Her focus on the constraints
experienced by researchers after 9/11 loses sight of how the meaning of ‘terrorism’ evolved
and how ‘terrorism’ scholars actively contributed to this process. It also does not consider
the establishment of “Critical Terrorism Studies,” the first time a more critical approach
to the academic production of knowledge about ‘terrorism’ became organized. Here my
own analysis offers a more nuanced reading which takes these developments into account
and explains how the meaning of ‘terrorism’ adapted in the post-9/11 climate.
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Another important scholarly appraisal of the ‘terrorism’ discourse is Carol Winkler’s
2006 study In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World
War II Era. Winkler traces how U.S. presidents have spoken about ‘terrorism,’ charting
the term’s development since the 1950s until the early post-9/11 years. The first study to
take a diachronic account of the presidential discourse on ‘terrorism,’ Winkler posits that
“terrorism functions as a symbolic marker of the culture” and stresses that “the term does
perform ideological work within the culture” (7). Unfortunately, however, her analysis is
often imprecise, too descriptive, and does not properly demonstrate the ideological work
performed by the discourse. Upon closer scrutiny, some of her findings are not borne out
by the available evidence and my own readings regularly differ from hers. Nevertheless,
her work offers a point of departure on how to contextualize presidential statements on
‘terrorism’ over the course of several decades.
Apart from these more general studies which trace a particular aspect of the
‘terrorism’ discourse over time, there also exist a few analyses which focus on one
particular historical moment. In February 2018, for instance, Adrian Ha¨nni published
his book Terrorismus als Konstrukt: Schwarze Propaganda, politische Bedrohungsa¨ngste
und der Krieg gegen den Terrorismus in Reagans Amerika (‘Terrorism as Construct:
Black Propaganda, Political Threat Anxiety, and the War against Terrorism in Reagan’s
America’). Ha¨nni is the first scholar to put forth a detailed investigation of how the
Reagan administration constructed ‘terrorism’ as a threat emanating from a ‘terror’
network organized and sponsored by the Soviet Union. He analyzes in great detail how
different members of the administration as well as various committees and government
agencies, aided by journalists and scholars, argued that ‘terrorist’ groups all over the world
had joined in an international network to do the bidding of the USSR. The threat of
Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorism’ against the United States thus became another element in the
Cold War narrative, politicizing the concept further and establishing it as central issue in
U.S. politics.
Ha¨nni’s work is important because it ventures into virtually unstudied territory and
he presents a multi-faceted picture of how the ‘terrorism’ discourse operated in the 1980s,
discussing how academic, political, and cultural actors created and spread claims about
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Soviet-organized ‘terrorism.’ I expand his approach to the topic by considering voices
resisting this narrative and by explaining how and why the narrative of a Soviet-sponsored
‘terror’ network fell out of favor again in the mid-1980s. Another difference between his
analysis and mine is that I systematically read the subject matter through the lens of
conspiracy theory – an analytical approach which contextualizes the narrative and provides
greater insight into how it could operate so successfully. Hence, my own analysis aims
to draw a more nuanced picture of this period, complementing and adding to Ha¨nni’s
assertions.
One of the first studies to extensively examine the ‘terrorism’ discourse in the 1990s
is Chin-Kuei Tsui’s Clinton: New Terrorism and the Origins of the War on Terror (2017).
Tsui analyzes Clinton’s language and concludes that “President Clinton rhetorically framed
and created so-called ‘new terrorism’, or ‘catastrophic terrorism’, which is defined not only
by its borderless character, but also by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) utilized by terrorists and rogue states” (7). Tsui’s study is valuable in that it
stresses the discursive continuity from the Reagan administration via the Clinton presidency
to George W. Bush’s “war on terror(ism).” It is the first book-length investigation of how
the Clinton administration’s conceptualized ‘terrorism.’ My own project seeks to build
on Tsui’s work by contextualizing Clinton’s statements further. It also broadens the view
by including Clinton’s direct predecessor, George H. W. Bush, and his contributions to
the ‘terrorism’ discourse in the analysis. Overall, my own approach aims to provide a
complex reading of how the ‘terrorism’ discourse operated in the 1990s by expanding on
the insights put forth in Tsui’s study.
By contrast, the period after the September 11, 2001 attacks has been much more
diligently investigated by scholars. Two studies in particular stand out. The first one,
Sandra Silberstein’s War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11, which appeared already
in 2002, analyzes how the Bush administration exploited the 9/11 attacks by discursively
constructing them as ‘terrorism’ which needed to be fought militarily. In the ensuing
climate of hyper-patriotism, fear, and control, the administration not only secured its power
but also re-defined what it meant to be American post-9/11. Silberstein complements her
analysis of presidential rhetoric with discussions of how the media framed the attacks
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as well as the U.S. war in response. She also addresses how voices criticizing the Bush
administration and the war effort fared. War of Words is therefore an indispensable
first look at how American society responded to the attacks. Silberstein’s study, however,
does not focus exclusively on ‘terrorism’ in relation to 9/11 and rather examines more
broadly how the Bush administration capitalized on the incident. Moreover, she limits her
investigation to the immediate aftermath of the attacks and the build-up to the beginnings
of the war in Afghanistan, meaning that the subsequent years of the “war on terror(ism)”
remain unaddressed.
Richard Jackson’s book Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and
Counter-Terrorism (2005), the second central analysis of the post-9/11 era, seeks to
remedy this gap. Jackson analyzes the political discourse which formed after the 9/11
attacks, how it characterized the perpetrators and the act itself, how it legitimized the
“war on terror(ism),” and how ‘terrorism’ was generally framed as an existential threat to
American society. His work has quickly become a standard text because of its forceful and
richly-sourced argument. But Writing the War on Terrorism is not without problems. Most
prominently, Jackson does not actually discuss how he conceptualizes ‘terrorism’ and how
he employs it in his study, leaving the theoretical framing incomplete. His discussion also
ignores the aspect of race, or ethnicity, in constructions of perpetrators and victims and he
barely acknowledges Silberstein even though he clearly builds on her previous work. Lastly,
Jackson does not consider resistance to and criticism of the discourse; in his portrayal, the
discourse on ‘terrorism’ is an all-powerful, monolithic entity. My own analysis, however,
shows that this is not the case. Hence, notwithstanding the groundbreaking work produced
by these two scholars, it is time for an updated reappraisal of this important time period
in recent U.S. culture.
Finally, Melani McAlister’s Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests
in the Middle East since 1945, which appeared in a second edition in 2005, and Douglas
Little’s American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (a third
edition was published in 2008) constitute two excellent studies which examine American
engagement in the Middle East from a historical, political, and cultural point of view.
Both authors have rightfully stressed the importance of the Middle East, both as imagined
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and geographical space, for U.S. politics, history, economy, and culture. My own project
therefore seeks to add to their analyses by outlining how the issue of ‘terrorism’ has shaped
American perceptions of and involvement in the region and contributed to American
identity constructions.
1.4 Project Outline
My own analysis of the discourse on ‘terrorism’ since the 1940s and 1950s until today
is organized into this introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion. Each of the topical
chapters analyzes how the four main discursive contributors, i.e. U.S. politics, the academic
field, the news media, and popular culture, have shaped the discourse with their claims
and ideas about ‘terrorism’ at a particular moment in time. The individual chapters
not only trace these developments, they also examine what functions these different
conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ fulfilled and why some constructions were more successful
than others. The chapters explore as well how these four discursive agents interacted with
each other and what consequences these linkages had. Ultimately, the aim is to offer a
more detailed and nuanced explanation of why and how the discourse on ‘terrorism’ has
dominated (and continues to do so) political and cultural debates about the meaning of
violence in the United States and from where these knowledge claims stem.
Chapter 2, entitled “‘Americans Are Suffering from International
Terrorism’ – The Emergence and Rise of the Discourse on ‘Terrorism’ from
the 1950s to the 1970s,” looks at the beginnings of the discourse on ‘terrorism’ and
investigates its roots and relations to other concepts of political violence. It shows how
‘terrorism’ went from relative obscurity in political, academic, media, and cultural debates
in the 1940s and 1950s to slowly become more central to analyses of political violence
and conflicts in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s. Importantly, however, early
usages of the term make clear that ‘terrorism’ enjoyed a neutral and at times even positive
connotation. In contemporary understanding, ‘terrorism’ described a strategy or tactic used
by rebelling forces predominantly in a colonial setting such as the struggles for national
liberation in Mandatory Palestine and Algeria. Commentators expressed a certain degree
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of sympathy and understanding for the ‘terrorists’ and their grievances even when they
did not condone their methods. Moreover, ‘terrorism’ was used to describe the repressive
actions by states, first and foremost Stalin’s regime in the Soviet Union.
While the ‘terrorism’ discourse in those early years had only limited reach and
influence, this would change significantly in the 1970s. Hence, the chapter then turns to
the impact of several key events which occurred in the 1970s, namely the Black September
attack on the Israeli team during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich and the Iranian
hostage crisis from 1979 to 1981, which brought the issue to the forefront in American
society and legitimized the concept as valid interpretative frame for incidents of violence.
These two crises also shifted the evaluation of the perpetrators from romanticized ‘rebels’
to dangerous ‘terrorists’ and worked to significantly change the connotation assigned to
‘terrorism’ to a markedly negative one. Moreover, it linked notions of ‘terrorism’ firmly to
the Middle East as space which supposedly produced ‘terrorism’ and turned it into an
all-encompassing identity role instead of a tactic any politically-minded actor might use at
one point in a conflict.
Next, Chapter 3, “‘This Is [. . . ] the Work of a Confederation of Terrorist
States” – The 1980s, ‘Terrorist’ Networks, and the Reagan Administration’s
‘War against Terrorism,’” discusses how the discourse fared in the 1980s under the
Reagan administration. Still clearly influenced by the traumatic experience of the Iranian
hostage crisis, ‘terrorism’ continued to be characterized as ‘international,’ meaning that it
was not only seen as posing a grave threat to the global community, but that ‘terrorists’
were generally thought to operate across state borders and that groups were linked in
international structures and networks. The other main knowledge claim about ‘terrorism’
derived from the hostage crisis was that while states were no longer conceptualized as
actively engaging in ‘terrorism’ themselves they could nevertheless ‘sponsor’ ‘terrorist’
groups to attack other nations. At the beginning of the decade, these ideas were first
put forth in a conspiracy theory which posited that the Soviet Union ‘sponsored’ an
international network of ‘terrorists’ to attack and destabilize the United States as part of
a Soviet masterplan to win the Cold War.
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This narrative fell out of favor once Cold War tensions began to fade and the mid-
to late 1980s then saw an increased focus on ‘Arab terrorism’ as main villains and, to
a lesser extent, ‘Muslim terrorists’ as well. Following previous discursivizations of the
term, these ‘Arab terrorists’ were conceptualized as working in international networks
with the sole aim to fight and destroy the United States as representative of ‘the West’
and its supposedly superior values. During those years, the concept of ‘terrorism’ was
further moralized as an “evil scourge” plaguing humanity and the discourse also became
markedly more militarized, a development which became openly visible when President
Reagan eventually proclaimed a first ‘War against Terrorism’ in 1985. This chapter thus
also provides a different, more theorized and nuanced reading as a development of Adrian
Ha¨nni’s earlier work.
Chapter 4, called “‘We Are Confronting the Emergence of New Kinds of
Terrorist Violence’ – ‘New Islamic Terrorism’ in the 1990s,” investigates how the
discourse changed after the end of the Cold War. In the early years of the new decade, the
‘terrorism’ discourse was actually struggling to remain relevant as the peaceful, non-violent
ending to one of the most serious and long-standing conflicts in history was widely seen to
signal no further need for knowledge about ‘terrorism’ and political violence. In the wake
of this threat to its dominance, agents participating in the ‘terrorism’ discourse began to
claim that post-Cold War ‘terrorism’ differed significantly from previous manifestations,
popularizing knowledge claims which mixed old, familiar assertions about ‘terrorism’ with
new ideas. Accordingly, this ‘new terrorism’ in the 1990s was overwhelmingly conceptualized
as being more deadly than before, relying on modern technology (particularly “weapons of
mass destructions”), and operating in international networks financed and organized (i.e.
‘sponsored’) by wealthy individuals or antagonistic regimes.
Most importantly, however, the discourse postulated that these ‘new terrorists’
were religious zealots, driven by their fanatical belief in Islam. Here, the ‘terrorism’
discourse clearly tapped into and exploited central tenets of Orientalist debates about a
“Clash of Civilizations,” a notion developed by Bernard Lewis and popularized by Samuel
Huntington. It posited that Muslims were irrational, hateful, violent, and unable to handle
the challenges of modernity and globalization and therefore supposedly lashing out against
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the United States as principal representative of ‘the West’ and its values. These ideas not
only invigorated the ‘terrorism’ discourse in the 1990s, they became firmly entrenched
in American politics, academia, news reporting, and popular culture when a series of
high-profile attacks against the U.S. were successfully discursivized as instances of ‘new
Islamic terrorism’ targeting the United States.
The last topical chapter, Chapter 5, named “‘Terrorism against Our Nation
Will Not Stand’ – 9/11, the ‘War on Terror(ism),’ and the ‘Terrorism’
Discourse at the Beginning of the New Millennium,” addresses how the experience
of the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the ensuing ‘War on Terror’ impacted the
discourse on ‘terrorism.’ It stresses that the discursivization of 9/11 as ‘Islamic terrorists’
attacking the United States in an act of war and out of irrational, religiously motivated
hatred was clearly indebted to the ‘new Islamic terrorism’ discourse of the 1990s which
provided the main interpretative frame through which politicians, scholars, journalists,
and creative artists made sense of what had happened. Already the dominant discourse in
debates about political violence in the United States at the end of the previous decade,
9/11 and the ensuing “war on terror(ism)” in its aftermath cemented the ‘Islamic terrorism’
discourse in its hegemonic position to an unprecedented extent. Indeed, while criticism
regarding the conduct of the “war on terror(ism)” grew louder from the mid-2000s onward,
the framing of ‘terrorism’ as ‘Islamic’ in nature and requiring a war in response was never
questioned, indicating that the discourse entered the new millennium more stable and
powerful than ever before.
Finally, the Conclusion, entitled “The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse in the 21st
Century,” not only reviews the narrative about how the ‘terrorism’ discourse has changed
and developed since the 1940s and 1950s but also offers an outlook on its manifestations
and impact in more recent years. I analyze how ideas about ‘Islamic terrorism’ continued
to influence the Obama administration as well as the reporting in The New York Times
and suggest that, despite their political and ideological differences, Presidents Bush and
Obama actually conceptualized ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ in a markedly similar manner. Clearly,
then, ‘terrorism’ continued to be the dominant paradigm through which American politics
and culture made sense of political violence and discursive actors during the Obama
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era proceeded to focus on the perpetrators’ religious beliefs (in Islam) in explanations
of the phenomenon. Lastly, I turn to the first year(s) of the Trump presidency and its
conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ which, it appears, may well be beginning to reconstruct
the meaning of ‘terrorism’ to foreground racial markers over religious labels once more,
indicating that the ‘terrorism’ discourse remains dynamic and powerful to this very day.
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Chapter 2
“Americans Are Suffering from International
Terrorism” – The Emergence and Rise of the Discourse
on ‘Terrorism’ from the 1940s to the 1970s
On April 15, 2013, a good four hours into the Boston Marathon, two bombs went off
near the finish line, killing three people and injuring 264 people more. Survivors described
a scene of pandemonium and panic as people fled in all directions, fearing more bombs
would explode, while police and first responders frantically tried to restore security and
provide first aid to victims. The next morning, President Obama addressed the press,
saying, “[t]his was a heinous and cowardly act. And given what we now know about what
took place, the FBI is investigating it as an act of terrorism. Any time bombs are used to
target innocent civilians, it is an act of terror” (“Remarks on the Terrorist”). He merely
cautioned, “[w]hat we don’t yet know, however, is who carried out this attack, or why,
whether it was planned and executed by a terrorist organization, foreign or domestic, or
was the act of a malevolent individual. That is what we don’t yet know.” While it was still
unclear who the perpetrators were or what their reason for setting off these bombs was, the
interpretation of the event as an act of ‘terrorism’ against the United States was already
in place. Indeed, it appeared to be the obvious interpretation of what had happened.
But this particular discursive choice was, in fact, neither self-evident nor natural. It
was, rather, the result of a long chain of changing conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ which
both reflected and actively shaped central political, social, and cultural concerns in the
United States across decades. As I show in the course of this study, the ‘terrorism’ discourse
continuously developed over the years to eventually become the powerful discursive
paradigm with which we are familiar today, manifesting itself in interpretations of events
like the Boston Marathon bombing as an ‘obvious’ case of ‘terrorism.’ Accordingly, this
first chapter returns to the roots of the ‘terrorism’ discourse and sets out to explain how
‘terrorism’ emerged from relative obscurity in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s to increasing
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prominence in the 1970s, consolidating distinct approaches and conceptualizations of the
issue into one homogeneous discourse along the way.
What is especially noticeable when exploring these beginnings is how drastically the
understanding of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ differed from our present-day conceptualizations
of the issue. One such basic difference is that the terms ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ were used
considerably less frequently in the 1950s and 1960s than today, suggesting that the
discursive standing of the concept developed over the span of several decades. The two
terms were also used more or less synonymously. Another important difference between
the meaning of ‘terrorism’ then and now is the depiction of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ in
neutral and even considerate, positive terms, meaning that ‘terrorists’ were accorded a
certain amount of respect and generally treated as rational, intelligent actors whose motifs
could be understood although their means were not condoned. Moreover, ‘terrorism’ in
the 1940s to 1960s was overwhelmingly conceptualized as a tactic in a larger political
struggle, one strategy among others in the larger field of political violence. As such, it
could be wielded by non-state and state actors alike. ‘Terrorism’ thus meant something
quite different in the 1940s to 1960s than it does today, making an investigation into the
roots of the discourse about it all the more indispensable. Lastly, the issue of ‘terrorism’
was, from the very beginning, connected to the geographical region of the Middle East
and its different populations and religions. Even though, as I show in the course of this
study, the focus on who was seen as ‘terrorist’ perpetrator shifted, the region (both as
an imagined and a geographical space) remained a central concern for discursive agents
shaping the discourse on ‘terrorism.’
Let me illustrate these assertions using a prominent example, Leon Uris’ bestselling
1958 novel Exodus. Set in the immediate post-war years, Exodus tells the story of the
foundation of the State of Israel as a democratic utopia modeled after the United States
to the backdrop of the romantic love story between Ari Ben Canaan, a tough and smart
Israeli, and Katherine “Kitty” Fremont, a beautiful American nurse who comes to Palestine
to work with Jewish children who were orphaned and traumatized by the Holocaust in
Europe. The struggle for a Jewish homeland is waged against a predominantly Arab (and
Muslim) population as well as the British armed forces who rigorously enforce British
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rule, including control over the Jewish immigrants in Palestine. Ultimately, the Jewish
community prevails and through much suffering and hardships founds the State of Israel
and begins the arduous task of nation-building. Ari Ben Canaan and Kitty Fremont find
themselves on the forefront of this struggle and must learn to reconcile their duties to the
State with their own feelings of love for one another.
Upon its release, the novel immediately became a bestseller in the U.S. and remained
so for almost five months; advance paperback orders reached an unprecedented 1.5 million
copies (Silver 5). Maxwell Geismar, in a contemporary review of the novel, called Exodus
“enlightening, horrifying, and heroic. It is a novel of social history and a social cause in the
tradition of The Grapes of Wrath and The Wall – a tradition which has been missing in
our literature of the 1950s” (22), thus indicating the cultural importance Exodus obtained
from the very beginning for its readers. What is more, in 1960, a highly successful film
version was released, directed by Otto Preminger and starring Hollywood superstars Paul
Newman and Eva Maria Saint in the leading roles. It is therefore safe to assume that
the novel (and later the movie) resonated with American audiences because it channeled
commonly held views about America and Israel into one coherent, idealized narrative.1
Much has been written already about Leon Uris, his novel Exodus, and its influence
on American post-war perceptions of the Middle East in general and Israel in particular.2
One aspect, however, has remained unstudied, namely the novel’s understanding of ‘terror’
and ‘terrorism,’ most notable in how it employs these terms to describe the activities of the
Jewish resistance fighters. In the novel, it is the Jewish rebels who are labeled ‘terrorists’
and not the Arab population or the various individual Arab and Muslim villains who
violently oppose the Jewish quest for a homeland (as most readers in the 21st century
would expect). Exodus ostracizes and vilifies these characters but through different means
and without referring to ‘terrorism’ at all.
Instead, Exodus depicts the members of the violent Jewish group “the Maccabees”
as “terrorists.” In the universe of the novel, the Jewish resistance consists of two distinct
groups: There are the Haganah, the quasi-legitimate Jewish militia in Palestine, and
1On the influence on Exodus on the American perception of Israel, see Breines; A. Kaplan; Mart, Eye and
“Tough,” McAlister; Mearsheimer and Walt; and Silver.
2See additionally Cain; Christison, “Arab” and Perceptions ; Furman; Gonshak; Loshitzky; Nadel; Orfalea;
Salt; and R. Weissbrod.
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the Maccabees, a splinter group which forms after internal disagreement among different
factions of the Haganah over the Jewish policy of restraint against the British occupying
forces and the Arab population in Palestine.3 The omniscient narrator in Exodus describes
the Maccabees as “terrorists” throughout the text (e.g. 314, 387, 402, 413), their actions are
referred to as “terror tactics” (e.g. 269, 290), and their “terrorist raids [. . . ] rocked the Holy
Land from one end to another” (359). In one of their daring acts, the Maccabees blow up the
King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which the British forces use as main headquarters (304).4
The Maccabees also target the British oil refinery in Haifa and assassinate the British
general Haven-Hurst in retaliation for his increasingly severe measures to counter and curb
Maccabee ‘terrorism.’
The novel’s application of the concept of ‘terrorism’ also follows the historical
developments I sketched above in other ways. Hence, the way the term ‘terrorism’ is used
in Exodus also points to a distinct evaluation of the actions it describes, meaning that
the Maccabees’ “terror tactics” are not seen in a negative light – rather the opposite.
For instance, in Exodus, Maccabee ‘terrorism’ is supported widely by large segments of
the Jewish community and the narrator in the novel reports that “many of the Yishuv
[the Jewish community in Palestine] were happy over the Maccabee actions” (274). The
Maccabees may be relatively small in numbers, but they do not constitute a fringe movement
at the margins of Jewish society. They actually represent the majority opinion of the
Jewish community which actively condones the Maccabee’s “terror tactics,” suggesting
that ‘terrorism’ at the time the novel was written did not carry the stigma it does today.
Moreover, Exodus depicts Jewish ‘terrorism’ as a necessary and noble means in the
fight for Israeli freedom and statehood. Akiva, the leader of the Maccabees, is described
as “the spiritual force behind the terrorists” (413), a phrasing which implies that the
Maccabees are more than merely violent, desperate men, but driven by religious and
political principles derived at after careful deliberation, a rhetorical choice which ennobles
Maccabee ‘terrorism.’ The novel also references the Holocaust and familiar narratives of
3The Maccabees in the novel are a fictionalized construction based on the historical groups Irgun Zvai
Leumi, the Haganah, and the Stern Gang. See the classic Bell, Terror ; and, more recently, Sua´rez.
4This echoes the real-life bombing of the King David Hotel by the Irgun on July 22, 1946 which killed 91
people and injured 46. In the novel, the Maccabees warn the British beforehand to evacuate, but they do
not listen. Only the building is destroyed. For a discussion of the historical event, see Bell, Terror ; and
Sua´rez. For a discussion of the novel’s complicated relationship with historical fact, see Orfalea and Salt.
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continued Jewish suffering, suggesting that the Jews have earned a carte blanche of sorts
for their actions in Palestine since they have suffered unspeakably since the beginnings
of history: “Nothing we do, right or wrong, can ever compare to what has been done
to the Jewish people. Nothing the Maccabees do can even be considered an injustice in
comparison to two thousand years of murder” (271). This kind of relativizing argument
works to construct the Maccabees as brave fighters who finally stand up to and defend
their community against the oppressors.
Exodus ultimately legitimizes ‘terrorism’ as a valid tactic in a larger political
struggle. Thus, the Maccabees’ “terror tactics” are depicted as daring and successful means
to force the undesired colonial power Great Britain out of the country and to protect the
Jewish community against harassment and violence from the Arab population. Shortly
before the outbreak of World War II, the British issue a “White Paper,” which limits
Jewish immigration from Europe into Palestine and prohibits Jews from buying land in
Palestine (290). In the novel, the White Paper is described as “the most staggering blow
they [the Jewish community] had ever received” since it means the death of the Jews in
Germany and, later, in the Nazi-occupied territories as well (290). The novel explicitly
states that it is “[t]he White Paper [which] brought Jews into the Maccabees by the
hundreds. They lashed out in a series of raids, bombing a British officers’ club in Jerusalem
and terrorizing the Arabs. They raided a British arsenal and they ambushed several
convoys” (290). The novel depicts this political move by the British as crass betrayal,
grounded in historical reality.5 Maccabee ‘terrorism’ then becomes the only means left to
the otherwise powerless Jewish community to fight against this injustice. This not only
positions the British forces as antagonists in Exodus, it also casts the Jewish ‘terrorism’ as
legitimate, justified tactic in a highly contentious political struggle. Moreover, it depicts
the Maccabee ‘terrorists’ as rational actors with a clear grasp of the conflict, the major
parties in it, and a plan on how to achieve their objectives.
Following that same logic, once these political objectives have been achieved (with
the help of ‘terrorism’), these “terror tactics” are no longer needed. The narrator takes a
clear position in this regard:
5For more on the history of the British in Palestine as well as the founding years of the State of Israel,
see, e.g., Asseburg and Busse, Golani, M. Kelly, Matthews, and Sua´rez.
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Once the British were gone, terror tactics lost their usefulness and the Maccabees appeared
unable to accept the discipline that a field army required. Thus their value as a fighting
force was seriously qualified. [. . . ] The Maccabees were activists with great individual
courage but by their very nature they rebelled against any authority. [. . . ] they remained as
an angry, defiant, political group whose basic tenet was that force conquered all problems.
(547)
Now that the Jewish struggle for a homeland has been successful, Exodus dismisses
‘terrorism’ as no longer effective and rejects it as a tool in the political arena. This
suggests that ‘terrorism’ in the 1950s had a fairly limited meaning and applicability,
focusing predominantly on colonial settings where colonized groups wanted to overthrow
the oppressive foreign regime. It also indicates that since the term was conceptualized as a
tactic and strategy, it was seen as prudent and even logical to abandon it again if it did
not fit the situation or did not have the desired outcome. In Exodus, ‘terrorism’ constitutes
one stage in a larger developmental process of political groups and the Maccabees, in their
unwillingness to leave ‘terrorism’ behind once it is no longer useful, are now depicted as a
political group which has missed its chance to develop and grow into a serious political
contender in the new democratic Jewish state.
This conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ also explains why Exodus does not apply
the concept when describing the Arab villains: ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ are too positively
connoted and thus do not carry the negative stigma with which we are familiar today.
Instead, in order to denounce the ‘evil Arabs’ in Exodus, the novel relies on the classic
Orientalist discourse which views the (Middle) East as different and inferior to an inherently
superior ‘West.’ 6 Thus, the Arab populations in the novel are depicted as morally inferior
and fulfill every negative cliche´.7 Their “violent passions erupt” constantly (229), they are
superstitious (e.g. 509), lazy (e.g. 263), ignorant and illiterate (e.g. 253), and Arab women
“were held in absolute bondage, never seen, never heard, never consulted” (229). The
Arab masses are whipped into hatred and frenzy by their unscrupulous leaders and their
6The locus classicus for Orientalism is, of course, Said and his 1978 eponymous study. For other early
scholarship on Orientalism, see N. Daniel and Rodinson. For criticism on Said and his ideas put forward
in Orientalism, see the superbly researched and thorough study by Varisco which contains discussions of
and references to all major scholarship in response to Said. Other excellent sources on Orientalism and
Said include Hentsch and Macfie.
7Over the years, many different scholars have criticized Uris and his novel for its negative portrayal of ‘the
Arabs,’ rightfully pointing to the racist and biased views that come to the fore in the text. For examples,
see Christison, “Arab” and Perceptions; A. Kaplan; Mart, Eye and “Tough;” McAlister; Orfalea; Salt;
and Silver.
35
violent outbursts are always directed against the entire Jewish community in Palestine.
They murder indiscriminately and the narrator makes it clear that they are primitive and
evil: “When an isolated and unarmed Jew was found [by Arab gangs] his murder was
always followed by decapitation, dismemberment, eye gouging, and the most primitive
brutalities” (274). Importantly, however, all these malevolent actions do not constitute
acts of ‘terrorism.’
As these examples from Exodus show, then, in the 1950s and 1960s ‘terrorism’ had
a very distinct meaning. ‘Terrorism’ described first and foremost a tactic in a political
struggle, meaning that the ‘terrorists’ were seen as rational and even honorable actors
who had relatable political goals. In the next section, I turn to the early media coverage
of ‘terrorism,’ using the reporting of The New York Times as case study in order to
demonstrate that the conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ put forward in Exodus is not an
aberrant example. Then I examine the academic roots of the ‘terrorism’ discourse in the
1950s and 1960s. As the analysis in the second half of this chapter shows, the decade of the
1970s proved to be pivotal for the discourse on ‘terrorism’ as several incidents, particularly
the killing of the Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich and the hostage
crisis in Iran between 1979 and 1981, were constructed as decisive, discourse-changing
Foucaultdian events which problematized ‘terrorism’ to an unprecedented extent. In the
two corresponding sections, I discuss the impact of the “Munich Massacre” on American
politics, academia, news reporting, and popular culture as the experience and its aftermath
not only homogenized the discourse and created a more coherent narrative about ‘terrorism’
but also increased its reach and influence. Finally, the last section in this chapter examines
the Iranian hostage crisis which was soon constructed as the first major instance of
‘terrorism’ against the United States, thus establishing a particular understanding of
‘terrorism’ which would be influential for decades to come.
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2.1 Jewish “Terrorist Band[s]” and Soviet “Terror and
Sabotage” – The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse in U.S. News Media
in the 1940s to 1960s
Cultural productions in the 1940s to 1960s were not the only agents participating in
the emerging discourse on ‘terrorism’ by popularizing a conceptualization of the term
as a positively-connoted strategy and tactic used by rational actors. Another important
discursive agent involved in early attempts to construct ‘terrorism’ was the American news
media. In this section, I examine in more detail how The New York Times reported on
‘terrorism’ in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s and I analyze data derived from searches of the
newspaper’s online database. The numbers given and discussed throughout this study
refer to the amount of hits a search with a particular search term generated in the online
search mask on the website of The New York Times. As time periods, I chose full calendar
years from January 1 to December 31.
In the early 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, ‘terrorism’ as a concept already appeared
relatively regularly in journalistic writing, often in conjunction with other terms from the
broader field of political violence. Figure 2.1 outlines the general trend in reporting on
‘terrorism’ in The New York Times for the 1940s to the 1960s. In the 1940s, for instance,
there were on average 726 articles per year which contained the word ‘terrorism,’ i.e. almost
two articles per day. A decade later, in the 1950s, the database of The New York Times
lists 608 pieces per year (1.6 pieces per day) while there were on average 731 articles per
year (and two articles per day) in the 1960s which contained the term. However, given the
development of the reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times in later decades (see
again Figure 1.1 in the previous chapter), it is clear that these early years saw the lowest
amount of writing on ‘terrorism’ overall. In the 1970s, for instance, there were on average
961 articles per year which contained the term; in the 1980s, that number increased by
71 % to 1,645 pieces per year, making the upward trend visible and putting the numbers
for the early years into perspective. Nevertheless, as the data indicates, from the beginning,
reporting on ‘terrorism’ appeared fairly regularly in The New York Times.
It is informative to take a closer look at the particular contexts in which the term
was used in the writing of The New York Times because it allows us to draw conclusions
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Figure 2.1: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, 1940-1970
with regard to how the term was used and understood by reporters and, by extension,
readers of the newspaper in these early decades. Figure 2.2 traces the popularity of
certain kinds of ‘terrorism,’ meaning a variety of compounds which specify the (supposed)
perpetrator behind or the geographical location of the ‘terrorism’ in question. What
becomes immediately evident is that the term ‘terrorism’ appeared in the context of a wide
variety of international conflicts. Certain combinations, like ‘Arab terrorism’ and ‘Jewish
terrorism,’ peak at specific historical moments and constitute the majority of reporting
on ‘terrorism’ at that time, suggesting that the term was mainly applied to fairly specific
conflicts and issues and that ‘terrorism’ became one of the central concepts in explaining
these events.
Overall, as Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show, the blue graph describing the general reporting
trends for ‘terrorism’ spikes significantly at certain historical moments. Thus, the issue
of ‘Nazi terrorism’ clearly dominated reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the 1940s. In 1940, for
instance, 37 % of all articles on ‘terrorism’ also referred to Nazi crimes and violence; a
year later, that number rose to 39 % and peaked in 1942 at 40 % of the overall journalistic
output on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times. After the end of the war in 1945 and the
defeat of the Axis powers, ‘Nazi terrorism’ ceased to be a concern in the United States
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Figure 2.2: Reporting on different kinds of ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, 1940-1970
and The New York Times equally reduced its writing on the topic, reporting dropping
sharply from 30 % in 1945 to 15 % a year later and 10 % in 1947.
A second high point in the reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times occurred
almost immediately after the end of World War II in 1946 and 1947. As Figure 2.3 presents
in more detail, this can be explained as a response to the political conflict in Palestine
over plans to form an independent Jewish as well as an equally independent Arab state
in the British Mandate. For 1946, The New York Times database lists 204 articles on
‘Jewish terrorism’ which amounts to 22 % of the overall reporting on ‘terrorism’ that year.
For 1947, there were 273 articles discussing ‘Jewish terrorism’ in some form or other,
meaning that 32 % of all reporting on ‘terrorism’ actually focused on ‘Jewish terrorism’
specifically. Meanwhile, in 1946, there were 123 pieces on ‘Arab terrorism’ (13 % of the
overall ‘terrorism’ reporting that year), a number which rose to 160 articles (19 %) a
year later. A search with the terms ‘Palestine terrorism’ generated comparable results:
204 articles (22 %) for 1946 and 287 hits (33 %) for 1947, indicating that the conflict in
Mandatory Palestine was regularly linked to ‘terrorism.’
Of course, some articles are likely to appear in more than one search if they contain
more than one of these search terms, so these results have to be taken with a measure
of caution. They do, however, indicate a general trend, i.e. that the violence erupting
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Figure 2.3: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the Palestine conflict in The New York Times,
1945-1950
in the conflict over Palestine was predominantly understood as ‘terrorism’ by The New
York Times. What is more, both sides of the conflict were linked to this ‘terrorism,’ albeit
not equally. As the comparison between the respective lines makes clear, there were
continuously more articles on ‘Jewish terrorism’ than ‘Arab terrorism’ in those early years,
suggesting that the focus of The New York Times lay on the actions of the Jewish groups
in Palestine, not the Arab ones, and that those actions were more likely to be framed
as ‘terrorism.’ Likewise, the strikingly similar developments of the graphs for ‘Jewish
terrorism’ and ‘Palestine terrorism’ imply that the concept of ‘Jewish terrorism’ was
intimately connected to the conflict over Palestine. By contrast, Islam and ‘terrorism’ were
not at all connected in the reporting of The New York Times in those early years, thus
firmly foregrounding the political aspects of the conflict and its ethnic dimensions, not
(potential) religious ones.
Indeed, as the data for these early years indicates, the term ‘terrorism’ appeared in
two distinct situations: On the one hand, it was used to describe the actions of a hostile
regime, i.e. Nazi Germany, with which the United States was at war in the 1940s. On the
other hand, the term was also applied in the conflict in Mandatory Palestine to characterize
the violent behavior of the Jewish groups, meaning non-state actors who, just a few years
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earlier, had actually been the most prominent victims of ‘Nazi terrorism.’ This suggests
that ‘terrorism’ in the writing of The New York Times in the 1940s could refer to both
types of perpetrators regardless of whether it was an independent state or a non-state
group. Likewise, the application of the term to two so disparate actors (Nazis and Jews) at
roughly the same time implies that a perpetrator’s ideology or religion did not particularly
influence whether he or she was labeled a ‘terrorist,’ indicating that the term first and
foremost described a practice or tactic instead of conferring a permanent characteristic or
identity trait onto a ‘terrorist.’
These discursivizations of ‘terrorism’ remained active in later decades as well.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 record another notable, above-average spike in the reporting on
‘terrorism’ in The New York Times in the early 1960s and the available data suggests
that this increase in journalistic output may, at least in part, be related to the conflict
in Algeria. While the number of articles on ‘terrorism’ in Algeria as well as pieces on
‘terrorism’ in connection to being ‘Moslem’ (in those years the most typical spelling of the
word) peaked only comparatively modestly in the 1950s, the early 1960s saw a marked
rise in articles in The New York Times which were tagged with these terms. Figure 2.4
illustrates these developments in more detail. In 1957, The New York Times published
95 articles on ‘terrorism’ in Algeria (i.e. 13 % of the overall reporting on ‘terrorism’ that
year); in 1962, this number increased to 367 pieces, a 286 % increase. In 1962, reporting on
‘terrorism’ in Algeria constituted 40 % of all writing on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times.
A similar pattern is discernible for ‘Moslem terrorism’: for 1957, the database lists 68
articles (i.e. 9 %); in 1962, there were 250 pieces, constituting an upsurge of 268 % which
made up 28 % of all articles on ‘terrorism’ that year. These numbers clearly relate how
central the conflict in Algeria was to reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the early 1960s.
The more detailed graphs in Figure 2.4 also suggest that many articles appeared in
both searches, indicating how strongly connected the conceptualization of the violence
in the Algerian War of Independence as ‘terrorism’ was to its geographical and religious
markers. The reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times in the early 1960s focused
predominantly on the conflict in Algeria, framing it as ‘terrorism’ and locating it in a specific
geographic space. It further categorized this ‘terrorism’ as ‘Moslem’ in nature, another
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Figure 2.4: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the Algerian War of Independence in The New
York Times, 1952-1965
specification indicating an increased awareness of the cultural and religious background
of the actors involved in the conflict. This is noteworthy because, as Figure 2.2 shows,
this peak constitutes a singular moment in the overall graph for ‘Moslem terrorism’ in
the early decades. It suggests that references to ‘Moslem terrorism’ reflected the general
framing of the struggle in Algeria as not only a colonial but also a religious conflict. It did
not, however, (yet) work as a universal marker for ‘terrorism’ as it would in later decades
(see especially Chapters 4 and 5), but instead was only applied to this specific political
and historical situation.
Towards the end of the 1960s, the overall amount of reporting on ‘terrorism’
increased slowly and steadily. But this time, as Figure 2.2 indicates, the concerns had
shifted once more, and the journalistic focus lay instead on the war in Vietnam and, less
importantly, ‘Arab’ and ‘Jewish terrorism’ in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war. Figures 2.5
and 2.6 present this development in more detail. In Figure 2.5, the graphs documenting the
number of articles in The New York Times on ‘Vietnam terrorism’ and ‘Vietcong terrorism’
(a term already widely in use at the time) develop similarly, indicating that violence against
the American troops and allies in Vietnam was coded as ‘terrorism.’ While there were only
40 articles in 1963 (i.e. 6 % of all articles on ‘terrorism’ that year) connecting Vietnam to
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Figure 2.5: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in connection with the Vietnam War in The New
York Times, 1962-1971
‘terrorism,’ that number rose to 224 pieces in 1965 (31 %), 270 articles in 1966 (35 %), and
288 pieces (again 35 %) a year later. Slightly less popular, articles mentioning ‘Vietcong
terrorism’ in The New York Times went from 13 pieces (i.e. W2 %) in 1963 to 135 (19 %)
in 1965, 138 articles (18 %) in 1966, and 124 pieces (15 %) in 1967.
To a lesser extent, the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors also continued
to occupy reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times in the late 1960s. As Figure 2.6
shows, while there were only 32 articles mentioning ‘Arab terrorism’ in 1965 (i.e. only 4 %
of the overall reporting on ‘terrorism’ that year), this number rose to 115 pieces (14 %)
in 1967 and peaked at 137 articles (19 %) in 1969. The close alignment of the graphs
for ‘Arab terrorism’ and ‘Arab Israel terrorism’ in Figure 2.6 suggests that most articles
tagged under the former label in The New York Times database dealt with the conflict
with Israel, meaning that Arab violence in this conflict was predominantly framed as
‘terrorism.’ Interestingly, journalists also reported on ‘Jewish terrorism’ in this context,
but the concept was less often used than ‘Arab terrorism,’ an evident reversal of reporting
trends in the 1940s. In comparison, there were only 27 articles on ‘Jewish terrorism’ in
1965 (i.e. 4 %), 78 pieces (9 %) in 1967, and 68 articles on the issue in 1969 (again 9 %),
indicating that the notion of ‘Jewish terrorism’ was becoming less relevant to journalistic
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Figure 2.6: Reporting on different kinds of ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East in The
New York Times, 1962-1971
writings on the conflict. Moreover, as the graph in Figure 2.6 also makes clear, ‘Moslem
terrorism’ did not feature significantly in reporting on the conflict as articles mentioning
the term only made up between 2 % and 3 % of the overall reporting on ‘terrorism’ in
those years. As these examples show, then, ‘terrorism’ became an important concept in
reporting on political conflicts worldwide in the journalism of The New York Times.
Lastly, one central theme recurring throughout the reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The
New York Times in these early decades is the notion of ‘Soviet Union terrorism.’ As the
graph in Figure 2.7 shows, journalistic writing on ‘terrorism’ in connection with the Soviet
Union consistently made up 13 % of all reporting on the issue between 1940 and 1970. In
the early 1950s, the output was above average, going from 51 articles in 1955 (i.e. 9 % of
the overall writing on ‘terrorism’) to 212 pieces a year later (26 %), a staggering increase
of 316 %. In 1957, there were still 122 articles on ‘Soviet Union terrorism’ (17 %) and a
year later, The New York Times published 100 pieces containing the term (also 17 %).
Similarly, the early 1960s marked another high point with 160 articles in 1961 (22 %),
128 pieces in 1962 (14 %), and 101 articles a year later (17 %). These numbers suggest that,
generally speaking, ‘terrorism’ in relation to the activities of the Soviet Union constituted
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Figure 2.7: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in connection with the Soviet Union in The New York
Times, 1940-1970
a permanent journalistic concern which was present already from the very beginning of
the Cold War between the USSR and the United States.
Ultimately, comparing all these different instances of increased ‘terrorism’ reporting
in The New York Times allows us to draw a few important conclusions about the term’s
meaning in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Indeed, the consistent application of the term
‘terrorism’ in a wide variety of international conflicts suggests that The New York Times
predominantly relied on the concept of ‘terrorism’ in cases where non-state actors attempted
to violently fight what they saw as an oppressive colonial power standing in the way of
independence and self-government by the colonized people, a conceptualization which
fits in the cases of Palestine in the late 1940s and Algeria in the 1960s. This notion of
‘terrorism’ evolved slightly in later years to include violence by non-state actors against
what the United States deemed to be legitimately formed governments, mainly meaning
Israel and itself as it became more and more entangled in Vietnam. At the same time,
to a lesser extent, ‘terrorism’ was also used to describe the actions of regimes considered
to be antagonists of the United States. Hence, the activities of Nazi Germany during
World War II were often labeled ‘terrorism’ while the behavior of the Soviet Union during
the early phases of the Cold War was similarly framed. This indicates that The New York
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Times applied the term in its writings to describe a certain set of activities and actions
instead of focusing only on a perpetrator’s nationality, ideology, religion, or other marker
of identity.
As such, ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times was framed as one tactic in the political
struggle among several others, meaning that articles often also referred to ‘terrorism’
alongside other forms of violence. For instance, in 1946, Gene Currivan reported from
Palestine on more violent acts by the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, describing
the former group as “going in for extreme terrorism and the Stern group [as being]
concerned with assassinations” (11). Similarly, Benjamin Welles wrote in a 1956 special
to the newspaper that “[f]or the past nine months Cypriote extremists have waged a
mounting campaign of terrorism against the British administration of the island” (E5).
On March 20, 1962, Paul Hofmann wrote in another special to The New York Times
about the escalating violence in Algeria, commenting that “[t]errorism and shootings this
afternoon marked a new surge of violence in the two biggest cities of Algeria” (1). Roughly
one month later, on April 26, Henry Tanner reported from Algiers that “[s]ecret Army
Organization terrorists were able to provoke Moslem crowds into retaliatory attacks on
Europeans for the first time here today” (“Algiers Moslems” 1). As all these different
examples show, ‘terrorism’ was regularly linked to acts of violence like assassinations and
shootings and did not yet operate independently. In these early years, a sole reference to
‘terrorism’ was not enough to establish what had happened; rather, journalists writing
for The New York Times tended to name ‘terrorism’ in conjunction with another type of
violence in order to describe events more precisely.
Equally noticeable when reviewing the reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York
Times is how most conflicts which were covered by the newspaper under this concept
were set in the Middle East, or rather countries typically associated with the Middle
East in the American cultural and political imaginary. This journalistic focus mirrored
and also enhanced increasing American political and cultural interest in this particular
geographical space, its people and their cultures. Melani McAlister has shown how cultural
texts “helped to make the Middle East an acceptable area for the exercise of American
power” and “a stage for the production of American identities – national, racial, and
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religious” (3). The journalism of The New York Times, I argue, contributed significantly
to this project since it introduced American readers to representations of the region and,
from the very beginning, depicted it as conflict-prone and its people as likely to engage in
‘terrorism’ and other forms of violence. It also positioned the United States as benevolent
power intervening in ‘terrorism’-laden conflicts and, later, as fighters of ‘terrorism’ in the
Middle East and beyond.
What is a little harder to generalize in this context is how The New York Times
actually evaluated ‘terrorism’ and the ‘terrorist’ perpetrators. In the case of the conflict in
Palestine in the late 1940s, articles tended to describe the Jewish and Arab ‘terrorists’ in
neutral terms, avoiding moral condemnations and judgments. Clifton Daniel, for instance,
wrote in a special to The New York Times on June 10, 1947 about the kidnapping of
two British police officers by a Jewish “terrorist band” (1). The article recounted how
“twelve armed Jews, including one woman,” stormed “the luxurious new swimming pool
north of Ramat Gan” (1). Notably, the description focused on the sequence of events and
did not include evaluations or commentary, even when relating how “one policeman tried
to resist and was struck on the head with the gun” by one of the Jewish invaders (1).
Here, Daniel’s continuous use of passive sentence structures (“the two policemen were
marched off,” “[t]wo smoke bombs were hurled”) put the focus on the chain of actions
leading to the kidnappings and not on the identity and motivations of the perpetrators.
Moreover, early into the article, Daniel referred to the “the dissident’s terroristic operations
against the British” (1), a phrasing which stressed that ‘terrorist’ was not the main identity
component describing the perpetrators. Instead, it framed their reliance on ‘terrorism’ as
a tactic in the struggle against the British government. The term “dissident” further cast
the conflict as political in nature and even conferred a certain amount of legitimacy and
respectability onto the actors, suggesting that they had to rely on “terrorism” in order to
make their disagreement with British policies in Palestine heard.
In the case of escalating violence between France and Algeria in the 1960s, The New
York Times employed a somewhat more judgmental tone than previously, but overall
maintained similar levels of respect for the perpetrators. A special by Henry Tanner from
May 6, 1962, at the height of the conflict, discussed “two particularly gruesome terrorist
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attacks [which occurred] this week” and which were committed by the French paramilitary
group, the Secret Army Organization (OAS) (“Algerian Secret” E4).8 In this context, the
word “gruesome” passed judgment on the attacks and evaluated them as horrific, but this
assessment did not color the rest of the article which devoted a considerable amount of
space to explaining the objectives of the OAS in Algeria – mainly the “partition of Algeria
into a Moslem hinterland and two European coastal areas around Algiers and Oran” (E4).
What is more, Tanner explained that the power of the OAS had diminished
considerably and that “their operations [we]re confined to entirely destructive sabotage
and terrorism” (E4). This presented the OAS “terrorists” as intelligent actors with a clearly
identifiable, perhaps even relatable, goal who had turned to “sabotage and terrorism” out
of desperation. In this view, ‘terrorism’ constituted a strategy of last resort, a sign for the
increasing weakness and desperation of the actors. Similarly, Tanner also referred to the
OAS “terrorists” as “insurgents” and “commandos,” further underlining that they were
seen as political groups with clear goals and an agenda, even if their methods (“sabotage
and terrorism”) were at times deplorable. Importantly, this also meant that the “gruesome”
violence meted out by the OAS “terrorists” served a clear political purpose; as Tanner put
it, the “aim [wa]s to provoke the Moslem masses to descend on European neighborhoods,
where the Army would have to open fire on them, and to cause the cease-fire to break
down into a general bloodbath” (E4). By contrast, Tanner described “the frustration and
anger of the Moslem masses and their leaders, hunted by terrorists and killed by the score,
straining under a policy that forbids them to strike back and waiting for the day when they
may even the score” (E4), suggesting that (the expected) counter-violence by “the Moslem
masses” was merely revenge (and not ‘terrorism’) and as such automatically intolerable
and reprehensive.
This framing of ‘terrorism’ also largely holds for the reporting on ‘Vietcong terrorism’
during the Vietnam War. Thus, articles referred to “Vietcong terrorism” and “Communist
terrorists” who committed “[t]errorist incidents” and “Vietcong acts of terror” (Bigart 1),
but also called the opposing side “a Communist guerrilla force” and warned of the dangers
of “serious Communist subversion and sabotage” (Reuters 2) as well as “increased guerrilla
8For more on the conflict in Algeria and the role of the OAS, see, e.g., Harrison and Horne.
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warfare” (Robinson 4). This indicates that ‘terrorist’ was not the main label used to identify
and construct the perpetrators, but rather one among several others available to describe
them. It presented the perpetrators as political beings with an ideology, communism, and a
political goal, the establishment of a communist state. Moreover, reporters writing for The
New York Times noted the humanity of the “Rebel Guerrillas,” commenting in one incident
that “[m]any of the dead [Vietnamese ‘terrorists’] were young boys who lay slumped in the
water. All wore the black garb of the South Vietnamese peasant” (Reuters 1, 2), suggesting
that these ‘terrorists’ were to be pitied and mourned despite their political affiliation.
By contrast, when the ‘terrorist’ perpetrator was not an individual actor or group
but rather an entire state, the evaluation of the ‘terrorism’ in the writings of The New
York Times was markedly less neutral. For instance, in its reporting on ‘Nazi terrorism’
in the 1940s, journalists for the newspaper often described the methods used by the Nazi
regime as “terror” and “terrorism,” suggesting that the distinction between these two
terms was not yet established.9 On September 10, 1940, for instance, The New York Times
published a piece which opined that “Winston Churchill was wise to have have warned his
people last week that the attacks against them might be doubled and trebled before the Nazi
terror had reached its fullest fury” (“Terror” 22). The article then proceeded to describe
the nightly bombings of London by the German army as “indiscriminate death [which]
was hurled from the night sky at almost every section of the great city” (22), painting a
terrifying scene for readers by indicating that the entire civilian population of London,
representing Great Britain as a whole, was the explicit target of this ‘Nazi terror(ism).’
In the view of this article, these tactics clearly constituted ‘acts of terrorism’ which were
used by the Nazi regime as a strategy to win the war: “Where world domination is the
prize, no methods of terrorism are too brutal if they will help to win” (22). ‘Nazi terrorism’
was thus clearly evaluated in negative terms as exceptionally violent, indiscriminate, and
ruthless, and, since the objective was “world domination,” also a serious threat to the U.S.
and its allies and friends.
Similarly, journalists writing for The New York Times also regularly used references
to ‘terrorism’ to describe actions and activities by the Soviet Union and to mark them as
9See, e.g., “Asks,” “Invasions,” and “Ukraine.”
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repressive and illegitimate. On December 31, 1949, for example, an article related that
the government of Yugoslavia had “accused the Soviet Union today of sending terrorist
squads” into the country in order “to commit acts of ‘terror and sabotage’” (“Yugoslav” 3).
Likewise, a piece published in the newspaper on December 28, 1951, warned of the dangers
of “Communist terrorism” by the Soviet Union which it described as “spreading out
and turning against the democracies and their citizens, either to collect ransom [. . . ]
or to terrorize democratic critics into silence and subservience” (“Long” 20). As these
examples show, ‘terrorism’ was predominantly used in these instances to characterize Soviet
policies and politics as grounded in illicit violence, clearly carrying a negative connotation.
This suggests that, generally speaking, whenever violence was perpetrated by a regime
hostile or antagonistic to the United States, mentioning the concept ‘terrorism’ enabled
The New York Times to characterize this violence as unlawful and excessive. In this
context, references to ‘terrorism’ revealed the repressiveness of the (fascist or communist)
system since it did not hesitate to use ‘terrorism’ to control its own citizens through fear
and violence and to extend its powers into other regions, thus portraying these nations as
(potentially) dangerous for the United States and its allies.
Overall, then, ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times was used in a notably different
manner in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s compared to today. Articles on the topic tended
to acknowledge explicitly or implicitly the humanity of the actors and framed them
as rational and intelligent human beings with political goals which could be identified,
understood, and discussed. Outright condemnation of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ as morally
reprehensible was rare. ‘Terrorism’ itself was predominantly conceptualized in general
terms as a strategy and tactic used in a larger political conflict by weaker non-state groups
who also had other methods like bombings and assassination in their arsenal. As such,
‘terrorism’ was closely linked to other concepts from the broader field of political violence
such as ‘insurrection,’ ‘rebellion,’ and ‘guerrilla warfare,’ meaning that ‘terrorists’ were also
described as ‘rebels,’ ‘insurgents,’ and ‘guerrillas’ as the same time. Moreover, ‘terrorism’
was already predominantly located in the geographic and imaginary Middle East, effectively
establishing a discursive connection which would only strengthen in coming years. However,
whenever the ‘terrorist’ perpetrator was an enemy state, references to ‘terrorism’ served
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to stress the illegitimacy and ‘evilness’ of the regime. As the discussion above showed,
in these cases, ‘terrorism’ had a more negative connotation and marked the violence as
illegitimate and oppressive, revealing the ‘true’ nature of the regime as dictatorial.
These findings thus add to our understanding of how ‘terrorism’ was framed in these
early post-war decades in the United States, underwriting conceptualizations made popular
as well by Leon Uris’ bestselling novel Exodus. The American news media, as exemplified
by The New York Times, established itself in those early decades as another important
discursive agent who reflected and actively shaped the understanding of ‘terrorism’ at the
time and disseminated this particular ‘knowledge’ into wider parts of American society,
introducing readers to the concept and working to stabilize a certain set of meaning
components. In the next section, I discuss how the academic community approached the
issue of ‘terrorism’ and developed a variety of theories aimed at making the phenomenon
knowable and thus controllable. Early scholars also provided other discursive agents with
input and ideas on how to approach ‘terrorism,’ infusing the emerging discourse with
vitality and developing narrative elements which would become central in later decades.
2.2 “Rebels,” “Enemies,” and “Terrorists” – The ‘Terrorism’
Discourse in U.S. Academia in the 1950s and 1960s
As an analytical concept, ‘terrorism’ circulated not only in the American news media in
the 1940s to 1960s. In a similar development, the term was also used by the academic
community and in this section, I examine how ‘terrorism’ was turned into an object of
academic scrutiny about which scholars could produce a certain kind of knowledge and
make certain truth claims. In this endeavor, it is also important to look at the discursive
agents themselves, i.e. the scholars researching ‘terrorism’ and other related concepts, since
it tells us with which kinds of ideas, theories, and methods they approached the issue
of ‘terrorism’ in those early decades. These particular intellectual and discursive roots
significantly shaped the way ‘terrorism’ was understood and used within early discourses
on (political) violence in the 1950s and 1960s.10
10Lisa Stampnitzky has argued in her 2013 book Disciplining Terror that until the 1970s the discourse on
‘insurgency’ provided the dominant frame of interpretation for hijackings, bombings, and other forms of
(political) violence (49-50). I do not completely disagree with her claim, but I would take a broader
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Many of those scholars who would become influential in the following decades
and who contributed significantly to eventually making the study of ‘terrorism’ its own,
independent discipline, first approached the issue via their work on ‘insurgency,’ but also
relied on other concepts like ‘revolution’ and ‘war.’ Thomas P. Thornton, for example,
wrote an article on “Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation.” His article formed part of
Harry Eckstein’s anthology Internal War (1964), itself the result of “a symposium of social
scientists” at the Center of International Studies at Princeton University in 1961 where
these scholars were asked to apply different social theories to the problem of “internal war”
and write papers on their findings (Eckstein 4). Thornton’s article, however, is the only one
of eleven in Eckstein’s anthology to address ‘terrorism,’ already signaling that ‘terrorism’
was seen as not overly relevant for the study of “internal war.” Similarly, Roger Trinquier’s
influential 1961 study La guerre moderne – translated as Modern Warfare in 1964 – focused
conceptually on ‘war’ and drew on his experience as officer in the French army during
the 1940s and 1950s. In turn, Peter Paret and John W. Shy’s 1962 study Guerrillas in
the 1960’s argued that “war may assume different forms” and focused specifically on
the dangers of “guerrilla warfare” (4, e.g. 13). As these examples show, ‘terrorism’ did
not feature prominently in academic work on ‘war’ and ‘insurrection,’ indicating that it
was not the dominant conceptual frame for discussions of political violence, but rather
subordinate to other models.
Not all scholars who would make a name for themselves in later years were established
social scientists either. Indeed, some of them had backgrounds in the liberal arts and
humanities. Brian Crozier, for instance, author of the classic study The Rebels, originally
studied Music at Trinity College in London and worked as journalist and war time reporter
before turning to the study of ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurrection.’ Robert Payne, another
important ‘terrorism’ scholar in the 1950s and 1960s, actually taught English literature and
naval architecture and wrote novels and poetry. He engaged with the issue of ‘terrorism’
primarily as author of biographies about important historical figures. These examples show
stance here. In my view, the early scholarly attempts to understand and explain ‘terrorism’ originated
from many different fields and ‘insurgency’ was not the only analytical concept which was used. Likewise,
the scholars who relied on ‘terrorism’ in their work came from disparate backgrounds, meaning that
the beginnings of the discourse on ‘terrorism’ were more diverse and less unified than they appear in
Stampnitzky’s analysis.
52
that scholars interested in the study of ‘terrorism’ in the immediate post-war decades came
from multifarious backgrounds and had little of what we would consider today adequate
formal training to support their research and analyses. This also indicates that the study
of ‘terrorism’ constituted a niche at the time since only a few scholars actively worked
with the term and contribution to its study was hardly regulated or controlled.
Notably, many of these scholars active in the American academic community also
had foreign backgrounds. Brian Crozier (1918-2012) was Australian by nationality but lived
most of his life in England. Robert Payne (1911-1983) was British, but eventually took U.S.
citizenship in 1953 and lived and worked in New York City. Harry Eckstein (1924-1999)
was German and Jewish, but escaped Nazi persecution to the United States as a boy to
become a noted political scientist in the U.S. As in many other fields at the time,11 the
United States did not yet have enough ‘home-grown’ scholars working on the topic and
ended up importing European expertise and experts, another sign pointing to the rather
divergent beginnings of ‘terrorism’ studies and the lack of institutional structures and
boundaries to guide research and the production of knowledge and expertise.12
Mirroring this diversity in the scholars’ backgrounds and training, the academic
community developed a variety of approaches to ‘terrorism’ itself, establishing links and
connections which would influence the discourse for decades to come. Early attempts at
theorizing ‘terrorism’ illustrate this dynamic well. In his 1950 study Zero: The Story of
Terrorism, Robert Payne linked ‘terrorism’ to nihilism and the first Russian revolutionaries
of the 19th century, most notably Sergei Gennadiyevich Nechayev (1847-1882), whom Payne
called “the founder of modern terrorism” (2). Ten years later, Brian Crozier published his
seminal study The Rebels (1960) in which he defined ‘terrorism’ as “the threat or use of
violence for political ends” (159). Crozier understood ‘terrorism’ as a first step in a larger
political process which ultimately culminated in ‘rebellion’ and ‘insurrection.’ According
to Crozier, ‘terrorism’ was usually followed by ‘guerrilla warfare’ and full-scale war and
11For the beginnings of Middle East or Area Studies, see Lockman, Contending. For the beginnings of
Soviet Studies in the United States, see Engerman.
12Another poignant example for this dynamic is Roger Trinquier’s book Modern Warfare, discussed in
more detail below. During the Vietnam War in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States imported experts
in ‘counterinsurgency’ from France who brought Trinquier’s book with them and used it when teaching
their American counterparts, thus slowly turning it into a ‘classical’ text which, to this day, is freely
available on the internet. See Riegler, Terrorismus for more information.
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the main purpose behind ‘terrorism’ was “to make life unendurable for the enemy” (160).
In 1964, Thomas Thornton wrote a contribution for Harry Eckstein’s anthology Internal
War in which he attempted to outline a first theory of ‘terrorism.’ Thornton conceived of
‘terrorism’ as a form of ‘internal war’: “in an internal war situation, terror is a symbolic act
designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat
of violence” (73). In a similar vein, Roger Trinquier defined ‘terrorism’ as “a weapon of
warfare” (16). Again others, like Eugene Walter or J. S. Roucek, understood ‘terrorism’
simply as “a type of violent action [. . . ] designed to make people afraid” (Walter 5) and
“a means of social control” (Roucek 165). As these examples demonstrate, ‘terrorism’ was
linked to a number of different concepts and theories from a wider ideological spectrum.
But despite these diverse conceptualizations and definitions, many of these scholars
shared, perhaps surprisingly, some core assumptions about ‘terrorism.’ As the examples
above demonstrate, ‘terrorism’ was connected to already established concepts of analysis
like ‘rebellion’ or ‘war(fare)’ and thus incorporated from early on into discourses on political
violence. This meant that ‘terrorism’ was overwhelmingly framed as vaguely ‘political’
in outlook and aim, to be distinguished, for example, from violence for profit. Scholars
also conceptualized ‘terrorism’ as a strategy used by non-state actors against a state or
colonial power, most often in struggles for national liberation which, according to these
scholars, would eventually culminate in ‘revolution,’ ‘rebellion,’ ‘insurgency,’ ‘insurrection,’
or a form of ‘war(fare).’ ‘Terrorism’ was thus generally framed as one important step on
the road to escalating political violence.
This particular construction of ‘terrorism’ had consequences for how the act itself
was evaluated. Similar to the reporting practices of The New York Times in those years,
most scholars tended to distinguish between a ‘good,’ acceptable, relatable, even honorable
form of ‘terrorism’ and a ‘bad,’ unacceptable ‘terrorism’ which they condemned. Indeed,
how ‘terrorism’ was judged depended largely on how the scholar in question viewed the
‘terrorist’ actors themselves. For instance, in The Rebels Crozier discussed the actions
of the Haganah, the Irgun Zvai Leumi, and the Stern Gang in Palestine/Israel as an
example of “Terrorist Successes” where ‘terrorism’ proved to be a “decisive instrument of
rebellion” (182). He stressed that these Zionist groups enjoyed wide public support for
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their agenda: “Thus, for nearly half the terrorist period, these terrorists enjoyed an alliance
with the militant mass organisation [the Haganah], and therefore the active support of
the Jewish population; for the remainder of that time they enjoyed at least a measure of
passive support and immunity from betrayal” (185). He defended the Jewish resistance’s
resort to ‘terrorism’ by pointing out that “[t]he more blood-curdling methods of terrorism
– such as torture or mutilation – seem to have been avoided; and the terrorist activities
were not, or virtually not, directed against the terrorists’ own side” (184). The phrase
“blood-curdling methods of terrorism” implies a value judgment and the existence of ‘good’
and ‘bad terrorism’ at the same time. In the discussion of ‘Jewish terrorism’ in Palestine, it
functions to elevate the status of the ‘Jewish terrorists’ to ‘good terrorists’ and romanticizes
them as rebels nobly fighting for national liberation and statehood.13 Moreover, it presents
these ‘terrorists’ as rational actors with a clearly identifiable, relatable, and honorable
objective, suggesting that the resort to ‘terrorism’ in this struggle was justified.
Crozier’s approach stands in stark contrast to Roger Trinquier’s 1964 analysis
Modern Warfare. Trinquier, a French officer who served in Algiers during the Algerian
War for Independence (1954-1962), conceptualized ‘terrorism’ as a form of what he called
“modern warfare” (in italics throughout his entire study) on which clandestine guerrilla
groups relied in order to overthrow the government and establish their own regime (6).
As an official government representative, Trinquier exhibited a clear bias in favor of
governmental power and against non-state actors like the National Liberation Front (Front
de Libe´ration Nationale, FLN) in Algiers. Where Crozier idealized “the rebels,” Trinquier
consistently spoke of “enemies,” a term which abounded in his study and which evoked
the dualistic antagonism between army and opponent, between an ‘us’ and a ‘them.’ It
also worked to militarize the issue by linking ‘terrorism’ to warfare. As Trinquier argued,
‘terrorism’ was “the basic weapon that permit[ted] our enemies to fight effectively with a
few resources and even to defeat a traditional army” (16). This kind of language bolstered
the threat emanating from ‘terrorism’ and similar tactics and constructed it as dangerous,
‘bad,’ and requiring a forceful response by the state.
13This kind of white-washing is reminiscent of the depiction of the Maccabees in Leon Uris’ Exodus and
introduces a problematic racial component to the evaluation of the perpetrators by these scholars.
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The importance of who engaged in ‘terrorism’ for the evaluation of ‘terrorism’ as a
strategy is most obvious in the case of the Russian revolutionaries. Scholars discussing the
Russian anarchists and nihilists of the 19th century generally took an idealizing approach,
similar to Crozier’s romanticizing of the Jewish resistance in Palestine. Robert Payne, for
instance, wrote extensively on Nechayev and his contemporaries. Indeed, Payne’s academic
writings, which describe these ‘terrorists,’ their lives and motivations, reveal a certain
degree of fascination with their methods. For example, in Zero, Payne acknowledged
Nechayev, author of “The Revolutionary Catechism,” as “the first to draw up a code
of revolutionary laws which represented [. . . ] the romantic protest against the age of
reason” (39). In The Terrorists (1957), Payne maintained that “[t]he terrorists who
emerged in Russia in the second half of the last century were men who saw that the
dynasty could be overthrown only by terror” (xiii). He portrayed them as desperate, but
inherently rational men, driven by a political ideology which demanded more equality and
freedom than Tsarist Russia was prepared to give them: “These terrorists did not enjoy
terrorism. They resorted to terrorism because they were outnumbered, and in the hope of
opening the way for a peasant revolt” (xv).
By contrast, scholars analyzing the communist regime of the USSR and its ascent
to power described the ways the Soviet regime consolidated its power under Lenin,
Stalin, and even Trotsky as ‘terrorism’ of the reprehensible kind and condemned its use.
In The Terrorists, Payne called Stalin “the greatest terrorist of all” and credited him
with the introduction of ‘mass terrorism,’ meaning “the murder of countless people for
no reason except that they stood in the path of the dictator or appeared to stand in his
path” (350, 348). Mirroring the journalistic practices of the time, calling Stalin’s actions
‘terrorism’ enabled Payne to denounce the USSR in a way in which ‘terrorism’ became
a marker of dictatorship and totalitarianism. Payne argued that in order to understand
the rise of Soviet communism, one needed to look at its origins, i.e. the oppressive Tsarist
regimes against which the 19th century ‘terrorists’ fought. His distinction between ‘good’
and ‘bad’ ‘terrorists’ indicates that the term ‘terrorism’ itself maintained a considerable
conceptual and evaluatory fluidity, allowing scholars like Payne to apply it to an array of
widely different cases.
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What is more, these early scholarly analyses also introduced and established two
important themes which would become central to the discourse on ‘terrorism’ at various
points in later decades. One of these was the location of ‘terrorism’ in the Middle East
(geographical and imaginary), the other was the link between ‘terrorism’ and communism,
mainly using the USSR as example. In the works of scholars like Brian Crozier or Roger
Trinquier, countries and peoples associated with the Middle East in the American cultural
and political imaginary were already connected to the issue of ‘terrorism.’ Both authors
represented two ways of evaluating ‘terrorism’ – Crozier romanticized and justified it while
Trinquier condemned it as major threat to the established (colonial) order – yet they both
depicted the Middle East as a contested space in which violence dominated the political
process. As the rest of the chapters in this study show, these early discursive connections
would become fortified and adapted in later decades.
It is predominantly in the case of these early discursive connections between
‘terrorism’ and communism that we can already observe an increasing politicization of
the knowledge about ‘terrorism’ that these scholars produced. Take, for instance, Feliks
Gross’ study The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions (1958). In Gross’
view, ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ constituted a tactic used in revolutions which, in turn,
symbolized violent transfers of power. With regard to the Soviet Union, Gross maintained
that both Lenin and Stalin desired unlimited power “as the means to establish a state
founded on violence and terror” (6). He drew a sharp distinction between a superior
Western ‘us’ and an inferior Soviet ‘them’ based on the different political systems and
how power was supposedly transferred in each: “Among nations which have accepted
the Western democratic pattern, the transfer of power is a peaceful and orderly process,
according to definite rules, rigorously enforced” (33). Gross then spent the rest of his
study analyzing in detail how power changed hands in Russia only through different types
of revolutions and the use of ‘terror(ism).’ The clear implication was that this way of
effecting political and social change was inferior to the American political system. Similarly,
Robert Payne, discussed extensively above, framed what he deemed the Soviet use of
‘terrorism’ as a marker of distinction between the communist Soviet Union and the United
States as benevolent democracy. Analyzing the two political systems through the lens
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of ‘terrorism’ made the difference absolute and validated the Cold War as necessary and
important. ‘Terror’ and ‘terrorism’ became another aspect through which authors could
prove American superiority over the USSR.14
Importantly, these early discursive links became the foundation which the ‘terrorism’
discourse could (and would) exploit successfully, allowing it to grow in power and reach
over the decades while recycling and developing many of the major themes established in
these early decades by different discursive agents like popular culture products (especially
novels and films), the American news media, and the academic community. The emerging
discourse on ‘terrorism’ also received a significant boost at the beginning of the following
decade, the early 1970s, by offering an attractive and seemingly novel interpretative frame
which could be applied to make sense of what were generally seen to be decisive political
(and discursive) events, shaping their construction as acts of ‘terrorism’ (and not, say,
‘insurrection’ or ‘internal war’). In the next section, I turn to these moments of change
which precipitated, as becomes clear in retrospect, the ascent of the discourse on ‘terrorism’
to a hegemonic position in the discursive arena in the United States.
2.3 “A Definite Turning Point” – The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse in
U.S. Politics and Academia in the 1970s
As the discussions in the previous sections showed, in the early decades after World War II,
‘terrorism’ was generally not perceived to be a serious social and political problem. This
was reflected in conceptualizations of the term in neutral and at times even positive
ways as a strategy and tactic, and its embedment in larger discourses on ‘insurgency,’
‘insurrection,’ and ‘war(fare).’ In the 1970s, however, this changed dramatically: ‘terrorism’
slowly became the dominant explanatory paradigm for particular instances of political
violence and in the course of this process also adapted its meaning to the shifting discursive
requirements. The 1970s thus functioned as an important period of transition in which
the discourse on ‘terrorism’ slowly grew out of its earlier conceptual roots to increased
influence and heightened visibility. Indeed, a series of historical events became events in
14I discuss the notion that the Soviet Union plots to destroy the United States and the rest of ‘the West’
by using terrorist techniques and supporting terrorist groups all over the world, regardless of ideology,
in depth in Chapter 3 of this study.
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a Foucaultdian understanding of the term, meaning that they disrupted previous ways
of problematizing ‘terrorism’ and constituted it as a different “object for thought” than
before (Foucault, Politics 257).
Scholars have offered a variety of reasons for this development. Adrian Guelke, for
instance, has pointed to the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and a coalition of the United
Arab Republic (i.e. Egypt and Syria) and Jordan as “a significant factor in loosening the
media’s inhibitions over the use of the term [‘terrorism’]” (3). Lisa Stampnitzky, in turn,
has argued that the discourse on ‘insurgency’ already began to lose power and influence in
the late 1960s because of “the controversy that erupted over Project Camelot in 1965, and
the perceived failure of counterinsurgency in Vietnam” (57).15 This, she has suggested,
allowed the emerging discourse on ‘terrorism’ to become more central in discussions of
political violence in the 1970s. Similarly, Adrian Ha¨nni has generally named the early 1970s
as the period in which ‘terrorism’ was constructed as a problem in the interspace of media,
academia, and politics for the first time (Terrorismus 39).16 Lastly, Timothy Naftali has
referred to “Skyjack Sunday,” the coordinated hijackings of four commercial airliners by
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in September 1970
which, he has claimed, specifically targeted the United States and not ‘just’ Israel and
indicated a change in tactics and outlook by Palestinian groups (Blind 42).
Where all scholars have agreed on, however, is the importance of what transpired
during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, Germany, for the development of the
discourse on ‘terrorism.’ When a group of Black September fighters sneaked into the
Olympic village and stormed the Israeli quarters, killing two Israeli athletes before taking
nine members of the Israeli team hostage, it left a global audience stunned and helpless.
15The goal of “Project Camelot” was “to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems
model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social
change in the developing nations of the world” as well as “to identify [. . . ] those actions which a
government might take to relieve conditions which [. . . ] giv[e] rise to a potential for internal war” (qtd. in
Horowitz 4-5). The project was heavily funded by the government and drew some of the most esteemed
scholars and biggest names in the field. However, controversy erupted when its intentions became public,
leading the project to be accused of recruiting academics in order to further the American imperialist
agenda. In the end, the project was canceled over the massive public outcry and an investigation by the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, lastingly “disrupting the prior seemingly stable relations between
government and the social sciences in the United States” as well as stigmatizing the field of ‘insurgency’
studies (Stampnitzky 58). See Horowitz, Ellen Herman, Solovey, and Stampnitzky for more details.
16Since Ha¨nni’s study is written in German, I paraphrase his arguments instead of citing them directly in
order to avoid excluding non-German-speaking readers.
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Black September operatives declared that they would kill one hostage every two hours
unless their demands, i.e. the release of 234 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails as well
as members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) from German prisons, were not met. Tense
negotiations ensued. Eventually, the kidnappers demanded a plane to Cairo and German
officials agreed, seeing it as an opportunity to free the hostages. But the rescue attempt
failed tragically because the German police was not experienced enough to handle the
situation. In the ensuing shoot-out with the Black September group at Fu¨rstenfeldbruck
Airport, all nine Israeli hostages and all but two of the kidnappers as well as one German
police officer were killed.17 International TV crews and news media, already on location in
order to report on the Olympics, covered every little detail about the crisis “and because
sustained broadcasting of live images from one side of the globe to the other was still
a novel feature of commercial television, the Munich tragedy received unprecedented
international attention” (Yaqub 92).
Analyses of the events in Munich have stressed the amplifying effect of international
live broadcasting, giving what transpired an aura of immediacy and novelty which added
significantly to its perception and construction as a watershed moment. Timothy Naftali
asserted that “[t]he Palestinian assault on the Israeli team at the 1972 Munich Olympics
shocked the consciousness of the world and finally defined the new menace of international
terrorism” (Blind 54). Melani McAlister agreed that “[t]he massacre at Munich had an
extraordinary impact in the United States,” primarily as a result of the extensive live
media coverage of the events (180). She concluded that “[l]ive terrorist TV was born at
the Munich Olympics” (180). Lisa Stampnitzky also maintained that “the massacre at
the 1972 Munich Olympics [. . . ] took on central symbolic significance in the history of
terrorism” and called it “a definite turning point” (21, 22).
In my view, it was a combination of all these different events in the late 1960s
and early 1970s which problematized ‘terrorism’ and brought it to the forefront of the
political consciousness in the United States. The narrativization of what had happened
in Munich as an instance of ‘terrorism’ made a changing discursive landscape visible and
accelerated the process, but it was also not as clean a cut as it might appear in retrospect.
17For a history of the events, see Klein and Reeve, One.
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Indeed, while ‘terrorism’ was the term frequently used to describe the Black September
attack on the Israeli Olympic team, it was not the only concept in circulation. President
Nixon, for instance, spoke to reporters about “this murderous action that occurred in
the Olympic village in Munich” and called the perpetrators “international outlaws of
the worst sort” (“Remarks”). When it became clear that none of the Israeli hostages
had survived the ordeal, Nixon wrote to Prime Minister Golda Meir, telling her, “[t]his
tragic and senseless act is a perversion of all the hopes and aspirations of mankind which
the Olympic Games symbolize. In a larger sense, it is a tragedy for all the peoples and
nations of the world” (“Message”). As these examples show, President Nixon did not
use ‘terrorism’ to describe the events even though he condemned them in unequivocal
terms. This indicates that ‘terrorism’ was not (yet) the dominant discursive frame through
which these events were interpreted and made meaningful. It also serves as a poignant
reminder to present-day scholars that there was nothing innate in the events of Munich
that predetermined an interpretation of the events as ‘terrorism.’
Rather, the fact that important discursive agents began to construct the events in
Munich as ‘terrorism’ in the days and weeks that followed sparked political developments
and cultural responses which made the discourse on ‘terrorism’ more prominent and
endowed it with more power and influence than before. Indeed, already a day after the
attacks in Munich, The New York Times reported that “[t]he United States embarked
today on diplomatic efforts throughout the world and new security measures at home
to try to curb international political terrorism following yesterday’s killings of members
of the Israeli Olympic team at Munich in the attack by Palestinian guerrillas” (Szulc,
“U.S.” 1). Journalist Tad Szulc continued that “[a]cting on President Nixon’s instructions,
Secretary of State William P. Rogers moved for consultations with foreign governments
on formulating a collective security system against worldwide terrorism” (1), informing
readers that the Nixon administration was developing strategies against ‘terrorism’ in
direct response to the tragedy in Munich. Szulc further wrote that “[t]he revulsion over the
Munich killings was reflected in the passage by the Senate and the House of Representatives,
[sic] of identical resolutions urging the United States and other countries to cut off all
contacts with nations providing sanctuary or support to terrorists” (19). This also told
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readers that ‘terrorism’ had become a significant political problem practically overnight,
eliciting responses and legal actions by all major political institutions in the United States.
These actions included the establishment of the Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism (CCCT) a few weeks later to address the growing anxieties of the American
public about ‘terrorism.’ In a presidential memorandum, Richard Nixon tasked the CCCT
to “consider the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and
[. . . ] [to] take the lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our government can take
appropriate action in response to acts of terrorism swiftly and effectively” (“Memorandum”).
Indeed, its function was “largely symbolic,” as Lisa Stampnitzky has maintained (27). As
Timothy Naftali and Salim Yaqub have argued independently of each other, in practice it
was really the CCCT working group, comprising representatives from nine different agencies
(including the FBI, the CIA, and the Department of State), which actively engaged with
the issue of ‘terrorism’ over an extended period of time at this level of government (Naftali,
Blind 59-60; Yaqub 98-99). Nevertheless, the establishment of the CCCT signaled to the
American public that the president had identified ‘terrorism’ as a “worldwide problem”
with the capacity to endanger the U.S. (“Memorandum”), and decided to confront and
combat the threat by founding a special Cabinet Committee, indicating that ‘terrorism’
was perceived as a new kind of threat which also required a different kind of institutional
response.
Other political initiatives to address the perceived threat of ‘terrorism’ included
the foundation of the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), also in 1972
and sponsored by the Department of Justice, which collected in its database material and
information on issues such as crime and public safety. The CIA, in turn, compiled its
first weekly report on ‘terrorism’ by September 15, 1972, ten days after the tragedy in
Munich (Naftali, Blind 55). Moreover, in the early 1970s, the Departments of Defense,
State, and Justice began to systematically fund research projects, predominantly with
the RAND Corporation, to investigate the issue of ‘terrorism’ (Lockman, Contending
144-45; L. Weissbrod 46). The CCCT working group also funded a series of conferences and
research projects and Congress even added a “Chronology of Terror” to the Congressional
Record from 1973 onwards (Ha¨nni, Terrorismus 45, 51). Starting in 1976, the CIA also
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published annual reports on ‘terrorism’ and its political and economic consequences for the
United States. Congressional Hearings into the nature of ‘terrorism’ and internal security
abounded as well.
The U.S. government thus actively worked towards the creation of knowledge about
‘terrorism’ by investing in ‘terrorism’ research in the hopes of receiving policy suggestions
and practical advice on how to respond to the perceived ‘terrorism’ threat.18 This has
led Timothy Naftali to conclude that “[t]he Nixon administration would be the first in
U.S. history to consider international terrorism a national problem” (Blind 33). I agree
with this view, but would add that, in fact, all major American political bodies became
interested in ‘terrorism’ as a problem and developed ways to collect and create knowledge
about it.
Indeed, even President Nixon (just like his successors in later years) increasingly
began to speak about ‘terrorism’ in his official statements. Two days after his
“Memorandum” to establish the CCCT, for instance, President Nixon gave a statement
in which he decried “the inhuman wave of terrorism that ha[d] been loosed on the world”
and announced that“[t]he time ha[d] come for civilized people to act in concert to remove
the threat of terrorism from the world” (“Statement about Action”). A year later, on
March 2, 1973, he denounced “the acts of terrorism which took the lives of Ambassador
Cleo A. Noel and Deputy Chief of Mission George Curtis Moore” in the Sudan and
reaffirmed “the need for all nations to take a firm stand against the menace of international
terrorism” (“Statement on the Slaying”). Hence, while presidents in the 1940s and 1950s
spoke on average less than once per year about ‘terrorism’ to their constituents (see
again Figure 1.1), these numbers increased in the following decades. In the 1960s, there
were on average three presidential statements per year which used the term, a rise of
650 % compared to the 1950s. Then, in the 1970s, the average increased once more to
9.4 references per year, another boost of 213 % from the previous decade. While the actual
numbers may still be relatively low, they nevertheless mark a distinct change: American
presidents from Nixon onward had clearly begun to think of ‘terrorism’ as an international
problem and threat to American national security and were not only increasingly starting
18See also Reid, “Evolution” and “Terrorism;” and Stampnitzky for a similar argument.
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to frame issues as ‘terrorism’ but actually also developed policy specifically designed to
combat it.
These changes in how ‘terrorism’ was slowly constituted as a problem by American
politicians also carried over into the realm of academia. Now that ‘terrorism’ had become
a central concern in American politics, it also followed that its solution required trained
and knowledgeable experts. Nixon’s CCCT comprised the first group of politicians and
scholars interested in tackling the issue of ‘terrorism.’ The working group met regularly
between 1972 and 1977 and was “one of the first institutional locations from which a
demand for terrorism expertise originated” (Stampnitzky 27-28). Members of the CCCT
like Robert Kupperman used their membership in this government committee to position
themselves as experts on ‘terrorism’ by authoring reports and speaking publicly on the
issue. Other researchers like Brian Crozier or Brian Jenkins at RAND emerged as leading
figures in the academic study of ‘terrorism’ and political violence. Scholars like Crozier
already had a background in the study of ‘insurgency,’ ‘internal war,’ or ‘rebellion,’ which
imbued them with discursive authority to speak about ‘terrorism’ as well. Between 1977
and 1979, three peer-reviewed journals dedicated to the study of ‘terrorism’ were founded;
the number of publications about ‘terrorism’ rose exponentially (Reid, “Terrorism” 24;
Stampnitzky 30).19 ‘Terrorism’ research thus slowly created the necessary structures to
become an established field of scholarship, albeit with strong political ties and investment.
These structural developments also affected the content of the discourse, i.e. how
‘terrorism’ itself was understood, debated, and theorized in the academic community.
While there was still no consensus on whether ‘terrorism’ constituted a form of political
violence, ‘internal war,’ or ‘guerrilla warfare,’ the more neutral to noble conceptualizations
of ‘terrorism’ as ‘rebellion’ or movement for national liberation I discussed in the previous
section were absent from 1970s scholarship, eclipsed by the symbolic power of the
‘Munich Massacre.’ Instead, scholars started to recognize the complexity of the issue
and developed typologies of different forms of ‘terrorism’ with the result that a multitude
of concepts flooded the discourse. For instance, in her 1972 article “The Concept of
19The journals were Terrorism: An International Journal (1977-1991; then continued as Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism), Conflict (1978; merged with Terrorism in 1991), and Terrorism, Violence, Insurgency
(1979-1999).
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Revolutionary Terrorism,” Martha Crenshaw (one of the few female researchers in this
otherwise male-dominated field) conceptualized ‘terrorism’ as a form of ‘internal war’ and
spoke of “insurgent terrorism” and “revolutionary terrorism.” John Bowyer Bell proposed
the concept of “transnational terror” in his 1975 book of the same title and distinguished
between “psychotic,” “criminal,” “endemic,” “authorized,” “vigilante,” and “revolutionary
terror.” In turn, Brian Jenkins referred to “pure terrorism” as well as “international
terrorism” (International), while Paul Wilkinson coined the term “political terrorism,” a
concept which he divided further into “revolutionary,” “sub-revolutionary,” and “repressive
terrorism.”
Other attempts to create knowledge about ‘terrorism’ focused on setting up
databases and writing chronologies. In 1972, under supervision by Brian Jenkins (who
would go on to become an acknowledged ‘terrorism’ expert himself), RAND set up a
“Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents” which collected information on incidents
of ‘terrorism’ all over the world. Three years later, in 1975, Edward Mickolus developed
ITERATE, “International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events,” another database,
this time funded by the Office of Political Research at the CIA. Mickolus also published a
series of chronologies as well as annotated bibliographies listing academic literature on
‘terrorism.’20 These many different lists, chronologies, and typologies worked to impose
a special kind of order onto both ‘terrorism’ as a concept and a discourse. They also
presented ‘terrorism’ as a new kind of problem requiring extensive investigation, public
interest, and government funding, effectively stabilizing and extending the discourse on
‘terrorism’ beyond its previously marginal status.21
These early academic efforts to conceptualize ‘terrorism’ and to impose discursive
boundaries also came to the fore in debates over which issues were or were not classified
as ‘terrorism.’ As in the decades before, domestic ‘terrorism’ within the U.S. was barely
addressed, even though the actions by the Black Liberation Army and the Symbionese
Liberation Army made headlines at the time.22 If it was acknowledged at all, it was usually
dismissed as ‘not really’ constituting ‘terrorism.’ Bell, for instance, argued that there
20See, e.g., his Annotated Bibliography (1976) and International Terrorism (1976).
21See Ha¨nni, Terrorismus; and Stampnitzky for a similar argument.
22For more information on the Black Liberation Army, see Rosenau. For a history of the Symbionese
Liberation Army, see Malkki.
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was a difference between “the committed revolutionary” and “the violent eccentric” and
categorized these two American groups as a case of the latter because they “exist[ed] on the
margin of rationality and c[ould] only function by resort to a violence that [wa]s ultimately
self-destructive” (Transnational 10). This indicates that, as the discourse on ‘terrorism’
began to slowly gain in dominance, it also established which topics were acceptable and
which types of knowledge would be excluded and silenced.
What is more, all these examples show that the academic discourse on ‘terrorism’
became increasingly professionalized and complex, but also that ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’
remained fuzzy concepts whose exact meanings remained arbitrary and unfixed since
there was no consensus on how to define the term properly. First attempts at producing
knowledge about ‘terrorism’ focused predominantly on developing different typologies
which ultimately competed with each other for discursive hegemony. As before, the terms
(and many of its synonyms) were used to describe violence in the broadest sense committed
by non-state actors against a state or government, usually deemed illegitimate, and never
applied by Americans.
Notably, academic consensus existed only with regard to one particular aspect,
i.e. who the main ‘terrorist’ actors were and which geographical region was considered
to be the hotbed of ‘terrorism.’ Spectacular operations like the one in Munich in 1972
and similar ones directed American and European attention onto the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and brought the people as well as the region in which the conflict played out into
focus. In the American academic community, this was reflected in the fact that ‘terrorism’
was increasingly evaluated in negative terms by scholars and especially Palestinian groups
came to be seen as its prime representatives. John Bowyer Bell, for instance, opened his
1975 study Transnational Terror with a vivid description of the Rome Airport shooting
on December 17, 1973 by a group of Palestinians, a rhetorical move which stressed the
innocence of the victims, the brutality of the act, and, from the beginning, prejudiced
the reader against ‘terrorism’ in general and against Palestinian ‘terrorism’ in particular.
Walter Laqueur argued in Terrorism (1977) that “[t]he history of the Palestine resistance
c[ould] be briefly recapitulated: Palestine militants did not accept the existence of a
Jewish state and organized armed resistance against it” (191), a gross oversimplification of
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the actual historical process which painted ‘the Palestinians’ uniformly as anti-Semitists
lashing out unjustifiably against Israel. Similarly, Edward Hyams maintained that “[t]he
first practitioners of terrorism against both Jews and British in Palestine [. . . ] were the
Arabs” (144). In the wake of the events at Munich and other “spectacular terrorist dramas”
like the Rome Airport shooting, ‘terrorism’ was increasingly perceived in negative terms
only and the Palestinian groups became the most important actors in discussions of the
phenomenon.
This discursive focus on Palestinian ‘terrorism’ was also mirrored in American
politics where the emerging trope of the Palestinian ‘terrorist’ fused with general concerns
over the Middle East as a region prone to ‘terrorism.’ These particular discursive
constructions presented ‘terrorism’ as a serious threat to U.S. interests which required an
extensive political response. One area where this framing of ‘terrorism’ became especially
visible were the official government reports on ‘terrorism,’ published annually from the late
1970s onwards in an effort to get a better grasp on the problem.23 In April 1976, a first
research study entitled International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis
was published under the auspices of the CIA. The report aimed “to cast the problem
of internationalized terror into clear perspective” and called ‘terrorism’ “a particularly
controversial and complex phenomenon” (Milbank i). It broadly defined ‘terrorism’ as
“[t]he threat or use of violence for political purposes” and further distinguished between
“international” and “transnational terrorism,” where the former term described actions
“carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state” and the latter referred
to ‘terrorist’ acts carried out by “basically autonomous non-state actors” (1).24
In terms of conceptualization, this first definition of “international terrorism” is
noteworthy since it maintained that states could actively sponsor ‘terrorist’ groups to
further their own political agenda – an idea which would become central in American
23The first report International and Transnational Terrorism (1976) was followed by the series International
Terrorism in. . . which covered the years 1976-1979. Its successors were Patterns of International
Terrorism, which analyzed the period 1980-1982, and Patterns of Global Terrorism, which ran from
1983-2003. Since 2004, it has been replaced by Country Reports on Terrorism, also published annually.
24The full general definition of ‘terrorism’ used in the report was: “The threat or use of violence for
political purposes when (1) such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target
group wider than its immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications transcend national boundaries (as a
result, for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its
institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution)” (1).
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politics the next decade and which was already introduced in the 1970s (see Chapter 3).
This report also revealed how closely academia and politics were connected when it came
to conceptualizing ‘terrorism.’ In the section discussing the theoretical framework of
the study, the report referenced many important scholars of ‘terrorism’ and their works,
most notably Brian Jenkins, Martha Crenshaw, Brian Crozier, Paul Wilkinson and even
Thomas Thornton’s contribution to Harry Eckstein’s edited volume Internal War (which I
discussed above). This first official government report on ‘terrorism’ was thus influenced by
earlier academic conceptualizations of ‘terrorism,’ pointing to the close ties which existed
between these two discursive fields which worked to reinforce and solidify the emerging
discourse on ‘terrorism.’
In the summer of 1977, the CIA followed up on its initial research study and
published the first volume of what would become an annual series, entitled International
Terrorism in 1976, which summarized and analyzed events categorized as ‘terrorism’ in
1976. As the new title already indicates, the report simplified the theoretical framing.
It discarded the concept of “transnational terrorism” entirely and only retained the concept
of “international terrorism” which appropriated the all-purpose, broader definition of
‘terrorism’ of the previous report. ‘Terrorism’ was thus generally understood as violence used
for political purposes exceeding national boundaries and with the aim to influence a certain
group. This analytical shift also meant that the focus moved away from distinguishing
between different types of actors (state or non-state) to questions of where it occurred. As
a consequence, only certain regions, like the Middle East, came into focus as designated
hotbeds for ‘terrorism.’ Conversely, the nationalities or ethnicities of the perpetrators
became important as well. Thus, in the ensuing years, the reports increasingly constructed
the Middle East as region associated primarily with ‘terrorism’ and the different nations
and ethnic groups living there as ‘terrorists.’ Indeed, the official government reports focused
on Palestinian groups and constructed them as instigators of ‘terrorism’ in the Middle East
and beyond, effectively fusing the emerging discursive trope of the ‘Palestinian terrorist’
with notions of the Middle East as a region full of ‘terrorism.’25
25By contrast, Israel was regularly presented as victim of ‘Palestinian terrorism,’ presenting a clearly
biased view on the conflict between the two groups.
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International Terrorism in 1976 already showed the first traces of this particular
discursive approach to ‘terrorism.’ For instance, the report claimed that “[t]he Palestinian
issue continued to be at the heart of most terrorist incidents in or related to the Middle
East” (3), suggesting that “[t]he Palestinian issue” caused ‘terrorism’ in the entire region
and that the entirety of the Palestinian community engaged in ‘terrorist’ activities.
Moreover, the report informed that “[a]s in 1975, direct governmental support of terrorist
groups was most evident and most extensive with respect to small Palestinian splinter
formations associated with the rejectionist wing of the fedayeen movement” (4). It also
identified Iraq as “the principal patron of the Black June Movement” (4). Statements
like these implied that ‘terrorism’ was wide-spread in the Middle East and, since it was
often actively supported by sovereign states in the region, a systemic problem as well. By
identifying distinct nations or ethnic groups as sponsors or perpetrators of ‘terrorism,’ the
CIA reports introduced an ethnic and geographical marker to specify what counted as
‘terrorism’ and what did not.
The reports following these first publications became more explicit in their framing
of the entirety of the Middle East as center of ‘terrorism’ and different ethnic or national
factions as ‘terrorists.’ International Terrorism in 1977 maintained that “[t]errorism in the
Middle East stayed at relatively high levels and again transcended the Arab-Israeli conflict”
(2), suggesting that ‘terrorism’ primarily and repeatedly occurred in all of the Middle
East and involved the entire spectrum of nations in the region. The report for the year
1978 explained that “[m]uch of the increase [in terrorist incidents] c[ould] be attributed
to the export of Middle Eastern conflicts to Western Europe” (1), again marking the
Middle East as a region in which ‘terrorism’ had practically gotten out of control and
spread to other regions. International Terrorism in 1979 not only discussed the different
Palestinian ‘terrorist’ groups, but also Syrian involvement and support for some Palestinian
factions, and, most notably, the U.S. hostage crisis in Iran (discussed in more detail below).
By subsuming variedly different cases under the category of ‘Middle Eastern terrorism,’
these government reports effectively eliminated the distinct factors which caused these
incidents and suggested that there was a correlation between them based simply on relative
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geographical proximity, thus moving away from earlier conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ as
a strategy or tactic.
What is more, these reports positioned the United States as popular target for
‘terrorist’ attack. The report International Terrorism in 1977 predicted that “American
personnel and facilities overseas will continue to be attractive targets” (i; emphasis added),
a phrasing which insinuated that there already existed at this point a long history of
‘terrorism’ against the United States, presenting ‘terrorism’ as a significant political and
societal problem. Similarly, International Terrorism in 1978 stated that “[t]here were more
attacks than the previous year, both in relative and absolute terms, on US citizens and
property” and even provided a table to illustrate the trend (1). The report for 1979 claimed
that “many more Americans were killed this year than before” (International Terrorism
in 1979 1), implying that Americans regularly ran the danger of dying from ‘terrorism.’
Overall, the reports helped to construct a pervasive narrative of how ‘terrorism,’ especially
in and from the Middle East, posed a significant threat to Americans and American
interests worldwide.
The government reports on “international terrorism” constituted one important
political initiative to create knowledge about ‘terrorism’ by attempting to quantify and
measure its manifestations. Another significant political act which contributed to elevating
the status of the discourse on ‘terrorism’ was the “Export Administration Act of 1979.”
It tasked the Secretary of State to present an annual list of nations which were seen to
“support terrorism” and which were then subject of economic sanctions (United States,
Export). The first states officially placed on the list at its inception were Syria, Libya, Iraq,
and South Yemen – all nations which were located in the geographic and imaginary Middle
East for Americans. This further worked to firmly link the Middle East (and its peoples)
to ‘terrorism’ and endowed the discourse on ‘terrorism’ with considerable legitimacy and
political capital.
Overall, then, it becomes clear that the interpretation of the 1972 Black September
attack on the Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics as a case of ‘terrorism’ sparked
diverse political responses which constructed ‘terrorism’ in predominantly negative terms
as a form of political violence, ‘insurrection,’ or ‘war(fare).’ It also discursivized ‘terrorism’
70
as a new threat against the United States for which the nation was deemed not adequately
prepared, leading to various political initiatives which attempted to manage and control
‘terrorism’ as a problem. In turn, the structural changes in U.S. politics after 1972
also affected the scholarship on ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ in lasting ways as the field was
increasingly politicized and institutionalized. The discursive focus in these fields came
to rest on Palestinian groups as predominant ‘terrorists’ perpetrators and then slowly
extended to the rest of the Middle East, constructing the region as a hotbed of ‘terrorism.’
This effectively cemented a discursive claim about ‘terrorism’ which had already circulated
in earlier decades and which claimed that ‘terrorism’ was intricately linked to the peoples
and cultures of the Middle East. It effectively re-framed ‘terrorism’ as a marker of identity
by categorizing ‘terrorists’ according to the geographical location in which they operated
and/or their ethnicity or nationality. ‘Terrorism’ was no longer understood as a tactic any
kind of political actor might use. In the next section, I discuss how the American news
media and popular culture responded to this changing conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ in
the 1970s.
2.4 “An Explosion of Entries” – The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse in
U.S. News Media and Popular Culture in the 1970s
The 1970s were not only a turbulent decade with regard to how American politics and
academia engaged with ‘terrorism’ as a problem. Just like the American news media,
cultural productions also responded to the unfolding events and changed political outlook
on ‘terrorism’ by adapting their understanding and representations of the issue, effectively
contributing to the spreading of the discourse on ‘terrorism’ and the dissemination of
its central claims more widely within the American public. Both the American news
media, exemplified by the reporting in The New York Times, and popular novels reflected
and actively shaped the discourse on ‘terrorism’ with the result that it became more
homogeneous and coherent in its truth claims about ‘terrorism’ and also the increasingly
hegemonic paradigm to discursivize instances of political violence. Along the way, these
two discursive agents also helped to popularize notions of the Middle East as hotbed for
‘terrorism’ and its people as dangerous ‘terrorists,’ further re-conceptualizing ‘terrorism’ as
71
a marker of identity and no longer a strategy used in political conflict by rational, relatable
actors.
The early 1970s proved to be a transition period for the news media with regard to
how it reported on and framed incidents of political violence. As Ronald Crelinsten has
shown in an often-cited 1989 article “Terrorism in the Media,” The New York Times, along
with other major newspapers, began to categorize and index its reporting on political
violence increasingly under the heading of ‘terrorism.’ The New York Times Index, a
reference work in which The New York Times catalogs and groups articles published in
the previous year according to certain topics, is a valuable indicator of change since it
listed ‘terrorism’ as a category for the first time in 1970 (Crelinsten 172). This illustrates
that the American news media had started to consider ‘terrorism’ a pertinent issue already
before the events in Munich in 1972. Nevertheless, for the year 1970, the index only listed
a total of four articles, suggesting that the category ‘terrorism’ had not yet become a
significant journalistic fixture. Crelinsten concluded that “1970 mark[ed] a turning point
in the way that terrorism was perceived” and that “[i]ndexers began to struggle with how
to classify this phenomenon [‘terrorism’] and where to place the various articles” (173).26
This dynamic became more pronounced in the following years. Crelinsten reported
that in The New York Times Index, “in an explosion of entries,” there were 64 articles
and three related headings in 1972 (173). Moreover, in 1972, The London Times and
The British Humanities also added ‘terrorism’ as category to their respective indexes,
alluding to the impact the Black September operation in Munich had on American and
European conceptualizations of political violence. Crelinsten was aware of the constituting
power of the news media, commenting that “[a]fter 1972, however, a greater homogeneity
in framing occur[red],” meaning that before 1972, articles were significantly more likely to
be cross-referenced under other, related headings (193). After 1972, ‘terrorism’ became
the main (and often sole) heading under which articles were listed, suggesting that the
26Crelinsten also claimed that “[t]here was obviously a time lag of several years following the critical
year of 1968, where interest in terrorism first began” (173). His statement echoes one of the popular
claims of the ‘terrorism’ discourse which selects 1968, i.e. the year after the Six-Day War as somewhat
arbitrary beginning for ‘modern terrorism.’ This claim should be taken with a grain of salt because
academic studies have also singled out other years and historical moments as starting points of ‘modern
terrorism.’ Rather, this fixation with defining the precise moment when ‘terrorism’ began, constitutes a
way to organize and control ‘terrorism’ as a problem and a discourse. See also Stampnitzky and Ha¨nni,
Terrorismus.
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discourse on ‘terrorism’ had become more dominant and, in the process, marginalized
other related interpretations of incidents as, for example, ‘bombing’ or ‘massacre.’ As this
analysis shows, the American news media played a significant role in that process.
Crelinsten’s findings with regard to these newspaper indexes mirror other general
reporting trends in The New York Times. ‘Terrorism’ as a term appeared in significantly
more articles in the 1970s than in the preceding decades. Figure 2.8 illustrates this trend.
As we saw earlier, between the 1940s and 1960s, the newspaper published between one
and two articles per day which contained the word ‘terrorism.’ In the 1970s, however, this
number rose to about 3 articles per day as the overall amount of articles on ‘terrorism’
published by The New York Times increased by 31 % compared to the 1960s – a clear
marker of the increasing awareness of ‘terrorism’ as a problem worth reporting on. The
section of the graph depicting the developments during the 1970s is particularly telling in
this regard. In 1970, there were 849 articles in The New York Times which mentioned
‘terrorism;’ for 1979, the database records 1,153 hits, an increase of 36 % in nine years.
What is more, the first time that there were more than 1,000 articles per year on ‘terrorism’
published by the newspaper was 1973 (1,050 articles), then again in 1977 (1,145 pieces),
and from 1979 onward, there have never been less than 1,000 articles in The New York
Times which contain the word ‘terrorism.’ Thus data thus suggests clearly that instances
of political violence were increasingly framed as ‘terrorism,’ indicating that the discourse
on ‘terrorism’ had become more dominant in the 1970s compared to previous decades, a
trend which would continue to grow stronger in the decades to come.
Regarding the content of the articles on ‘terrorism,’ the data shows that one focus
of The New York Times lay on ‘terrorism’ in connection to the Middle East, Palestinians,
and ‘Arabs’ generally. Figure 2.9 illustrates these developments in more detail. Articles
addressing ‘Arab terrorism,’ ‘Palestinian terrorism,’ and ‘Middle East terrorism’ made up a
significant part of the overall reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times. Interestingly,
all three graphs spike in 1972, suggesting that the events of that year, especially the tragedy
in Munich, sparked increasing coverage of political events as ‘terrorism.’ Thus, while there
were only 14 articles in 1971 on ‘Palestinian terrorism’ in The New York Times, the
database lists 89 hits for the following year, i.e. a staggering 536 % increase. What is
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Figure 2.8: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, 1940-1980
more, the graph for ‘Palestinian terrorism’ indicates that after 1972 The New York Times
maintained this level of reporting, thereby slowly establishing ‘Palestinian terrorism’ as
a fixed trope in American journalism after 1972 and a staple issue in the discourse on
‘terrorism’ in the 1970s generally.
Equally noteworthy, ‘Palestinian terrorism’ was actually not the most popular
term in the writing of The New York Times. As the graphs in Figure 2.9 show, ‘Arab
terrorism’ and ‘Middle East terrorism’ were consistently used more often than references
to ‘Palestinian terrorism’ in the newspaper. Reporting on ‘Arab terrorism’ went from 49
articles in 1971 to 205 pieces a year later, a remarkable rise of 318 %. Similarly, while
there were 65 articles on ‘terrorism’ in relation to the Middle East in 1971, a year later
this number had risen by 205 % to 198 pieces. These findings suggest that news media
reporting broadened the scope with which it approached the issue of ‘terrorism’ to focus on
the geographical region of the conflict more generally. It also expanded the categorization
of the social group(s) involved to the even bigger umbrella term ‘Arab.’ Overall, in 1972,
articles on ‘Palestinian,’ ‘Arab’ and ‘Middle East terrorism’ made up 54 % of the overall
reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, a trend which remained stable throughout
the rest of the 1970s. This indicates clearly that the Middle East and its Arab populations
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Figure 2.9: Reporting on different kinds of ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East in The
New York Times, 1965-1980
(including the Palestinians) were increasingly linked to ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times,
converting these terms into markers of ‘terrorism’ for its readers.
Of course, there is bound to exist some overlap between the different graphs in
that articles may have been counted more than once if they were listed under more than
one search term. This, however, also demonstrates the conceptual proximity between all
terms and the extent to which the qualifiers ‘Arab,’ ‘Middle East,’ and ‘Palestinian’ were
interconnected and ultimately referred to the same discursive construct: ‘terrorism’ as
located in and originating from the (imaginary and geographical) Middle East. By contrast,
the graph for ‘Moslem terrorism’ in Figure 2.9 shows that religion did not play a significant
role in conceptualizing ‘terrorism’ in the 1960s and 1970s. The number of articles for
‘Moslem terrorism’ remained consistently low throughout most of the 1970s. Unlike all
other graphs in Figure 2.9, it did not peak in any way in 1972. This reinforces the notion
that markers of nationality/ethnicity and geographical origin dominated conceptualizations
of ‘terrorism’ in the 1970s, but not references to religion.
Lastly, the data analysis for the reporting in The New York Times in the 1970s also
reveals that ‘terrorism’ in connection with the Soviet Union continued to be a concern,
albeit less centrally than in earlier decades. As Figure 2.10 shows, articles on ‘terrorism’
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Figure 2.10: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in connection with the Soviet Union in The New
York Times, 1965-1980
and the Soviet Union consistently made up between 12 % and 14 % of the overall writing
on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times in the 1970s. Indeed, the newspaper database
records marginally more articles on ‘Soviet Union terrorism’ than ‘Palestinian terrorism’
for the decade, indicating that the academic narrative about ‘terrorism’ in connection
with the Soviet Union had not only crossed over into the news media, but actually thrived
there and enjoyed a stable discursive presence. The next chapter of this study will address
this particular conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ more fully, so suffice it to say at this point
that reporting on ‘Soviet Union terrorism’ in The New York Times both reflected and
amplified central political and social concerns during the Cold War. We thus find the two
central narratives about ‘terrorism,’ i.e. one focusing on the Middle East and the other
one on the Soviet Union as producers of ‘terrorism,’ which were already developed and
circulated in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, still active and even strengthened in the 1970s.
These changes in how the American news media reported on ‘terrorism’ in the 1970s
also come to the fore when examining how The New York Times actually wrote about
the Black September attack on the Israeli team during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games.
Indeed, The New York Times diligently covered the tragedy in Munich and its journalism
both reflected and amplified many of the discursive changes with regard to ‘terrorism’
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in the 1970s that I outlined above. First of all, while ‘terrorism’ may not have been the
sole interpretative frame in circulation at the time – the headline for September 6, 1972
actually read “9 Israelis on Olympic Team Killed with 4 Arab Captors as Police Fight
Band that Disrupted Munich Games” – it nevertheless appeared in all articles on the first
page of The New York Times which discussed the events in Munich. Moreover, journalists
variously quoted Golda Meir, from the statement of the International Olympic Committee,
or the Democratic Presidential candidate George McGovern as denouncing “this senseless
act of terrorism” (qtd. in Szulc, “Nixon” 18). This not only signaled to readers of The New
York Times that influential discursive voices interpreted what had happened as ‘terrorism,’
it also imbued these claims with further authority simply because they were reprinted
in the newspaper. Moreover, these claims merged with ostensibly ‘objective’ journalistic
accounts of “the fate of the Israeli hostages seized by Arab terrorists in the Olympic
Village” (“Reports” 1), which made the framing of the events in term of ‘terrorism’ appear
coherent and omnipresent.
Equally noteworthy in the reporting of The New York Times is how journalists
labeled and described the perpetrators themselves. Articles referred to the Black September
group as “Arab terrorists,” but also as “Arab commandos” and simply “the Arabs” (Binder,
“23-Hour” 1). Other terms appearing in articles in The New York Times included “Arab
guerillas” (Smith, “Mrs. Meir” 1) and “Raiders” (Binder, “23-Hour” 18).27 The one
common conceptual link between all these terms is ‘Arab,’ meaning that the perpetrators’
(presumed) ethnicity was stressed in all writings on the issue in The New York Times.
What is more, the description of the perpetrators as ‘Arabs’ instead of ‘Palestinians’
created the impression that the conflict was much broader: ‘Arabs’ attacking ‘the West’
and the spirit of the Olympic Games, which evoked long-standing Orientalist prejudices
about the Middle East and its ‘Arabs’ as threatening ‘the West,’ effectively Othering the
perpetrators even further.
Most importantly, however, this ‘Arab terrorism’ committed by “Arab commandos”
was evaluated in different tones than before. Articles recounted how “the Olympic
Village building [had been] invaded by the Arabs” (Binder, “23-Hour” 18), creating
27More examples include M. Arnold; Binder, “Battle;” and Smith, “Arab.”
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the impression of a strong paramilitary force of ‘Arabs’ overrunning unsuspecting victims –
a reference which again tapped into existing Orientalist stereotypes about the Middle East.
This impression was further enhanced by articles extensively discussing how two Israeli
weight-lifting coaches were woken up by the noise and attempted to fight off the Black
September operatives (e.g. Binder, “23-Hour” 18), contrasting the depiction of ‘evil Arabs’
with the trope of the ‘heroic Israeli,’ which, in turn, activated cultural discourses about
the ‘special relationship’ between the U.S. and the Jewish state.28 Other contributions
humanized the victims by providing short biographies of the Israeli athletes who died
(e.g. “Sketches” 19), further cementing the ‘evil Arabs’ against ‘good Israelis’ dichotomy.
Only one article that day attempted to explain the political context of the Black
September raid. But Eric Pace’s contribution to The New York Times mainly listed
other attacks and killings by Black September in past months and years (19), creating
the impression that Black September was violent without specific political reasons. Pace
wrote that “[t]he guerrillas’ ultimate aim [wa]s to bring about the dismantling of Israel
somehow. They argue[d] that it was unjustly established on land that rightly belonged to
the Palestinian Arabs” (19). The word “somehow” implied that the Palestinian factions
did not have a sound plan on how to “dismantl[e]” the Jewish state; it even belittled their
agenda. Moreover, Pace clearly distanced himself from the claim that the State of Israel was
founded on contested territory by marking this statement as a claim made by Palestinian
factions. Indeed, the word “argue” even suggested that this claim was debatable and not a
fact; it allowed American readers to disagree and dismiss the Palestinian complaint without
having to properly engage with it. Lastly, the description of the Palestinian community as
“Palestinian Arabs” signaled a merging of different ethnicities under the umbrella term
‘Arab,’ further obscuring any historical and cultural differences as well as different political
contexts.
This negative interpretation of the event and the perpetrators ultimately also
reflected back on the concept of ‘terrorism’ itself. Since the context in which it was applied
was condemned and denounced, it affected the meaning of the term itself as well. References
to “Arab terrorists” (e.g. “Reports”) thus signaled to readers that the conceptual boundaries
28For more on the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel, see, e.g., Bar-Siman-Tov; Bick; Grose;
Mart, Eye; McAlister, Mearsheimer and Walt; Sarna; Sasson; and Schoenbaum.
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were being redrawn because of the changed political context. Previous conceptualizations
of ‘terrorism’ in more romantic terms as “rebels” and “insurgents” did not fit anymore.
At the same time, ethnic markers to label the ‘terrorist’ perpetrators became more
prominent, forging discursive links between the Middle East, its people(s), and ‘terrorism.’
Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times in later years would build on this
qualitative change in the conceptualization of the term, making more negative framings
of ‘terrorism,’ especially the ‘Arab’ kind, more prevalent, enabling these constructions of
‘terrorism’ to spread further and cement their dominant discursive standing.
This changed conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ was also reflected in and advanced by
the popular fiction of the time. Thomas Harris’ novel Black Sunday (1975) exemplifies this
changed discursive approach to ‘terrorism.’ Black Sunday is a thriller about a group of Black
September ‘terrorists’ who collaborate with deranged Vietnam vet Michael Lander to blow
up the stadium in New Orleans during the Super Bowl when the U.S. president is present.
Lander is to fly the Aldrich blimp over the stadium and explode it during the match, killing
himself and as many other people as possible, including the American president. But the
Israeli secret service learns of Black September’s plan to attack the U.S. and sends in a
team of Israeli agents, led by protagonist and hero Major Kabakov, to prevent the attack
and capture the ‘terrorists.’ In Harris’ novel, the threat of ‘Palestinian terrorism’ was
turned into an effective fictional device to heighten the drama and sensational effect of the
story. The success of both the novel and, especially, the movie two years later suggests that
the American public had grown accustomed to the topic of ‘terrorism’ by the mid-1970s
and that its portrayal of ‘Palestinian terrorism’ reflected widely-held views at the time.
The principal villain in Black Sunday is Dahlia Iyad, the Black September ‘terrorist’
sent to the U.S. to help Michael Lander to succeed in his plans. In its portrayal of
Dahlia, Black Sunday also makes use of Orientalist stereotyping, a narrative choice which
enhances her danger because she is both a dangerous Oriental femme fatale and a ruthless
‘Palestinian terrorist.’ Dahlia is an unscrupulous and effective killer, as demonstrated by
her quick murder of the original blimp pilot before breakfast so that Lander can take
his place during the Super Bowl (301). When Lander is drunk and becomes violent, she
simply knocks him unconscious (90). She is depicted as an animalistic predator with eyes
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“wide-set as a puma’s” and has “the steady, cool gaze of a cat” (34, 161). This suggests a
certain aloofness in her character and she emanates an eroticized danger. Fittingly, then,
she controls the men around her through the skilled use of her sexuality and femininity.
For instance, Dahlia is the one to ‘cure’ Lander’s impotence, thus giving him the strength
to continue his plans for an attack on the United States (e.g. 64). During the Israeli raid
on the Black September compound, it is her beautiful naked body which makes Major
Kabakov hesitant to shoot her: “The killer pointed his machine gun at her wet breast. His
finger tightened on the trigger. It was a beautiful breast. The muzzle of the machine gun
wavered” (19). Kabakov is initially blinded by Dahlia’s Oriental, sexualized body. As the
wavering gun implies, his masculine potency is weakened and he does not recognize that
she is the most menacing ‘terrorist’ of the group.
The novel makes it clear that her sexuality, and the power that comes with it,
are extremely dangerous. Violence is sexually arousing to Dahlia. When she records the
confessional tape in preparation for the attack on the Super Bowl in Beirut, she “become[s]
visibly aroused as she talk[s] into the microphone” and her “face [i]s flushed and her
nipples [a]re erect as she continue[s]” (16, 17). Similarly, the omniscient narrator describes
her pubic hair as “a black explosion” (34), out to destroy the men who come close to it,
especially Michael Lander. In this context, Philip Simpson has argued that Dahlia fuses
“sexuality with the politics of terrorism” (54). I agree in that Dahlia’s representation in the
novel follows well-known Orientalist stereotypes about eroticized, sexually available and
dangerous female bodies. The fact that she is a ‘Palestinian terrorist’ enhances her danger.
Thus, in my view, Black Sunday fuses Orientalist discourses about the Middle
East with contemporary notions about ‘terrorism’ to create Dahlia as an enemy who
proves more dangerous to the Israeli hero than previous ones. After all, protagonist Major
Kabakov dies in the attempt to steer the explosive laden blimp away from the Super Bowl
Stadium. Black Sunday ’s conceptualization of an Oriental enemy as ‘terrorist’ thus stands
in stark contrast to the representation of heroic Jewish ‘terrorists’ and abominable Arabs
in Leon Uris’ Exodus which I discussed at the beginning of this chapter. This illustrates
that American popular culture fused Orientalist techniques to Other the enemy with
the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the 1970s, not only invigorating this particular kind of
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stereotyping, but also working to stabilize negative conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ and
acquainting larger audiences with central tenets of the discourse on ‘terrorism.’
How pervasive the trope of the Palestinian ‘terrorist’ was in discourses on ‘terrorism’
in the 1970s also becomes evident when looking at who is not depicted as a ‘terrorist’
in Black Sunday. Michael Lander, the Vietnam veteran and former prisoner of war who
initially developed the idea to explode a blimp over the Super Bowl Stadium, is represented
in completely different terms. Even though it is his plan and he is the one to seek contact
with Black September for help in its execution, he is not described as a ‘terrorist’ like
his Palestinian co-conspirators. Instead, the novel portrays him as mentally unstable and
disturbed. After his release to the United States, he is traumatized by his experience in
Vietnam, but also stands accused of collaborating with the enemy during his time at a
Vietnam prison, making his rehabilitation into civil society extremely tense and stressful.
Interestingly, however, what pushes him over the edge into insanity is the moment he
finds his wife Margaret in bed with a stranger who, to add injury to insult, knocks him
unconscious while the two lovers escape (88). The novel describes the moment in which
Lander’s mind finally cracks under the strain: “When pain and rage reach levels far above
the mind’s capacity to cope, a curious relief is possible but it requires a partial death.
Lander smiled an awful smile, a bloody rictus smile, when he felt his will die. [. . . ] The relief
came to him then. It was over. Oh, it was over. For half of him” (89). What remains is
Lander’s deranged desire to kill and he begins to plan the attack on the Super Bowl.
Black Sunday, however, is careful to qualify Lander’s rage. Lander’s betrayal of and
immense hatred for his country are born out of “injury and madness” and thus constitute
a psychological aberration (131). In fact, the novel establishes early on that Lander was
never a ‘normal’ American. Considerable space is given to his childhood memories which
reveal that, while an intelligent child, he was bullied by other children and thus always felt
left out. He never developed any social skills and suffered from a dominant, controlling
mother and an effeminate father, internalizing the belief that he is a coward and inferior.
Lander never learns to express his feelings of anger and frustration. The narrator sums the
situation up as: “So he has no outlet. And he has swallowed his poison longer than most
could have done” (70), implying that Lander is a victim of “poison” and not an aggressive
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attacker himself. This reading is also supported by the fact that, in order for his plan
to succeed, Lander relies on the help of the ‘Palestinian terrorists’ and especially Dahlia.
Black September provides the necessary amount of explosives and Dahlia, understanding
that she “needed to know Lander, [. . . ] learned him very well, better than anyone else
would ever know him” (66). This enables her to control and manipulate the deranged
Lander and to prevent him from giving up on the task beforehand. The ‘real’ threat
throughout the novel does not emanate from Lander, he is simply a tool in the hands of
Dahlia and her fellow Black September ‘terrorists.’ Since Lander is clearly unhinged and
lunatic and not Palestinian, he cannot be a ‘terrorist.’
Black Sunday was not the only fictional text to present ‘Palestinian terrorism’
as a major threat to the United States in the 1970s. In The Aleph Solution, written by
Sandor Frankel and Webster Mews in 1978, ‘Palestinian terrorists’ take the United Nations
Assembly hostage in order to force it to vote in favor of the dissolution of Israel and the
foundation of Palestine in its place. To enforce the threat, the United States is shaken
by ‘terrorist’ attacks, systematically executed by small groups of ‘Palestinian terrorists,’
which mimic the Ten Biblical Plagues. In the end, the Israeli elite team “Aleph,” with
support by the American president, finally manages to free the hostages.
Another example for the proliferation of the notion of ‘Palestinian terrorism’ is
Joan Hemingway and Paul Bonnecarre`re’s 1974 novel Rosebud which was adapted for
the screen a year later with some significant changes. The plot line of the movie remains
essentially the same as in the novel: ‘Palestinian terrorists’ kidnap five wealthy teenage
girls off the yacht Rosebud and hold them as hostages until their influential families fulfill
their demands, which includes outing a Jewish family patriarch as avid supporter of Israel.
While the novel imagines Europe as target of ‘Palestinian terrorism,’ the movie version
presents the United States as the Palestinian terrorists’ objective. Thus, in the movie,
Peter O’Toole, of Lawrence of Arabia fame and a major Hollywood star at the time,
plays CIA agent Larry Martin who, under the cover of being a reporter for Newsweek,
investigates the case and ultimately frees the girls. As these examples show, the idea that
‘Palestinian terrorism’ constituted a viable threat to the United States was reflected in
cultural productions of the time.
82
Other novels also drew on the newly-established link between ‘terrorism’ and
Orientalist depictions of the Middle East and expanded the rooster of villains to not only
include ‘Palestinian terrorists’ but also more generic, unspecified ‘Arab terrorists.’ Novels
like Thirty-Four East (1974) or The Fifth Horseman (1980) feature multi-national ‘terrorist’
villains who either make trouble for the U.S. somewhere in the Middle East or attack the
nation on its own territory. In Thirty-Four East (1974), written by Alfred Coppel, for
instance, the Abou Moussa Commando of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Palestine
kidnaps the Vice President of the United States during his visit to the demilitarization
zone between Israel and Egypt. The Arab Front “had gathered together the shattered
remnants of the old Arab and Palestinian guerrilla and terrorist organizations” which
suggests that ‘terrorist’ groups are active all over the Middle East and they all unite to
pursue similar goals (5). In the novel, the ‘terrorists’ are depicted following well-known
Orientalist stereotypes. They are cruel, anti-Semitic, vicious, and amoral; they rape a
captured Jewish female soldier and kill defenseless Christian monks as well as their poor,
simple Bedouin helpers. The female leader of the group, Leila Jamil, “a beauty once, in the
manner of Arab women” (6), is a lesbian, an additional marker for her lack of femininity
and psychological aberration. Thirty-Four East presents the Middle East as a region full
of ‘Arab terrorists’ who move freely and collaborate to attack the United States.
In the 1980 bestseller The Fifth Horseman, written by Larry Collins and Dominique
Lapierre, Colonel Qaddafi threatens to annihilate New York City with a hydrogen bomb
unless the U.S. government makes Israel return to its original borders and give the occupied
territories to the Palestinians so that they can found their own country there. While the
president tries to convince Qaddafi to give up on his scheme, the entirety of America’s
law enforcement agencies organizes a joint, frantic search and combs through New York
City to find the bomb as well as the three ‘Palestinian terrorists’ who hid it there in the
first place. The novel represents Qaddafi as ‘terrorist’ mastermind, out to undermine ‘the
West,’ here meaning the United States. As one of the advisers tells the president about
Qaddafi, “[h]e’s been literally flooding this country with students taking nuclear courses.
Over a fifth of the Libyans who’ve studied here since 1973 have been enrolled in some kind
of nuclear program or other” (28), painting the Libyan population as devoted followers
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of Qaddafi’s plans to usurp world power. Qaddafi is depicted as leader of a professional
‘terrorist’ network which operates all over the globe under his orders:
The first chief of state in modern times to employ terrorism as an instrument of national
policy had taken over the noble old dwelling in 1971. It was the headquarters from which
Qaddafi directed the global activities of his terrorist network.
The Munich Olympic Massacre had been planned in its gracious sitting room; so, too had
the assault on the Rome airport meant to kill Henry Kissinger in December 1973, the
kidnapping of the OPEC oil ministers, the Entebbe skyjacking. The eucalyptus trees of the
villa’s gardens concealed the antennas that radioed Qaddafi’s orders to IRA provos, West
German students, Red Brigade dissidents, even Islamic zealots infiltrated into Tashkent
and Turkestan. (110-11)
The Fifth Horseman thus constructs a world in which the Middle East is a space of unrest
and violence, where the use of ‘terrorism’ is the norm, and which threatens peace and
stability in Europe and the U.S. What these examples show, then, is that in the American
cultural imagination of the 1970s, the Middle East as well as its peoples were increasingly
linked to the issue of ‘terrorism.’
While the finer details vary from novel to novel, the basic formula sets up the
United States as threatened by a group of ‘terrorists’ from different nations in the Middle
East. The threat is thwarted at the very end, but only narrowly, and often the status quo
has changed. In Thirty-Four East, the president dies in an accident and the kidnapped vice
president, unbeknownst to himself, becomes the new political leader of the United States
while still in captivity. The vice president, as the novel makes clear, has a completely
different, elitist, liberal approach to politics than his predecessor, suggesting that the
new president will steer the nation into an uncertain future, not in the least because
the kidnapping episode has brought the U.S. and the Soviet Union to the brink of war.
‘Terrorism’ in the Middle East, the novel suggests, can and does affect the United States
and its standing in the world. In The Fifth Horseman, the president and his advisers
discover to their dismay that Colonel Qaddafi has managed to get his hands on the latest
secret CIA technological gadget, an eye scanner which detects whether a person is lying or
not. Qaddafi then uses it successfully against the president during negotiations (312-13).
Even more worrisome, Qaddafi has built a hydrogen bomb, meaning that the power balance
in the Middle East has shifted dramatically. Both texts portray the United States as
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vulnerable to ‘terrorism’ from the Middle East, mirroring the general sentiment of the
decade.
What is more, these examples from American popular fiction of the 1970s also
indicate that the understanding of what ‘terrorism’ supposedly meant and entailed, had
changed. Not only did these fictional texts link Orientalist discourses about ‘Arabs’
(or ‘Palestinians’) to ‘terrorism,’ they also represented the issue in a different manner.
Unlike in Exodus, with which I opened this chapter, these ‘terrorists’ are not heroic rebels
and they do not use ‘terrorism’ as a tactic in a larger struggle for national liberation.
Rather, these ‘Arab terrorists’ in and from the Middle East are predominantly driven
by base sentiments, especially desire for revenge against as well as irrational hatred for
the U.S. (and/or Israel). In that sense, ‘terrorism’ functions in these novels as marker of
identity; it signals to readers that a character is unequivocally ‘evil.’ ‘Terrorism’ was thus
no longer represented as response to a legitimate political problem or struggle; instead,
depicting these villains as ‘terrorists’ became a way to dismiss the political context of the
conflict and simplify it into a ‘good-evil’ binary with clearly assigned roles.
To sum up, then, the American news media as well as cultural texts of the decade
engaged in important cultural work by carrying the discourse on ‘terrorism’ farther into
the American public space. This not only amplified the discourse’s message and introduced
a wider audience to its central claims, it also adapted the conceptualization of ‘terrorism’
itself in significant ways. Ultimately, the interconnectedness and cooperation between
these different discursive agents, i.e. the American news media, cultural texts, but also the
academic field as well as political voices, streamlined the ‘terrorism’ discourse over the course
of the 1970s and made the narrative it proposed more coherent. It made the discourse on
‘terrorism’ more powerful and more popular than before. This newly-established influence
and reach would be tested at the end of the decade when a group of Iranian students
stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held the staff captive for 444 days, a central
discursive event to which I turn in the next section.
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2.5 “America Held Hostage” – The Iranian Hostage Crisis as a
Case of ‘International Terrorism’ against the United States
In anger over President Carter’s decision to admit the recently-toppled Shah of Iran for
cancer treatment into the United States, a group of Iranian students scaled the walls of the
U.S. embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 and took its entire staff hostage.29 After a few
weeks, they released thirteen women and African Americans, but the remaining 53 hostages
continued in Iranian captivity for 444 days,30 accused of spying on the Iranian nation and
conspiring to return the deposed Shah to the throne, as the CIA had already done once
in 1953.31 While the Carter administration sought a diplomatic solution to the hostage
situation, slowly mounting political and economic pressure on the post-revolutionary
Iranian government, the American public quickly came to perceive the events as a national
crisis. Footage of blindfolded and handcuffed American hostages went around the world,
inciting anger and indignation over the degrading treatment of the captives. As Daniel
Houghton has maintained, “[f]rom the very beginning, the hostage crisis had exerted a
striking effect on ordinary Americans, who gradually became as obsessed as Carter with
the fate of their countrymen” (2).
Over thirty years later, the Iranian hostage crisis still excites the general public
and scholars alike. Ben Aﬄeck’s recent, Oscar-winning movie Argo (2012), based on the
secret escape of six embassy personnel with the help of the Canadian consulate in Iran,
is evidence to this. In general, there has been a fresh surge in scholarship on the Iranian
hostage crisis which, making use of recently declassified material, provides new analyses
and interpretations of the events.32 What concerns me here, however, is not a historically
accurate recounting of the events, but rather how the Carter administration chose to
narrate the hostage crisis in Tehran and how it explained events to the general American
29For a detailed account of the hostage crisis, see, e.g., Christopher et al.; McFadden et al.; Kreisberg;
Taheri, Nest of Spies ; and the report by the U.S. Committee of Foreign Affairs entitled The Iran Hostage
Crisis: A Chronology of Daily Developments. For a history of American-Iranian relations, see Bill. For
an analysis of how the hostage crisis affected the Carter presidency, see H. Jordan as well as Morris.
30One of the hostages, Richard Queen, was released in July 1980 after falling seriously ill. He was later
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.
31For more on the secret 1953 CIA and MI6 operation which displaced democratically elected Iranian
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in favor of the Shah, see Kinzer.
32For a historical account of the events depicted in Argo, see Pelletier and Adams. For an analysis of Argo
and its reception in Iran, see B. Edwards. Other works analyzing the hostage crisis, its build-up, and its
aftermath include Bowden, Guests; Farber; and D. Harris.
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public, namely as the first case of ‘international terrorism’ against the United States, thus
turning the incident into a “singular event” which reshaped and influenced the discourse
on ‘terrorism’ for decades to come (Foucault, “Order” 77).
From the very beginning of the crisis, President Carter linked what was occurring
in Iran to ‘terrorism.’ For instance, Carter already declared on November 8, 1979, i.e.
four days after the initial takeover, that “Americans [we]re suffering from international
terrorism in being held against their will” (“Visit of Lynch”). On November 12, he stated
that “we refuse[d] to permit the use of terrorism and the seizure and the holding of
hostages to impose political demands” (“Oil”). Again three days later, Carter condemned
the embassy takeover as “an act of terrorism – totally outside the bounds of international
law and diplomatic tradition” and asserted that “the United States w[ould] not yield to
international terrorism or to blackmail” (“American”).
This is also why I disagree with Carol Winkler’s analysis put forth in her 2006
study In the Name of Terrorism. Winkler claims that the Carter administration was
initially undecided over how to classify the captors and concerned over bringing up
debilitating memories of the disastrous Vietnam War (39). By January 1980, however,
the administration had settled on calling the embassy takeover an act of ‘terrorism’ (40).
This strategy, Winkler argues, meant that the Iranian government’s responsibility for
the takeover was minimized and the takeover itself became “a criminal act of terrorism
requiring the intervention of the international community” (41). Winkler then proceeds to
read the hostage crisis and Carter’s leadership in it from a literary studies perspective as a
classical tragedy and understands the embattled president as tragic hero in this narrative.
While this may be a novel approach to interpreting Carter’s role in the hostage crisis, it
does not actually advance our understanding of how the ‘terrorism’ discourse operated
during this historical event, much less how it changed the discourse in the process. As
the examples above show, the Carter administration relied much earlier on the ‘terrorism’
discourse to make sense of the events in Iran than Winkler acknowledges. This constitutes
a clear sign of how influential the discourse on ‘terrorism’ had become over the course of
the decade. It was immediately employed by the Carter administration and no important
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discursive agent contested the framing, making it the dominant paradigm through which
the hostage crisis was understood and managed.
The framing of the events in Tehran as “another exhibition of international terrorism”
(Carter, “Visit of Thatcher”) carried significant political advantages. Most importantly,
it enabled the president to arbitrarily distinguish between the Khomeini government,
the larger Iranian population, and the actual hostage takers to respond flexibly to the
ever-changing political situation. This vaguely defined, emotionally charged term allowed
the president to include the Iranian government in the group of ‘terrorists’ whenever he
deemed it advantageous. For instance, when announcing international economic sanctions
against Iran, Carter talked about “kidnappers and terrorists, supported by Iranian
officials” (“International”). By grouping the Iranian government with the ‘terrorists,’
he subtly justified the drastic sanctions to the international community and his American
audiences, and characterized the situation in Iran as extraordinary in nature since official
representatives of Iran were actively involved in it.
Similarly, on April 17, 1980, a good five months into the crisis, Carter charged that
the Iranian “Government [wa]s now directly involved in continuing this act of international
terrorism” (“President’s News” 17 April 1980). A day later, Carter reiterated that “the
legitimate constitutional Government of Iran [was] officially condoning and even supporting
this international act of terrorism” (“Interview”). These statements further escalated official
Iranian involvement in the hostage crisis since, according to the president, it was now
the entire government which engaged in ‘terrorism.’ In these and similar examples, the
Carter administration consciously linked the new Iranian government led by the Ayatollah
Khomeini to ‘terrorism’ and reaped ample benefits from this linguistic fusion. Not only did
the American nation rally around its leader in this time of crisis – Carter’s approval ratings
soared for a while – it also meant that there existed little interest in Iranian grievances
and open criticism of American foreign policy.
Casting the Iranian hostage crisis in terms of ‘international terrorism’ also had
other domestic political advantages. The Carter administration used the embassy takeover
as a reason to further advocate the president’s energy policy and the need to become
independent of foreign (now meaning Iranian) oil imports. In the same November 12, 1979
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statement already quoted above, Carter addressed “the extreme importance of reducing
oil consumption here in the United States” a mere eight days after the embassy takeover
(“Oil”). Three days later, he warned the public that “our excessive dependence on foreign
oil [wa]s a direct, physical threat to our freedom and security as Americans (“American”).
The administration made good use of the already existing discursive link between the
Middle East, oil, and ‘terrorism,’ employing it to push for further national reform and
energy conservation by presenting it as a way to fight ‘terrorism’ against the United States.
President Carter and his administration were not the only ones to frame the
hostage situation in Iran as an act of ‘terrorism.’ The New York Times also regularly
linked the crisis in Iran to ‘terrorism.’ A special from November 11, 1979, for instance,
opened by claiming that “[i]n the Twentieth Century, political terrorism ha[d] usually
been disavowed by ruling authorities” (“Held” E1), in order to stress to readers that the
Iranian political elite had precisely not done this, suggesting that what was happening in
Tehran constituted ‘terrorism’ and that the Iranian government was complicit in it. James
Reston’s contribution to that same edition of The New York Times discerned “a new
kind of international warfare, with new weapons of publicity and destruction in the hands
of fanatical minorities, requiring new methods of defense” (E21). According to Reston,
‘terrorism’ of the type occurring in Iran epitomized this “new kind of international warfare”
and he concluded that “diplomatic blackmail and international terrorism [we]re increasing
and the methods for dealing with them obviously ha[d] to be quite different” (E21).
Moreover, The New York Times often reprinted Carter’s speeches and statements, thus
circulating the president’s framing of events as ‘terrorism’ and suggesting to readers that
this particular discursivization was deemed ‘correct’ by the newspaper.
However, despite intense negotiations and economic and international pressure, the
Carter administration found itself incapable of freeing the hostages through diplomatic
channels. On April 24, 1980, a military operation called “Operation Eagle Claw” was
launched which put the U.S. ‘anti-terrorism’ unit Delta Force to the test. The mission
failed even before it had properly begun. During the clandestine journey to Iran, a total
of three helicopters broke down, leading President Carter to abort the mission. As the
teams were preparing to leave again, one of the remaining helicopters crashed into another
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transport aircraft, killing eight servicemen whose bodies were left behind in the desert by
the retreating troops. The Iranian military later recovered the bodies of the dead American
soldiers as well as the remaining helicopters, weapons, maps, and sensitive intelligence
material.33 In interviews and press releases, President Carter praised the soldiers for their
valor, patriotism, and dedication, and stressed that the mission was necessary because of
“the steady unraveling of authority in Iran and the mounting dangers that were posed to
the safety of the hostages themselves and the growing realization that their early release
was highly unlikely” (“Address”).
After the failed rescue attempt, President Carter was noticeably more careful in his
labeling of the hostage crisis as ‘terrorism.’ In his address to the nation on April 25, one
day after the failed mission, Carter did not mention ‘terrorism’ once. He merely insisted,
“we continue to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety and for the early
release of the American hostages, who have been held so long. The United States remains
determined to bring about their safe release at the earliest date possible” (“Address”).
Similarly, in his message for the memorial service for the eight soldiers who were killed in
the accidents a few days later, Carter expressed his sorrow, saying that he “grieve[d] with
you for eight fine men who died in the service of America” and praised the men’s “daring
spirit” (“Rescue”). He did not mention ‘terrorism’ at all. Indeed, references to the hostage
takers as ‘terrorists’ in this context could have been problematic since it could be seen to
imply that the United States was unable to beat a group of ‘terrorists.’
In the context of the Iranian hostage crisis, Carter mentioned ‘terrorism’ again at
the end of the month, namely on April 29 during a news conference. He defended the rescue
mission as well as charges that the U.S. violated international laws by invading Iranian
territory in secret and stressed the integrity of the soldiers during the mission by highlighting
that “they [the U.S. soldiers] carefully released, without harm, 44 Iranians who had passed
by the site and who were detained to protect the integrity of the mission” (“President’s
News” April 29, 1980). Carter then contrasted this to “the ghoulish action of the terrorists
and some of the Government officials in Iran, in our Embassy this weekend, who displayed
in a horrible exhibition of inhumanity the bodies of our courageous Americans.” During
33On “Operation Eagle Claw,” see Beckwith and Knox, D. Martin and Walcott, McAlister, and P. Ryan.
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the round of questions with reporters following his statement, Carter reiterated this
point, claiming that “the fact that the terrorists participated in the desecration [wa]s an
indication of the kind of people they [we]re.” Here, the ‘terrorist’ label worked to depict
the perpetrators as acting outside of the international community’s norms and passed a
moral judgment on them.
In the end, however, the Iranian hostage crisis was not only shaped by the discourse
on ‘terrorism,’ it also influenced the discourse in return. Carter’s particular framing of
the concept introduced two new aspects to the discourse, one being the characterization
of ‘terrorism’ as ‘international’ and the other the notion that states (like Iran) could
actively sponsor ‘terrorist’ groups for political gain. Carter’s continuous references to
‘international terrorism,’ instead of, say, ‘Iranian terrorism’ or even ‘Islamic terrorism,’
avoided identifying the ‘terrorism’ with a specific social group or religion which could have
made the administration vulnerable to charges of racism, religious discrimination, and the
like. Moreover, framing the ‘terrorism’ as religiously motivated or based on geographical
and ethnic markers could have alienated allies in the Middle East whose participation in
the international embargo was vital to make it work. Rather, the notion that this particular
kind of ‘terrorism’ was ‘international’ in nature suggested that this constituted a threat
facing the entire global community and made it easier to forge strategic partnerships
with other countries. It also implied that ‘terrorists’ now operated across state borders,
enhancing the threat because local conflicts could easily become international issues
involving many nations.
At the same time, even though Carter was generally careful about charging the
Khomeini administration directly with ‘terrorism,’ he nevertheless regularly accused the
Iranian government of sponsoring it. Early on into the crisis, he decried, for instance, how
“kidnappers and terrorists, supported by Iranian officials, continue[d] to hold our people
under inhumane conditions” (“International;” emphasis added). Similarly, on April 29,
1980, President Carter insisted during a news conference that “[t]he crime [wa]s being
committed by terrorists who [we]re kidnapping innocent victims, sponsored by and approved
by Government officials themselves” (“President’s News” April 29, 1980; emphasis added).
Ultimately, this particular framing of ‘terrorism’ as international and sponsored by a
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foreign government made it easier for the Carter administration to build an international
alliance, especially through the United Nations, which not only condemned Iran for what
was happening, but also agreed to put sanctions against it in place.
This notion that governments did not actively have to engage in ‘terrorism’
themselves but could instruct third parties to act on their behalf in international settings
would become extremely influential in later years. When Ronald Reagan took over the
presidency on January 20, 1981, the discourse on ‘terrorism’ became another way through
which to frame the ongoing Cold War and the concept of ‘international terrorism’ sponsored
by antagonistic governments became central to explanations of the conflict with the Soviet
Union. Moreover, as the next chapter shows, it provided the discursive ‘glue’ to link ideas
about the Soviet Union’s reliance on ‘terrorism’ to the discourse on ‘Arab’ and ‘Middle
East terrorism,’ constructing the region and its peoples as dangerous and evil ‘terrorist’
agents in the intensifying Cold War.
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Chapter 3
“This Is [. . . ] the Work of a Confederation of Terrorist
States” – The 1980s, ‘Terrorist’ Networks, and the
Reagan Administration’s ‘War against Terrorism’
The experience of the Iranian hostage crisis influenced the American discourse on ‘terrorism’
significantly and motivated important and far-reaching changes in how ‘terrorism’ was
conceptualized and discursivized in the decade that followed. Indeed, for the newly-elected
Reagan administration, ‘terrorism’ became a central concern and its approach to the issue
was determined by what were seen as key lessons from the crisis with Iran. It immediately
became clear that the new administration would handle ‘terrorism’ differently than its
predecessors. During his inaugural address on January 20, 1981, the same day that the
hostages in Iran were finally released, President Reagan told the nation:
Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is
so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our
adversaries in today’s world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have.
Let that be understood by those who practice terrorism and prey upon their neighbors.
(“Inaugural”)
Not only was Reagan the first president to mention ‘terrorism’ in his inaugural address,
he also ideologized the term’s meaning by framing it as the opposite of freedom and
“moral courage,” which he in turn stylized as “weapons” which would guarantee the
American nation victory over its “adversaries.” Moreover, his address already contained a
thinly-veiled threat of retribution towards “those who practice[d] terrorism,” suggesting
that the incoming administration would take a more militaristic stance towards the issue.
This approach differed noticeably from Carter’s and became more pronounced in
the following days and weeks.1 The American hostages returned from Iran to the United
States on January 27, 1981 and were officially welcomed by President Reagan and his wife.
Reagan, at that point a president for only seven and a half days, used the opportunity
to issue a stern warning in the direction of the ‘terrorist’ perpetrators and potentially
1By contrast, President Carter, responding to the fallout from the Watergate scandal, announced in his
inaugural address four years earlier his intentions to “create together a new national spirit of unity and
trust” and stressed the importance of human rights and global peace (“Inaugural”).
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like-minded groups: “Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior
are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution. We hear it said that
we live in an era of limits to our powers. Well, let it be understood, there are limits to our
patience” (“Remarks for the Freed”). His remarks were broadcast live on national radio
and television, ensuring that his message was widely disseminated and discussed.
The president’s words signaled that a change in the conceptualization of ‘terrorism’
and the new administration’s approach to the issue was underway. Reagan’s remarks,
especially the call for “swift and effective retribution,” indicated a militarization of the
‘terrorism’ discourse and contained an implicit promise to restore American power and
honor in response to the perceived political and military failure in the Iranian hostage
crisis. Reagan’s listeners evidently understood his statement in these terms. The New York
Times concluded that in his speech Reagan “seemed to sketch the outlines of a new and
more forceful policy as he addressed the crowd on the White House lawn” (Raines A14).
It also reported that when Reagan spoke the above-cited three sentences, each of them
“was greeted by a strong burst of applause” (A14), suggesting that Reagan’s show of
strength against the ‘terrorist’ enemy was well-received. It was certainly condoned by the
former hostages who, as Howell Raines noted, “expressed happiness with the tough tone
of Mr. Reagan’s remarks” (A14). Raines’ observation not only linked Reagan’s statement
on ‘terrorism’ explicitly to the Iranian hostage crisis, but also made it clear to readers
that this rhetoric shift was endorsed by the former hostages who, as the most recent and
prominent victims of ‘terrorism,’ could speak with authenticity and moral authority on
the issue.
Reagan did not only speak about ‘terrorism,’ he also initiated policy reviews
and changes, demonstrating to the American public that his administration considered
‘terrorism’ a central and serious political problem.2 Just how much the Reagan
administration considered ‘terrorism’ a top priority became apparent when the National
Security Council held its first meeting on January 24, 1981, i.e. on the president’s fourth
day in office. The meeting was convened in order to discuss the threat of ‘terrorism’ for
the United States and was attended by some of the most powerful men in U.S. politics at
2For a historical analysis and evaluation of President Reagan’s ‘counter-terrorism’ policies, see Wills.
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the time: President Reagan himself was present just like Vice President Bush, Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, National Security Advisor
Richard Allen, Attorney General William French Smith, FBI Director William Webster,
CIA Director William Casey, NSA Director Bobby Ray Inman, and White House Chief
of Staff James Baker (Ha¨nni, Terrorismus 170, 177; Naftali, False 3n4). That such an
illustrious group of high-ranking officials met this early into their tenure showed how much
influence the issue of ‘terrorism’ carried in American politics and how central the discourse
had become.
In the meeting, participants discussed how best to confront the threat of
‘terrorism.’ However, while experts of the intelligence community described the issue
of ‘terrorism’ as a “manageable” problem, the politicians in the room openly disagreed
(Ha¨nni, Terrorismus 177). In fact, Secretary of State Alexander Haig escalated the rhetoric
by insisting throughout the meeting that the most pressing threat facing the United
States was ‘terrorism’ financed and organized by the Soviet Union (176). CIA Director
William Casey agreed while lower-level analysts expressed their skepticism. But even
though intelligence experts in the room voiced their doubts both about the magnitude of
the ‘terrorism’ threat as well as Soviet involvement in it, as a consequence of the meeting,
the CIA began advising its stations all over the world to put ‘terrorism’ at the top of their
lists of “Essential Elements of Intelligence” (178). This constituted another clear sign that
‘terrorism’ was perceived as an important political problem.
In the days and weeks that followed, members of the administration introduced
the American public to the changed approach to and understanding of ‘terrorism’ as a
national security threat. Most importantly, on January 28, a mere four days after the
meeting of the National Security Council, Secretary of State Alexander Haig held a press
conference during which he confidently declared that “the greatest priority in human
rights today [wa]s the problem of rampant international terrorism” (qtd. in Gwertzman,
“Haig” A1). Haig also promised his audience that “[i]nternational terrorism w[ould] take
the place of human rights in our concern because it [wa]s the ultimate abuse of human
rights” (qtd. in Taubman 36; qtd. in Woodward 93). In this manner, Haig echoed and
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reinforced the president’s message about the threat of ‘terrorism’ for the United States
and presented it as serious political concern.
But Haig not only identified ‘terrorism’ as the new administration’s main foreign
policy issue, he also used the press conference to openly accuse the Soviet Union of “training,
funding and equipping” ‘terrorist’ groups around the world, unequivocally denouncing these
practices as “international terrorism” (“Excerpts” A10). Haig was not alone. Two days
later, The New York Times reported that a spokesman for the State Department, in an
official statement, named “Russian financial support, training and arming of Palestine
Liberation Organization guerrillas; the use of Cuban and Libyan surrogates as conduits
to terrorist groups; support of guerrillas in El Salvador and South-West Africa, and
broadcasts supporting the holding of the American hostages in Iran” as examples for “Soviet
involvement in terrorist acts” (Gwertzman, “President” A3). These blunt accusations
against the Soviet Union were widely noted and interpreted as putting an end to de´tente
and “reignit[ing] the Cold War” (Paull 1). They also signaled to the wider American public
that a reframing of ‘terrorism’ within the Cold War paradigm was under way. Indeed, even
President Reagan claimed that the Soviet Union sponsored ‘terrorism’ against the United
States. During a news conference in March 1981, he decried, for instance, “the infiltration
into the Americas by terrorists” and claimed that “the Soviet Union and Cuba and those
others that we’ve named” backed ‘terrorist’ groups in the region (“President’s News”).
Coming from the president himself, these accusations carried significant weight, endowing
claims about Soviet sponsorship of ‘terrorism’ with legitimacy and ensuring their wide
circulation.
After his press conference in January 1981, Haig tasked the intelligence community
with compiling the necessary evidence for his claims against the Soviet Union and ordered
the CIA to write up a “Special National Intelligence Estimate” (SNIE), fully expecting it to
confirm his public statements about Soviet support for “international terrorism.” To Haig’s
surprise, the CIA did not find any proof for Haig’s accusations and actually contradicted
and dismissed them. CIA Director William Casey, however, agreed with Haig that the
Soviet Union was sponsoring ‘terrorism’ all over the globe against the U.S. and instead
of backing up the work done by his agency actually rejected the SNIE as bad analysis.
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Casey then ordered a second SNIE, this time written by a known Cold Warrior, Wynfred
Joshua. The second SNIE, as expected, confirmed Haig’s and Casey’s beliefs, but was so
badly compiled and written that Casey could not present it as official CIA analysis without
losing face. In the end, Casey tasked the National Intelligence Council with producing
a third and final SNIE. This intelligence estimate concluded that the Soviet Union did
support a few so-called revolutionary movements, but not a network of ‘terrorist’ groups
as described by Haig and the State Department (Ha¨nni, Terrorismus 188-96; D. Martin
and Walcott 51-56; Woodward 93, 124-29).3
Both Haig and Casey were angry and frustrated that the intelligence community
seemingly refused to produce the desired results but had to give in eventually. As a final
resort, the third and final SNIE was classified as ‘top secret,’ which limited access to it
to only the highest-ranking members of the Reagan administration. As a consequence,
Bob Woodward notes, in the eyes of the American public, “the Soviets still stood publicly
branded by the Secretary of State as active supporters of terrorism. The record was never
corrected” (129). This effectively made the fact that the Soviet Union was not sponsoring
‘terrorism’ against the U.S. a state secret (Ha¨nni, Terrorismus 198). It also meant that
the Reagan administration did not have to publicly retract these claims which would have
been embarrassing and awkward, to say the least.
Undeterred by these findings, Haig continued to make public statements about
Soviet sponsorship of ‘international terrorism.’ For instance, he declared in April 1981
that “Moscow continue[d] to support terrorism and war by proxy” (“Text” 4). Similarly,
President Reagan regularly referred to the notion of a Soviet-sponsored ‘terror’ network in
speeches and public appearances long after the composition of the third SNIE. For example,
when Reagan addressed the nation during his State of the Union speech on January 26,
1982, he promised that “[t]oward those who would export terrorism and subversion in
the Caribbean and elsewhere, especially Cuba and Libya, we w[ould] act with firmness”
3Recent archival research has shown that the Soviet Union did have some ties to some ‘terrorist’ groups.
For instance, documents made accessible after the fall of the USSR reveal Wadi Haddad of the PFLP
to have been an agent for the KGB (Naftali, Blind 124). Nevertheless, the Soviet Union never had the
amount of control over these ‘terrorist’ groups as Haig and others claimed. See the works by Naftali
as well as Ha¨nni for more detail. See Stanik for a minority counter-view, i.e. the claim that “Sterling’s
controversial hypothesis about a functioning terrorist network [. . . ] [was] [. . . ] vindicated” because former
Soviet satellite states “disclosed the true nature of the terror network” after the fall of the Soviet Union
(38).
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(“Address before a Joint”). Cuba and Libya, of course, had already been accused of acting
as Soviet surrogates in the global network of ‘terrorist’ groups.
This raises the question of why the president and his Secretary of State (as well
as other members of the administration) continued (to varying degrees) to insist upon
the existence of a Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorism’ network despite knowing that their own
agencies had dismissed these ideas as political fantasy. Even more pressing, where had the
Secretary gotten the idea for this notion in the first place? Why were he and others like
CIA Director Casey so convinced that their very own analysts were completely wrong to
claim Soviet innocence in matters of ‘terrorism’?
The rest of this chapter sets out to answer these questions by examining the roots of
these claims as well as how and why they spread as widely as they did through American
society in the early 1980s. These ideas about ‘terrorism’ in the midst of the Cold War
affected the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in lasting ways, consolidating a conceptualization of
‘terrorism’ as war waged by state-sponsored networks which circulates to the present day.
I begin by discussing in detail the discursive roots of the accusations against the Soviet
Union of sponsoring ‘terrorism’ against the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s
before analyzing these claims as a conspiracy theory in order to explain how it functioned
and why it proved so popular for a few years. In the third section, I examine political,
academic, and journalistic responses to the conspiracy theory. Then I turn in the fourth
section to alternative discursivizations of ‘terrorism’ which became prominent from the
mid-1980s onward and which drew on ideas about ‘terrorism’ developed by the conspiracy
theory. In the last section, I focus on conceptualizations of the issue which were advanced
by the American news media, using The New York Times as a case study, as well as
cultural productions which reframed ‘terrorism’ in the mid- to late 1980s after the the
Cold War with the Soviet Union had begun to thaw, making claims of Soviet sponsorship
of ‘terrorism’ no longer tenable.
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3.1 The Root of All Evil – The Intellectual Origins behind
Claims of Soviet Sponsorship of ‘Terrorism’ in the Early
1980s
The claim that the Soviet Union organized and financed ‘terrorist’ groups all over the world
and deployed them against the United States evidently enjoyed considerable popularity
with members of the recently elected Reagan administration. As I have argued in the
preceding chapter, discursive links between ‘terrorism’ and communism, particularly as
ideology practiced by the Soviet Union, already existed in the previous decades. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, however, these concerns were taken up by a group of scholars,
politicians, and journalists who warned their contemporaries of what they perceived as
serious threat emanating from a (supposed) Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorism’ network. This
section therefore looks more closely at the intellectual origins of this claim as well as the
surge in popularity it experienced in the early 1980s.
The content of this particular narrative is fairly easily summarized: It posited as
its central argument that the Soviet Union, with the help of its satellite states, had built
an international network comprising all major ‘terrorist’ groups worldwide and provided
funding, equipment, training, and advice to all of them, no matter their ideology and
politics – it even gave these groups orders as to who should be attacked next. Most texts
presenting this narrative also pointed to communist Cuba and the various Palestinian
(‘terrorist’) groups as central Soviet proxies and particularly dangerous agents in this
network. The main targets of this Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorism’ were the United States and
the nations of Western Europe, i.e. its antagonists in the Cold War. Indeed, the Soviet
Union supposedly relied on these ‘terrorist’ groups in order to lastingly destabilize ‘the
West,’ win the Cold War, and spread communism around the globe. At the same time, the
narrative warned that the nations of ‘the West,’ particularly the United States, had been
dangerously unaware of these developments and therefore needed to be made to realize
the ‘truth’ and act on it.
Importantly, this narrative about a global Soviet-financed and organized ‘terrorism’
network did not appear out of the blue, but emerged slowly and was continuously developed,
honed, and refined by different writers and discursive agents attempting to expose
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the allegedly secret Soviet plan to destabilize the United States through ‘international
terrorism.’ Early texts which put forth a first version of the narrative I outlined above
include Ovid Demaris, Brothers in Blood (1977), Stefan Possony and L. F. Bouchey’s
aptly titled 1978 study International Terrorism – The Communist Connection, Robert
Kupperman and Darrel Trent’s work Terrorism (1979), and Louis Beres’ account in
Apocalypse (1980). These texts generally linked communism to ‘terrorism’ and pointed to
the communist powers in China and the Soviet Union as dangerous enemy forces relying
on ‘terrorism’ to spread their ideology.
This emerging narrative about a communist-controlled ‘terrorism’ network was
significantly streamlined, propagated, and disseminated by an international conference on
the issue of ‘international terrorism,’ held in Jerusalem between July 2 and July 5, 1979,
and organized by the Jonathan Institute, an Israeli organization founded by Benjamin
Netanyahu in the wake of his brother Jonathan’s death during the 1976 Israeli raid on
Entebbe.4 The conference featured distinguished speakers mainly from the United States
and Israel, including Benzion and Benjamin Netanyahu, Menachem Begin, described
euphemistically as “leader of the underground organization Irgun Zvai Leumi prior to the
establishment of the State of Israel” (Begin 39), Brian Crozier as acknowledged expert
on ‘international terrorism’ (Crozier, “Soviet” 64), Ray Cline, the Deputy Director for
Intelligence at the CIA, as well as George H. W. Bush, “an American diplomat and leading
figure in the Republican Party” (“U.S.” 332). Given the high social and political standing
and rank of most of the participants, the conference generated “significant media coverage”
(Stampnitzky 112), meaning that the conference’s message was disseminated widely in the
United States.5
Conference participants overwhelmingly agreed that the Soviet Union functioned
as a major sponsor and coordinator of international ‘terrorism’ and used the conference as
4For a critical view of the Jonathan Institute, especially the charge that the Jonathan Institute functioned
as a front organization for the Mossad, see Ha¨nni, Terrorismus; Herman and O’Sullivan; and Landis,
“Moscow” and “Robert.”
5The first text to point to the importance of the Jerusalem Conference for the discourse on ‘terrorism’
is Philip Paull’s final thesis written in 1982 as part of his studies for an M.A. degree in international
relations. This constitutes the only significant contemporary analysis of the conference and its effects on
public discourses on ‘terrorism’ and foreign policy. The importance of the Jerusalem Conference for the
‘terrorism’ discourse in the United States has only recently been re-discovered by scholars. See especially
Ha¨nni and Stampnitzky.
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a platform to make their claims and accusations public. Taken together, the conference
not only introduced the narrative about an international ‘terrorism’ network to a wider
audience, but also repackaged it as easily consumable, straightforward story: The Soviet
Union became the main foe as references to China and other communist powers were
dropped and the links to established ‘terrorist’ groups in the Middle East, predominantly the
Palestinian movements, were stressed, thus linking knowledge claims about ‘Middle Eastern
terrorism’ and ‘communist terrorism’ from previous years to construct one homogeneous
narrative (see again Chapter 2).
The Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism was attended by more than
400 journalists who carried back to their home countries the news that the Soviet
Union was financing and guiding practically all ‘terrorist’ groups in existence at the
time (Ha¨nni, Terrorismus 82; Herman and O’Sullivan 105). Similarly, the conference
participants themselves not only understood the event as “an intervention to change the
international discourse on terrorism” (Stampnitzky 113), but also saw it as their mission to
educate politicians and their constituents at home and to actively work towards countering
the perceived Soviet threat (Ha¨nni, “Mastermind” 220). Thus, in the aftermath of the
conference, a variety of influential publications appeared which further elaborated on
the notion of a Soviet-controlled global ‘terrorist’ network and which ultimately greatly
influenced the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the United States.
Central figures among this group of disseminators included Robert Moss, a journalist,
author, and “a major propaganda asset of American and British intelligence” who ended
up writing a variety of articles (and even novels – more on that in the next section) in which
he argued for the veracity of the narrative (Ha¨nni, “Mastermind” 236). Likewise, his friend
and colleague Arnaud de Borchgrave collaborated with him on several projects, particularly
the editing of the journal Early Warning whose subscription cost $1,000 per year and
could be acquired by invitation only (Herman and O’Sullivan 124, “De Borchgrave”).
De Borchgrave also published his own articles in academic and news journals, warning of
the dangers of the ‘terrorism’ network.6 Both Moss and de Borchgrave not only depicted the
6For more on Moss’s and de Borchgrave’s ties to American and British secret services, see Ha¨nni,
Terrorismus and “Mastermind;” and Landis, “Moscow” and “Robert.”
101
Soviet Union as main antagonist, but also used references to and examples of ‘Palestinian
terrorism’ to enhance the threat emanating from the ‘terrorism’ network.7
However, the most important text for the development of the narrative proved to be
Claire Sterling’s 1981 book The Terror Network in which she detailed her investigations and
‘revealed’ the existence of a Soviet-controlled ‘terrorist’ network active all over Europe. Like
her contemporaries, Sterling also stressed the importance of Palestinian ‘terrorist’ groups
for the network and even suggested that Libyan leader Colonel Qaddafi was entangled
with the Soviet ‘terror’ network, thus furthering the link between ‘terrorism’ in and from
the Middle East and ‘communist terrorism.’ Sterling’s report, which a review in Foreign
Affairs called “a landmark book, breaking much new ground and deserving of the care
it takes to read it thoroughly” (Bundy), became a world-wide bestseller and one of the
most-cited studies in the field of ‘terrorism’ research in the 1980s (Reid, “Terrorism” 34).
Critics like Stampnitzky and Ha¨nni thus rightfully stress the importance and influence of
Sterling’s book for the development of the ‘terrorism’ discourse in the United States and
the narrative about a Soviet-controlled ‘terrorism’ network in particular (Stampnitzky 117;
Ha¨nni, “Mastermind” 222-23).
Sterling’s revelations fell on fertile grounds. In the academic realm, her claims were
discussed and confirmed by other recognized experts on ‘terrorism,’ leading to a wide array
of publications which drew on Sterling’s The Terror Network and endorsed her findings.8
In response to Sterling, prominent American think tanks published their own studies which
further spread the narrative of the Soviet ‘terror’ network.9 As we have seen, the allegations
against the Soviet Union even seemed credible to powerful politicians like Alexander Haig
or high-ranking government officials like William Casey at the CIA. Alexander Haig, for
instance, repeatedly referred to Sterling’s book both during private meetings with analysts
as well as during press conferences and, at one point, even distributed excerpts from the
book to a congressional committee (Schmid et al. 103). Similarly, William Casey is reported
7Other important texts which argued for the existence of a Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorism’ network in
some form or other include de Borchgrave, “Unspiking;” Kirkpatrick, “U.S.;” Ledeen, Grave; and Moss,
“Terror.”
8Examples of such works include Barron; Goren; and Becker, Soviet
9Examples for studies by American think tanks include Francis (supported by The Heritage Foundation),
Cline and Alexander (published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies). The CSIS also
sponsored the anthology Latin American Insurgencies (1985), edited by Georges Fauriol, which features
an article written by Y. Alexander and Kucinski on the alleged Soviet ‘terrorism’ network.
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to have told a group of CIA analysists that “I paid $13.95 for this [Sterling’s book] and it
told me more than you bastards who I pay $50,000 a year” (qtd. in Woodward 126). Both
men were convinced of the veracity of Sterling’s claims about a Soviet-financed ‘terrorism’
network, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
Interestingly, the U.S. government was not the only discursive actor to believe, repeat,
and spread claims about a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network. The legislative branch also began
to investigate these allegations and eventually the Senate established the Subcommittee
on Security and Terrorism (SST) in 1981, chaired by Jeremiah Denton (R-AL). The SST
began to hold hearings in April 1981 and was active until 1986. All in all, the SST held
a total of 37 hearings, invited as witnesses 32 U.S. government employees and elected
officials, 18 “former members of terrorist organizations or [. . . ] victims of terrorism,” seven
“prominent advocates” of the Soviet ‘terror’ network conspiracy theory, including Stefan
Possony, Claire Sterling, Robert Moss, and Arnaud de Borchgrave, as well as 18 other
witnesses from a variety of related fields and occupations (Stampnitzky 122). The witnesses
overwhelmingly confirmed the existence of a Soviet-controlled ‘terrorist’ network; dissident
views (like the testimony by James H. Billington on June 11, 1981) were not considered or
reframed as proving the conspiracy theory after all.10
By inviting the most prominent advocates of these claims to speak at the hearings,
the SST provided a platform to further fix the meaning of ‘terrorism’ and to disseminate
the discourse “in a generally unhampered way” (Gold-Biss 80). Indeed, Michael Gold-Biss’s
1994 study The Discourse on Terrorism, the first thorough scholarly analysis of the work
of the SST and its impact on the discourse on ‘terrorism,’ stresses that “[t]he discourse on
terrorism and the relationship between the cabalist community of interpretation and the
SST was premised on the notion of the expertise of the former to interpret and analyze
political violence and the importance of the latter as a venue for the expression and
10The day after Billington’s testimony before the SST, Senator Denton opened the session by announcing
that “I would like to set the record a little bit straighter in view of a press report today regarding
yesterday’s hearing. The report quotes Dr. Billington as urging that, ‘rigorous scholarly scrutiny’ be
applied to suggestions that Soviet leaders had overcome doctrinal inhibitions about terrorism as a
revolutionary technique. [. . . ] I dare say that Dr. Billington did say those words [. . . ], but I am not
sure that that represents [. . . ] a balanced presentation of what Dr. Billington had to offer. [. . . ] it was
clear from Dr. Billington’s testimony and from his book that all he was stating was that there should
be fundamental documentation to support the thesis that the Soviets are supporting international
terrorism” (United States, Historical 30).
103
diffusion of the discourse itself” (75). What is more, Gold-Biss argues, the SST, under the
leadership of Senator Denton, “manufactured the discourse on terrorism” (76), meaning
that the subcommittee was the first agent to problematize ‘terrorism’ and, through its
activities and practices, the first to construct a coherent discourse about it.
I hesitate to agree fully with Gold-Biss’s rather sweeping statement because in
my view it somewhat overstates the effect and reach of the SST, especially considering
that the media interest in the hearings soon abated (see also Stampnitzky 122, 126;
Gold-Biss 79). Nevertheless, it is clear that the SST engaged in important political and
cultural work which influenced and spread the discourse on ‘terrorism’ (it did not, however,
single-handedly create it) because it offered an easily understandable and consumable,
coherent presentation of the allegations against the Soviet Union. This was achieved, in
part, by simplifying the issue further to exclude cultural and political factors as irrelevant,
unless they ‘proved’ a propensity to rely on ‘terrorism’ for an entire people like ‘the
Soviets’ or ‘the Arabs.’ It also used its own authority as a legislative organ with official
hearings, witnesses and an audience, official transcripts which were published later, as
well as an overall atmosphere of being in a courtroom to endow the claims about Soviet
sponsorship of ‘terrorism’ with legitimacy and maintain its central discursive position
(Ha¨nni, Terrorismus 219). After delving into the intellectual origins and dissemination of
ideas about a Soviet-sponsored international ‘terrorism’ network, I use the next section to
read this narrative as a conspiracy theory in order to discuss its workings and functions in
detail.
3.2 “Proof Abounded” – Reading Claims of a Soviet ‘Terror’
Network as Conspiracy Theory
In order to gain a clearer understanding of how the narrative of a Soviet-sponsored
‘terrorism’ network circulated and functioned in American society of the early 1980s,
I propose to read it through the lens of conspiracy theory. This may seem like a controversial
decision, especially when considering that previous scholarship on this narrative has, so
far at least, never shown an interest in the concept as an investigative tool. This may
be related, at least in part, to the fact that the main proponents of the narrative did
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not rely on typical conspiracist language which would have openly marked their claims
as conspiracy theory. Thus, Adrian Ha¨nni, the first scholar to engage at length with the
discourse on ‘terrorism’ during the (first) Reagan administration, uses the phrase “Terror
Network Image” in his 2018 study Terrorismus (unfortunately only available in German).
Carol Winkler, in turn, has argued that “Reagan’s application of the Cold War narrative
transformed the national debate about the crime of terrorism” (In the Name 82; emphasis
added). In my view, however, understanding the allegations about a Soviet-sponsored
‘terrorism’ network as a conspiracy theory captures the full scope of the issue, acknowledges
its complexity, and constitutes a useful tool to analyze the diverse functions and changing
discursive status of these claims. In the rest of this section, I therefore discuss the notion
of a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network as a conspiracy theory and draw on the valuable insights
put forth by a growing body of research engaged in analyzing the impact of conspiracy
theories in American culture, past and present.11
I follow here Michael Butter who defines conspiracy theories as the belief that
“a group of evil agents, the conspirators, has assumed or is currently trying to assume
control over an institution, a region, a nation, or the world” (Plots 1). The conspiracy
theory under investigation here fulfills the parameters of Butter’s definition. It depicts
the Soviet Union as main conspirator, the secretive force plotting to gain control over
the world. At times, the conspiracy theory also names Cuba or Palestinian groups as
co-conspirators, but in other versions of the narrative, these “evil agents” are represented
rather as loyal and dutiful minions instead of equal partners. While it is only implied
in Butter’s definition, Michael Barkun’s explanation of the concept includes a moral
evaluation of the conspirators’ plans, i.e. the notion that they are “acting covertly to
achieve some malevolent end” (3). In the case of the Soviet ‘terror’ network conspiracy
theory, this element is relevant as the conspiracy theory posits a dichotomy between the
‘good,’ democratic, ‘counter-terrorist’ United States and the ‘evil,’ communist, ‘terrorist’
Soviet Union and its ‘terrorism’ network. As we will see later, this moralizing stance
11For more on the development and functions of conspiracy theories in American history, politics, and
culture, see Barkun; Butter, Plots; Fenster; Goldberg; Knight; Melley, Empire and Covert ; Olmsted;
and Thalmann.
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inherent in the conspiracy theory of the Soviet ‘terror’ network would also influence the
discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the years to come.
Moreover, Michael Barkun has stressed that conspiracy theories present the world
as functioning “by design rather than by randomness” (3). Barkun has developed three
principles which characterize conspiracy theories; the first one, “[n]othing happens by
accident” (3), means that everything happens according to someone’s master plan. Barkun’s
second principle states that “[n]othing is as it seems” (4), i.e. that the conspirators
actively seek to hide their true identities and wish to appear innocent. The third principle,
“[e]verything is connected” (4), posits that all clues and evidence are linked by a pattern
which the conspiracy theorist has to discover to unveil the conspiracy.
In the case of the narrative about the Soviet ‘terror’ network, we can see Barkun’s
principles at work. Every single case of ‘terrorism’ against a Western nation, be it the 1975
attack on the meeting of OPEC ministers in Vienna or the Rome and Vienna airport attacks
ten years later, was explained as Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorism’ against ‘the West’ – allegedly,
these were not unrelated incidents developing out of complex historical, cultural, and
political conflicts, but rather steps in a single scheme to challenge ‘the West,’ particularly
the United States. Likewise, the actual conspirators, the Soviet government and its many
secret agents, were accused of using proxies like the PLO or Cuba to train, finance, and
house ‘terrorists’ all over the globe. Soviet declarations of innocence and statements
decrying ‘terrorism’ were re-interpreted as ‘proof’ of guilt as the Soviet government had to
maintain its appearance of innocence and deny all involvement in order to keep the truth
from leaking out. Moreover, main proponents of the Soviet ‘terror’ network conspiracy
theory linked ‘terrorism’ in the Middle East to ‘terrorism’ in Italy and Germany and then
connected it all with, for instance, the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II in 1981,
thus tying diverse events together into one coherent explanation which denied accidents
and randomness.12
Indeed, as scholars of conspiracy theory have repeatedly stressed, conspiracy
narratives offer a simple, coherent explanation for a complex situation (e.g. Knight 32;
Melley, Empire 8). In the case of the Soviet ‘terror’ network conspiracy theory, this is
12Examples include, e.g., Sterling, Time; Becker, Soviet ; and de Borchgrave, “Unspiking.”
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certainly the case as the narrative provides a straightforward explanation for a chaotic
international political situation where the ideological conflict between the Soviet Union
and the United States constituted just one troublesome problem among several others
like, for instance, the ongoing conflict between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle
East. In fact, the conspiracy theory offered a way to integrate these diverse issues into
one coherent explanation, brushing over ideological, cultural, historical, economical, and
political differences between the different groups and actors, thus significantly simplifying
a complex and complicated political landscape and reducing it to what was perceived as
the one common denominator, i.e. antagonism towards the United States.
Fittingly, Mark Fenster has noted in this regard that conspiracy theories “engage
in a logic that is at once tautological and Procrustean” because these narratives connect
disparate events and figures, derive conclusions on the basis of little to no evidence, and
generally offer explanations that are either “too simplistic or too complicated [. . . ] to
account for historical or present-day events” (95). One of the earliest texts to present the
conspiracy theory of the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network to the wider public, namely Stefan
Possony and L. F. Bouchey’s 1978 study International Terrorism, clearly engaged in
this kind of argument. The book maintained that “present day international terrorism
[wa]s principally attributable to communists, either directly or indirectly” (2), a sweeping
statement with an overly simplistic claim to ‘fact.’ Possony and Bouchey then proceeded
to argue that the Soviet Union sponsored ‘terrorist’ groups, providing training, weapons,
and funding either directly in Moscow or in its satellite states because its ultimate goal
was to extend its power, gain more satellite states, and destroy its opponents so that it
could become the only global superpower (e.g. 22, 39).
As proof for their claims, Possony and Bouchey argued in typical conspiracist
fashion that one should find out who benefited – Cui bono? – from the ‘terrorism’ in
question (Byford 41-43; Uscinski and Parent 43-46). The authors called this a “structural
analysis” (22), meaning that if a certain ‘terrorist’ incident could be seen to advance Soviet
interests and the event was positively reviewed in Soviet media, then it was likely that the
Soviet Union supported this ‘terrorist’ group. They cautioned that this “structural analysis”
did not provide ultimate proof and that a thorough investigation had to follow the initial
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suspicion, but this was mere lip-service because Possony and Bouchey then proceeded to
claim that “structural analysis show[ed] that in a cautious way, the U.S.S.R. ha[d] provided
psychopolitical support to international terrorism” – without specifying what that actually
meant (23). What is more, they argued that “[t]he Kremlin, and communism, always
gain[ed] by encouraging and fomenting disorder and turmoil wherever they c[ould]” (32),
thus suggesting that any act of ‘terrorism’ anywhere in the world benefited the USSR and,
following their own logic, therefore had to be sponsored by it. The entire argument put
forth in International Terrorism thus illustrates how proponents of the Soviet ‘terrorism’
network conspiracy theory argued their case by relying on tautological reasoning and gross
oversimplification of political reality in order to create a coherent narrative.
Tautological and Procrustean logic was also on display during the Jerusalem
Conference on International Terrorism where speakers advanced analyses in a similar
vein to argue in favor of the existence of a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network across ideological
boundaries. Mordecai Abir, for example, maintained that “in the 1960s and 1970s puritan
Muslim ideology was replaced, ironically, by an extreme Marxist ideology” (136), thus
providing a rather simple and sweeping description for why ideologically disparate actors
like Palestinian factions and the Soviet Union were supposedly collaborating so successfully.
Yet, his statement did not actually provide any evidence for this development nor explain
why this “extreme Marxist ideology” gained such a strong foothold in the Middle East.
Similarly, Brian Crozier asserted during his talk at the conference that “there c[ould] be
no doubt about general Soviet aid and sponsorship” to the Arab states in the Middle East
and cited as evidence the fact that the PLO was allowed to open offices in Moscow in
August 1974 (“Soviet” 71). Here, Crozier suggested a causal relationship between “Soviet
aid and sponsorship” in the Middle East and the existence of PLO offices in Moscow, but
it really constituted conjecture and not irrefutable evidence.
What is more, regarding the manner in which the alleged evidence was presented
to the audience, conspiracy theorists warning of a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network also engaged
in other strategies characteristic for the genre. Most notably, authors of conspiracist texts
mimicked respectable academic research and writing styles. In The Terror Network, for
instance, journalist Claire Sterling provided extensive footnotes which were meant to back
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up her claims with evidence from either primary sources or other recognized secondary
literature. Her book also contained a detailed bibliography as well as an index, both
standard features of ‘serious’ academic works. Similarly, works like John Barron’s KGB
Today (1983) or Roberta Goren’s The Soviet Union and Terrorism (1984) extensively
relied on “elaborate citations and bibliographies” when presenting their argument in favor
of the existence of a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network (Barkun 28). This suggested to readers
that the texts at hand constituted serious and respectable intellectual work and had gone
through the standard academic processes of peer-review and fact-checking to ascertain
their veracity.
As Michael Barkun has stressed, however, these techniques merely give “the
impression of validation without actually putting any propositions to the test of
evidence” (28-29). In The Terror Network, for instance, Sterling claim[ed] that
[p]roof abounded in 1979 that the Soviet Union had trained, educated, and equipped every
component of the Palestine Resistance [. . . ]. Russian military hardware and expertise
had in fact furnished the officers’ corps, tactics, and superb modern armament for all the
Palestinians’ combined forces, the most formidable professional guerrilla army on earth.
(277-78)
Yet, she did not actually provide any direct support from other sources for these claims,
meaning that they remained unsubstantiated. But since the preceding and the following
paragraph in the chapter both featured footnotes (which refer the reader to obscure foreign
newspaper articles from the late 1970s), the impression of impeccable academic practice
was maintained.
Alternatively, other conspiracy theorists insisted that there existed plenty of evidence
for Soviet support of ‘terrorism,’ but offered no further references to prove it. During the
Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism, for instance, Brian Crozier began his
talk by stating that “[t]he Soviet Union [wa]s deeply involved in supporting terrorist groups
in many countries – through the provision of arms, weapons and training” (“Soviet” 64).
He then proceeded to acknowledge that “[t]here [we]re of course gaps in the publicly
available evidence of Soviet involvement” before concluding that “the evidence that ha[d ]
come to light [wa]s sufficiently abundant and authentic to put facts beyond all doubt” (64).
Robert Moss declared in a similar vein that “[t]here [wa]s a great deal of evidence of
the direct role that [wa]s played by the Soviet Union and its satellites in training foreign
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terrorists” (“Terrorist” 131). Finally, in the closing session of the conference, Lord Chalfont
summarized that “the involvement of the Soviet Union, and the common cause between
the Soviets and some of the terrorist organizations, ha[d] been established as a matter of
incontrovertible fact” (327). None of the speakers, however, produced any testable evidence
which could be examined and analyzed by third parties who could have reproduced and
confirmed these conclusions. But since these claims and allegations were voiced during an
international conference attended by distinguished politicians, journalists, and researchers,
the aura of academic practice was maintained and let these conspiracist messages appear
as valid knowledge.
Another common practice in conspiracist texts is what Barkun calls “reciprocal
citation,” the habit of conspiracy theorists to exclusively quote and reference only each
other (28). Claire Sterling, for example, referred in her article in The New York Times
Magazine from March 1, 1981 to Alexander Haig’s first press conference, discussed in
the introduction of this chapter, which he used as a platform to accuse the Soviet Union
of organizing and financing an international network of ‘terrorists’ (“Terrorism” 16).
Haig, however, had based his own claims at the time on Claire Sterling’s then-unpublished
book The Terror Network of which he had received an advance copy (Yallop 687). Likewise,
in The Terror Network, Sterling quoted Brian Crozier, Stefan Possony and L. F. Bouchey’s
International Terrorism, and various talks at the Jerusalem Conference on International
Terrorism, continuing the cycle of conspiracy theorists citing each other (almost) exclusively.
Similarly, John Barron, Roberta Goren, and Jillian Becker (who even edited Goren’s study)
variously cited Sterling, the Jerusalem Conference, other pertinent proponents of the
conspiracy theory, and each other in their works (e.g. Barron 238; Goren 142n188, 159n242;
Becker, Soviet 16-18), creating what Barkun calls “a kind of pseudoconfirmation” since
it suggested that these claims and sources had to be solid, precisely because they were
cited so often (28). This practice effectively obscured the fact that these works merely
recycled the same handful of ‘core’ conspiracist texts over and over instead of creating and
participating in an open scholarly debate. Moreover, I contend, this practice constructed
a kind of discursive echo chamber which amplified the central tenets of the conspiracy
theory through endless repetition.
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Believers in the conspiracy theory of a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network did not only use
traditional ‘academic’ venues to present and discuss their findings. Some of them, most
notably Robert Moss and Arnaud de Borchgrave, also employed fiction as a medium to
spread information about the dangers of an international ‘terrorism’ network active in
the United States and beyond. Their first novel The Spike (1980), an instant bestseller,
follows the adventures of young journalist Robert Hockney who builds a career around
reporting and exposing the CIA, its clandestine operations, and the Vietnam War. After a
while, however, Hockney discovers that the KGB has skillfully infiltrated U.S. media,
politics, and even the government up to the Vice President, and that he himself was fed
misinformation by KGB agents. His attempts to reveal the conspiracy to the American
public fail and Hockney is discredited and disgraced. Finally, the tide turns when Hockney
helps a high-ranking KGB officer to defect to the United States where he reveals the
workings and extent of the secret Soviet network to the public. In the end, Hockney is
reinstated and the conspiracy is exposed and defeated, a move typical for what Fenster
calls “classical” conspiracy narratives (140).13 The Vice President is forced to resign, and
an incorruptible senator takes his place, governing with a firm hand and controlling a
weak president. Both the FBI and the CIA are rebuilt to former powers and capacities,
allowing the United States to – finally – take a strong stance against the Soviet aggressor.
The success of The Spike also points to another central element in conspiracy
theories at work here as well, namely how “[t]he commonsense distinction between fact
and fiction melts away” in conspiracy narratives (Barkun 29). In the case of Moss and
de Borchgrave’s novel, many of its prominent readers did not regard the novel as a work
of fiction, but rather as a roman a` clef where (supposedly) true events were represented
in fictional form. Most notably, Senator Denton, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee
on Security and Terrorism, praised the novel during a hearing on “Terrorism: Origins,
13Fenster argues that “[t]he classical conspiracy narrative attempts to provide closure to the complex and
multifarious conflicts and crises it presents,” but also acknowledges that “any resolution” fictional and
non-fictional conspiracy narratives offer “is often incomplete and disquieting” because the conspiracy
in question is portrayed as all-powerful, making any resolution appear futile and instable (140). More
recently, Thalmann has adapted Fenster’s categorization, suggesting instead that the type of conspiracy
narrative Fenster describes constitutes “the latest stage” in the “conspiracy narrative tradition” (21).
Thalmann shows that this type of narrative was particularly dominant in the 1950s when it was used to
narrativize anti-communist conspiracy theories (22). Even though The Spike was published in the 1980s,
the novel clearly takes up these concerns over a communist conspiracy against the United States and
follows the literary traditions of this type of text.
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Direction, and Support” in April 1981, telling Arnaud de Brochgrave: “I do not think
your book is fiction. I think it is extremely relevant to our day and I think that some
of the characters in your book are painted so accurately that one needs but change the
name” (United States, Terrorism 78). Astute readers thus easily recognized the real-life
personalities behind the fictional characters and could interpret the fictional text as
providing more evidence for the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory.
Ultimately, the conspiracy theory of a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network fulfilled a variety
of important functions, both for its believers and the discourse on ‘terrorism’ at large.
First and foremost, it offered an attractive and stable identity to the conspiracy theorists
who could fashion themselves as intelligent and dedicated patriots (Butter, Plots 20).
In this regard, Mark Fenster has commented that conspiracy theorists “gain[ ] a sense
of exception and privilege” by engaging in the work of explaining and unveiling the
conspiracy in question (115). Benjamin Netanyahu, for instance, asserted in the foreword
to the published proceedings of the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism that
the conference as a whole sent “a message that could not be ignored and whose echoes
ke[pt] reverberating around the world. As several influential commentators ha[d] noted,
the Conference marked a turning point in the world’s understanding of the problem of
terrorism and what ha[d] to be done about it” (Foreword). This boisterous statement
elevated the status of both the conference as a whole and the individual participants
and organizers as having brought the truth to light by revealing the existence of a Soviet
‘terrorism’ network and as having consequently changed the course of history and politics
for the better.
The conspiracy theory about a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network influenced American
foreign policy and, at the same time, provided a convenient explanation of American
aims and objectives in the arena of world politics. Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg, for
instance, have pointed out that one of the ‘tasks’ of the conspiracy theory was to destroy
any signs of peace and easing of tensions between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact (58).
The conspiracy theory explained why these two organizations could not possibly work
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together in times when references to ideological differences were no longer sufficient (58).14
Publicly accusing the Soviet Union of controlling and supporting ‘terrorism’ all over the
globe thus became an effective way to escalate the Cold War and to demonize the Soviet
Union and construct it as a serious threat to U.S. national security and the global status
quo.
Moreover, the conspiracy theory turned out to be an effective justification for
interventions in countries within the U.S. sphere of influence, such as Grenada, Nicaragua,
or Lebanon, and beyond. As Adrian Ha¨nni has argued, the Soviet ‘terror’ network conspiracy
theory “constituted a rationale for supporting clandestine wars in countries at the margins
of Soviet power” (“Mastermind” 245). It also gave the Reagan administration the discursive
tools to explain its departure from the strategy of de´tente as practiced by the Ford and
Carter administrations and functioned as an effective means to maintain unity and cohesion
among the European allies. By projecting the Soviet Union (and much of the Middle East)
as engaged in ‘terrorism,’ the United States could rationalize its foreign policy and, most
importantly, its active escalation of the Cold War.
Maintaining and disseminating the conspiracy theory also had considerable domestic
advantages for the Reagan administration. By presenting the Soviet Union as leading force
behind a global ‘terrorist’ network with the stated aim to attack the United States, the
U.S. government also (re)constructed the United States as global superpower and defender
of supposedly ‘Western’ values like democracy and freedom. Establishing the Soviet Union
and the ‘terrorist’ groups which allegedly made up the ‘terror’ network as ‘evil’ and
totalitarian Other also enabled the United States to represent the Self as binary opposite,
a powerful yet benevolent force which constituted the last hope for peace and justice in a
world under attack by a global ‘terrorist’ network.
In addition, the conspiracy theory served more practical political purposes.
As contemporary Reagan critics Edward Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan already remarked
in 1989, the representation of the Soviet Union as leader of a global ‘terrorism’ network
functioned in the tradition of previous Red Scares as a tactic to manage public opinion
14Hippler and Lueg do indeed call the proponents of the conspiracy theory about a Soviet-organized
‘terrorism’ network “pathological conspiracy theorists” (63; my translation, “die pathologischen
Verschwo¨rungstheoretiker” in the German original).
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(Herman and O’Sullivan 23). Herman understood the conspiracy theory as a way to counter
“the weakening of traditional restraints on the masses, and their assertive demands to
share political power with the elite” in the wake of Vietnam (Herman 47). The conspiracy
theory thus created a cultural and political climate within the United States which enabled
the Reagan administration to return to the U.S. secret services rights and powers that had
previously been curtailed in the wake of Watergate and other CIA scandals in the 1970s.
Executive Order 12333, which Reagan put in place on December 4, 1981, for instance,
considerably extended the competencies of the CIA and, among other things, allowed
covert operations again. In 1983, the Department of Defense and FEMA received even
more rights, most notably the right to impose martial law in cases of national emergency.15
In the end, the conspiracy theory about a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network influenced the
discourse on ‘terrorism’ in lasting ways, particularly with regard to its framing of ‘terrorism’
as an international activity sponsored by an antagonistic government which targeted the
United States. Earlier conspiracist texts in the mid- to late 1970s such as, for instance,
Possony and Bouchey’s International Terrorism (1978) or the Jerusalem Conference on
International Terrorism, developed these ideas and introduced them into the discourse.
Then, when the Iranian hostage crisis began (see previous chapter), conceptualizations of
‘terrorism’ as international and receiving substantial state support were already present,
providing President Carter with an attractive interpretative frame to make sense of
what had happened. Carter’s choice to conceptualize the events in Iran as ‘international
terrorism’ facilitated by financial and ideological support from the Iranian government,
in turn, popularized these notions and endowed them with political power and cultural
capital, effectively enhancing their discursive standing – and provided later conspiracist
texts like Claire Sterling’s The Terror Network with an already established notion of
what ‘terrorism’ meant at the time. Sterling and other conspiracy theorists writing during
and after the Iranian hostage crisis could exploit these discursivizations of ‘terrorism’ as
international and dependent on state support and develop them to portray the Soviet
Union as sponsoring an entire international network of ‘terrorist’ groups. It effectively
made their argument more appealing since its central knowledge claims had already been
15For more information, see Ha¨nni, Terrorismus; Naftali, Blind ; and Toaldo, Origins.
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established as common knowledge. This reciprocal exchange thus not only illustrates how
successfully conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ traveled through different discursive fields,
but also indicates the central role the conspiracy theory about a Soviet ‘terror’ network
played in the development of the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The other important discursive development forged by proponents of the conspiracy
theory was the conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ as a form of war. Here, the Jerusalem
Conference on International Terrorism proved central as it popularized a framing of
‘terrorism’ as a form of war against ‘civilized,’ meaning ‘Western,’ society. Benzion
Netanyahu, one of the founders of the Jonathan Institute and father to Benjamin Netanyahu,
asserted that “it [wa]s quite clear that the terrorist ha[d] declared war on the society of
free men” (“Chairman’s Opening” 6). U.S. Senator Henry Jackson confidently stated that
“international terrorism [wa]s a modern form of warfare against liberal democracies. [. . . ]
[T]he ultimate [. . . ] goal of these terrorists [wa]s to destroy the very fabric of democracy”
(33). Ray Cline, in turn, warned the audience: “Time is not on our side! Terrorism is part
of a larger war! We, the open societies, are the targets!” (90).
By declaring ‘terrorism’ “a suitable substitute to traditional warfare” (Cline 92),
participants incorporated both the phenomenon and the discourse about it into the Cold
War framework. Lord Chalfont’s statement during the closing session aptly reflected the
general message of the conference: “[m]any people [. . . ] expressed the opinion that we are
at war,” adding later, “[t]errorism, as we [. . . ] defined it, is evil. It is a menace to the
free society” (326, 329). ‘Terrorism’ thus became another strategy of warfare for the Cold
War enemy, i.e. the Soviet Union and its satellites and allies all over the world, to use
against the United States and the democratic ‘West.’ Moreover, by declaring ‘terrorism’
to be “evil,” the conference worked to moralize the term and escalate the level of threat
supposedly emanating from it.
In that sense, the conspiracy theory about a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network, in a move
characteristic for conspiracy theories generally, “express[ed] [. . . ] virulent hostility” to a
range of cultural and political Others (Fenster 11), militarizing the discourse on ‘terrorism’
and restructuring the meaning of the term itself. However, while the conspiracy theory
was undoubtedly influential, it circulated in a fairly tight-knit community of journalists,
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politicians, and scholars. The next section evaluates how successfully the conspiracy theory
managed to cross over into other discursive sectors as well as critical responses to it.
3.3 “The Terror What?” – Responses to the Soviet ‘Terrorism’
Network Conspiracy Theory
At first glance, then, it appears that the Soviet ‘terror’ network conspiracy theory
enjoyed considerable popularity and circulated widely throughout American politics,
news, academia, and popular culture. In his study Terrorismus (2018), Adrian Ha¨nni
has illustrated in great detail how what he calls “Terror Network Image” pervaded
American politics, news media, and popular culture. Among other insights, he argues
that the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism in 1979 marked the birth of
an organized, international propaganda network which spread and instrumentalized the
narrative about a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network for its own purposes (72). Similarly, he views
Claire Sterling’s The Terror Network as one of the most representative and influential texts
for the American discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the early 1980s and highlights how the Senate
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism (SST), as a closed and regulated discursive space,
spread and legitimized the conspiracy theory (95, 218-19). Moreover, Ha¨nni maintains that
Reagan personally did not have any doubts regarding Soviet involvement in ‘terrorism’ and
acknowledged the Soviet role in ‘international terrorism’ in speeches and public statements
(231). However, while this constitutes an attractive argument, in this section I take a closer
look and, with the help of recent insights into the study of conspiracy theory generally,
investigate these assumptions more critically.
I disagree with Ha¨nni’s approach to read the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy
theory as a firmly established and practically uncontested discourse which dominated the
public sphere. In my view, other discursive agents, like the president or contemporary
popular fiction, did not actually propagate and advocate the conspiracy theory as a
whole and rather carried a few selected components of meaning into public discourses on
‘terrorism’ and ‘terror networks.’ They framed Soviet involvement in a global ‘terrorism’
network in noticeably vaguer, more generalized and ambiguous terms and concentrated on
other perpetrators like Cuba or Palestinian groups directly, thus actually downplaying the
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extent of Soviet leadership in scenarios about international ‘terrorism’ networks. What is
more, there were also a variety of critical voices who responded forcefully to the claims of
the conspiracy theory and denounced and dismissed interpretations of ‘terrorism’ as solely
organized and financed by the Soviet Union.
President Reagan, for instance, did not simply repeat the central claims of the
conspiracy theory. This becomes clear when reading Reagan’s public statements on the
matter more closely. While Reagan did circulate notions of an international ‘terrorism’
network operating globally against the United States, he rarely implicated the Soviet
Union directly as its (supposed) leader. In the few cases where he referred explicitly to a
Soviet role in ‘terrorism,’ the president framed it in noticeably looser terms, thus often
actually minimizing the impact of Soviet actions. During a news conference on March 6,
1981, for instance, Reagan discussed the crisis in El Salvador and decried “the infiltration
into the Americas by terrorists” as well as “this destabilizing force of terrorism and guerilla
warfare and revolution [. . . ], backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba and those others that
we’ [d ] named (“President’s News;” emphases added). Here, Reagan acknowledged Soviet
involvement in ‘terrorism,’ but presented the USSR as one nation among many others which
engaged in the practice instead of depicting it as the leader of the network. What is more,
by describing Soviet actions as “back[ing]” ‘terrorism’ generally, the president remained
rather vague and abstract and avoided hard accusations regarding concrete actions which
would require evidence and, importantly, a response by the American government.
Similarly, in his speech on June 17, 1982 before the United Nations General
Assembly, the president argued that “Soviet-sponsored guerrillas and terrorists [we]re at
work in Central and South America, in Africa, the Middle East, in the Caribbean, and in
Europe, violating human rights and unnerving the world with violence” (“Remarks in New;”
emphasis added). Once more, Reagan used vague terminology by relying on the notion
of ‘sponsorship,’ leaving open what kind of actions and behaviors this actually entailed.
Terms like ‘backing’ or ‘sponsoring’ were considerably less concrete than accusations of
financing, organizing, and equipping ‘terrorist’ groups which core texts of the conspiracy
theory circulated.
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Indeed, even during Reagan’s “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and
Grenada” on October 27, 1983, the president maintained his ambiguous stance toward
supposed Soviet sponsorship of ‘terrorism.’ In the address, the president responded to the
suicide attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, as well as the U.S. invasion of
Grenada two days earlier after a coup had ousted and executed the previous left-wing
government. Commenting on the attacks in Beirut, Reagan accused Syria of trying to
assimilate Lebanon into its own territory and claimed that “Syria ha[d] become a home for
7,000 Soviet advisers and technicians who man[ned] a massive amount of Soviet weaponry”
(“Address to the Nation;” emphases added). Here, Soviet support was described as directed
towards a nation, not ‘terrorism’ or a ‘terror network’ of some kind. Moreover, this support
involved “Soviet advisers and technicians,” again fairly vague terminology which left open
the exact extent of the Soviet aid. Rather, it was Syria, because it possessed “a massive
amount of Soviet weaponry,” which had become the main threat and danger to U.S.
interests in the region.
Most importantly, Reagan did not implicate the Soviet Union in the bombing of the
Marine barracks. Rather, he accused “a young man on a suicide mission” and argued that
“[t]he clear intent of the terrorists was to eliminate our support of the Lebanese Government
and to destroy the ability of the Lebanese people to determine their own destiny.” This
indicates that Reagan did not interpret the attack through the lens of the Soviet ‘terrorism’
network conspiracy theory. Similarly, when addressing the conflict in Grenada, namely
the ousting of Prime Minister Bishop, “a prote´ge´ of Fidel Castro,” Reagan described the
usurpers as “more radical and more devoted to Castro’s Cuba than he [PM Bishop] had
been.” Here, the focus is on Grenada’s political and ideological relations to Cuba – not the
Soviet Union, suggesting once more that the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory
did not play a central role in Reagan’s understanding and framing of global conflicts.
Eventually, the president linked the conflicts in Lebanon and Grenada – but not,
as Adrian Ha¨nni has suggested, by describing it in terms of the “Terror Network Image”
(Terrorismus 234-35). Reagan told his audience:
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The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only
has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct
support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. It is no coincidence that when the
thugs tried to wrest control over Grenada, there were 30 Soviet advisers and hundreds of
Cuban military and paramilitary forces on the island.” (emphases added)
First of all, the president described Soviet actions as ‘assistance,’ ‘encouragement,’ and
‘advice’ – all broad terms which left open what kind of specific behavior they entailed.
This also meant that Reagan’s next accusation that the Soviet Union “provide[d] direct
support through a network of surrogates and terrorists” was significantly softened since the
type of support he depicted here was clearly of a non-military and rather intellectual kind.
What is more, this phrase contains an open contradiction: the Soviet Union supposedly
“provide[d] direct support,” yet this support came “through a network of surrogates and
terrorists,” meaning that it was not “direct” after all. This suggested that the Soviet
Union was not the only responsible power for the spreading of ‘terrorism.’ Rather, the
main danger emanated from “the thugs [who] tried to wrest control over Grenada.”
Lastly, in this paragraph, Reagan acknowledged the presence of both “30 Soviet
advisers” and “hundreds of Cuban military and paramilitary forces” on Grenada. The vast
difference in numbers insinuated that the real threat emanated from Cuban forces who were
not only present in significantly higher numbers, but also boasted military capacities while
the “Soviet advisers,” few in numbers, did not fulfill any such function. Ultimately, Reagan’s
depiction of the conflicts in Lebanon and Grenada did not follow the argumentation of
the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory exactly. He rather borrowed some its
claims whenever politically useful and ‘softened’ them up before presenting them to the
public. Hence, I disagree with Adrian Ha¨nni’s claim that Reagan also spread the conspiracy
theory of a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network (Terrorismus 231). Instead, I agree with Katharina
Thalmann who has shown that Reagan “actually adhered to the markers of legitimate
knowledge set forth by the discourse on conspiracy theory as he [. . . ] avoided the semantic
field of conspiracy” (207). Reagan remained vague and ambiguous about the extent of
supposed Soviet sponsorship of ‘terrorism’ and also avoided openly conspiracist language,
a rhetorical strategy which provided him with plausible deniability without alienating
proponents of the conspiracy theory, after all often quite influential and powerful voices,
who could still interpret his statements as confirming their beliefs. In turn, those among
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his constituents who rejected the conspiracy theory as illegitimate knowledge could equally
confidently interpret the president’s utterances as non-conspiracist statements.
Another discursive space in which only selected elements of the conspiracy theory
about a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network circulated was the pulp fiction series centering on
the vigilante character Mack Bolan, also nicknamed “The Executioner.” Created by Don
Pendleton in 1969, the fictional character Mack Bolan is a Vietnam vet who returns home
after his father has killed his sister and mother before turning the gun on himself in utter
desperation over his inability to free his family from the pressures and threats of Mafia loan
sharks.16 Bolan vows revenge and begins a killing spree which lasts the first 38 installments
of the series, wiping out the entire Mafia operating all over the United States in a violent,
ruthless vigilante war.
In episode 39, entitled The New War and published in 1981, however, the series
undergoes a major narrative change, away from the notion that the mafia constitutes the
biggest threat to U.S. interests. As the title of the novel indicates, a new enemy becomes of
central concern to the protagonist and, by extension, his readers: ‘terrorism.’ Mack Bolan
is approached by Hal Bologna, a high-ranking official in the U.S. Department of Justice,
who offers him amnesty for his bloody past and the opportunity to start anew. Under
the fake identity of John Phoenix (note the symbolic name), Bolan now heads a team of
government-sanctioned vigilante fighters with a secret base called “Stony Man Farm” from
where equally secret missions against ‘terrorists’ all over the world are launched. This 1981
change in the plot line of the hugely successful “Executioner” series is significant because
it indicates that, in the wake of the Iranian hostage crisis, the issue of ‘terrorism’ had
become a dominant worry for a wider audience who was also familiar enough with the
phenomenon to accept it as a seemingly ‘realistic’ and ‘authentic’ plot device.
With regard to notions about Soviet involvement in ‘terrorism’ all over the globe, the
series contained various conspiracist plot elements, but shied away from openly advancing
a ‘complete’ version of the Soviet ‘terror’ network conspiracy theory. To begin with, the
series engaged with the conspiracy theory about a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network only fairly
16For an analysis of the ‘early’ “Executioner” series, i.e. when Bolan still fights the mafia, see W. Murray
and Server. For a history of the paperback publishing explosion in the 1950s and 1960s, see Davis. For
the general representation of the Middle East in American crime fiction, see R. Simon, Middle as well
as Spies.
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late in 1984 when the story arc culminated in Bolan finding and uncovering a Soviet mole
in the U.S. government. The story developed continuously over several installments, which
is rather untypical for this type of formula writing and pulp fiction publishing in general,
suggesting that publishers may have seen this as a plot device which would successfully lure
readers in and keep them ‘hooked’ because of its topicality. In Day of Mourning (1984),
Stony Man Farm, Bolan’s secret headquarters, is attacked and April Rose, Mack Bolan’s
girlfriend and love of his life, is killed as she throws herself in front of a bullet meant for
Bolan. In the next installment, Dead Man Running (1984), Bolan, driven by his desire for
revenge for April’s death, reveals that a high-ranking official working for a rival agency
and with direct access to the president, is really a KGB mole. He then executes the traitor
with a quick chop to the neck and walks out of the White House, having declared war on
the KGB.
In subsequent installments of the series, Bolan proceeds to fight the KGB and its
‘terrorist’ network all over the globe, but the individual books overwhelmingly focus on
local enemies, especially from the Middle East, and do not really delve into the intricacies
of the supposed network. In Beirut Payback (1984), for instance, Bolan is sent to Lebanon
where the KGB has caused a bloody civil war with the help of the governments in Syria
and Iran. However, the conflict between Bolan and the KGB/the Soviet Union is, as
the narrator explains, first and foremost personal: Bolan “had come to Beirut to track
down the elusive Soviet terror boss, destroy whatever the cannibal had going for him and
terminate the KGB major general once and for all” (13). The characterization of Bolan’s
nemesis as “Soviet terror boss” only implies that the Soviet Union in the “Executioner”
universe has institutionalized ‘terrorism’ by tasking a high-ranking officer with spreading
it. The novel does not explain further how the Soviet Union supposedly organized the civil
war in Lebanon and rather relies on the familiar Cold War opposition between ‘Soviet
communism’ and ‘American democracy’ to set up the conflict between the two characters.
In many ways, then, Beirut Payback evokes the vague links between the Soviet Union
and ‘terrorism’ constructed by the political discourse under Reagan and, by relying on
the same kind of vague and imprecise language, leaves it open to its readers whether they
want to read the plot as a Soviet ‘terrorism’ conspiracy or not.
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Indeed, the main cast of enemies in these various installments consists predominantly
of ‘Arab’ or ‘Muslim terrorists,’ thus further underscoring the series’ ambiguous attitude
towards the conspiracy theory about a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network. In Beirut Payback
(1984), the “diehard PLO terrorists” are controlled by Syria, here a nation with exceptional
political power. As the narrator states, “[c]ontrol over the terrorist network gave Syria
sinister leverage over moderate pro-Western oil producers who were exceedingly vulnerable
to terrorism” (47). Indeed, by describing Syria as heading a “terrorist network,” the novel
leaves it open to readers whether they want to assume that Syria, in turn, is controlled
by the Soviet Union and Bolan’s arch nemesis – or whether they want to ignore the
conspiracy theory and read Beirut Payback as a story about an American hero fighting
‘Arab terrorists’ in the Middle East.17 The series continuously hints at a possible connection
between the Soviet Union and ‘international terrorism’ against the United States, yet
remains ambiguous enough to facilitate conspiracist and non-conspiracist readings at the
same time, allowing readers from both groups to find their beliefs confirmed in the novels.
Ultimately, then, Reagan appeared ambivalent about the Soviet ‘terror’ network
conspiracy theory and popular pulp fiction series like “The Executioner” mirrored his
vague and ambiguous language, meaning, however, that both discursive actors refrained
from openly criticizing the conspiracy theory. Other discursive voices were considerably
more critical. Interestingly, it was The New York Times which, from the very beginning,
provided a platform for criticism and counter-views regarding the Soviet ‘terror’ network
conspiracy theory. On February 9, 1981, i.e. twelve days after Reagan’s first Secretary
of State Alexander Haig accused the Soviet Union of sponsoring international ‘terrorism’
during his first press conference, The New York Times ran an article reporting that
“officials in the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
State Department, asked to document those charges, said they were unable to do so”
(Halloran A3). In fact, the article repeated the view of “[s]pecialists in terrorism outside
the Government” who argued that the Soviet Union supported what they deemed to be
national liberation movements but not “genuine terrorism” (A3), thus explaining Soviet
17Other novels in the series which depict Bolan as fighting ‘Arab terrorists’ in the Middle East include
Appointment in Kabul, Cold Judgment, The Libya Connection, Sudan Slaughter, Teheran Wipeout, and
Trojan Horse. To varying degrees, these novels also allude to Soviet involvement in these conflicts, but
the main narrative focus lies on Bolan’s fight against ‘terrorism’ perpetrated by local actors.
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support for Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba explicitly as not forming part of a larger
Soviet ‘terrorism’ policy. What is more, the article reported the official, indignant Soviet
response to Haig’s accusations by quoting from the Soviet statement which said that “Mr.
Haig’s reasoning would have made terrorists out of George Washington and other early
American leaders” (A3). This article thus attempted to balance out the drastic claims
made by members of the incoming Reagan administration and presented evidence which
challenged official government statements.
Six weeks later, on March 29, 1981, The New York Times published another article,
entitled “U.S. Study Discounts Soviet Terror Role,” which noted that “[a] draft report
produced by the Central Intelligence Agency ha[d] concluded that there [wa]s insufficient
evidence to substantiate Administration charges that the Soviet Union [wa]s directly
helping to foment international terrorism” (Miller 4). Moreover, the article repeatedly
commented on the “concern that the agency was once again being asked to tailor its views
to fit public pronouncements of senior Administration officials” (“U.S.” 4). Similarly, an
article published a few weeks afterwards took up these charges against CIA Director Casey,
writing that “[a]nalysts complained that Mr. Casey had considered the draft faulty because
it did not support Mr. Haig’s assertions” (Taubman 36). The New York Times put forth
serious charges which further undermined the sweeping claims made by Haig as well as
other members of the Reagan administration with regard to supposed Soviet sponsorship
of ‘terrorism.’
The reporting of The New York Times notably provided a more nuanced picture
and journalists paid attention to small, but important details. According to journalist
Philip Taubman, “the Soviet Union ha[d] provided aid to organizations and nations [. . . ]
that support[ed] terrorism and engage[d] in it themselves” (36). But at the same time he
also cautioned that “the Soviet Union ha[d] not played a direct role in training or equipping
traditional terrorist groups [. . . ] and ha[d] no master plan to create terrorism around the
world” (36). Taubman even suggested that Haig might have been unduly influenced by
Claire Sterling’s book The Terror Network and quoted acknowledged ‘terrorism’ experts
Walter Laqueur and Brian Jenkins who were both critical of Haig and questioned the
Secretary of State’s grasp of the problem of ‘terrorism’ in general (36).
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Similarly, on October 18, 1981, Leslie Gelb published a special to The New York
Times tellingly entitled “Role of Moscow in Terror Doubted.” The article quoted members
of the intelligence community as insisting that “[t]here [wa]s no substantial new evidence”
regarding a possible Soviet ‘terrorism’ network (9). Gelb also related to readers that
“officials [. . . ] told Haig on several occasions that there was no hard evidence to back
up his assertions, and that he was basically repeating the stories of the Czechoslavak
[sic] defector” (9). This depicts Haig as stubbornly clinging to a discredited (conspiracy)
theory and risking a continued deterioration of relations with the American intelligence
community. In this regard, Gelb was careful to note that “[i]ntelligence officials react[ed]
with sensitivity to the subject of Soviet complicity in terrorist activities. Some fe[lt] that
recent statements, including some by Administration officials, [we]re really accusing the
intelligence agencies of covering up links between Moscow and terrorists” (9). Articles of
this kind appeared repeatedly and consistently in The New York Times and opened up a
discursive space in which counterviews and criticism of the conspiracy theory could be –
and were – openly voiced.
The New York Times even became a platform for non-journalist ‘experts’ to
criticize and deconstruct the conspiracy theory. For instance, Harry Rositzke, a retired
CIA officer who specialized in Soviet operations, penned an opinion piece on June 20, 1981,
ridiculing the notion of a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network. Rositzke opened his contribution
by noting that “Washington ha[d] also resurrected the old idea that the Soviet Union
[wa]s managing a worldwide conspiracy” (A17). He even outright called the narrative
a “conspiracy theory,” arguing that it was unrealistic to assume that the KGB could
“totally control and manipulate a dozen regimes and security services” (A17). Ultimately,
“[r]ather than getting lost in the fog of ‘international terrorism,’” Rositzke concluded,
“the Reagan Administration would do well to focus its energies on devising political and
economic strategies that w[ould] reduce the prospects for success of these liberation efforts
in South-West Africa, and South Africa, in the Middle East, and in Central and, inevitably,
South America” (A17). As these examples demonstrate, then, a range of critical voices
responded to the claims of the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory and dismissed
it as ideologically driven and (willfully) ignorant of historical and political realities.
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Not only was the conspiracy theory itself heavily criticized, but some of its most
visible and prolific proponents were also vocally denounced and dismissed. Robert Dreyfuss,
for instance, published a satirical article entitled “A Close Encounter with Robert Moss”
in The Executive Intelligence Review in 1980 based on his meeting of Moss during a
conference of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. In the piece, Dreyfuss
called Moss “an overgrown fattish Eton schoolboy” and ridiculed Moss’s novel The Spike
as a “Grade B novelette” (43). According to Dreyfuss’ report, Moss gave a talk during the
conference in which he attempted to convince his listeners of the veracity of the Soviet
‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory (43-45). Dreyfuss then recounted how he exposed
Moss’s lies during the questions round after the talk, writing how he “point by point, [. . . ]
noted several cases of Mr. Moss’s lying,” before adding that “the next three questioners
[. . . ] each got up to say, with differing evidence, that Moss was insane” (45). Discounting
Dreyfuss’s hyperbole and sarcastic, even insulting commentary, the article nevertheless
demonstrates that the conspiracy theory, and its proponent Robert Moss, were recognized
as such by other journalists and scholars, indicating that the conspiracy theory, as well as
its proponents, were extremely contested from the outset.
Claire Sterling and her book also received significant push-back. Conor Cruise
O’Brien, for instance, reviewed The Terror Network in an article entitled “The Roots
of Terrorism” in July 1981. He opened his article by cautioning that ‘evidence’ about
‘terrorism’ was not only scarce, but actually suspect since the ‘terrorists’ themselves had
“strong incentive[s]” to not keep records while informers and defectors were likely to “to
report, or ‘recall,’ what their employers or debriefers want[ed] to hear” (29). Hence, O’Brien
warned, there existed a strong “need for vigilance against the danger of manufactured or
doctored evidence, ammunition in the cold war, for one side or another or for some faction
within the intelligence community” (29). In his view, “Claire Sterling show[ed] almost no
awareness of the existence of this problem, almost no skepticism about her Western sources”
and O’Brien extensively criticized her for not questioning their veracity (29). He equally
denounced her habit to rely on the other Cold Warriors Robert Moss and Brian Crozier,
concluding that “[s]he may well indeed be citing the same sources, directly or indirectly,
under other names, producing a cumulative effect on the unsuspecting reader through a
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kind of echo chamber” (30). O’Brien then used the remainder of his article to discredit
Sterling’s argument by deconstructing her case study of the Provisional IRA, ultimately
concluding that “The Terror Network is worthless,” but likely successful because it “t[old]
people exactly what they want[ed] to believe” (32).
Another, similar example constitutes Konrad Ege’s review of Sterling’s book,
published in the summer of 1982, and entitled “The Terror What?” Ege equally dismissed
Sterling’s work as unsubstantiated claims, writing that “Claire Sterling d[id] not prove
or document that there [wa]s a Soviet-orchestrated campaign of supporting terrorist
movements either directly or through its ‘surrogates’” (123). In his view, “The Terror
Network [wa]s very poorly sourced. Many crucial quotes [we]re not referenced at all.
Sterling relie[d] heavily on extreme rightwing publications and authors” (125). Ege also
accused Sterling of basic mistakes such as spelling errors and lacks in logic, noting that
“she contradict[ed] herself a few times” and that she “tend[ed] to ignore and downplay
ideological differences between her ‘terrorist’ movements and orthodox Communist parties”
(126). Like O’Brien before him, however, Ege was also forced to acknowledge that “her
belief in Soviet responsibility for worldwide terrorism seem[ed] to be very close to the
actual thinking of leading members of the Reagan Administration and the Republican
Right” and poignantly called the book “a tool for the extreme right and fuel for the Cold
War” (127). As these examples show, both the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory
and its main proponents were heavily criticized and contradicted both in the news media
and academic circles, a conclusion which indicates that the conspiracy theory did not
circulate unimpeded and unhindered.18 Rather, the forceful response from these different
discursive spaces and agents suggests that, overall, the conspiracy theory did not circulate
in an unimpeded manner. It was significantly adapted, often only alluded to in passing, or
even aggressively rejected by critical voices as a form of corrupt and illegitimate knowledge.
These findings are, in fact, not surprising given the status of conspiracy theories
in U.S. culture and politics at the time. As recent studies have shown, conspiracy
theories underwent a change in status between the 1950s and 1970s. Both Michael
Butter and Katharina Thalmann have argued that conspiracy theories constitute a
18Other contemporary texts criticizing the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory and its proponents
include Chomsky, Culture; Herman; Herman and O’Sullivan; Schmid et al.; and Yallop.
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form of illegitimate knowledge from the 1960s onwards (Butter, Plots 9; Thalmann 16).
According to Butter, discourses delegitimizing conspiracy theories, conspiracy theorizing,
and conspiracy theorists emerged from the 1950s onwards, making conspiracy theories “a
form of counterknowledge” with decreasing degrees of influentiality (Plots 9). This also
meant that, unlike in the centuries before, conspiracy theories, while still attractive, were
no longer that dominant in American politics (Plots 285). Similarly, Katharina Thalmann,
who has analyzed the status change of conspiracy theories between the 1960s and the 1980s
in more detail, asserts that in the 1970s, “[i]n mainstream public discourse, [. . . ] conspiracy
theory continued to produce and represent illegitimate knowledge and continued to be
problematized” (206).
In my view, this explains the complex state of affairs regarding the Soviet ‘terrorism’
network conspiracy theory in the late 1970s and early 1980s: A tight-knit community
of academics, journalists, and politicians used newly available platforms like conferences
and publishing opportunities to construct, refine, and disseminate their views about
a global conspiracy by the Soviet Union to use ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist groups’ to
defeat the United States. As the cases of Claire Sterling, Robert Moss, and Arnaud de
Borchgrave demonstrate in particular, activity in this community of conspiracy theorists
also became a way to making a living by disseminating it. At the same time, however, as
the examples I discussed in this section showed, proponents of the conspiracy theory had
to negotiate public skepticism, ridicule, and even outright rejection because conspiracy
theories in general had become illegitimate, stigmatized knowledge. In an attempt to
circumvent the negative label of ‘conspiracy theory,’ these proponents avoided openly
conspiracist language when describing and arguing their claims. For instance, presenters at
the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism and Sterling herself refrained from
speaking about ‘plots,’ ‘conspiracies,’ or ‘schemes,’ terminology which had become markers
of a conspiracist world-view and as such automatically suspect. By avoiding language from
the semantic field of conspiracy (theory), its proponents successfully masked their ideas
as ‘non-conspiracist’ knowledge. This made it easier for their allegations to be taken up
by voices which did not form part of their community like President Reagan or popular
fiction like “The Executioner” series who, in turn, spread some of the central claims of the
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conspiracy theory. It also meant that whenever these claims were rejected, critics could not
simply denounce them as ‘crazy’ conspiracy theory, but actually had to engage with these
texts and prepare an evidence-based rebuttal, thus elevating the status of these ideas in
the process. In the next section, I examine how these conspiracist ideas about international
‘terrorism’ networks developed from the mid-1980s onward as discursive actors began to
explain ‘terrorism’ as something other than organized and controlled by the Soviet Union.
3.4 Starting a “War against Terrorism” – The ‘Terrorism’
Discourse in U.S. Politics and Academia in the Mid- to
Late 1980s
As we have seen, the conspiracy theory about a Soviet ‘terrorism’ network proved popular
in some discursive circles in the late 1970s and early 1980s while also being heavily
criticized and stigmatized as illegitimate knowledge in others. Yet, the ideas put forth by
conspiracy theorists still influenced the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in significant ways. This
section therefore examines how the ‘terrorism’ discourse developed from the mid-1980s
onward as it discursivized ‘terrorism’ in a manner which clearly reflected the traumatic
experience of the Iranian hostage crisis as well as more recent knowledge claims circulated
by the conspiracy theory. Generally speaking, then, this meant that, following the crisis in
Iran, ‘terrorism’ was framed as international menace which was significantly aided and
abetted by nations hostile to the U.S. The conspiracy theory provided further conceptual
impulses so that ‘terrorism’ was additionally discursivized as a form of war, as ‘evil,’ and as
organized in networks. However, in response to the changing political landscape in the mid-
to late 1980s, the discursive focus shifted from the Soviet Union as main perpetrator to
‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic terrorists’ in and from the Middle East. Another important aspect was
that while the emerging narrative about ‘terrorism’ did not constitute a conspiracy theory
in itself – among other things, these new perpetrators were not portrayed as orchestrating
‘terrorism’ around the globe in a bid for world domination – it nevertheless clearly borrowed
ideas from the genre. It also continued to rely on ambiguous language and phrasing which
allowed for conspiracist and non-conspiracist readings simultaneously, thus revealing the
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continued popularity of conspiracy theory as a way of making meaning while also reflecting
its changed status as illegitimate knowledge.
Hence, as the discussion above showed, Ronald Reagan did not openly support
the narrative about Soviet ‘terrorism’ networks propagated by conspiracy theorists, but,
interestingly, adopted some of its knowledge claims about ‘terrorism’ and included them in
his own statements on the issue while eschewing overtly conspiracist language. In his official
statements, speeches, and messages, the president conceptualized ‘terrorism’ as a form of
war which required a response in kind, accused ‘terrorists’ of operating in larger networks,
often supposedly sponsored by other states and nations, and moralized it as “evil scourge”
which needed to be eradicated. Indeed, Reagan popularized the phrase “the scourge of
(international) terrorism,” repeating it in dozens of political speeches and statements over
the years and turning it into a phrase which encapsulated his understanding of the issue.
Reagan framed ‘terrorism’ in this manner from the beginning of his presidency. For
instance, he already spoke about “the scourge of international terrorism” during Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s visit to the United States in February 1981, a mere month
into office (“Remarks for Margaret Thatcher”). Likewise, during a visit to Great Britain in
June 1982, Reagan used his address to the British Parliament to comment on the conflict
in Lebanon, telling his listeners:
In the Middle East now the guns sound once more, this time in Lebanon, a country that
for too long has had to endure the tragedy of civil war, terrorism, and foreign intervention
and occupation. The fighting in Lebanon on the part of all parties must stop, and Israel
should bring its forces home. But this is not enough. We must all work to stamp out the
scourge of terrorism that in the Middle East makes war an ever-present threat. (“Address
to Members”)
Not only did the president here link ‘terrorism’ to ‘(civil) war’ by suggesting that
there existed a pattern of causality between the two, he also moralized ‘terrorism’ as a
“tragedy” and “scourge.” Reagan also spoke about “the fundamentally new phenomenon
of state-supported terrorism” during a session with reporters in December 1983 and talked
about his intentions “to hold increasingly accountable those countries which sponsor[ed]
terrorism and terrorist activity around the world” (“Remarks and a Question-and-Answer”).
Taken together, these presidential utterances constructed ‘terrorism’ as an abhorrent evil,
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committed by ‘terrorists’ who received substantial support from other nations, and framed
the concept as an act of war.
This notion gained traction in the years to come and became more prominent in the
governmental discourse on ‘terrorism.’ Famously, Reagan used his April 26, 1984 “Message
to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation to Combat International Terrorism”
to declare a “war against terrorism.”19 Describing “international terrorism” as a “pressing
and urgent problem,” the president announced plans to introduce new legislation designed
to combat it. He also used his message to warn his constituents:
In recent years, a very worrisome and alarming new kind of terrorism has developed:
the direct use of instruments of terror by foreign states. This ‘state terrorism,’ starkly
manifest in the recent dreadful spectacles of violence in Beirut, Rangoon, and Kuwait,
accounts for the great majority of terrorist murders and assassinations. Also disturbing is
state-provided training, financing, and logistical support to terrorists and terrorist groups.
These activities are an extremely serious and growing source of danger to us, our friends
and our allies, and are a severe challenge to America’s foreign policy. (emphases added)
In this paragraph, Reagan constructed ‘terrorism’ as a practice used by hostile nations
against ‘the West’ who provided a wide range of material, ideological, and financial support
to ‘terrorist’ groups in an effort to threaten America’s allies and destabilize international
relations. He thus advanced an understanding of ‘terrorism’ which portrayed it as global
in scope, a dangerous tool in international relations wielded by antagonistic governments,
and therefore particularly threatening. This framing clearly exploited central claims about
‘terrorism’ which were developed in previous years, particularly during the Iranian hostage
crisis (see previous chapter), thus establishing discursive continuity which, in turn, made the
president’s statement appear logical and ‘true.’ What is more, in his message, the president
also relied again on ambiguous language, meaning that it could easily be construed as
a warning about a conspiracy by nations in the Middle East which used ‘terrorism’ to
“challenge [. . . ] America’s foreign policy.”
That the president considered the U.S. to be vulnerable to “this scourge” became
clear when he wrote, “The legislation I am sending to the Congress is an important step
in our war against terrorism. It will send a strong and vigorous message to friend and
foe alike that the United States will not tolerate terrorist activity against its citizens or
19For analyses of Reagan’s rhetorical style, particularly his framing of ‘terrorism’ as a form of war, see
Gold-Biss; Ha¨nni, Terrorismus; R. Jackson, Writing and “Genealogy;” Winkler, In the Name and
“Parallels;” and Zulaika and Douglass.
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within its borders” (“Message”). By declaring a “war against terrorism,” the president
significantly escalated the rhetoric about the topic and sidelined other framings of the issue.
He further militarized the conceptualization of the term while positioning the United States
as (possible) victim of a heightened ‘terrorist’ threat emanating from state-sponsored
‘terrorist’ groups.
Reagan then expanded on these themes in another, much noted speech on July 8,
1985 at the annual convention of the American Bar Association. In that speech, Reagan
pointed to “a steady and escalating pattern of terrorist acts against the United States
and our allies and Third World nations friendly towards out interests” (“Remarks at
the Annual”). According to the president, Iran, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and “the
Communist regime in Nicaragua” had formed a “terrorist network” which targeted the
United States. Reagan claimed that “these terrorist states [we]re now engaged in acts
of war against the Government and people of the United States,” indicating that the
conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ as a form of war continued to enjoy dominant discursive
standing, just like the notion that states could commit ‘terrorism’ and organize their
activities in loose networks. The president’s speech shows once more how both the Iranian
hostage crisis as well as the conspiracy theory about ‘terrorism’ networks continued to
influence conceptualizations of the issue in the mid- to late 1980s. Conspiracy theorists
found their ideas confirmed in Reagan’s talk about a ‘terrorist network’ while those
rejecting them worried about an emerging “pattern of terrorist acts against the United
States” instead.
In this speech, Reagan developed the notion of a “war against terrorism” further
and exacerbated the rhetoric about ‘terrorism’ once more, telling his audience:
[T]here we have it – Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua – continents away, tens
of thousands of miles apart, but the same goals and objectives. I submit to you that the
growth in terrorism in recent years results from the increasing involvement of these states
in terrorism in every region of the world. This is terrorism that is part of a pattern, the
work of a confederation of terrorist states. Most of the terrorists who are kidnaping [sic]
and murdering American citizens and attacking American installations are being trained,
financed, and directly or indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian
governments – a new, international version of Murder, Incorporated. And all of these
states are united by one simple criminal phenomenon – their fanatical hatred of the United
States, our people, our way of life, our international stature. (emphases added)
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Reagan not only named those he considered to be members of the ‘terrorism’ network, he
also openly blamed them for “the growth in terrorism in recent years.” He expanded his
conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ in that he described the (alleged) workings of the network
in more detail as training, financing, and controlling ‘terrorist’ groups around the globe
and depicted the network as organized and run like a business with an aim for profit, as
the reference to “Murder, Incorporated” makes clear. According to Reagan, this new kind
of efficient, well-organized and funded ‘terrorism’ network specifically targeted Americans
out of its “fanatical hatred of the United States,” a rhetorical move which discredited any
claims to political objectives these states or the ‘terrorist’ groups might have had. It also
moralized the issue of ‘terrorism’ into a conflict between the ‘good,’ benign United States
and the ‘evil terrorists’ and “these outlaw governments who [we]re sponsoring international
terrorism against our nation.” Ultimately, the president’s conceptualization of ‘terrorism’
successfully exploited characterizations of it as international and successful because of
extensive state sponsorship which were developed first during the Iranian hostage crisis.
Moreover, he continued to tap into conspiracist ideas about secret ‘terrorism’ networks
aiming to attack and destroy the United States while also militarizing and moralizing the
issue.
The president was not the only discursive agent to conceptualize ‘terrorism’ in this
manner. The legislative branch of the U.S. government also intervened in the discourse on
‘terrorism’ and put forth a similar framing of the concept. Indeed, the official government
reports on ‘terrorism’ in the 1980s predominantly conceptualized ‘terrorism’ as a practice
engaged in by states hostile to the United States, describing these states not only as
supporting ‘terrorist’ groups in various ways, but also as organized in international networks.
Importantly, at the beginning of the decade, the Reagan administration had tasked the
State Department with revising the official statistics on ‘terrorism,’ in order to, as Charles
Mohr reported for The New York Times at the time, “include ‘threats’ as well as actual
acts of politically motivated violence,” a move which “would approximately double the
number of terrorist ‘incidents’ counted by the United States in the last 12 years” (A17).
This political move not only shows how ‘terrorism’ was actively constructed as political
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problem, it also demonstrates how different discursive agents cooperated in order to
advance their central knowledge claims.20
The Middle East remained a central concern in the reports which consistently
identified a host of different nations in the area as state sponsors, particularly Libya,
South Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran and generally warned of the “volatile situation” there
(Patterns 1982 1). Reports confidently asserted that “the Middle East dominated the global
terrorism picture in 1983” (Patterns 1983 1). Middle Eastern ‘terrorism’ was depicted
as requiring constant attention and vigilance because “[t]he threat from Middle Eastern
perpetrators of terrorism extend[ed] far beyond the region itself. During 1983, Iran, Syria,
and several Middle Eastern terrorist groups carried their struggle into Western Europe and
South Asia” (Patterns 1983 13). Patterns 1984, in turn, warned of “the growing dominance
of the Middle East as the crucible of terrorism” and described the region as “a venue of
international terrorism” (1, 2). These reports thus continued to construct the Middle East
as center of ‘terrorism’ and expanded the threat by framing it as state-directed and local
‘terrorist’ groups as closely linked to their host governments.
The reports’ focus on the Middle East as hotbed of ‘terrorism’ also paved the way
for another important discursive change: along with markers of ethnicity, religion started to
become a central element in conceptualizations of ‘terrorism,’ particularly in and from the
Middle East. Patterns 1984, for instance, singled out Iran, Syria, and Libya as principal
sponsors of anti-American ‘terrorism’ and marked their brand of ‘terrorism’ as distinctly
religious and ethnic. The report claimed:
These three Muslim radical states have actively supported a variety of ethnic and religious
terrorist and guerrilla groups. Indeed, Iran, Syria, and Libya have set a new – and alarming
– style in state-supported terrorism, one unique among the nations facilitating the spread
of anti-US attacks. The unprecedented degree of backing and, in some cases, active
participation by these states in terrorist operations, helped make terrorism in 1984 very
much a problem of the Middle East. (4; emphases added)
‘Terrorism’ in and from the Middle East was primarily driven by religious and ethnic
considerations, making this type of ‘terrorism’ “new” and “unique” and by implication
more dangerous than previous encounters with ‘terrorism.’ For instance, as Patterns
20See also Adrian Ha¨nni’s discussion in his book Terrorismus of how, using Patterns of International
Terrorism: 1980 as an example, the reports manipulated the statistics and numbers. For a more general
discussion of how these reports manipulate statistics of ‘terrorist’ incidents, see Guelke; Livingston; and
Zulaika, Terrorism.
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1984 maintained, Iran relied on ‘terrorism’ “to help create like-minded fundamentalist
Islamic republics in Middle East and Persian Gulf states with large Shia populations” (4).
Middle Eastern ‘terrorism,’ in the rhetoric of these government reports, was now invariably
represented as solely religiously and/or ethnically motivated and threatening American
interests in the Middle East and beyond. At the same time, this particular conceptualization
of ‘terrorism’ also confirmed framings of the term circulated first during the Iranian hostage
crisis that states could sponsor ‘international terrorism’ against the U.S. Moreover, the
report echoed the president’s views and hinted at a ‘terrorism’ conspiracy of sorts by
Middle Eastern states targeting the United States.
Yet, this “unique” ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East was depicted as inherently
different in nature. For example, Patterns 1985 claimed that “[m]ost attacks by West
European terrorists were designed to avoid casualties, but most of those by Middle Eastern
terrorists were intended to cause maximum casualties” (1). Middle Eastern ‘terrorism’
thus became its own analytical category, surpassing ‘terrorism’ from other regions in the
degree of ‘evilness,’ i.e. willingness to accept loss of human life. This statement not only
relativized ‘terrorism’ occurring in Europe (e.g. the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany or
the Red Brigades in Italy), but also insinuated that ethnicity (derived from geographical
location) and religious belief could influence the behavior of ‘terrorist’ groups.
Subsequent reports continued to style Middle Eastern ‘terrorism’ as unprecedented
threat which was continually on the rise. Patterns 1985, for instance, maintained that
“[i]nternational terrorism of Middle East origin increased substantially in 1985” (2), a
statement which was printed in bold and italics to stress its importance as one of the
report’s central findings. What is more, Patterns 1985 escalated the threat by claiming that
“Middle Eastern terrorists increased their level of activity outside the region, especially in
Western Europe” (2), also printed in bold and italics to emphasize that it was spreading
and affecting American allies. The implication was that ‘the West,’ led by the United
States, had already become a target.
The reports of following years engaged in a similar strategy. While overall ‘terrorism’
might be diagnosed as declining for some years (e.g. Patterns 1986 and Patterns 1987 ),
all reports stressed that the Middle East constituted a notable exception to these trends.
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Patterns 1986, for instance, maintained that “[i]n 1986 more international terrorist incidents
– 360 – were recorded in the Middle East than in any other part of the world, virtually
unchanged from the 1985 figure of 357” (1). Similarly, Patterns 1987 found that the Middle
East was still the region with the highest number of terrorist attacks (4). Patterns 1988
equally stated that “[t]he Middle East again had the highest incidence of international
terrorism” (1). These examples show, then, how an entire region and its nations and
populations were vilified and how the discursive link between the Middle East and
‘terrorism’ was maintained and strengthened.
Apart from singling out the Middle East as hotbed of ‘terrorism’ and Middle
Eastern ‘terrorism’ as its own category, these government reports also engaged in sweeping
generalizations when it came to analyzing the different actors within the region. Libya
and Iran received special attention in all reports for the 1980s as supposed state sponsors
of ‘terrorism.’ Iranian ‘terrorism’ was represented as being motivated by religious concerns.
Patterns 1987, for example, argued that
Tehran use[d] terrorism skillfully and selectively to support its long-term objectives of
ridding the Middle East of all Western influence, intimidating Iranian dissidents overseas,
forcing Arab countries to end their support for Iraq, and exporting Khomeini’s vision of a
radical Islamic revolution to all parts of the Muslim world. (35)
Libya, in turn, was led by Colonel Qaddafi who “ha[d] made terrorism one of the primary
instruments of his foreign policy, generally through the support of radical groups that use
terrorist tactics” (Patterns 1985 4). Libya and Iran became familiar case studies in these
government reports which used these two nations to generalize the problem of religiously
and ethnically motivated ‘terrorism’ as a phenomenon which affected the entire Middle
East. At the same time, these cases were presented as singular and unprecedented threats
to ‘the West’ and the United States, thus combining broad generalizations with claims to
uniqueness.
In this light, the disclaimer added in the foreword to the edition of Patterns 1987
sounded sophisticated and self-aware, but effectively only confirmed that these government
reports on ‘terrorism’ engaged in generalizations and put entire ethnic and religious groups
under universal suspicion:
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Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic,
religious, or national group is not meant to imply that all members of that group are
terrorists. Indeed, terrorists represent a small minority of dedicated, often fanatical,
individuals in most such groups. It is that small group – and their actions – that is the
subject of this report. (v)
This becomes especially evident when considering the analysis offered a few pages into
that same report regarding the future development of Middle Eastern ‘terrorism’:
[T]he potential for terrorism of Middle East origin remaind high because of the region’s
large populations of Middle Eastern students, immigrants, and guest workers who may be
recruited as terrorist operatives; easy access from the Middle East; lax security at borders;
and an abundance of targets. Moreover, the increase in imprisoned terrorists may result
in an upsurge in retaliatory attacks. (16)
Here, once more, Patterns 1987 followed the discursive framework already established
in previous editions of vilifying the entire region while emphasizing the increased threat
emanating from Middle Eastern ‘terrorism.’
The reports not only focused on the Middle East as source for religiously and
ethnically motivated ‘terrorism,’ they also corroborated the conceptualization of ‘terrorism’
as a form of warfare. This change becomes apparent in Patterns 1983, published in the
spring of 1984 and thus reflecting and further shaping President Reagan’s more militarized
approach to the topic. Patterns 1983 simply defined ‘terrorism’ as “premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine state agents.” This definition is remarkable in that it, for the first time, spoke
of “noncombatant targets,” a military term which framed ‘terrorism’ as a form of warfare.
This definition was only slightly amended the next year when the subordinate clause
“usually intended to influence an audience” was added. All subsequent reports in the 1980s
adhered to this definition which shows that in the 1980s the conceptualization of ‘terrorism’
was militarized. The reasons given by the reports for a group to engage in ‘terrorism’
remained only vaguely ‘political,’ indicating that the discursive focus had shifted away
from actually explaining why groups engaged in the practice at all.
Another discursive element which became increasingly important in the government
reports on ‘terrorism’ was the notion that the United States was a primary target
for ‘terrorist’ groups. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980 already asserted that
“Americans remained the primary targets of international terrorism” (iii), a claim that
was repeated in virtually every report in the 1980s. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983
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even contained a section entitled “Target USA” and another one called “The Impact of
Terrorism on US Interests,” effectively constructing the United States as principal target
and victim of ‘terrorism’ worldwide. In that regard, the changing structure of the reports,
especially in the early 1980s is telling. For the years 1980, 1981, and 1982, the reports’
titles indicated a concern with ‘international terrorism.’ From 1983 onwards, however, the
reports focused on ‘global terrorism.’ Speaking of ‘global terrorism’ enhanced the threat
because it suggested that, quite literally, ‘terrorism’ concerned the entire world and that
the ‘terrorist’ enemy operated in a worldwide network. This terminology also insinuated
that under these conditions the United States could not possibly escape the dangers of
‘terrorism’ and had to develop new strategies to defend itself. Overall, then, the government
reports on ‘terrorism’ formed an integral part of how the government framed ‘terrorism’
generally and how it approached ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East in particular
by constructing it as a war-like practice engaged in by nations in the Middle East out of
religious and ethnic motivations, primarily targeting the United States. What is more,
the reports exploited discursivizations of the issue established during the Iranian hostage
crisis and tapped into claims and allegations about ‘terrorism’ networks popularized by
conspiracy theorists, thus strengthening and disseminating this particular understanding
of ‘terrorism.’
Similar framings were also popularized and circulated in the academic field of
‘terrorism’ studies. Here, the Jonathan Institute played once more a central role in the
development of the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the mid-1980s by not only developing but
also spreading specific conceptualizations of ‘terrorism,’ thus privileging some knowledge
claims about ‘terrorism’ over others and amplifying the power of the discourse. The
Jonathan Institute organized its second international conference on ‘terrorism’ in 1984,
but this time it was held in Washington, D.C., instead of Israel – another sign for the
importance the issue was accorded in the United States. Once more, Benjamin Netanyahu
edited the conference proceedings and published them in 1986 under the title Terrorism:
How the West Can Win. It became one of President Reagan’s favorite books (Toaldo,
“Reagan” 11).
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The conference itself was organized into eight panels with influential and prestigious
speakers. In the third panel, for instance, speakers focused on “Terrorism and the Islamic
World” and, as the title already suggested, connected the issue of ‘terrorism’ to religion,
specifically Islam. In his introduction to the third panel, Benjamin Netanyahu explained
that “[c]ertain strains of Islam promote[d] an uncompromising interpretation of the faith
which divide[d] the world into Muslim and infidel, and enjoin[ed] the former to wage
unremitting warfare against the latter” (“Terrorism” 61). He concluded that “[t]errorism
[wa]s thus uniquely pervasive in the Middle East, the part of the world where Islam
[wa]s dominant” (61-62). Netanyahu even went so far as to claim that “[i]t [wa]s, in fact,
impossible to conceive of international terrorism without the Middle East as both locus
and source of so much terrorist activity” (62). Netanyahu constructed the Middle East
as a region which created and spread ‘terrorism’ and linked it persistently to Islam, thus
providing a powerful thematic frame for the contributions which followed in the panel
itself.
The conference talks which formed the third panel on the connections between
Islam and ‘terrorism’ all universally constructed the Middle East as a region which created
and spread ‘terrorism’ and linked it persistently to Islam. J. P. Vatikiotis, for instance,
spoke of “[t]he growth of terrorism in and from the Middle East” (77), warning that the
principal reason for this development was Islam itself. He then claimed that “religion in
the Middle East [wa]s a potent ideological force which challenge[d] territorial rule” (77).
Vatikiotis characterized ‘terrorism’ as modus operandi in the Middle East, claiming that
“[u]nrestrained Middle Eastern rulers ha[d] resorted to terrorism for domestic, regional,
and international political purposes” (78-79). In his view, “one c[ould] not separate, in
the Middle East, international terrorism from domestic terrorism” (83). Elie Kedourie, in
turn, confirmed that “terrorism in modern Islam [wa]s unlikely to prove a flash in the pan”
(76). Similarly, Bernard Lewis, an acknowledged ‘expert’ on the Middle East and Islam,
conceded that “Islam [wa]s a political religion” (“Islamic Terrorism” 66). What all these
examples show is how conference participants connected ‘terrorism’ to Islam and argued
that Islam contained innate qualities which made it susceptible to ‘terrorism.’ They also
represented Islam as the main motivating force behind ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle
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East, effectively de-politicizing the concept and Othering Muslims in general as solely
driven by religious feelings and therefore more likely to engage in ‘terrorism’ against ‘the
West.’
Speakers at the Washington Conference not only linked ‘terrorism’ in the Middle
East to Islam, they also described it as organized in networks and as financed and supported
by specific states. Secretary of State George Shultz, for instance, coined the term “League
of Terror” (16), which in his view included Libya, Syria, Iran, and North Korea. Similarly,
Benjamin Netanyahu saw Iran, Libya, and Syria as “the principal terrorist states of the
Middle East” (“Defining” 14). Eli Kedourie, in turn, pointed to Iran as prime instance of
“a ‘terrorist state’ – a state which, as a matter of course, organize[d] terrorist activities
against foreign individuals and groups whom it desire[d] to eliminate or intimidate” and
listed the Soviet Union, Syria, Libya, and Iraq as further examples (72). Taken together,
then, the conference advanced an understanding of ‘terrorism’ as originating in the Middle
East, motivated by Islam, and organized in sophisticated networks and receiving significant
state support.
Interestingly, apart from these conceptualizations of ‘terrorism,’ the Washington
Conference also still provided a platform for proponents of the conspiracy theory about a
Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorism’ network to advance their views. The fourth panel debated “The
International Network” and featured well-known advocates of the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network
like Claire Sterling, Jillian Becker, and Michael Ledeen. At the conference, Secretary of
State George Shultz, for instance, argued, “The Soviet Union officially denounces the use
of ‘terrorism’ as an instrument of state policy. Yet there is a wide gap between Soviet
words and Soviet actions. [. . . ] The Soviets use terrorist groups for their own purposes,
and their goal is always the same: to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world
stability” (21). Becker, Ledeen, and Sterling all argued that the Soviet Union organized and
sponsored ‘terrorism’ worldwide; Becker and Ledeen additionally claimed that the PLO
received Soviet support while Sterling focused on the assassination attempt on Pope John
Paul II which, she claimed, was organized by Soviet proxies (Becker, “Centrality” 98-99;
Ledeen, “Soviet” 91; Sterling, “Unraveling”).
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Yet, the discursive presence of the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory was
clearly waning since all other participants gave precedence to framings of ‘terrorism’ which
focused on the Middle East and the role of Islam. This led, at times, to attempts to explain
‘terrorism’ simultaneously as a global, Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorist’ network and as organized
in the Middle East and influenced by Islam. In his contribution, Benjamin Netanyahu,
for example, explained that “[m]odern terrorism ha[d] its roots in two movements that
ha[d] assumed international prominence in the second half of the twentieth century,
communist totalitarianism and Islam (and Arab) radicalism” (“Defining” 11-12). Paul
Johnson concluded that “[t]errorism was thus able to draw on the immense financial
resources of the Arab oil states, and on the military training programs of the Soviet
Union and its satellites, Cuba, South Yemen, Vietnam, and North Korea” (31). Arnaud de
Borchgrave, in turn, argued more generally for links between international ‘terrorist’ groups
and the Soviet Union as well as “radical Middle Eastern regimes” (“Censorship” 117).
These examples suggest that the original conspiracy theory about a Soviet-sponsored
‘terrorism’ network had been marginalized over other, more dominant explanations,
effectively forcing some of its main proponents like Arnaud de Borchgrave to adapt
their narrative in order to maintain their influential discursive position. The second
international conference on ‘terrorism’ thus also functioned as a platform to ‘test’ and
spread conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ which gave the Middle East more prominence and
worked towards establishing ‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim terrorism’ as independent
discursive concepts. An indication for the ‘success’ of this discursive endeavor is Edward
Said’s review of the volume which concluded that “Terrorism: How the West Can Win
[wa]s thus an incitement to anti-Arab and anti-Moslem violence” (“Essential” 832).
While there may have been some disagreement over which actors were ultimately
responsible for ‘terrorism,’ what virtually all conference participants agreed on was that
‘terrorism,’ whether led by “terrorist states” in the Middle East or the Soviet Union itself
(Benzion Netanyahu, “Terrorists” 29), constituted a form of war. Arnaud de Borchgrave, for
instance, spoke of “the free world’s war with international terrorism” (“Censorship” 119).
Jeane Kirkpatrick, American ambassador to the United Nations, agreed that “[t]errorism
[wa]s a form of political war” (“Totalitarian” 56). She argued:
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Terrorist war is part of a total war, which sees the whole of society as the enemy and all
the members of society as appropriate objects of violence. It is absolute war because its
goal is the absolute destruction of a society. Terrorists are the shock troops in a war to
the death against the values and institutions of a society and of the people who embody
it. (57)21
In turn, George Shultz not only spoke of a “battle against terrorism” (21), but also
maintained that “[i]t [wa]s time to think long, hard, and seriously about more active
means of defense – defense through appropriate preventive or preemptive actions against
terrorist groups before they str[uck]” (23). As Secretary of State, Shultz’s words carried
considerable weight since they suggested that the military power of the United States
should be employed. What is more, speaking about “preventive” or even “preemptive
actions” reflected conventional military jargon and cast the confrontation with ‘terrorism’
as a conflict which could only be resolved through military means, i.e. open warfare, if
necessary even before ‘the terrorists’ themselves had become active.
But the conference participants not only understood ‘terrorism’ to be a form of
war which had to be defeated through war, they also continued the tradition to cast the
conflict in moralizing terms, depicting ‘terrorists’ as innately evil and amoral. Benzion
Netanyahu, for instance, referred to “the terrorist menace” (“Terrorists” 25). George
Shultz likened ‘terrorism’ to an “epidemic” for which “the civilized world” had not yet
found the much needed “remedies” (16). Similarly, Paul Johnson declared that “[t]errorism
[wa]s the cancer of the modern world” (31). According to George Shultz, ‘the terrorist’
“s[ought] to spread chaos and disorder, to paralyze a society” (19). Benzion Netanyahu
characterized ‘the terrorist’ as “carrier of oppression and enslavement” (“Terrorists” 29)
while Jeane Kirkpatrick explained that “[t]he terrorist cho[se] violence as the instrument
of first resort” (“Totalitarian” 56). Conference participants thus actively constructed the
trope of the amoral, evil ‘terrorist’ and used it to further de-politicize analyses of ‘terrorism’
by preventing any probing into historical and cultural contexts and political motivations of
21Particularly for a German scholar, Kirkpatrick’s declaration of “a total war” carries additional meaning
as it evokes Joseph Goebbels’ infamous Sportpalast speech on February 18, 1943. As the Axis powers
were starting to lose ground to the Allies, Goebbels used the speech to whip the crowds assembled at
the Sportpalast in Berlin into a frenzy. It is considered to this day a haunting example of the power
of propaganda and Nazi rhetoric. Kirkpatrick’s use of this phrase thus framed the conflict between
democracy and totalitarian ‘terrorism’ following the narrative conventions of the United States’ ‘good’
fight against ‘evil’ Hitler and Nazism. ‘Terrorism,’ like fascism, had become an ideology, not just a
technique of combat anymore.
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those labeled ‘terrorists.’ This kind of rhetoric also paved the way for increased (military)
aggression towards those called ‘terrorists’ by dehumanizing them as disease which needed
to be eradicated forcefully.
Overall, then, the second international conference on ‘terrorism’ constituted another
important intervention in the discourse on ‘terrorism’ since it shifted the focus to ‘Arab’
and ‘Muslim terrorism’ in the mid-1980s. What is more, conference participants advanced
an understanding of ‘terrorism’ as organized in networks, supported by nations hostile
to the United States, and a form of war which required a response in kind, effectively
re-affirming and cementing knowledge claims first developed during the Iranian hostage
crisis and then adapted by proponents of the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory
a few years later. Likewise, the conference moralized the conflict between ‘terrorism’ and
‘the West’ as war between good and evil, civilization and “prehistoric times [. . . ] when
morality was not yet born” (Benzion Netanyahu, “Terrorists” 29). As we will see in the
next chapters of this study, these discursive themes proved to be resilient and persisted
well into the next decades as hegemonic conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ in American
discourses.
Other scholars studying ‘terrorism’ in the 1980s advanced similar conceptualizations
of the issue. Robin Wright, for instance, published Sacred Rage: The Crusade of Modern
Islam in 1985. Using Iran after the 1979 revolution as a case study, Wright argued that
“the Middle East had begun witnessing a virulent new strain of terrorism that spread like
an infectious virus” (18). Here, Wright insisted that it was both Shia and Sunni groups
which relied on ‘terrorism’ to further their goals (22), effectively suggesting that Muslims
of all schools of faith were potential ‘terrorists.’ Referencing the Marine barracks bombing
of 1983 in Lebanon, Wright also concluded that “[t]he suicide attack was no longer an
isolated incident, but a trend, one that neither the massive intelligence apparatus nor the
elite military wing of the free world’s superpower could prevent” (17). Indeed, Wright’s
study connected ‘terrorism’ to Islam and depicted it as a military struggle which targeted
first and foremost the United States.
Wright was not the only scholar to frame ‘terrorism’ in this manner. Gayle Rivers,
for instance, published The War against the Terrorists in 1986, a study in which he, as
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the title already indicates, described ‘terrorism’ as a war between ‘the West’ and different
groups of ‘terrorists.’ Rivers insisted that “[a]ll terrorists [we]re the enemy” and referred
to them as “roaches and rats” (103, 31), warning that “if we let them proliferate, we
w[ould] lose the war in which we ha[d] been pitted against them by their volition” (31).
Amir Taheri wrote Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism in 1987 in which
he warned that “there exist[ed] today a phenomenon justifiably described as ‘Islamic’
terrorism” (3). In Taheri’s view, ‘Islamic terrorism’ constituted a new movement different
from other forms of ‘terrorism’ because “it [wa]s clearly conceived and conducted as a
form of Holy War which c[ould] only end when total victory ha[d] been achieved” (8). He
warned that “[r]adical Islam ha[d] declared a war on the infidels” and maintained that
“[t]he terror that the world [wa]s witnessing today in the Middle East and beyond [wa]s
directly traceable to the basic teachings of Islam” (12, 9). Taheri also claimed that the
United States had become the main object of hate in “the Muslim world” (194), thus
mirroring a conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ as a form of war waged by fanatical Muslims
against the United States.22
The examples discussed here suggest that conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ as
motivated by belief in Islam and constituting a form of war, as put forth by participants
of the Washington Conference, were slowly influencing other scholars working in the
field of ‘terrorism’ studies. Nevertheless, these ideas were not yet taken up to the same
extent by the more prominent members of the academic community. Bruce Hoffman, for
instance, predominantly focused on providing broader assessments to the government
about the threat of ‘terrorism’ generally. In his view, ‘Islamic terrorists’ constituted one
dangerous group among several others such as “Left-wing radical organizations” and
“Right-wing racist, anti-authority, survivalist-type groups” (Terrorism in the United v).
He only mentioned in passing that “Islamic elements m[ight] be preparing to carry
out terrorist attacks in the United States” (Recent Trends 57), but did not discuss it
further. Similarly, Brian Jenkins was more generally concerned about “Future Trends in
22Other examples include David Rapoport, “Fear,” and the various contributions collected in Yonah
Alexander’s anthology Middle East Terrorism, discussed in more detail in the next chapter. At the
same time, scholars working in the field of Middle Eastern Studies increasingly discovered ‘Islamic
fundamentalism’ as a problem but investigated it without explicitly referring to ‘terrorism.’ See, e.g.,
Lewis, “Islamic Revolution;” and Pipes, “Fundamentalist” and In the Path.
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International Terrorism” and did not single out Islam as force behind ‘terrorism’ (Future 1).
Walter Laqueur’s 1987 study The Age of Terrorism does not address the issue of religion
in connection with ‘terrorism’ at all, suggesting that the notion of ‘Islamic terrorists’ was
not yet considered overly relevant by the most influential ‘terrorism’ scholars.
More importantly, the mid- to late-1980s also saw the emergence of a small group of
more critically-minded scholars who engaged not only with the issue of ‘terrorism’ but also
‘terrorism’ studies itself. Most significantly, in 1984, Alex Schmid, in collaboration with
Albert Jongman, published Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories,
Data Bases and Literature. The handbook, which appeared in a second revised, updated,
and expanded edition in 1988, quickly became one of the most important publications
in the field. (The 1988 edition is still cited and referred to by scholars to this day.) In
Political Terrorism, Schmid and Jongman set out to map the field of ‘terrorism’ research,
compiling and critically reviewing, among other things, existing definitions and typologies
of the term, various theories about ‘terrorism,’ and the use of data and data bases on
‘terrorist’ incidents as a research tool. They also provided an extensive bibliography listing
relevant literature on the topic as well as a comprehensive directory of designated ‘terrorist’
organizations.
They additionally polled their fellow scholars to establish who they considered as
leading authors in the field. The list, revised once more in 1988, featured, among others,
Brian Jenkins, Paul Wilkinson, J. Bowyer Bell, Yonah Alexander, Martha Crenshaw,
Walter Laqueur, Claire Sterling, Michael Stohl, Ray Cline, and Brian Crozier (Political
Terrorism: A New Guide 181). This endeavor not only established an academic hierarchy,
it also confirmed and institutionalized these particular voices as more important than
others, accepting and legitimizing their discursive dominance. It effectively cemented their
position as (often uncontested) leaders for decades to come, signaling that the knowledge
about ‘terrorism’ produced by these scholars was privileged and more valuable than the
work done by other academics.
What set Schmid and Jongman’s handbook apart from other publications at the
time was the self-reflective, critical tone with which they evaluated the state of the
field. First and foremost, the authors focused on the need for an accepted definition of
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‘terrorism,’ arguing that “[w]ithout some solution to the definitional problem, without
isolating terrorism from other forms of (political) violence, there c[ould] be no uniform
data collection and no responsible theory building on terrorism” (Political Terrorism:
A New Guide 3). Moreover, they added, “[t]he question of the definition of a term like
terrorism c[ould] not be detached from the question of who [wa]s the defining agency” (127),
a statement notable for its awareness of the role of the academic researcher in shaping
knowledge about a topic.
Alex Schmid also set out to build a consensus definition, to date the first and
only scholar to do so, by sending out questionnaires to other leading scholars in the field.
Based on the responses, Schmid compiled a complex definition of ‘terrorism,’ which he
revised once more for the 1988 edition of the handbook after collecting feedback and
suggestions from colleagues in the field. While his definition never achieved a dominant
status in the field – in fact it was seldom cited by any other scholar – Schmid’s endeavor
nevertheless illustrates that the mid- to late-1980s saw the emergence of a new, more
critical generation of scholars who approached the issue of ‘terrorism’ with greater care,
aware of the discourse’s power to shape (political) reality and calling for a more critical
approach to the study of ‘terrorism.’ However, since they were only few in numbers, they
did not have the political capital to change the academic discourse on ‘terrorism’ in a
significant and lasting way.23 Ultimately, this meant that conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’
as a form of war waged by ‘evil’ networks, spearheaded by ‘Islamic’ terrorists from the
Middle East, remained (largely) unchallenged. In the next section, I discuss how the news
media and American popular culture responded to these constructions.
23Other examples include Slater and Stohl as well as Stohl. The first dissertations which surveyed the
academic field of ‘terrorism’ studies were written by Kissane; Reid, Analysis; and Romano.
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3.5 Fighting ‘Arab Terrorists’ in the Middle East – The
‘Terrorism’ Discourse in U.S. News Media and Popular
Culture in the Mid- to Late 1980s
As the section above showed, in the 1980s, political and academic discourses presented a
fairly homogeneous conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ as a form of war conducted mainly by
‘evil terrorists’ who received state support and were organized in global networks. They
only differed in the extent to which religion (meaning Islam) was included in framings of
‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ motivations. Thus, media and cultural discourses on ‘terrorism’
in the 1980s did not simply adopt these knowledge claims about ‘terrorism,’ but rather
advanced their own framings of the concept which at times echoed some of these notions
yet also differed significantly from these rival constructions in other aspects. As a result,
some claims about ‘terrorism,’ particularly that it constituted a form of war and that
it involved support from hostile states, achieved a dominant discursive position as they
reverberated through different discursive fields. However, other claims, for example that
‘terrorists’ operated in networks or that religion somehow fueled ‘terrorism,’ did not play an
important role in media and cultural discourses and did therefore not become a dominant
component in the meaning of ‘terrorism’ in the 1980s. Hence, this section thus takes a closer
look at how the media, using The New York Times as an example, as well as Hollywood
movies like The Delta Force (1986) conceptualized ‘terrorism.’ As in the previous chapter,
I base my analysis of media trends on data taken from the online database of The New
York Times where I collected and counted the amount of hits a particular search term
generated per calendar year (January 1 to December 31).
Generally speaking, in the 1980s, ‘terrorism’ became even more central in American
news reporting than in the previous decade. Figure 3.1 illustrates this trend. In the 1970s,
an average of 961 articles containing the word ‘terrorism’ appeared per year in The New
York Times. A decade later, however, this number rose to 1,645 pieces, an increase of 71 %.
In fact, the 1980s, with five articles per day which mentioned ‘terrorism,’ constituted the
decade with the highest average number of articles on ‘terrorism’ before the events of
September 11, 2001.24 By comparison, for the 1990s, this number is reduced slightly to
24For the decade spanning the years 2000-2009, there were an average of 6,378 articles per year in The
New York Times which mentioned ‘terrorism.’ See Chapter 5.
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Figure 3.1: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, 1977-2000
1,625 articles per year, a minimal decrease of 1 %. These numbers thus indicate the central
role the issue of ‘terrorism’ played in the American news media in the 1980s.
A further look at the graph in Figure 3.1 supports this claim. In the late 1970s
to the early 1980s, reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times went through a first
notable growth, resulting in an above-average number of articles in 1980 and 1981, i.e.
the years of the Iranian hostage crisis but also the beginning of Reagan’s presidency.
While there were already 1,153 articles on ‘terrorism’ in 1979, this number rose by 51 %
to 1,742 articles the following year. In 1981, journalistic interest in ‘terrorism’ remained
high (even though the hostages had come home in January) at 1,715 articles that year,
suggesting that Reagan administration’s immediate focus on ‘terrorism,’ which I recounted
at the beginning of this chapter, was also mirrored in above-average reporting on the issue
in The New York Times.
A similar dynamic was on display a few years later. In 1984, there were 1,476 articles
on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, but that number increased by 19 % to 1,752 reports
in 1985 and then once more by 45 % to 2,536 articles in 1986. During the entire decade,
reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times was constantly higher than in the 1970s,
even in 1983, the year for which the database records the lowest number of articles at
1,293 pieces. This illustrates not only how dominant the discourse on ‘terrorism’ had
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Figure 3.2: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, 1977-1990
become in American news reporting, but suggests, in fact, that in the 1980s the discourse
maintained a hegemonic position in American mainstream society.
The data also allows for interesting conclusions with regard to how The New York
Times framed ‘terrorism’ in its writings. As Figure 3.2 outlines, two topics dominated
reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the 1980s: the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Indeed, as the
data shows, roughly one third of all articles on ‘terrorism’ in the 1980s also mentioned the
Soviet Union in some form or other. Searches with the terms ‘Soviet Union’ and ‘terrorism’
on the website of The New York Times recorded numbers of hits which regularly made
up about a fourth of all articles on the issue. As this chapter has already demonstrated,
The New York Times maintained a decidedly critical view and continuously questioned
and rejected claims about the existence of a Soviet-sponsored global ‘terrorism’ network.
The data collected here, however, quantifies the extent of the newspaper’s efforts to
deconstruct and discredit the conspiracy theory, suggesting that the debate delegitimizing
and stigmatizing the conspiracy theory was central to discourses about ‘terrorism.’
However, the far more central topic in journalistic writings on ‘terrorism’ in The
New York Times was the Middle East. As the graphs in Figure 3.2 show, reporting on
‘terrorism’ in relation to the Middle East made up a third of the overall coverage of
‘terrorism’ in the newspaper, particularly from 1983 onwards, indicating that the topic
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became increasingly important as the decade progressed. In fact, reporting on ‘Middle
East terrorism’ trumped the coverage of ‘Soviet Union terrorism’ in every year except in
1981 and 1982, the years when the conspiracy theory enjoyed the highest popularity in
U.S. politics and academia. This development also highlights the interconnectedness of
the various discursive fields.
As Figure 3.2 makes clear, in the 1980s, ‘terrorism’ in connection to the Middle
East experienced a heightened journalistic interest. Indeed, the data also shows that,
as ‘Middle East terrorism’ became more popular, so did references to ‘Arab terrorism.’
While reporting on ‘Islamic terrorism’ remained fairly low throughout the decade, articles
mentioning either ‘Middle East’ or ‘Arab terrorism’ made up, on average, 35 % of all
writing on ‘terrorism’ per year (although there is bound to be some overlap between the
two concepts). This illustrates that The New York Times predominantly linked ‘terrorism’
to a geographical region, namely the Middle East, and the perpetrators’ ethnicity as ‘Arab’
while questions of religious belief remained marginalized and not important in journalistic
framings of ‘terrorism.’ In this regard, the journalistic discourse on the phenomenon differed
noticeably from academic and political conceptualizations of ‘terrorism,’ indicating that
not all meaning components had stabilized sufficiently to exert dominance across different
discourses.
This journalistic interest in ‘terrorism’ in relation to the Middle East can be further
specified and quantified. As Figure 3.3 illustrates, at different times throughout the 1980s,
different nations located in the geographical and imaginary Middle East became central
to reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the newspaper. In the early 1980s, articles addressing Iran
and ‘terrorism’ spiked in response to the hostage crisis (see previous chapter). From 1982
onwards, The New York Times also increasingly focused on ‘terrorism’ in Lebanon, the
coverage peaking in 1985 (374 articles, i.e. 21 % of all reporting on ‘terrorism’) and 1986
(369 articles, 15 %). 1986 also saw a spike in reporting on ‘terrorism’ in and from Libya
with 768 articles (30 % of all ‘terrorism’ reporting), an increase of 793 % compared to
86 articles in the previous year. ‘Terrorism’ in connection to Iran, Iraq, and Syria also
generated continuous journalistic interest throughout the 1980s, suggesting that the actions
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Figure 3.3: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East in The New York Times,
1977-1990
of states antagonistic to or in outright conflict with the United States were central to news
reporting on ‘terrorism.’
Furthermore, it appears that The New York Times, much like other central discursive
agents, conceived of ‘terrorism’ as closely tied to war. The graph in Figure 3.4 shows that
the number of articles addressing both ‘terrorism’ and ‘war’ at the same time consistently
constituted a third of all reporting on ‘terrorism.’ By comparison, notions of a ‘terror
network’ or a ‘terrorism network’ did not figure in any significant way in the writings of
The New York Times, suggesting that constructions of ‘terrorist’ groups as operating in
networks were not particularly relevant to the newspaper’s understanding of the concept.
Lastly, the reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times remained moderate in
tone. As the graphs in Figure 3.5 demonstrate, articles addressing the issue of ‘terrorism’
rarely contained emotionalizing or moralizing terms such as ‘evil’ or ‘bad.’ Even the phrase
“scourge of terrorism,” coined by President Reagan throughout the 1980s, did not impact
the journalistic discourse on the issue in any significant way. This indicates that a moral
condemnation of ‘terrorism’ did not play an important role in journalistic constructions of
the issue, an important difference to conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ advanced by other
discursive agents.
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Figure 3.4: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ and other concepts of (political) violence in The New
York Times, 1977-1990
Figure 3.5: Reporting on the ‘scourge’ of ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, 1977-1990
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Overall, then, the data suggests that The New York Times conceptualized ‘terrorism’
predominantly as a state activity which constituted a form of war, thus echoing and
enhancing similar knowledge claims by other discursive agents. The newspaper also
retained the familiar focus on the Soviet Union and especially nations in the geographic
and imaginary Middle East, linking them together via a presumed shared ethnicity, ‘Arab.’
Yet, significantly, markers of religion were not central to journalistic writings on ‘terrorism,’
indicating that The New York Times participated actively and independently in the
discourse by advancing its own constructions and conceptualizations of the term. Similarly,
it rejected the notion of networks, popularized by political and academic discourses, instead
focusing on the behavior and actions of individual states. Interestingly, the newspaper
also refrained from overtly moralizing and emotionalizing instances of ‘terrorism,’ rather
retaining a more restrained tone in its reporting. This indicated that the overall discourse on
‘terrorism’ was marked by a considerable degree of heterogeneity since different discursive
agents conceptualized the term independently, with some meaning components overlapping
and others diverging.
The threat from ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East as constructed by the
Reagan administration, U.S. academia, and print media like The New York Times also
quickly spread into American popular culture. The 1980s saw the rise of the Hollywood
blockbuster with enormous budgets for filming, star power, and action sequences.25
‘Terrorism,’ especially the kind from the Middle East, quickly became a staple in action
blockbusters in the 1980s. As William Palmer has pointed out, ‘terrorism’ on film was
seen as a convenient “provider of automatic weapon toting cannon fodder” and became
“the predominant source of villainy” in these films (128, 164). In addition, the ‘terrorist’
action blockbuster popularized the stereotype of the hate-filled, irrational, violent ‘Arab
terrorist’ who wanted to destroy the United States as representative of ‘Western’ values.
One such example is the 1986 production The Delta Force, starring Chuck Norris
and Lee Marvin. The Delta Force tells the story of how a group of ‘Arab terrorists,’ with
the help of the Lebanese military, kidnap American Travelways Flight 282 and take all
25For more on the emergence of the Hollywood blockbuster, see Alford and King. On the general
representation of ‘terrorism’ in film, see Auge´; Cettl; Prince, Firestorm; Riegler; “Through;” M. Ryan
and Kellner; Vanhala; and Zywietz. For the representation of ‘Arabs’ in film, see Semmerling and
Shaheen, TV and Reel.
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passengers as hostages. The ‘terrorists’ order the pilot to fly to Beirut, Lebanon, and
commence negotiations with the U.S. government for the release of the hostages. In an
emotionally charged scene and unbeknownst to the American authorities, the ‘terrorists’
separate the Jewish passengers from the rest of the group and hide them in a safe house in
Beirut. Then the plane departs again for Algiers where the ‘terrorists’ release the women
and children on board. A first rescue attempt while the plane is still on the tarmac by the
American ‘counter-terrorism’ unit Delta Force, led by Colonel Nick Alexander (Lee Marvin),
is aborted when Alexander learns about the Jewish passengers still kept hostage in Beirut.
A shoot-out ensues in which the ‘terrorists’ execute one of the passengers, navy diver
Tom Hale, and throw his body on the runway before taking off with the remaining male
passengers on board. In response, Delta Force prepares and executes a daring rescue
mission to free both the hostages on the plane as well as the small group of predominantly
Jewish passengers kept hidden in a safe house in Beirut by the ‘terrorists.’ Major McCoy
(Chuck Norris) and his men kill all ‘terrorists’ and free the passengers. Their plane returns
to Israel where they are accorded a triumphant welcome.
The events depicted in the movie were partly inspired by real-life historical events
and other filmic representations of successful fights against ‘terrorism.’ The Delta Force
borrows central plot elements from the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 by members of
Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, particularly the killing of U.S. Navy Petty Officer Robert
Stethem. An additional influence on the movie was the successful and internationally
celebrated Israeli rescue mission to free hostages held at Entebbe Airport, Uganda, in
June 1976 by Palestinian ‘terrorists’ as well as the Israeli movie production Operation
Thunderbolt (1977) which brought the story of the daring Israeli rescue mission to the
silver screen.26 These references virtually guaranteed that audiences of The Delta Force
interpreted the events depicted in the movie as ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East
from the very beginning.
The Delta Force shows the United States as under attack from ‘Arab terrorism’
and constructs the villains as state-sponsored ‘terrorist’-soldiers enacting the ‘terrorism’
policies of notorious state sponsors like Iran and Lebanon. The impression that the United
26In fact, both The Delta Force and Operation Thunderbolt were produced by the same production
company, Golan-Globus, and directed by Menachem Golan.
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States is imperiled by ‘terrorism’ is created by continuous references to the Iranian hostage
crisis throughout the movie. Most notably, the opening scenes of The Delta Force recreate
the failed rescue operation “Eagle Claw” in the Iranian desert. In the chaos of running
and shouting soldiers, fires and explosions, protagonist McCoy distinguishes himself by
rescuing one of his men from a burning helicopter despite significant danger to his own
life. As he carries his injured friend to the waiting chopper which lifts them out of the
desert, the movie already establishes that the U.S. soldiers engaged in the day-to-day
battle against America’s enemies are unequivocally ‘good’: McCoy and his men are heroic,
loyal, strong, masculine, and intelligent.
It is also McCoy who, on the flight back to the U.S., sitting defeated among the other
equally silent and serious soldiers, asks his commanding officer Colonel Nick Alexander,
“[w]hy the hell wouldn’t they listen, Nick? We told ‘em it’s too dangerous to launch
this operation at night” (04:13-04:19). This comment suggests that the American defeat
against the ‘terrorism’ behind the Iranian hostage crisis was engineered in Washington
and constitutes a not so subtle smear of then-President Carter. It also establishes that the
United States has, so far, been powerless and ineffective against ‘terrorism,’ particularly
the kind from the Middle East. Nevertheless, the heroic music and theme song underlying
much of the opening sequence of The Delta Force also indicate that the situation will not
remain that way and that the United States will eventually return to its former glory and
power. Indeed, the movie functions in many ways as a revenge fantasy through which the
trauma of the Iranian hostage crisis is overcome.
The Delta Force then dedicates considerable time to establishing the ‘Arab terrorist’
threat. Audiences can easily identify the ‘terrorists’ in The Delta Force as ‘Arab’ since the
movie makes use of general stereotypes already firmly entrenched in American culture and
merges them with dominant conceptualizations about ‘the terrorist’ to create the trope
of the ‘Arab’ (and ‘Muslim’) ‘terrorist.’27 The ‘terrorists’ are marked as ‘Arab’ because
of their darker skin tone, dark hair, and dark eye color. By contrast, the non-‘terrorist’
characters in the movie are all light-skinned, overwhelmingly blond and blue-eyed. This
27For a discussion of the general representation of ‘Arabs’ in American television and film, see the body of
work by Shaheen. For an analysis of the representation of the Middle East in American popular fiction,
particularly crime fiction, see again R. Simon, Middle and Spies.
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includes the Israel characters who, following established discursive traditions of the ‘special
relationship’ between the United States and Israel, are white-washed as quasi-Americans.28
The ‘Arab terrorists’ are further Othered since they speak Arabic for most of the movie
and English only with a strong accent. They also have stereotypical ‘Arab’ names like
Abdul or Mustafa.
The movie then fuses these biased representations of ‘Arabs’ with equally
stereotypical notions about ‘terrorists’ to construct and visualize the trope of the ‘Arab
terrorist.’ Especially Mustafa (David Menahem), one of the two hijackers, enjoys cruelty
as depicted, for instance, in his vicious and merciless beating of one of the navy divers
or punching the priest on board when he dares to correct Mustafa that “America never
bombed Beirut” (25:22). What is more, the group’s objective is left vague throughout the
movie, giving the impression that the ‘terrorists’ engage in ‘terrorism’ for the sake of the
violence itself, not for a larger political goal with which audiences might even sympathize
to a certain extent.
Moreover, the movie works to enhance the danger of the ‘Arab terrorists’ by
presenting them as part of a larger pan-Arab ‘terrorist’ network supported by various
state sponsors in the Middle East, thus taking up and disseminating prevailing discursive
constructions of ‘terrorism’ in the mid- to late-1980s. The ‘Arab terrorists’ have links to
Iran and the Ayatollah Khomeini, which can be gleaned from the fact that a large picture
of the Ayatollah hangs above the radio equipment in the ‘terrorist’ group’s headquarters
in Beirut. When it becomes clear that the Delta Force will succeed in its mission to free
the hostages, Abdul (Robert Forster), the head of the ‘terrorist’ group, receives the news
that the Ayatollah is prepared to welcome him and the hostages to Iran so that they can
continue the confrontation with the United States. The Delta Force here clearly raises the
specter of a second Iranian hostage crisis and the possibility of another American failure
to combat ‘Arab terrorism’ effectively and efficiently.
Lebanon turns out to be another state sponsor of the ‘Arab terrorists’ in the movie.
When the hijacked plane lands in Beirut for the first time, Abdul is greeted by Jamil
(Uri Gavriel), a high-ranking military officer as “brother” (41:39), indicating that, at the
28For more on the ‘special relationship,’ see the references in Chapter 2, footnote 28 on page 78.
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very least, the Lebanese military sympathizes with the ‘terrorists.’ In the course of their
conversation (entirely in Arabic), however, it becomes apparent that the Lebanese military
has taken a much more active role and been involved in the planning of the hijacking from
the beginning. The military officer Jamil tells Abdul to release the women and children
as a sign of good will so that the United States will negotiate with the ‘terrorists.’ But
Abdul refuses to follow these orders and in the ensuing discussion Jamil tells him that
“I am your commander” in an attempt to get Abdul to comply (41:54). In the end, the
‘terrorists’ are given fuel and told to continue the hijacking in their own manner as the
Lebanese Minister of Defense caves to the pressure of the situation. These scenes make
it clear that the Lebanese state apparatus has financed and organized the hijacking and
is generally supportive of ‘Arab terrorism’ against the United States. All in all, then,
The Delta Force depicts the ‘Arab terrorists’ as having links and receiving unconditional
support from many different Middle Eastern nations, thus visualizing and legitimizing
already circulating constructions of ‘terrorism’ as financed and organized by nations in
the Middle East hostile to the United States.
Similar to knowledge claims made by other discursive agents in the 1980s, The
Delta Force also depicts ‘terrorism’ as a form of war. In the movie, the ‘Arab terrorists’
are shown wearing military fatigues while they expertly handle military equipment like
jeeps and machine guns. In the latter half of the movie, where the action takes place
in Beirut itself, the ‘terrorists’ work jointly with Lebanese soldiers to keep the hostages
hidden and, later, to fight the attack of the Delta Force. In these scenes, it is practically
impossible to distinguish between genuine ‘Arab terrorists’ and Lebanese soldiers as they
all wear the same uniforms. The Delta Force thus constructs the ‘Arab’ perpetrators as
‘terrorist’-soldiers, engaged in a ruthless and violent war against the United States.
In the end, the threat from the ‘Arab terrorists’ can only be contained and
defeated through the superior violence styled as vengeance and justice exacted by members
of the Delta Force, foremost protagonist Major McCoy. The Delta Force glorifies this
anti-‘terrorist’ violence in countless shooting scenes in which anonymous ‘Arab terrorists’
are sprayed with fire from American machine guns and die gory deaths. The final battle
between McCoy and Abdul is staged as hand-to-hand combat in which McCoy beats
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Abdul to a pulp before exploding him inside his car with a rocket from his motorcycle.
Melani McAlister has rightfully commented that this scene “functions as something like a
torture session, where vengeance is enacted slowly on the body of the Arab” (229). Thanks
to the heroism and power of the Delta Force, ‘Arab terrorism’ against the United States is
successfully combated and defeated.
The Delta Force was not the only Hollywood production to make use of ‘Arab
terrorists’ as villains. Other movies, like Iron Eagle (1986), Iron Eagle II (1988), or Death
before Dishonor (1987), equally presented ‘Arab terrorists’ as enemies of the United States.
The trope became so pervasive, in fact, that the first Die Hard movie, released in 1988 and
starring Bruce Willis, could rely on “the audience’s presumed familiarity with the genre”
to construct its plot by having the villains pretend to be ‘terrorists’ in order to rob a vault
(McAlister 224). What is more, movies featuring ‘Arab terrorists’ acted out U.S. revenge
fantasies and visualized the tough rhetoric with which the Reagan administration sold its
‘counter-terrorism’ strategy to the public, even though it corresponded rarely to actual
policy. Stephen Prince recounts that after President Reagan watched Rambo: First Blood
Part II in 1985, “he enthusiastically announced that he knew what to do the next time
American hostages were taken in the Middle East” (Visions 16). Hollywood productions
of brave Americans fighting ‘Arab terrorism’ not only turned ‘terrorism’ into a commodity
item, they set up the entire discourse on ‘terrorism,’ particularly the kind in and from the
Middle East, for consumption. However, as the next chapter shows, ultimately, political
and academic conceptualizations of the issue which stressed the importance of religion
(read: Islam) as motivation for ‘terrorism’ overshadowed media and cultural framings which
singled out ethnicity as main meaning component.
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Chapter 4
“We Are Confronting the Emergence of New Kinds of
Terrorist Violence” – ‘New Islamic Terrorism’ in the
1990s
The end of the Cold War was widely perceived as a watershed moment in U.S. history (e.g.
Badey 51, J. Edwards xi, Hendrickson xi).1 Contemporary commentators continuously
stressed that the world was entering a new, unparalleled era of peace and prosperity,
leading political scientist Francis Fukuyama to proclaim a definite victory of democracy
over communism: “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or
the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that
is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western
liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (4).
While Fukuyama and his colleagues constructed and celebrated the end of the Cold
War as caesura in world politics and history, American politicians, diplomats, and military
officers were unexpectedly faced with an ideological void. Since the Soviet Union was no
longer available as nemesis and ‘Other’ to vilify, these officials suddenly lacked an enemy
figure against which to position the United States as superior. As Michael Klare has put
it, “the end of the Cold War provided an enormous shock for American military leaders”
and politicians because it “eradicated the mental map that hitherto had explained world
events and governed U.S. policymaking” (6). New enemies and new explanations for their
motivations were needed.
This also influenced the American discourse on ‘terrorism.’ Now that the distinctly
political and ideological paradigm which had framed the ‘terrorism’ discourse in the 1980s
had become obsolete, perceived cultural and religious differences gained in importance,
especially differences between ‘the West’ and Islamic cultures in the Middle East, which
were positioned as inherently Other and threatening to American society. In that process,
1For a history of the Cold War, see Campbell and Logevall, Fink, Immerman, and Lu¨thi. For an analysis
on the Cold War with a focus on rhetoric, see Medhurst et al. For an analysis of the aftermath of the
Cold War, see Adelman, Cameron, Casey and Wright, and Savranskaya and Blanton.
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discursive actors and voices continuously tapped into notions of ‘terrorism’ established in
the previous decade, i.e. that ‘terrorists’ operated in groups and networks, that ‘terrorism’
constituted a form of war, and that it overwhelmingly involved ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’ in
and from the Middle East. But these ideas were not simply ‘recycled,’ they were also
adapted and tailored to the changed political and cultural context, thus both reflecting
concerns over ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ in a post-Cold War world and actively shaping
them at the same time.
The often openly antagonistic attitude towards the Middle East and, increasingly,
Islam was espoused by prominent members of the political scene, the academic communities,
journalists, and in influential Hollywood productions. Already in 1990, Vice President Dan
Quayle, for instance, warned during a speech at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis,
“We have been surprised this past century by the rise of communism, the rise of Nazism,
the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism. [. . . ] Though we may be surprised, let us
always be prepared” (33:06-33:11).2 With just a few sentences, Quayle constructed ‘Islamic
fundamentalism’ as a threat for not only U.S. national security but for American society
as a whole. By likening the dangers from “radical Islamic fundamentalism” to the 40-year
long conflict with the Soviet Union and Nazism, arguably discursivized as the ‘ultimate
evil’ in American culture, Quayle endowed it with epic proportions and constructed it as a
central challenge for U.S. politics.3
He was not the only one to perceive Islam and the Middle East that way. The
influential scholar and designated ‘expert’ on the Middle East, its peoples, and cultures,
Bernard Lewis, took it upon himself to clarify to readers “The Roots of Muslim Rage”
in an influential, eponymous article for The Atlantic in 1990. Lewis explained that while
the American way of life with its promise of freedom, justice, and opportunity was widely
admired throughout the Middle East, a “great change” had occurred recently “when the
leaders of a widespread and widening religious revival sought and identified their enemies
as the enemies of God” and designated the U.S. as such an enemy (50). Lewis discerned
that Americans were “baﬄe[d]” by this “surge of hatred” against them and endeavored
2See also Halliday.
3For more on the representation of the Holocaust in American culture, see J. Alexander; Butter, Epitome;
Novick; and Rosenfeld. For an analysis of the representation of World War II in American culture, see,
e.g., Christiansen, Ramsay, and Takayoshi.
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to explain these developments to the public (48). As Zachary Lockman has pointed out,
Lewis’ “age, much trumpeted erudition, magisterial style and very British air of authority
enhanced his stature” so that Lewis’ opinions and writings carried considerable weight
(Contending 251).
In his article, Lewis wrote that the principal reasons for this anti-Americanism
among Muslims in the Middle East were “American support for Israel” as well as “American
support for hated regimes” (52), but qualified these explanations immediately by arguing
that they had only “some plausibility” and therefore “d[id] not suffice” as reasons at
all (52-53). Similarly, he relativized and discarded accusations of ‘the West’ as racist,
imperialist, and sexist by stating that “[i]n none of these sins [we]re we the only sinners,
and in some of them we [we]re very far from being the worst” (53). Here, Lewis’ choice of
the personal pronoun “we” is telling as he created an imagined community with readers
of his article, assuming a collective kinship which erased all differences and nuances and
created a homogeneous ‘Western’ reader who shared Lewis’ concerns. Moreover, Lewis’
description of human rights violation by Western colonial powers as “sins” added a religious
undertone which subtly framed the conflict he described as one between different cultures
and faiths. He dismissed charges of imperialism against the United States in the same vein,
arguing, “In many of these writings, ‘imperialist’ is given a distinctly religious significance
[. . . ]. [. . . ] What is truly evil and unacceptable is the domination of infidels over true
believers” (53). Lewis thus interpreted conflicts between ‘the West,’ meaning the United
States as its principal representative, and the entire Middle East as driven by cultural
and religious imperatives. Political explanations for tensions and clashes were downplayed
and read as obscuring deeper religious struggles while the Middle East was represented as
united in its animosity towards a benevolent, innocent United States.
Following his own logic, Lewis then concluded that “A Clash of Civilizations”
between a distinctly Christian “Western civilization” and “the Islamic world” was
immanent (56, 58, 59). As he explained, while “Christendom [learned to] restrain the
murderous intolerance and persecution” of others, “Muslims experienced no such need and
evolved no such doctrine” and were thus more prone to resort to violence to act out their
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hostile feelings (56). From Lewis’ point of view, this fault in “the Islamic world” made
Muslims inherently inferior to ‘the West’ and he posited:
Islamic fundamentalism has given an aim and a form to the otherwise aimless and
formless resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have devalued their
traditional values and loyalties and, in the final analysis, robbed them of their beliefs,
their aspirations, their dignity, and to an increasing extent even their livelihood. (59)
In Lewis’ analysis, Islam dominated the entire Middle East, homogenizing the region
under its banner and providing the motivation and rationale for its conflicts with a benign,
enlightened ‘West.’ Islam became the sole aggressor in this scenario and created “the
danger of a new era of religious wars” (60).
Lewis’ notion of a “Clash of Civilizations” between ‘the West’ and Islam resonated
with readers and the article was widely and controversially discussed.4 Importantly, it
paved the way for Samuel P. Huntington who expanded on Lewis’ theses in a 1993 article
for Foreign Affairs entitled “The Clash of Civilizations?” Huntington postulated:
[T]he fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or
primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of
conflict will be cultural. [. . . ] the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between
nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global
politics. (1)
Huntington then proceeded to identify the civilizations in question as “Western,
Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly
African civilization” (3).5 In his view, these civilizations would clash in the future because
“processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world [we]re
separating people from longstanding local identities” (4). People, he wrote, built their
identities in predominantly ethnic and religious terms which dispositioned them to interpret
the world in terms of religious and ethnic markers (7). What is more, according to
Huntington, these cultural (and especially religious) differences contained a significant
potential for violent conflict not only between groups within a single civilization, but
predominantly between two or more civilizations.
As example for his claims, Huntington singled out the “fault line” between Western
and Islamic civilization since conflicts between the two “ha[d] been going on for 1,300
4See, e.g., Esposito, Islamic.
5For a contemporary critique of Huntington’s claims, see Ajami; Binyan; Ignatieff; Mahbubani; and Said,
“Clash.” For a more recent engagement with Huntington’s claims, see Holloway and Migdal.
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years” (9). For Huntington, Western civilization was “at an extraordinary peak of power
in relation to other civilizations” and its military might was “unrivaled” (15). This
enabled ‘the West’ “to run the world in ways that w[ould] maintain Western predominance,
protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values” (17),
but also contained the seed of conflict since “Western ideas of individualism, liberalism,
constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets,
the separation of church and state often ha[d] little resonance in Islamic, Confucian,
Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures” (17). Huntington thus positioned a
monolithic ‘West’ as culturally, economically, and politically superior to “the Rest” (16),
suggesting that civilizations and cultures which opposed the status quo were, at least in
part, driven by feelings of inferiority and envy.
On the other side of the conflict between “the West and the Rest” (16, 18),
Huntington singled out “The Confucian-Islamic Connection” (21), basically arguing that
these two civilizations had joined forces to challenge the dominance and superiority of
‘the West.’ Both civilizations especially hoped to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons and weapons technologies in order to balance out Western military might (22-23).
Huntington thus constructed two cultures, traditionally Othered in American discourses,
as threats against American national security and foreign policy interests. 6 These threats
were of a new magnitude since a peaceful resolution of tensions and conflicts between
different civilizations was extremely unlikely, if not outright impossible. As Huntington
asserted from the outset, “[t]he fault lines between civilizations w[ould] be the battle lines
of the future” (1) – and the conflict between ‘the West’ and Islamic civilization with its
“centuries-old military interaction [. . . ] [wa]s unlikely to decline” (9).7 Huntington, much
like Lewis before him, not only downplayed all cultural, historical, political, economic, and
social differences between those he grouped together into one civilization on either side
of the divide, he also offered a coherent interpretative paradigm which transcended Cold
6For an analysis of the representation of Asian communities and cultures in American culture, see, e.g.,
Lee, R. Mayer, and Nishime. For an analysis of the representation of Arab and Muslim communities in
‘the West,’ Said’s Orientalism (1978) is the classic study. See also Little; Lockman, Contending ; Macfie;
McAlister, Sha’ban; Varisco; and Chapter 2, footnote 6 on page 35.
7The term ‘fault line’ can also refer to geological phenomena, for example a large crevice on the surface of
the earth after an earthquake. In the context of Huntington’s argument, it naturalized the conflict and
subtly coded the cultural opposition as strong and lasting enough to rip apart the previous world order.
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War explanations of conflict and instead framed perceived differences in an essentialist
manner as much more fundamental and innate to humanity itself.
Huntington eventually expanded on his ideas in the widely-discussed 1996 volume
The Clash of Civilizations. While Huntington’s Foreign Affairs article still contained a
question mark at the end of the title, suggesting that there was, at the very least, still
some room for doubt and discussion, his book three years later shed all signs of ambiguity
and hesitation and stated as a matter of fact his belief that “[i]n the post-Cold War world,
the most important distinctions among peoples [we]re [. . . ] cultural” (21). Huntington
also continued the theme established in the article that “[t]he resurgence of Islam and
‘re-Islamization’ [. . . ] in Muslim societies” constituted a considerable threat to ‘the West’
and its central tenets (94).
In the book, Huntington singled out once more the ‘Islamic civilization’ as the
main opponent of ‘the West.’ He discerned an “Islamic Resurgence” (103) – spelled in
capital letters to underline its significance and global dimension – which, while accepting
modernity, strictly rejected Western culture and was committed to “Islam as the guide to
life in the modern world” (110). This characteristic marked Islam as dangerous to ‘the
West’ because it “unit[ed] religion and politics” (210), thus offering an all-encompassing
way of life. In Huntington’s interpretation, Muslims were always the aggressors and the
ones to engage most in “fault line conflicts,” i.e. conflicts between members of different
civilizations, a claim that he repeated several times throughout the book (e.g. 208, 255,
259-264, 268). Huntington then clarified that “[t]he underlying problem for the West [wa]s
[. . . ] Islam, a different civilization whose people [we]re convinced of the superiority of their
culture and [we]re obsessed with the inferiority of their power” (217).
In his highly influential writings, Huntington developed and constructed a post-Cold
War future which posited the United States as main representative of ‘the West’ against
an Islamic civilization which spanned, geographically, all of the Middle East and large
parts of Asia, and included the entirety of Muslim believers who all supposedly espoused
aggressive anti-secular and anti-Western views and who were willing to challenge global
Western dominance through violence, ‘terrorism,’ and “fault line” wars. What the rest
of this chapter shows is that Lewis and Huntington (and others like them) provided the
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vocabulary and ideological paradigm to invigorate ‘terrorism’ studies in the 1990s and
(re-)focus the ‘terrorism’ discourse decisively on the Middle East, ‘Arabs,’ and threats
from ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘terrorism.’8
The 1990s were, in many ways, a turbulent decade and these ideas influenced how
incidents of (political) violence were problematized. Some of these events, which proved
influential for the discourse on ‘terrorism’ include the bombing of the World Trade Center
on February 26, 1993, when a bomb exploded in the garage of the building with the clear
intention of bringing the towers down. The endeavor failed, but still killed six people and
injured over 1,000 more. A few years later, on August 7, 1998, almost simultaneously,
two al-Qaeda suicide bombers drove trucks filled with explosives into the U.S. embassies
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, causing 224 deaths and more than
4,500 injuries as well as the destruction of the compounds. These incidents generated
considerable coverage and commentary at the time and greatly impacted the discourse
on ‘terrorism,’ as commentators took these incidents as proof that ‘Islamic terrorism’ was
on the rise and specifically targeting the United States. Thus, throughout the rest of the
chapter, I will continually refer to these events in my discussions of how the discourse on
‘terrorism’ developed in the 1990s and came to focus on ‘Islamic terrorism’ as its main
concern.
In the next section, I discuss how both the academic and the political discourse on
‘terrorism’ reoriented themselves in the early years of the new decade by developing a new
way to problematize the issue. Then I turn to early manifestations of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in
American news media, using The New York Times as an example, as well as Hollywood’s
engagement with ‘Islamic terrorism’ in the beginning of the decade. In the third section,
I analyze how the academic discourse on ‘terrorism’ recovered its dominant position in
the field by constructing ‘Islamic terrorism’ as supposedly new and unprecedented threat.
After that, I examine in more detail how the Clinton administration responded to these
discursive framings. Finally, in the last section, I turn to media and cultural representations
of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in the mid- to late 1990s.
8Other contemporary articles which took a similar approach to the Middle East and the issue of ‘terrorism’
in the 1990s include Miller, “Challenge;” Kramer, “Islam;” and Pipes, “Muslims” and “There Are.”
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4.1 “A Period of Relative Quiet” – The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse
in U.S. Politics and Academia in the Early 1990s
The beginnings of the new decade constituted somewhat of a lull for the discourse on
‘terrorism’ as interest in the topic waned. In the political arena, President George H. W.
Bush set the rhetorical focus on building his “New World Order,” which he started to
proclaim in early 1990, most prominently during an Address to Congress on September
11 that year in response to the brewing crisis in the Gulf region after the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait (“Address on the Persian”). This shift away from ‘terrorism’ as main political
focus also affected the academic study of ‘terrorism’ where the production of knowledge
about ‘terrorism’ received reduced attention and support. This section therefore discusses
how the ‘terrorism’ discourse evolved in the early 1990s in the political and academic fields
as it struggled to remain relevant and maintain its hegemonic position.
At the beginning of the new decade, the ‘terrorism’ discourse had notably lost
influence in the American political scene, in part because contemporary political wisdom
held that the end of the Cold War had ushered in an unprecedented era of peace and
stability, making war, ‘terrorism,’ and other forms of political violence obsolete. Indeed,
George H. W. Bush kept comparatively quiet on the issue of ‘terrorism,’ illustrating the
decreased importance of the ‘terrorism’ discourse in presidential rhetoric and U.S. politics
in the early 1990s.9 Figure 4.1 visualizes this trend and is based on data derived from
my online search of the database of The American Presidency Project (see also again
Figure 1.1). As Figure 4.1 shows, President Bush mentioned ‘terrorism’ on average only
32 times per year during his presidency. By comparison, Reagan referred to ‘terrorism’
38 times a year while Clinton even spoke of the issue 106 per year on average. In fact, for
the years 1989, 1990, and 1992, the number of times President Bush brought up the issue of
‘terrorism’ were below his average, suggesting that ‘terrorism’ was not a particularly central
topic for the Bush administration. The year 1991 marked an exception with above-average
references to ‘terrorism’ for President Bush, namely 43 in total. According to the database
of The American Presidency Project, 21 of those 43 statements on ‘terrorism’, almost
half (49 %), also mentioned Iraq, suggesting that this spike in presidential comments on
9For a general analysis of his presidency, see, e.g., Greene as well as Nelson and Perry.
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Figure 4.1: Presidential references to ‘terrorism,’ 1981-2001
‘terrorism’ in 1991 was related to the escalating Gulf War, i.e. a specific historical incident,
and not a more permanent and stable interest in the topic of ‘terrorism’ generally.10
Not only did President Bush rarely mention ‘terrorism,’ he also conceptualized it
in noticeably vague terms. For instance, only a few days into office himself, the president
declared during the Swearing-in Ceremony for James A. Baker III as Secretary of State
on January 27, 1989, “Today’s Secretary of State must be prepared to work with our
allies to solve such global threats as the international narcotics trade, terrorism, the
degradation of the world’s environment, and the economic distress of developing countries”
(“Remarks for James”). Similarly, he urged a few days later, “We must be in the forefront
in the fight against terrorism” (“Remarks for Samuel”). Bush identified “the problem of
international terror” and, during a visit of the Japanese Prime Minister later that year,
called for “international cooperation for the prevention of terrorism” (“Remarks and a
Question-and-Answer;” “Remarks Following”). President Bush repeated this call during
his speech at the United Nations later that same month, urging the representatives at the
General Assembly to “join forces to combat the threat of terrorism” (“Address to the 44th
Session”). The president also insisted, “I have frequently emphasized my determination to
work to eliminate the scourge of terrorism, and I have no intention of negotiating with
10By contrast, in the previous year, only 9 out of the total 28 statements mentioned ‘terrorism’ and Iraq
together, i.e. 32 %.
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terrorists” (“Statement”). Repeated references to ‘terrorism’ as a “scourge” established a
discursive continuity with the administrations of his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, without
actually adopting any of the definitional components inherent to the term in the previous
decade. Indeed, President Bush never specified how he understood the term itself, rather
using it as buzz term alongside other social and political problems of a global scale. In his
rhetoric, ‘terrorism’ became a means to present himself as focused, dedicated president
who understood the serious political and social problems of the day and knew how to
combat them.
As a consequence, ‘terrorism’ could be applied to a variety of different situations.
For instance, President Bush repeatedly and consistently also linked drugs and narcotics to
‘terrorism’ to justify being ‘tough’ on drug abuse. Just a few weeks into office, he already
spoke of “the scourges of terrorism and drugs” (“Written”). A month later, he explained,
“drugs are like chemical weapons that a society turns on itself. And they breed the most
insidious forms of domestic terrorism. And they’ve got to be stopped, and we’ve got to vow
that they will be stopped” (“Remarks to Members”). President Bush also stated that “we
ha[d] all different kinds of terrorists, but this narco terrorism [wa]s simply outrageous and
unacceptable” (“Joint”). By linking the drug trade to ‘terrorism,’ the president amplified
the perceived threat emanating from drug abuse and drug cartels and enhanced its status
as a domestic policy issue. As these examples illustrate, President Bush used ‘terrorism’
as a flexible signifier in his statements, widening its meaning and applicability to a greater
variety of situations than before, obscuring its meaning, and in the process removing the
‘terrorism’ discourse from its dominant position.
The effects of this rhetorical strategy become particularly apparent when considering
how President Bush referred to ‘terrorism’ in the context of the crisis in the Persian Gulf,
precipitated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait between August 2 and 4, 1990.11 Even though
the Bush administration inherited a strong discursive construction of ‘terrorism’ as a form
of war from its predecessor, Bush remained extremely reluctant to frame the invasion as a
form of ‘terrorism’ or to accuse the Iraqi regime of engaging in it. Instead, President Bush
explained on August 2, 1990, during a speech at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen,
11For analyses and histories of the first Persian Gulf War, see, e.g., the anthologies edited by Bresheeth
and Yuval-Davis as well as Blumberg and French, and the studies by Malik, Moore, and Yetiv.
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Colorado, that “[t]he brutal aggression launched last night against Kuwait illustrate[d]
my central thesis: [. . . ] the world remain[ed] a dangerous place with serious threats to
important U.S. interests” (“Remarks at the Aspen”). He continued that “[t]he events of the
past day underscore[d] also the vital need for a defense structure which not only preserve[d]
our security but provide[d] the resources for supporting the legitimate self-defense needs
of our friends and of our allies” (“Remarks at the Aspen”). In the early stages of the
conflict, President Bush condemned the invasion and suggested that it constituted a threat
to American interests in the Middle East but refrained from linking it to ‘terrorism’ in
any way. Instead, he focused his efforts on building an international coalition to support
Kuwait and mobilized the United Nations Security Council to organize the response of the
international community.
In fact, the president did not connect the crisis in the Persian Gulf directly to
‘terrorism’ at all, suggesting once more that the ‘terrorism’ discourse was not particularly
relevant or dominant in the early 1990s. Hence, I disagree with Carol Winkler who has
argued that “[e]ventually, the administration decided to depict the events in the Gulf as
terrorist acts and borrowed the Reagan strategy of reconstituting the Cold War narrative”
(In the Name 98). Rather, President Bush continued to refer to ‘terrorism’ in a vague,
almost dismissive manner. For instance, in response to a reporter question about “the
possibility of terrorist attacks” against Americans living and working in the Persian Gulf
region, the president admitted that he “[did] worry about extremists taking extreme action”
(“Exchange aboard Air”), a noticeably imprecise phrasing which did not use the term
‘terrorism’ at all. He added later, “There’ve been concerns about terrorism for many years.
And those concerns have been there long before this irrational action by Saddam Hussein,
and they are ongoing. Because, you know, you could well see terrorist groups try to
capitalize on this” (“Exchange aboard Air”). Here, Bush characterized Hussein’s behavior
as explicitly ‘non-terroristic,’ as “irrational action,” and, in fact, clearly distinguished
between ‘terrorism’ and the crisis in the Persian Gulf. The president instead presented the
prospect of ‘terrorist’ acts against the U.S. as hypothetical possibility, yet also remained
vague on who these opportunistic “terrorist groups” might be and how exactly they might
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“try to capitalize on this.” The Iraqi regime, however, was not described as (possible)
‘terrorist’ perpetrator.
It was only after the multi-national operation “Desert Storm,” led by U.S. forces,
began operations to push the Iraqi army out of Kuwait that President Bush became
more direct when characterizing Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime, but he was –
again – noticeably non-committal and inconsistent in how he used the term ‘terrorism’ in
this context. In a few instances, President Bush accused the Iraqi regime of engaging in
“environmental terrorism” against its own population and the rest of the world, referring to
Iraqi soldiers spilling oil and setting fire to oilfields. For example, during the 1991 State of
the Union speech, President Bush declared that “if he [Hussein] th[ought] that he w[ould]
advance his cause through tragic and despicable environmental terrorism, he [wa]s dead
wrong” (“Address on the State”), but then publicly wondered a few days later about “the
endless appetite for evil that would lead a man to make war on the world’s environment”
(“Remarks to Community”), not mentioning ‘terrorism’ at all.
In another instance, Bush described the Iraqi dictator as “a man that ha[d] launched
environmental terrorism” and warned that while “[t]he environmental terrorism ha[d]
not taken human life yet, [. . . ] it [was] pretty bad” (“President’s News;” “Exchange on
the Persian”). After the coalition victory and the liberation of Kuwait, the president
commented that “what he [Hussein] ha[d] done, laying waste to the assets of Kuwait,
[wa]s brutal environmental terrorism. There [wa]s no excuse for it” (“Interview”). As these
examples demonstrate, President Bush’s coining of the term “environmental terrorism”
followed his tradition of merging ‘terrorism’ with other societal ills like drug abuse and
environmental destruction. It suggests that ‘terrorism’ functioned as a flexible signifier
which could be combined with another concept, thus requiring no further elaboration or
explanation. What is more, these references to ‘terrorism’ appeared only after the Iraqi
regime had been defeated and they did not describe the invasion itself, only an aspect
of its aftermath. As becomes apparent, then, ‘terrorism’ did not constitute a compelling
political paradigm in the early 1990s, as President Bush’s usage of the term remained
vague, flexible, and even somewhat inconsistent, indicating that it did not exert significant
discursive control over the administration.
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The abating political interest in ‘terrorism’ also had consequences for the academic
field and its production of knowledge about ‘terrorism.’ As Lisa Stampnitzky has pointed
out, “[w]ith the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the end of the
Cold War, [. . . ] external demand and funding for terrorism expertise dried up, making the
early 1990s a period of relative quiet” (139). Emblematic for this “period of relative quiet,”
Stampnitzky notes, was also the fact that between 1990 and 1995, only eight conferences
were held, a serious low point, especially considering that a few years earlier, there were
often over ten conferences on ‘terrorism’ organized per year (139). Likewise, think tanks
like RAND experienced difficulties in procuring sufficient funding. As a consequence, in
the early 1990s, there was little significant academic output, stalling the production of
knowledge about ‘terrorism’ and quieting and marginalizing the academic discourse about
the issue.
An example for the precarious situation of ‘terrorism’ studies in the early 1990s was,
for instance, Yonah Alexander’s 1994 edited collection Middle East Terrorism. Alexander,
a few years earlier still a staunch proponent of the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy
theory, used the book as an opportunity to reprint a diverse array of articles from the
1980s and early 1990s which all focused on ‘terrorism’ in connection to the Middle East,
‘Arabs,’ and the role of Islam. John W. Amos II’s contribution to the volume, originally
written in 1985, for instance, argued that ‘terrorism’ in the 1980s was increasingly used by
religious and ethnic minorities and relied on motivated individuals instead of ‘professional
terrorists’ trained by states (150). He concluded that “[v]iolence in the Middle East in the
middle of the 1980s ha[d] taken on a new dimension,” aided by more sophisticated weapons
used by smaller groups who engage in supposedly “random” ‘terrorist’ violence (160).
Evelyn le Cheˆne, originally writing in 1989, identified chemical and biological warfare
as “the threat of the future” (27), while several other scholars focused on the supposedly
rising ‘new’ threats from “Militant Islamic Movements” and “Muslim Fundamentalism.”
Nazih Ayubi, for example, already warned in 1982 that “the flourishing of militant Islamic
groups [wa]s an indication of the existence of a disillusioned youth revolt in many countries
of the Middle East” (272), suggesting that the 1980s were witnessing a “strong ‘return
to Islam,’ but this time with a right-wing orientation” (272). Similarly, Anthony Hyman
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discerned already in 1985 “a rising Islamic tide” and cautioned readers that “Muslim
fundamentalism ha[d] grown under the pressures and challenges of foreign – especially
Western – influences in Muslim lands” (4, 3). Lastly, also in 1985, Daniel Pipes informed
readers that “[t]he United States face[d] a new adversary, the radical fundamentalist Shi’i
Muslim” (“Death” 3). He advised that “[t]he scope of the radical fundamentalist’s ambition
pose[d] novel problems; and the intensity of his onslaught against the United States ma[de]
solutions urgent” (“Death” 3). In the eyes of these authors, then, ‘terrorism’ was becoming
predominantly ‘Muslim’ in nature – ethnic markers, as in the concept of ‘Arab terrorism,’
were considered noticeably less important.
Alexander’s anthology fulfilled several important functions. First of all, it confirmed
conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ as motivated by Islam which had already circulated in
the late 1980s and presented them as legitimate knowledge (see again Chapter 3). It built
a bridge to previous scholarship and created discursive continuity which strengthened
the conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ as based on religion, meaning Islam. Also, given
Alexander’s close ties to political institutions and think tanks, it signaled to fellow scholars
which interpretative frameworks for ‘terrorism’ were favored by the current political elite.
Moreover, it enabled Alexander to fashion himself as a scholar who had supposedly always
claimed that Islam caused ‘terrorism,’ even though he used to be a firm believer and
disseminator of the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory a decade earlier. In that
sense, the anthology also demonstrates that in the early 1990s, the academic community
mainly recycled old knowledge claims about ‘terrorism,’ lacking fresh ideas and in danger
of stagnating as a field of research.
Indeed, Alexander was not the only acknowledged ‘terrorism expert’ to change his
interpretation of ‘terrorism’ in the early 1990s. Benjamin Netanyahu, a few years earlier
also a vocal advocate for the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory, now proclaimed
that “[o]ne d[id] not have to be an expert in international terrorism to sense that this
rising tide of Islamic terrorism [wa]s qualitatively different from the terrorism which the
West ha[d] had to face up until now” (Fighting 125). He, too, discerned a “new terrorist
challenge which the democracies now face[d]” and worried about “the enduring hatred of
the West by today’s Islamic militants” (130, 82), effectively merging notions of ‘terrorism’
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with familiar narratives of how “the West” was threatened by Islam and presenting it as
entirely ‘new’ knowledge.
Overall, however, the early 1990s saw hardly any significant academic studies on
‘terrorism’ which presented original knowledge claims, leading Edna Reid to not only note
a “major decline in publications” for the period 1986-1990 (“Terrorism” 22), but even to
proclaim in her 1997 review of the field that this time period was “characterized by crisis and
m[ight] include the eventual demise of a research area” (“Evolution” 96). With the benefit
of hindsight, we know that these prophecies of doom were overstating the actual state of
academic research into ‘terrorism’ in the early 1990s. Yet, these contemporary assessments
are informative because they reflect the general state of desolation and preoccupation
of scholars with the sudden marginalization of ‘their’ discourse after years of dominance
and the disappearance of the material, political, social, and cultural benefits that used to
come with it. In order to remain relevant and return the academic discourse on ‘terrorism’
to its former status, the academic community had to – and would eventually – produce
‘new’ knowledge about ‘terrorism’ to showcase its continued relevance. Nevertheless, in the
early 1990s, the academic and political discourses on ‘terrorism’ were not the only ones
experiencing a waning interest in the topic. As the next section demonstrates, the news
media and cultural representations of ‘terrorism’ fared similarly.
4.2 “Islamic Terrorist Groups Have Mushroomed Throughout
the Arab World” – The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse in U.S. News
Media and Popular Culture in the Early 1990s
Similar to developments in U.S. politics and academia, ‘terrorism’ as an issue was sidelined
in U.S. news and cultural discourses in the early 1990s, meaning that the ‘terrorism’
discourse was considerably less central at the beginning of the decade than it had been
during the Reagan years. In part, this simply mirrored a general declining interest in
‘terrorism’ as the Cold War came to a surprisingly peaceful end. It made ‘terrorism’ a
less attractive paradigm through which the government could interpret global conflicts.
As a consequence, newspapers like The New York Times referred less to ‘terrorism’
in their writings. When ‘terrorism’ was referred to, however, it was framed as not only
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stemming from the Middle East and involving ‘Arab’ perpetrators, it also, importantly, was
increasingly linked to Islam. Initially less pronounced, these developments would become
more visible as the decade progressed, eventually making the notion of ‘Islamic terrorism’
the dominant discursive concept. At the onset of the 1990s, though, conceptualizations of
‘terrorism’ still focused on a combination of all three attributes, ‘Middle Eastern,’ ‘Arab,’
and ‘Muslim.’ In this section I therefore examine more closely how the news media, using
The New York Times as an example, framed ‘terrorism’ in the early 1990s, basing my
analysis on data derived from searches of the newspaper’s online database. Then I turn to
cultural representations of the issue at the beginning of the decade.
In the early 1990s, reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times experienced
somewhat of a lull, mirroring the reduced political interest in the topic. As Figure 4.2
shows, the overall volume of reporting on ‘terrorism’ went down in the early years of the
new decade. While there were 1,500 articles on ‘terrorism’ in 1989, this number dropped
by 15 % the following year to 1,274 pieces. In 1991, that number rose again by 12 % to
1,430 articles that year, only to drop once more by 18 % to 1,175 articles in 1992. On
average, for the time period 1990-1999, there were 1,625 pieces on ‘terrorism’ per year in
The New York Times, a marginal drop of 1 % from the average of 1,645 articles in the
1980s, meaning that for the first time in several decades, reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The
New York Times had not increased but stagnated. These numbers indicate, then, that
‘terrorism’ played a rather reduced role in American news reporting, suggesting that the
discourse had lost in importance and vitality in the early 1990s.
However, the graph in Figure 4.2 also shows a few notable spikes in the mid- to late
1990s. In 1993, there were 1,696 articles on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, a rise of
44 % compared to the previous year. This was also the first year in which the total amount
of articles was (slightly) above the average for the decade. Thus, in hindsight, 1993 marked
the discourse’s return to a more dominant position. Indeed, while 1994 was once again
a ‘quieter’ year with only 1,406 pieces, i.e. a drop of 17 %, this number was also not the
lowest point in the graph either, suggesting that, as a general trend, interest in ‘terrorism’
was on the rise once more. From 1995 onwards, then, there was continuously above-average
coverage of ‘terrorism’ in the newspaper. For that year, for instance, The New York Times
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Figure 4.2: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, 1987-2000
database lists 2,002 articles on ‘terrorism,’ a growth of 42 % compared to 1994, suggesting
that the increased journalistic output on the topic reflected a (re-)vitalization of the
‘terrorism’ discourse and its return to a hegemonic position. What is more, considering that
after 1995, the annual total of articles on ‘terrorism’ remained above-average, it appears
that the discourse’s return to prominence was long-term and stable.
Moreover, as Figure 4.3 demonstrates, regardless of the changing status of the
discourse on ‘terrorism,’ the Middle East remained a central focus in the reporting on the
issue in The New York Times. In 1990, articles mentioning the Middle East and ‘terrorism’
made up 24 % of all reporting on ‘terrorism;’ a year later, that number rose to 30 %. Indeed,
roughly a third of all pieces on ‘terrorism’ published by The New York Times in the 1990s
mentioned the Middle East in some form or other, indicating that it continued to be a
central element in conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ in the American news media. ‘Arab
terrorism’ was slightly less commonly used in journalistic writing, but, as the development
of the respective graph indicates, remained stable throughout the 1990s, suggesting that
ideas about ‘terrorism’ which focused on the perpetrators’ ethnicity, popularized first
in the 1980s, remained relevant to media conceptualizations about ‘terrorism.’ Indeed,
articles mentioning either the Middle East or the ‘Arab’ ethnicity of the perpetrator in
connection with ‘terrorism’ made up, on average, 31 % of the overall annual reporting on
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Figure 4.3: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East in The New York Times,
1987-2000
‘terrorism’ in the 1990s, thus clearly indicating how central these conceptualizations were
to the discourse.
Lastly, articles linking ‘terrorism’ to being Muslim or Islamic became increasingly
more common throughout the decade. For both graphs, the year 1993 marked a first and
important peak. While there were only 127 articles on ‘Muslim terrorism’ in 1992 (i.e. 11 %
of the overall ‘terrorism’ reporting that year), this number rose by a remarkable 165 %
to 337 articles a year later (20 %). Conversely, the newspaper published 104 pieces on
‘Islamic terrorism’ in 1992 (9 %), but 305 articles a year later (18 %), a staggering increase
of 193 %. After 1993, both graphs even out at around a fourth of the overall ‘terrorism’
reporting of the decade. Interestingly, ‘Islamic terrorism’ appears to become the slightly
more popular term of the two from 1995 onwards. This suggests that even though both
terms, ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic,’ presented belief in Islam as central characterizing element
for ‘terrorism,’ the latter expression proved more successful in traveling through different
discursive spheres, crossing over into academic, media, political, and cultural discourses
on ‘terrorism’ and functioning as unifying element between them.
Ultimately, the graphs in Figure 4.3 also clearly show that, when added up, reporting
on ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East, with a focus on ‘Arab’ ethnicity, and belief in
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Islam, made up, on average, 44 % of the overall reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the 1990s. While
there is bound to be some overlap with articles appearing multiple times in searches for
all four categories, it is nevertheless apparent that ‘terrorism’ in the writings of The New
York Times was predominantly linked to the Middle East as well as ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’
perpetrators, indicating that these framings of ‘terrorism’ had carried over successfully from
the previous decade and stabilized, effectively marginalizing other regions and perpetrators.
These discursive trends also come to the fore in the detailed reporting of specific
incidents in the early 1990s, for example the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New
York City. Indeed, the bombing was immediately described as act of ‘terrorism’ and
explanations of possible motifs and objectives of the perpetrators drew on familiar notions
of ‘Arab terrorism,’ the Middle East as hotbed of ‘terrorism,’ and, importantly, ‘Islamic
terrorism.’ (By contrast, later incidents would be almost solely discussed as instances of
‘Islamic terrorism.’ See below.) This not only explains the spike in the graphs represented
in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, but also the increased interest in ‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic terrorism’
thereafter.
After a bomb exploded in the underground parking of the North Tower of the
World Trade Center in New York City on February 26, 1993, the initial reporting of The
New York Times focused on reconstructing the events, the plight of the victims, and the
frantic rescue efforts. But already these first articles on the incident persistently raised the
possibility that the bombing could have been a ‘terrorist’ attack. Douglas Jehl, for instance,
informed readers that “[i]t [wa]s unknown whether a terrorist group was responsible for
the explosion today” (“Car” 24) while his colleague Catherine Manegold disclosed that
“preliminary investigations pointed to the possible involvement of a terrorist group in the
explosion in the basement of the World Trade Center on Friday” (35). In another article,
Jehl openly speculated which ‘terrorist’ group could have perpetrated the bombing and,
again a day later, revealed that “[f]ederal officials and private experts said, the explosion
bore many of the earmarks of a terrorist attack, including the size of the explosion and the
choice of a symbolic target” (“Lack” B4). This indicates that a framing of the bombing as
an act of ‘terrorism’ occurred almost immediately and quickly provided the most popular
explanation for what had happened.
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It is also noteworthy that many articles on the World Trade Center bombing
quoted established ‘terrorism experts’ and their views on the incident. Douglas Jehl, for
instance, referred in one of his articles to “Brian Jenkins, a security consultant with
Kroll & Associates who [wa]s one of the nation’s leading private experts on terrorism”
(“Car” 24). He also quoted “Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism specialist” and “the author
of several surveys of terrorism in the United States” as saying that “the World Trade
Center [wa]s a symbol of Wall Street and the Manhattan skyline and the United States
itself,” positioning Hoffman’s comment as evidence for ‘terrorism’ behind the bombing
(“Car” 24). Ralph Blumenthal, in turn, referred to the verdict of “L. Paul Bremer, who
headed the State Department’s counterterrorism operations in the 1980’s” (B4), to support
his argument that car bombs, as in the case of the World Trade Center bombing, were a
device frequently used by ‘terrorist’ groups. These numerous deferrals to the opinion of
established ‘terrorism experts’ formalized and valorized the construction of the bombing as
act of ‘terrorism’ while edging out other interpretations of the event. They further explain
how information and conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ traveled from one discourse, here
the academic one, to another, i.e. the news media, while simultaneously institutionalizing
both as authorities on the topic.
Considering the reporting in The New York Times as a whole, it is noticeable
how notions of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘terrorism’ were mixed with the concepts of
‘Arab’ and ‘Middle Eastern terrorism.’ The emerging narrative posited that the bombing
constituted an act of ‘terrorism,’ targeting the United States for its supposedly ‘superior’
values while casting the perpetrators as ‘radical Islamic fundamentalists’ as well as a mix
of different ethnicities subsumed in the category of ‘evil Arabs’ coming from the Middle
East to attack the U.S. on its own territory. Richard Bernstein, for instance, argued that
while that United States used to be fairly “immune” to attacks at home, “the assault on
the World Trade Center appear[ed] to have changed that” (39). Bernstein explained that
“the bombing of the trade center appear[ed] to be the first episode of Middle East terrorism
on such a scale to take place on American soil, and the first time the entire terrorist
panoply of events – the scenes of horror, the disruption of life, the huge economic costs –
had taken place here” (39). To further validate his interpretation, Bernstein quoted Bruce
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Hoffman from RAND as agreeing that “it [was] very much of a watershed” (qtd. in 39).
A. M. Rosenthal noted that “[w]herever the inspiration and money for the World Trade
Center bombing came from, the tragedy at least g[ave] us a chance to examine Mideast
terrorism and see it whole – a major danger in international life, a planned policy, not a
mad unfathomable passion” (A29).
Likewise, on March 6, Youssef Ibrahim published an article, telling readers that
“Islamic terrorist groups ha[d] mushroomed throughout the Arab world during the last two
decades” and that “[t]he quest to establish fundamentalist Islamic states ha[d] long existed
in the region” (24). Ibrahim connected ‘Islamic terrorism’ with “the Arab world,” specifying
the threat and fixating it in the geographic and imaginary Middle East. Similarly, A. M.
Rosenthal referred to “Muslim Mideastern states” (A29), a phrasing that located Islam in
the Middle East and suggested that Islam was the driving political force in the region.
When Richard Bernstein warned that “[t]here ha[d] in the last few years been a substantial
immigration of Muslims to the United States, some of whom [we]re fundamentalists who
could potentially be used to form terror networks here” (39), ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic
fundamentalism’ were effectively used synonymously.12 In this manner, the reporting in
The New York Times constructed a chain of signifiers which interlinked notions of ‘Arabs’
and the Middle East with ideas about ‘terrorism’ motivated by Islamic beliefs where one
term triggered the others, inviting readers to (subconsciously) tap into concepts of ‘Arab’
and ‘Islamic terrorism’ in their interpretation of events.
These ideas about ‘terrorism’ in the early 1990s were not restricted to U.S. news
reporting, but also influenced cultural representations of ‘terrorists.’ Indeed, the end of
the Cold War also posed a challenge to the Hollywood film industry in that the trope of
the evil Soviet communist enemy was no longer available. As Douglas Kellner has pointed
out, “films are highly capital-intensive and the producers of the culture industries closely
follow political and social trends. They are especially sensitive to winds of change, so when
detente with the Soviet Union appears as an important political development, Hollywood
shifts its focus accordingly” (Media 83). Thus, as the Cold War ended, Hollywood needed
12Also note Bernstein’s reference to “terror networks,” evoking conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ from the
previous decade and thus establishing discursive continuity which made his analysis appear even more
convincing.
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new enemies and, as the previous chapter already showed, began to present audiences
with ‘Arab terrorists’ as villains from the late 1980s onwards. Over the course of the 1990s,
movies slowly developed this trope further into the ‘Islamic terrorist,’ an antagonist from
the Middle East, vaguely ‘Arab’ in appearance, who was predominantly motivated by
religious imperatives. In the early 1990s, however, this trope was not yet fully developed
and refined; rather, Hollywood productions from the onset of the decade still relied on
‘terrorist’ villains which were a blend of different, already circulating tropes and stereotypes
about the Middle East, ‘Arabs,’ and Islam. These early representations did significant
cultural work as they drew on representations of ‘terrorism’ from the Middle East with
which audiences were already familiar and adapted and developed them to reflect (as well
as shape) an increasing concern over the role of religion (meaning Islam) in connection to
‘terrorism.’
In what follows, I analyze the films Navy SEALs (1990) and True Lies (1994) to
illustrate the early stages of this development. Navy SEALs was released at the beginning
of the 1990s and, in my view, constituted one of the first films in the new decade to
represent ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East in this more ambiguous manner as both
politically and religiously motivated. However, the film was not particularly successfully
at the box office as it only debuted in fourth place and barely recuperated its budget
(Broeske), also a sign for the marginalized status and reduced interest in ‘terrorism’ at the
time. By contrast, four years later, the James Cameron production True Lies topped the
box office on its opening weekend and was one of the first films to have a budget of $100
million for filming (“True”). While this is certainly not the sole factor in determining a
movie’s discursive impact, this nevertheless suggests that the overall status of the discourse
on ‘terrorism’ had changed compared to earlier years and that it had become central once
more by the mid-1990s.
The 1990 production Navy SEALs, directed by Lewis Teague and starring, among
others, Charlie Sheen and Michael Biehn, details how a team of Navy SEAL special forces
recover powerful U.S. Stinger missiles from the hands of the Lebanese ‘terrorist’ group
Al Shudadah, led by Ben Shaheed (Nicholas Kadi). This eventually requires the SEALs
to infiltrate into Beirut, a city destroyed by a raging civil war, to find the safe-house
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where the ‘terrorist’ group hides the missiles in order to destroy the weapons as well as
the ‘terrorist’ base. The film itself features a wide array of action sequences, including a
car chase through war-torn Beirut, and bloody shoot-outs with the ‘terrorists,’ used as
opportunities to stage the heroism, patriotism, and selflessness of the individual members
of the SEAL team. Navy SEALs contrasts the valor displayed by the American agents
with the depravity of the ‘terrorists,’ who are characterized as driven by both political
and religious imperatives.
The antagonists in Navy SEALs are constructed as ‘terrorists’ from the very
beginning. Already the film’s paratexts frame what viewers will see on the screen as ‘good’
Americans fighting (and winning) against ‘evil terrorists.’ For example, the trailer declares
that “they [the SEALs] are America’s designated hitters against terrorism.” Similarly, one
of the film’s official taglines reads “[t]hey’re America’s secret weapon against terrorism”
(“Navy”), thus preventing other possible interpretations of the conflict. In the movie itself,
U.S. officials speak of the group as “terrorists” and casting choices reinforce the notion
that leader Ben Shaheed and his men are stereotypical ‘Arab terrorists.’ They have a
darker complexion, most of them wear facial hair, and they speak Arabic most of the time
which the film rarely translates, thus presenting them as inscrutable, mysterious Others.13
Shaheed and his men are also heavily armed and wear non-descript military fatigues,
suggesting that their group represents the most organized and dominant of all the factions
vying for power in war-torn Lebanon. In addition, the ‘terrorists’ are violent and cruel. For
instance, in the beginning of the movie, they have captured an American army helicopter
crew and execute in cold blood one of the soldiers with a shot in the head, his blood and
brains splashing on his fellow prisoners. In response, the other Americans start screaming
and, even though bound by hand and foot to chairs, attempt to fight the ‘terrorists’ who,
however, mercilessly begin kicking and hitting their defenseless prisoners. It is only thanks
to the U.S. SEALs bursting in at the last moment that the captured soldiers survive. The
‘terrorists’ are also dangerous since they possess a large cache of American Stinger missiles
(how they received them is a question the film does not address) which one U.S. officer
calls “the perfect terrorist weapon” (23:56). Later in the movie, Shaheed’s group uses
13Shaheed’s English is also heavily accented to further mark him as outsider.
180
one of these missiles to shoot down a private jet leaving Madrid airport with an Algerian
peace committee on board, killing all passengers and crew on board, thus demonstrating
to the other characters in the film and audiences alike that these ‘terrorists’ prefer war
and violence over peace and that they are willing to kill ruthlessly.
Navy SEALs depicts the motivations of the ‘terrorist’ group as partly political and
partly driven by religious imperatives. That Shaheed’s group has political objectives
becomes evident in the following exchange between Ben Shaheed and the young
and beautiful Lebanese-American female reporter Claire Varrens (played by Joanne
Whalley-Kilmer):
Shaheed: You cannot invade our land and talk about security. You cannot send soldiers
into our homes and talk about peace. You cannot kill a man’s family and talk
about human rights.
Claire: When you wage this war with acts of terrorism against civilians.
Shaheed: If America kills our people, then our people will kill Americans.
Claire: As in the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983?
Shaheed: In the reprisal for the shelling of our homes and the murder of our families by
American warships. (23:01-23:27)
This exchange accomplishes several things at once. It suggests once more that Shaheed
and his group are ‘terrorists’ and that they have chosen this course of action in response
to the political situation in Lebanon. Shaheed’s statements indicate that he and his group
deeply resent U.S. involvement in the Middle East and that they rely on “acts of terrorism”
in order to drive U.S. forces out of the region. Furthermore, the reference to the historical
1983 Marine barracks bombing establishes the political context since the attack was widely
interpreted as an attempt to force the U.S.-led international forces out of the country by
making staying too costly. At the same time, the movie blurs the line between fictionality
and factuality since the journalist alleges that it was Shaheed’s group which carried out
the 1983 bombings. These scenes are also filmed in a way aimed at imitating U.S. news
journalism and at the end of the dialogue the camera zooms out again to show a TV set
in a large room at the Pentagon full of high-ranking officers who then proceed to discuss
how to respond to the threat posed by Shaheed and his group. Shaheed and his group are
thus carefully represented as dangerous ‘terrorist’ threat, driven by political motives.
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However, the film does not stop there and also adds a religious component to explain
what motivates the ‘terrorists.’ When U.S. intelligence services eventually determine that
the Stingers may be on board a merchant vessel also carrying a group of “Muslim pilgrims”
(31:39), the SEALs are sent back out again to make their way on board of the ship and find
the missiles. The team uses the cover of the night to climb on board and search the vessel
for both the Stingers and the ‘terrorists’ who are hiding among the sleeping pilgrims by
pretending to be part of their group. This is already the first indicator that the ‘terrorists’
also have a religious background since they are indistinguishable from ‘regular’ Muslims.
As one of the ‘terrorists’ is clumsy enough to kill himself with his own booby trap,
the explosion wakes the group of pilgrims and panic ensues immediately.14 In the chaos,
the SEALs find it impossible to distinguish between ‘terrorists’ and Muslim pilgrims and,
once they have established control over the vessel, they simply assume that everyone on
board is a potential ‘terrorist.’ They solve the situation by rounding all passengers up and
forcing them to kneel on deck with their hands behind their heads until reinforcements
arrive early the next morning, all while members of the SEAL team tower menacingly over
the frightened group, machine guns pointed directly at them.15 The film thus fortifies the
link between ‘terrorism’ and Islam.
A little while later, Navy SEALs shows how reporter Claire works on another of her
pieces for TV, recording the commentary for a short news segment about the situation in
war-torn Lebanon. “True Islam does not preach terrorism” (38:55) she can be heard saying
at the opening of the sequence. It is noteworthy that this is the first sentence she says
because it implies that she is responding to a common criticism of Islam, meaning that
‘terrorism’ is the first thing people generally associate with Islam. When she continues
by declaring that “[t]rue Islam is one of the world’s most tolerant religions” (38:57), this
14Navy SEALs exhibits the same contradictions in the representation of the ‘evil,’ foreign enemy as other
films in the genre: On the one hand, the ‘terrorists’ are depicted as extremely dangerous and powerful –
they have managed to acquire a large amount of U.S. Stinger missiles after all – on the other hand, they
are easily killed in great numbers by the American SEALs because they are clearly not very good at
what they are doing. This enables the movie to legitimize the use of excessive counter-violence against
the ‘terrorist’ enemy while at the same time maintaining American military and moral superiority in
the face of the ‘terrorist’ threat.
15In the initial panic, one ‘terrorist’ takes a hysterically screaming Muslim woman hostage, but is
unceremoniously shot by Dale Hawkins (played by Charlie Sheen) who tells his boss Curran that this is
“a dead terrorist” in order to explain the chaos on board (37:44). Curran accepts this without further
discussion, signaling that violence against ‘terrorists’ is always legitimate and justified.
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statement rings hollow because the connection between ‘terrorism’ and Islam has already
been evoked. When speaking, Claire emphasizes the word ‘true’ in each of the sentences,
suggesting that there is another version of Islam – ‘untrue’ as it may be, but nevertheless
existing – in which ‘terrorism’ is condoned. The comments she makes in defense of Islam
after the initial link between Islam and ‘terrorism’ do not rebut and weaken the connection;
instead, they reinforce the notion that there exists a popular version of Islam which
facilitates ‘terrorism.’
Moreover, even Claire has to acknowledge that “[f]ourteen years of devastating
civil war [in Lebanon] have given rise to small but militant groups of fundamentalists who
believe the very survival of their faith is at stake” (39:15-39:27). Viewers are encouraged
to transfer this observation onto the activities of the ‘terrorists’ in the movie because
she finishes her recording by referring to Al Shudadah, Shaheed’s ‘terrorist’ group. As
she speaks the last sentences, James Curran enters the studio and the audience already
knows that he wants to convince Claire to help them find Shaheed and the Stinger missiles.
The connection between Islam and ‘terrorism’ is fortified further at this point.
Eventually, even Claire herself, the only voice in the movie attempting to draw a
nuanced picture of the situation in Lebanon and Shaheed’s motivations, has to concede
that negotiating with these ‘terrorists’ is impossible because they are driven by religious
imperatives. When Curran finally convinces her to help them find Shaheed, she, Curran,
and Hawkins go through all the material they have and develop a plan. Hawkins suggests
kidnapping a man closely linked to Shaheed’s group and “make him talk” (53:37). Claire
scoffs at the idea, explaining that “I don’t think you understand the situation. These guys
are religious zealots. There’s no way you could make them talk. You’re dealing with
extremists” (53:44-53:52). Claire’s explanation significantly undermines any pretensions
to political objectives Shaheed’s ‘terrorists’ may have (had) and thus turns the ‘terrorist’
group from a political one into a group of ‘Islamic extremists’ whose complaints and
criticisms can be easily dismissed.
As a result, the ‘terrorists’ in Navy SEALs constitute a hybrid form – they are ‘evil
Arabs’ operating in the Middle East and are, at least partially, driven by their ‘Islamic’
faith. This particular construction marked the slowly changing discursive focus, moving
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from ‘Arab terrorists’ in the late 1980s to the ‘Islamic terrorists’ of the 1990s. What is more,
it also invigorated the newly-emerging discursive strand since it specified that these ‘Islamic
terrorists’ could only be Arabs from the Middle East – no other ethnicity or geographic
location is compatible with the notion of ‘Islamic terrorism.’ Thus, future representations
of ‘Islamic terrorists’ can draw discursive power from already firmly established notions of
‘Arab’ and ‘Middle Eastern terrorism’ in their conceptualization of ‘Islamic terrorists.’
While Navy SEALs to some extent still grants its ‘terrorists’ a political background
and subtly brings in the religious subtext, subsequent Hollywood productions addressing
‘terrorism’ in the 1990s gradually focused on Islam as the main explanation for the
‘terrorism’ they depicted. For example, True Lies (1994), directed by James Cameron
and starring Arnold Schwarzenegger and Jamie Lee Curtis in the leading roles, is an
action-comedy film about the double life of Harry Tasker (Schwarzenegger) who works
as a secret agent for the fictional ‘counter-terrorism’ task force Omega Sector, but keeps
this a secret from his wife Helen (Curtis) and teenage daughter Dana (Eliza Dushku),
who both think he is a boring computer salesman. Soon, however, the domestic and the
professional spheres of Tasker’s life collide as the ‘terrorist’ group “Crimson Jihad,” led
by Salim Abu Aziz (played by Art Malik), prepares to launch a nuclear attack on the
United States. Harry’s fight against “Crimson Jihad” becomes personal when Abu Aziz
kidnaps first Helen and then later Dana. Although they both turn out to be fairly capable
of defending themselves, they still need to be saved by Harry in the end. He heroically
protects his family and the nation from the destructive forces of ‘terrorism’ and restores
the status quo.16
In True Lies, the ‘terrorists’ of “Crimson Jihad” do not have a clear political agenda
and instead appear to be predominantly driven by religious motives. The first indicator
is already the name of the group itself, “Crimson Jihad,” which already implies that the
group’s focus is religious, not political. Moreover, during the first spectacular chasing
16Many reviewers of True Lies have commented in detail on the problematic representation of gender
and gender roles in the film, especially with regard to Schwarzenegger’s screen persona, as well as the
(infamous) erotic dancing scene in which Harry/Schwarzenegger orders his wife Helen to perform a
striptease while he watches her from the dark. See, e.g., Clarke, Hyden, McVeigh and Kapell, and Turan
for critical analyses. While these discussions are relevant and important, especially considering the
commercial success of True Lies which grossed more than 378 million U.S. Dollars worldwide (“True”),
I rather want to focus here exclusively on the movie’s portrayal of the ‘Arab-Islamic terrorists,’ which
has been discussed far less frequently.
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sequence which has Abu Aziz escape on a motorcycle while Harry pursues him through
the streets, a hotel, a shopping mall, and rooftops on a police horse, Abu Aziz can be
heard yelling “Allahu akbar” several times (e.g. 33:42, 33:58). Audiences do not need to
speak “perfect Arabic” like Harry in order to understand that Aziz is invoking the help of
Allah in order to evade capture successfully, thus marking him as religious fanatic (06:21).
At first sight, True Lies grants the ‘terrorists’ some political motivation but a closer
look reveals that the movie actually actively works to undermine this dimension. After the
captured Harry has verified that the nuclear warheads in the groups’ possession are indeed
what Abu Aziz claims them to be, Aziz has one of his followers record his message on a
hand-held video camera. Aziz addresses the American public in his speech, declaring that
[y]ou have killed our women and children, bombed our cities from afar like cowards, and
you dare to call us terrorists! Now the oppressed have been given a mighty sword with
which to strike back at their enemies. Unless you, America, pulls all military forces out of
the Persian Gulf area immediately and forever, Crimson Jihad will rain fire on one major
U.S. city each week until our demands are met. (1:26:00-26:40)
When considering Aziz’ statement in isolation, it reads indeed as highly political since he
voices familiar grievances over the American military operations in the Middle East as
well as specific demands to withdraw from the Persian Gulf region. True Lies, however,
persistently undercuts the gravity of these claims and ridicules Aziz and his demands.
Halfway through his announcements, the video camera runs out of battery, eventually
shuts down, and the recording session has to be stopped. This sequence is shot alternating
between what Aziz’ camera man sees through his lens, where soon an ‘empty battery’ signal
begins to flash, and the camera man’s face himself, sweating and swallowing hard as he
realizes that the camera finally turned off in the middle of Aziz’ speech. That a supposedly
dangerous ‘(Islamic) terrorist’ can be stopped in his tracks by something as simple as
an empty battery offers a moment of comic relief in what would otherwise have been a
tense, dramatic moment in the film. As Diane Waldman has pointed out, by capturing
Aziz’ helpless fury (another comedic moment), True Lies “plac[es] more emphasis on the
rage of his reaction than on the content of his speech” (126). The effect is, as critic Mark
Gallagher remarks, that “[t]he film denies the villains any substantial historical or political
foundations and presents them merely as unsympathetic killers” (218).
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Thus, films like Navy SEALs and True Lies functioned as active discursive
agents and put forth representations of ‘terrorists’ which increasingly replaced political
explanations for ‘terrorism’ with those focused on ethnic markers and religious motivations.
While Navy SEALs still depicted ‘terrorists’ who seemed to have an ill-defined political
grievance against the United States while also being driven by their faith in Islam, True
Lies already foregrounded the religious affiliation of its ‘terrorists’ and denied them any
political aspirations. In the next section, I turn to how the academic discourse on ‘terrorism’
recovered its dominant position in the mid- to late 1990s.
4.3 “Defining the Nature of [. . . ] Islamist Terrorist Groups” –
The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse in Academia in the Mid- to Late
1990s
While the early 1990s constituted “a period of relative quiet” (Stampnitzky 139), the mid-
to late 1990s saw an upsurge in the scholarly production of knowledge about ‘terrorism,’
returning the academic discourse to a more dominant position again. Remarkably, the
‘terrorism’ discourse of the 1990s was characterized by consensus with regard to the
narrative it presented about its subject, essentially arguing that a new kind of ‘Islamic
terrorism’ had become a central tool used by Middle Eastern groups and nations in a
Huntington-esque “Clash of Civilizations” between ‘the West’ and the Middle East which
had effectively superseded the Cold War. Critical voices were marginalized and sidelined.
The rest of this section analyzes these developments and claims in more detail.
A central knowledge claim posited by the academic discourse in the 1990s was that
Islam fueled ‘terrorism’ and that this made the Middle East with ‘Muslim’ populations a
problematic and dangerous opponent for the United States as representative of ‘the West.’
As Yonah Alexander’s anthology Middle East Terrorism, discussed earlier in this chapter,
demonstrated, these ideas already circulated in the 1980s and before, but in the 1990s
they were ‘rediscovered’ and presented as new and original knowledge. What had changed,
however, was the explanation offered for this rise in what was variously termed ‘Muslim
terrorism,’ ‘holy terror,’ ‘Islamic fundamentalism,’ or ‘Islamic terrorism.’ The reasons for
this surge in ‘Islamic terrorism’ supposedly lay in what both Lewis and Huntington called
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a “religious revival” among the Muslims of the world – and this idea was taken up by
‘terrorism scholars’ and integrated into their interpretations of the issue. For instance,
David Rapoport discerned that “[a] most arresting and unexpected development in recent
years ha[d] been the revival of terrorist activities to support religious purposes or terror
justified in theological terms, a phenomenon that might be called ‘holy’ or ‘sacred’ terror.
It [wa]s most striking in Islam among both Shia and Sunni” (“Sacred” 103).
Scholars overwhelmingly agreed that religious ‘terrorism’ was on the rise and singled
out Islam as the main manifestation of this worrisome trend. Jessica Stern asserted that
“[t]errorist groups motivated by religious concerns [we]re becoming more common” and that
“[t]he emergence of ad hoc fundamentalist Islamic groups [. . . ] [wa]s a particularly troubling
development. These groups operate[d] on a global scale and claim[ed] to act for Islam” (7).
Bruce Hoffman, in turn, insisted that “the religious imperative for terrorism [wa]s the most
important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today” (Inside Terrorism 1998, 87).
He explained that “[t]he reasons why terrorist incidents perpetrated for religious motives
result[ed] in so many more deaths may be found in the radically different value systems,
mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and world-view
embraced by the religious terrorist, compared with his secular counterpart” (94). Meanwhile,
Walter Laqueur warned of the dangers from “Islamic Radicalism” and explained that
“[t]he current resurgence of religious terrorism [wa]s largely identified with trends in the
Muslim and the Arab world” (New 127, 128). In Laqueur’s view, Islam condoned violence
“if it [wa]s carried out against infidels or heretics ‘in the path of Allah’” and he noted that
“the frequency of Muslim- and Arab-inspired terrorism [wa]s still striking” (129).17
In the eyes of most ‘terrorism’ experts, the fact that ‘terrorism’ was now
predominantly motivated by belief in Islam meant that this was an entirely ‘new’
phenomenon committed by a ‘new’ kind of actor who followed a different logic, unlike any
of the past manifestations of ‘terrorism.’ Harvey Kushner, for instance, spoke of “a new
breed of foreign terrorist” which appeared to threaten ‘the West’ (“New” 4). Jessica Stern
used noticeably analogous phrasing in her 1999 study The Ultimate Terrorists when she
stated that “[a] new breed of terrorists [. . . ] appear[ed] more likely [. . . ] to commit acts of
17Other examples include, e.g., Cooley; Emerson; R. Kelly; Kerry; Kushner, Terrorism and Future; Kramer,
“Moral;” Netanyahu, Fighting ; O’Ballance; Ranstorp, “Terrorism;” Reeve, New ; and Tibi.
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extreme violence” (8). Even Walter Laqueur, who at the time already enjoyed the status
of an eminence grise of ‘terrorism’ studies, proclaimed in his extremely influential and
aptly titled 1999 book The New Terrorism that “there ha[d] been a radical transformation,
if not a revolution, in the character of terrorism” (4). He warned his readers that they
“[we]re confronting the emergence of new kinds of terrorist violence” (4). Bruce Hoffman,
in the other main ‘terrorism’ study of the decade, Inside Terrorism (1998), proclaimed
that “the emergence of this new breed of terrorist adversary mean[t] nothing less than a
sea-change in our thinking about terrorism and the policies required to counter it” (212).
The view that ‘terrorism’ had changed (or was currently changing) into something
‘new’ fulfilled several important functions. First of all, it simplified the at times bewildering
new political, cultural, and societal dynamics emerging all over the globe in the 1990s which
seemingly could not be explained with the previous models. Insisting that ‘terrorism’ was
‘new’ provided an accessible framework which did not require more detailed explanations
of causes, causalities, and motivations. It also asserted the importance and relevance of
‘terrorism’ studies in times when a clear enemy like the Soviet Union was missing and the
Department of Defense and its associated think tanks and experts were faced with the
threat of significant budget cuts (Klare 7, Stampnitzky 139). Finally, those scholars (and
scholar-politicians) who insisted on the ‘newness’ of ‘terrorism’ could further cement their
academic standing by positioning themselves as having identified a previously unnoticed
phenomenon.
By constructing a dichotomy between ‘old’ and ‘traditional terrorism’ on one side
and ‘new terrorism’ on the other, the academic community worked to rewrite “the pasts of
both terrorism and terrorism expertise” (Stampnitzky 158). In that process, the ‘terrorism’
of the previous decades acquired the diametrically opposite characteristics of the ‘new
terrorism’ which were then positively connoted and held up as somehow ‘better’ than the
‘new terrorism’ since the ‘old terrorists’ were now supposedly guided by rational, relatable,
political principles – a clear contradiction of the dominant discursive constructions of the
1980s (see Chapter 3). At the same time, the narrative of a ‘new terrorism’ threatening
the post-Cold War world provided a “cohesive framework” which explained the incidents
of the 1990s and made them knowable and controllable (Burnett and Whyte 6).
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The academic community then proceeded to develop the concept of ‘new Islamic
terrorism’ further, elaborating on its supposed characteristics and components. In that
process, scholars often also ‘borrowed’ ideas already developed in the 1980s and adjusted
them to the present situation. Thus, while ‘Islamic terrorism’ in itself was already considered
a grave danger, the threat scenario was further escalated by imagining the enemy in
possession of so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMDs), i.e. biological, chemical,
and nuclear weaponry. Jessica Stern articulated the general concern that after the fall of
the Soviet Union, the “black market now offer[ed] weapons, components, and knowhow”
(9), leading to a proliferation of biological and chemical weapons which, in her view, “ha[d]
made terrorism with weapons of mass destruction easier to carry out” (10).18
In the view of these scholars, the use of WMDs was particularly attractive to
religiously motivated ‘terrorists.’ Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole stated that “[g]roups
that [we]re predominantly religious in character appear[ed] to have stronger motivations to
use NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] weapons than groups that [we]re predominantly
secular in character because of their all-encompassing objectives” (251). Jessica Stern
agreed that “[r]eligiously motivated terrorists might decide to use WMD [. . . ] in the belief
that they were emulating God” (70). Benjamin Netanyahu, in turn, warned that “[t]he
expansion of militant Islam, its growing power to intimidate the West and to cause it
grievous damage, would be immeasurably increased if the Islamic Republic of Iran or the
Sunni militant movement succeeded in acquiring nonconventional weapons – chemical,
biological, or even nuclear” (Fighting 121). He insisted that “the world [wa]s standing in
front of an abyss” and needed to act immediately (127).
Given the new technological and scientific possibilities, scholars assumed that the
‘new terrorism’ would be more indiscriminate and lethal. Brian Jenkins asserted that
“terrorists ha[d] become more bloody-minded” (“Will Terrorists” 242). Nadine Gurr and
Benjamin Cole agreed that the world community would have to expect fewer incidents
but with significantly greater numbers of casualties (22). Their colleagues Steven Simon
and Daniel Benjamin similarly argued that future ‘terrorist’ attacks would be more lethal
since ‘terrorists’ started to exhibit “increasing technological and operational competence”
18Similar views are also expressed in, e.g., Emerson; Gurr and Cole; Jenkins, “Will Terrorists;” Kerry;
and Laqueur, New ; and Netanyahu, Fighting.
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as well as a “desire [. . . ] to obtain weapons of mass destruction” (66). Bruce Hoffman also
warned that “terrorists ha[d] profited from past experience and ha[d] become more adept
at killing” (“Terrorism Trends” 14).
Moreover, the ‘terrorism’ experts claimed that political grievances and motivations
would lose in importance in the future. Simon Reeve asserted that “[t]errorism in the 1970s
and 1980s consisted largely of radical left-wing groups in Europe and South America with
definable goals – however unattainable. The new breed of terrorist attacking the West ha[d]
few aims. They just want[ed] to kill and punish for what they believe[d] [wa]s Western
imperialism and the global oppression of Muslims” (New 4). Walter Laqueur, in turn,
stated that “[t]he new terrorist [wa]s different in character, aiming not at clearly defined
political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections
of the population” (New 81). Similarly, Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, who I quoted
above, ascribed “all-encompassing objectives” to religiously motivated ‘terrorists’ (251),
arguing that “the short- to mid-term objective of many groups [wa]s to Islamize the nation
states in which they operate[d], or were born in” (127). However, these ideas were, at least
in part, uncontested because they had already been established as legitimate knowledge
about ‘terrorism’ in the 1980s.
Lastly, scholars insisted that the ‘new terrorists’ organized in a different manner
than groups in the previous decades had done – even though the idea of ‘terrorist’ networks
had already been central to ‘terrorism’ discourses a decade earlier. Ian Lesser, for instance,
explained that “[t]errorists [we]re organizing themselves in new, less hierarchical structures
[. . . ] to a far greater extent than in the past” (1-2). His colleague Simon Reeve concurred
and added that “[t]he new breed of terrorist [wa]s even more dangerous, because the groups
[we]re less structured and hierarchical: the terrorists [we]re more like members of a cult”
(New 263). At the RAND Corporation, Brian Jenkins discerned that “[o]rganizationally,
terrorism ha[d] become more fluid” (“Will Terrorists” 243) while Bruce Hoffman argued
that ‘new terrorists’ relied on “less-cohesive organizational entities, with a more-diffuse
structure and membership” (“Terrorism” 9).
Overall, then, ‘Islamic terrorism’ was, to use Foucault’s concept, problematized
as radically ‘new’ and ‘different’ from all other ‘terrorisms,’ past and present, and
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more dangerous than any other possible enemy. The ‘new Islamic terrorists’ supposedly
organized themselves globally and in loose networks without clear hierarchical structures;
they increasingly relied on WMDs, including nuclear weapons, and exploited the new
technological developments to their advantage – a trend which would make the ‘new
Islamic terrorism’ not only more dangerous than before, but also more indiscriminate and
lethal in its manifestations. In that context, Islam itself was constructed as “the single
greatest unifying factor in the region” and these experts assumed that all Muslims were
guided in their everyday life by all of Islam’s tenets at all times (Jacobs 55). This also
meant that historical grievances and political motivations behind ‘Islamic terrorism’ could
be ignored and discarded, thus effectively de-politicizing the concept of ‘terrorism.’ Hence,
scholars like Bassam Tibi could confidently argue that “[t]he breeding ground for Islamic
fundamentalism ha[d] been the perennial Islamic predicament with modernity” and that
‘Islamic terrorism’ “[wa]s in fact a defensive-cultural response to global issues” (34, 36).
In this manner, ‘Islamic terrorism’ was constructed as driven by cultural and religious
imperatives which could never be completely resolved as they were diametrically opposite
to ‘Western’ values.
This particular conceptualization of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ helped frame
interpretations of incidents of violence in the United States in the 1990s as instances of
‘(new) Islamic terrorism’ targeting the United States and the rest of ‘the West,’ just as the
meaning ascribed to the concept itself was influenced by the experience and interpretation
of these incidents themselves. Indeed, it was the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombing
in New York City which ‘terrorism’ scholars widely constructed as the first major instance
of ‘Islamic terrorism’ targeting the United States. Robert Kelly explained that “[t]he blast
that rocked the WTC, however, was unmistakably aimed against Americans and was a
signal that the ‘new’ Middle Eastern terrorism had arrived in the United States” (29).
Harvey Kushner called it “[t]he largest act of terrorism on U.S. soil” (Terrorism 11).
Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole maintained that “[t]he World Trade Centre bombing
was a powerful indicator that at least some groups [we]re willing to perpetrate acts of
indiscriminate mass killing” (133). Steven Emerson warned that “since the bombing,
prosecutors, intelligence agents, and law enforcement officials ha[d] discovered that militant
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Islamic extremists ha[d] established extensive networks throughout the United States” (24),
positing that the bombing marked the beginning of an assault by ‘Islamic terrorists’ against
the United States.
Even the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, perpetrated by the Americans Timothy
McVeigh and Terry Nichols, which killed 168 people, was recast as an act of ‘Islamic
terrorism’ by some stubborn scholars. Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, suggested that
the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma constituted “a mimicry of the
favorite type of Islamic fundamentalist car bombing” (Fighting 130). Simon Reeve alleged
that McVeigh and Nichols learned from the World Trade Center bomber and designated
‘Islamic terrorist’ Ramzi Yousef how to build the bomb and argued that while “[t]here
[wa]s no hard proof linking Yousef to the plot, [. . . ] there [wa]s a wealth of circumstantial
evidence” (New 83).
When in the summer of 1998 two suicide bombers blew up the U.S. embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which left 224 people dead, al-Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden moved into the academic focus. The scholarly community agreed that
“despite years of investigation and monitoring by the world’s intelligence services, al Qaeda
was still a powerful terrorist force worthy of a James Bond movie” (Reeve, New 200).
John Cooley asserted that these events “were signs of the spreading globalization and
privatization of the assault upon America” (7). Osama bin Laden, in turn, was described
as “the most significant individual sponsor of international terrorism during the 1990s”
(Reeve, New 156). He was portrayed as “the shadowy figure orchestrating global Islamic
terrorism” and quintessential ‘new terrorist’ relying on ‘Islamic terrorism’ to destroy
the West (1). Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, for example, maintained that “the
face of this phenomenon [‘new Islamic terrorism’] belong[ed] to Osama bin Laden” (59),
characterizations which depicted bin Laden and al-Qaeda as leading figures in a global
network of ‘Islamic terrorists,’ evoking similar constructions of the issue from the previous
decade (see Chapter 3).
What all these examples illustrate, then, is how the academic discourse on ‘terrorism’
came to construct ‘Islamic terrorism’ as the ‘new’ threat in the post-Cold War era.
‘Terrorism’ was de-politicized and instead framed as an inherently cultural and religious
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issue, influenced by notions of a “Clash of Civilizations,” propagated by influential scholars
like Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, which posited ‘the West’ as under attack from
Islam, located solely in the imaginary and geographical Middle East.19 ‘Islamic terrorism’
was presented as manifestation of the innate cultural and religious differences between the
Middle East and ‘the West’ – differences which could never be overcome, issues which could
never be settled because the Huntington-esque civilizations in question were inherently
disparate and thus destined to clash until one would eventually defeat the other.
At the same time, this ‘new Islamic terrorism’ also exploited previous
discursivizations of the issue as international, ‘terrorist’ groups as operating in networks
and receiving help from a state sponsor. However, as the examples of writing about bin
Laden and al-Qaeda show, this idea was adapted somewhat to include wealthy individuals
in the role of (state) sponsor of ‘terrorism.’ This discursive continuity made the knowledge
claims by scholars in the 1990s appear ‘logical’ and astute since they had already been
established as legitimate, accepted knowledge in the 1980s, thus fortifying the discursive
standing of these ideas in later years.
Indeed, the force of this academic construction of ‘Islamic terrorism’ was so immense
that it overshadowed more critical voices in the scholarly community. These scholars, for
instance, still grappled with the problem of defining ‘terrorism’ itself and criticized their
colleagues for largely abandoning the discussion or letting personal judgments about what
constituted an act of ‘terrorism’ and what did not affect their work.20 Those scholars
adhering to what I call the ‘orthodox’ interpretation of ‘terrorism,’ which I discussed above,
tended to follow one of three strategies. Some did not define ‘terrorism’ at all in their
studies, thus assuming that their readers simply ‘knew’ what the term meant.21 Again
others acknowledged that the search for a universal definition of ‘terrorism’ had not been
fruitful and provided a definition of their own with varying degrees of complexity and
ambiguity. Walter Laqueur, for instance, explained to readers, fairly late into his book:
19For histories of the field of Middle East Studies, see especially Lockman, Field ; and Khalil.
20Critical ‘terrorism’ scholars active in the 1990s include Adrian Guelke, Steven Livingston, Joseba Zulaika
and William Douglass, and, to a certain extent, Martha Crenshaw (one of the few women scholars in
the field), John Esposito, Richard Leeman, and Ehud Sprinzak.
21See, e.g., Clutterbuck; Crenshaw, “Logic;” O’Ballance; Nacos, Terrorism.
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[T]errorism has been defined in many different ways, and little can be said about it with
certainty except that it is the use of violence by a group for political ends, usually directed
against a government, but at times also against another ethnic group, class, race, religion,
or political movement. Any attempt to be more specific is bound to fail, for the simple
reason that there is not one but many different terrorisms. (New 46)
Instead of attempting to define the term, many authors followed approaches similar to
Laqueur’s and provided typologies in order to distinguish between different types of
‘terrorism’ or simply focused on case studies.22 A third, albeit quite small, group of scholars
outright rejected defining the term or simply stated that they would not attempt to define
it at this point.23 Harvey Kushner, for example, explained in the introduction to his edited
volume The Future of Terrorism (1998) that “[t]hose authors who contributed to this
book did not become bogged down in a morass of verbiage in trying to craft the universal
definition of terrorism. They chose instead to discuss terrorism without detailed discussions
about the problem with the problem definition” (“Preface” vii).
The ‘critical’ faction of ‘terrorism’ scholars, however, disapproved of all three
approaches and warned that these practices meant that “the concept of terrorism had
become so elastic that there seemed to be virtually no limit to what could be described
as terrorism” (Guelke 1). Steven Livingston pointed out that “[w]hat was regarded as
‘terrorism’ often had more to do with the geopolitical calculations of the moment and far less
to do with any assiduously followed conceptualization of terrorism” (13), thus effectively
arguing that ‘terrorism’ as a concept was first and foremost a political construction. Joseba
Zulaika and William Douglass maintained that “[t]he problem with terrorism [wa]s that
its basic categories [we]re so devoid of conceptual fixity and moral consensus that the
entire discourse turn[ed] on ad hoc definitions framed as mere appendages to whatever
international and national policy [wa]s at hand” (94).24
Zulaika and Douglass were also the first scholars to conceptualize ‘terrorism’ as
a discourse, explaining that “[o]ur goal [wa]s not to elaborate yet another typology, but
rather to redirect the study of terrorism into an examination of the very discourse in
which it [wa]s couched” (xi). They drew attention to “the cultural, political, [and] tactical
contexts” in which ‘terrorism’ was embedded (98). Zulaika and Douglass argued that the
22See, e.g., J. Green; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 1998; Kegley; Lustick, “Terrorism;” and Reich.
23See, e.g., Arquilla et al.
24Other examples include Leeman and Sprinzak.
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‘terrorism’ discourse was shaped by different “writers of terrorism” (35), including not only
the ‘terrorists’ themselves, but also journalists, fictional texts, films, and – notably – the
‘terrorism experts’ and the ‘counter-terrorists’ themselves. However, their seminal study
Terror and Taboo (1996) was largely ignored by their contemporaries, which is perhaps not
quite unsurprising, given that Zulaika and Douglass criticized ‘terrorism experts’ as abusing
their powers and legitimizing the political establishment and its agenda: “By claiming the
moral high ground in the name of scientific objectivity and universal ethics, the terrorism
expert in effect is close to proclaiming the political status quo to be sacrosanct” (112).
Consequently, neither Walter Laqueur nor Bruce Hoffman cited their work in their own
analyses and thus effectively sidelined more critical and self-conscious approaches to the
study of ‘terrorism.’
Hence, in the mid- to late 1990s, the academic discourse on ‘terrorism’ problematized
‘Islamic terrorism’ as ‘new’ threat for the post-Cold War era, dismissing and muting other,
more critical approaches to the topic. It also reinstated the dominance of the ‘traditional,’
‘orthodox’ academic ‘terrorism’ discourse over other interpretative paradigms, overcoming
the quieter early years of the decade. The academic discourse conceptualized ‘Islamic
terrorism’ as tool in the “Clash of Civilizations” in which the Middle East, representing
‘Islamic civilization,’ challenged ‘the West.’ In this framing, ‘Islamic terrorism’ responded to
cultural and religious differences between the two civilizations which were so fundamental
that they could never be resolved through mediation, tolerance, or compromise; rather, one
civilization would have to defeat the other in violent struggle. ‘Islamic terrorism,’ framed as
more indiscriminate, more lethal, loosely organized, and using modern technology, was used
against the United States for that precise purpose. These particular conceptualizations of
‘(Islamic) terrorism’ also spread into political discourses on the issue which I discuss in the
following section.
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4.4 Taking “the Fight against Terrorism” to the Political
Forefront – The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse in U.S. Politics in
the Mid- to Late 1990s
The academic field of ‘terrorism’ studies was not the only discursive agent to conceptualize
‘(Islamic) terrorism’ in this particular manner. Similar framings also informed political
approaches to the issue in the mid- to late 1990s as ‘(new) Islamic terrorism’ was constructed
as a serious threat requiring immediate political attention. While this meant that the
political discourse about the phenomenon became increasingly central as the decade wore
on, President Clinton also found ways to harness its power for his own political purposes,
effectively exploiting the discourse for political gain.25 In this section, I therefore analyze
how the Clinton administration engaged with the discourse on ‘terrorism’ by examining
presidential rhetoric on the issue as well as the government reports Patterns of Global
Terrorism.
Unlike his predecessor, President Bill Clinton could not (and would not) evade
the influence and reach of the ‘terrorism’ discourse. As Figure 4.1 above already showed,
Clinton mentioned ‘terrorism’ on average 106 times per year – a remarkable 231 % increase
compared to the previous administration. This demonstrates that the ‘terrorism’ discourse
had returned to its dominant position in U.S. politics and that it offered a central
paradigm through which Clinton shaped and interpreted his policies. Indeed, a closer look
at Figure 4.1 suggests that, as his presidency wore on, ‘terrorism’ became an increasingly
central framework, since Clinton mentioned ‘terrorism’ at a higher rate in later years than
in the early years of his administration. 1995, 1996, and 1998 stand out with above-average
references to ‘terrorism’ in presidential statements and speeches. In fact, Clinton was the
president to most often speak about ‘terrorism’ before the events of September 11, 2001,
another sign for return to power of the ‘terrorism’ discourse in the mid- to late 1990s.
Since Clinton mentioned ‘terrorism’ remarkably often during his tenure as President
of the United States, a detailed look at how he conceptualized and used the term is
indispensable. Upon closer analysis, it appears that Clinton was aware of the term’s
power and therefore careful with regard to how he spoke about it. Indeed, during his
25For a general analysis of his presidency, see, e.g., Bierling, Feste, Herrnson, and Phillips.
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two terms, the United States experienced several violent incidents which the majority of
the ‘terrorism’ discourse participants constructed and explained as incidents of ‘Islamic
terrorism’ against America. Clinton, however, approached the issue of ‘terrorism’ with great
caution, especially when it came to what others labeled ‘Islamic terrorism.’26 From his
public statements on these incidents it becomes clear that Clinton was quite hesitant and
initially avoided using the term ‘terrorism’ to describe what had happened. For instance,
after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Clinton spoke of “the tragedy that struck
Manhattan yesterday” and did not refer to ‘terrorism’ as a possibility at all (“President’s
Radio” 27 Feb. 1993). When a reporter a few days later asked him outright whether this
was “a terrorist incident,” Clinton replied defensively, saying,
I am not in a position to say that now [. . . ]. [. . . ] I can tell you this: that we have put the
full, full resources, the Federal law enforcement agencies, all kinds of agencies, all kinds of
access to information at the service of those who are working to figure out who did this
and why and what the facts are. But I cannot answer your question yet. (“Remarks and a
Question-and-Answer)
In that same exchange with reporters, Clinton explained further, “it’s also important that
we not overreact to it. [. . . ] If they get you ruﬄed, if they get us to change the way we
live and what we do, that is half the battle. I would discourage the American people from
overreacting to this” (“Remarks and a Question-and-Answer”). Similarly, when reporters
persistently kept asking, “Can we assume that it is terrorism?” Clinton merely responded
that he “d[id]n’t think you should assume anything until you hear[d] the statement today”
(“Remarks on Receiving”), effectively evading having to give a definite, quotable answer.
This trend of not immediately and consistently labeling the incidents ‘terrorism’
also repeated itself in the events which occurred in the next years. Hence, President Clinton
initially referred to the Oklahoma City bombing as “an act of cowardice, and it was evil,”
and called the then still unknown perpetrators “evil cowards” and “killers” (“Remarks
on the Bombing”). He also spoke of “this senseless act of violence” and “this tragedy” a
day later (“Memorandum on Employees”). Similarly, Clinton depicted the attacks on the
U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 as “the bombings” (“Memorandum on Assistance”) and
26See Tsui for the first book-length study on Clinton’s ‘terrorism’ rhetoric. Unfortunately, even though
Tsui’s book ventures into virtually unstudied territory, it remains predominantly descriptive in its
approach and does not offer much valuable analytical insight. It also does not situate Clinton’s rhetoric
into its historical context and thus does not address the issue of ‘Islamic terrorism’ adequately.
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when he sent an official “Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment
of United States Forces in Response to the Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania,”
he did not use the word ‘terrorism’ once. He rather talked about “the terrible tragedy
that occurred at our Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya” and promised “to deal with the
problems so horribly manifested in what we went through with our Embassies in Africa
and all the losses of life” (“Remarks on the Patients’ Bill;” “Remarks at a Victory”), again
avoiding any references to ‘terrorism.’
After some time, however, the president began acknowledging that the bombings
and other violent incidents could be interpreted as acts of ‘terrorism’ against the United
States, but usually tied it to calls for policy reform, more funding for government agencies,
or simply the passing of a piece of legislation stuck in Congress. When speaking about the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, for instance, Clinton argued that “the United States
ha[d] to review a lot of its policies in view of what happened at the World Trade Center to
try to make sure we [we]re doing everything we c[ould] to minimize the impact of terrorism
in this country” (“President’s News Conference with President”). He also acknowledged,
“Terrorism once seemed far from our shores, an atrocity visited on people in other lands.
Now, after the attack on the World Trade Center, we know that we, too, are vulnerable” –
but immediately linked ‘terrorism’ to crime and drug trafficking and continued by saying,
“Violent crime has been frightful but limited. But now armed drug gangs stalk the streets
of our cities, equipped like mercenary armies, randomly cutting down innocent bystanders
in a primitive struggle for territory” (“Remarks on the Swearing-In”).
Similarly, a few weeks after the Oklahoma City bombing, Clinton finally recognized
that “[i]n Oklahoma City, we suffered a terrible wound because it was an act of terrorism”
(“Remarks at the Women”). But this characterization of the incident as case of ‘terrorism’
came in the wake of the Clinton administration’s attempts to have Congress pass the
Omnibus Counterterrorism Act as well as the Antiterrorism Amendments Act: “I [. . . ] sent
a counterterrorism – a piece of legislation to Capitol Hill which I hope Congress will pass.
And [. . . ] I am going to send some more legislation to Congress to ask them to give the
FBI and others more power to crack these terrorist networks, both domestic and foreign”
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(“Interview”). Clinton explicitly linked the passing of his legislation to the Oklahoma City
bombing in later statements, writing:
Today I am transmitting for your immediate consideration and enactment the Antiterrorism
Amendments Act of 1995. This comprehensive Act, together with the Omnibus
Counterterrorism Act of 1995, which I transmitted to the Congress on February 9, 1995,
are critically important components of my Administration’s effort to combat domestic
and international terrorism.
The tragic bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19th stands
as a challenge to all Americans to preserve a safe society. In the wake of this cowardly attack
on innocent men, women, and children, following other terrorist incidents at home and
abroad over the past several years, we must ensure that law enforcement authorities have
the legal tools and resources they need to fight terrorism. The Antiterrorism Amendments
Act of 1995 will help us to prevent terrorism through vigorous and effective investigation
and prosecution. (“Message”)
This suggests that Clinton only started to use the ‘terrorism’ terminology because he
hoped it would help him achieve concrete political ends.
Thus, while Clinton eventually acknowledged that ‘terrorism’ constituted a serious
threat to U.S. national security, he did not conceptualize it as a form of war as Ronald
Reagan had done (see again Chapter 3). Clinton rather spoke of “the fight against
terrorism”27 and only used more militarized rhetoric in a handful of occasions.28 This
constituted in many ways a de-escalation of the political rhetoric of the previous decade
and allowed Clinton to rather frame ‘terrorism’ as a criminal and legal issue. He used
and exploited this rhetorical strategy, for instance, in the case of the Oklahoma City
bombing in order to urge Congress to pass his proposed legislation. In the statement
quoted above, Clinton asserted that “we [had to] ensure that law enforcement authorities
ha[d] the legal tools and resources they need[ed] to fight terrorism” (“Message”), thus
conceptualizing ‘terrorism’ as a crime which could only be fought adequately if Congress
passed his legislation.
Hence, I propose to read Clinton’s rhetoric on ‘terrorism’ in a more nuanced manner
than Winkler who has simply argued that “[b]y adopting the prophetic tradition, Clinton
elevated terrorism into a crime against God’s will” (In the Name 154). Winkler’s claim
that Clinton framed ‘terrorism’ in a religious manner is, in my view, not borne out by
27Examples for statements in which Clinton spoke of “the fight against terrorism” incldue, e.g., “Remarks
on the Terrorist;” “Remarks on International;” “President’s Radio” 10 Aug. 1996; “Remarks Announcing;”
and “Remarks to the 51st Session”
28See, e.g., “President’s Radio” 20 May 1995; and “Remarks to the Community.”
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the evidence. Moreover, Clinton did not exclusively refer to ‘terrorism’ as a crime. In this
context, Tsui has asserted that “[i]n contrast to Winkler’s definition and observation, [. . . ]
Bill Clinton adopted both the crime frame and the war metaphor to construct his political
discourse on terrorism” (53). I would also caution to overstate the impact of Clinton’s use
of the “war metaphor” since, as the examples above illustrate, he was not consistent in his
labeling of ‘terrorism’ as war and rather used more ambiguous terminology for specific
political purposes.
As the decade wore on, the ‘terrorism’ discourse became continuously more
established and powerful, predetermining to a certain extent the interpretation of incidents
as acts of ‘terrorism,’ but also enabling President Clinton to harness this framing for
political purposes. This dynamic comes particularly to the fore in the case of the al-Qaeda
bombings of the American embassies in Africa. Here, Clinton was noticeably quicker in
referring to these incidents as ‘terrorism.’ On August 8, 1998, one day after the attacks, he
already stated, “I want to talk to you about the terrorist bombings yesterday that took the
lives of Americans and Africans at our Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania; to tell you what we are doing and how we are combating the larger problem
of terrorism that targets Americans” (“President’s Radio” 8 Aug. 1998). Moreover, he
justified the retaliatory strikes against supposed al-Qaeda bases in Sudan and Afghanistan
by saying that he
ha[d] said many times that terrorism [wa]s one of the greatest dangers we face[d] in this
new global era. We saw its twisted mentality at work last week in the Embassy bombings
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which took the lives of innocent Americans and Africans
and injured thousands more. Today we [. . . ] struck back.
The United States launched an attack this morning on one of the most active terrorist
bases in the world. (“Remarks in Martha’s Vinyard”)
Clinton’s quick move to characterize the incident as act of ‘terrorism’ demonstrates how
pervasive the discourse had become by the end of the decade.
But Clinton’s construction of the embassy bombings as cases of ‘terrorism’ also
served a political purpose. At the time of the attacks, the (by now infamous) Lewinsky
scandal had reached a new peak and domestically, the president had come under significant
attack for his (mis-)conduct in office. Clinton ordered the retaliatory strike against al-Qaeda
only three days after publicly admitting to his affair with White House intern Monika
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Lewinsky and received widespread public support for his ‘tough’ stance against ‘terrorism’
(Hendrickson 107). The ‘terrorism’ rhetoric, and Clinton’s attempts to position himself as
patriotic defender against it, constituted a savory political tactic as the retaliatory strikes
were not only extremely popular, but also quieted his domestic enemies who did not want
to be seen as “preventing the president from using force against a Muslim fundamentalist
linked to embassy bombings who had also declared war on the United States” (Hendrickson
111).
Thus, while Clinton was careful and calculating in his usage of the ‘terrorism’
discourse, he could nevertheless not escape its influence and reach. This becomes apparent
when examining how he conceptualized the term itself. After the attacks in Tokyo and
Oklahoma, President Clinton noticeably started to frame ‘terrorism’ as ‘new’ and ‘different,’
clearly tapping into and echoing academic constructions of the term. Thus, he also spoke
of “the changing nature and scope of the threat of terrorist actions” and maintained
that “[o]ur generation’s enemies [we]re the terrorists and their outlaw nation sponsors”
(“President’s Radio” 20 May 1995; “Remarks on the 50th Anniversary”). During the 1996
“State of the Union” speech, he warned his audience:
The threats we face today as Americans respect no nation’s borders. Think of them:
terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, drug trafficking,
ethnic and religious hatred, aggression by rogue states, environmental degradation. If we
fail to address these threats today, we will suffer the consequences in all our tomorrows.
(“Address”)
Similarly, he cautioned the public that “in an open world of easy information, quick
technology, and rapid movements, we [we]re all more vulnerable than we used to be to
terrorism and its interconnected allies, organized crime, drug running, and the spread
of weapons of destruction” (“Remarks at the University”). In his 1996 address to the
United Nations General Assembly, he informed his audience that “[t]his [wa]s also an age
of new threats: threats from terrorists, from rogue states that support them; threats from
ethnic, religious, racial, and tribal hatreds; threats from international criminals and drug
traffickers, all of whom w[ould] be more dangerous if they gain[ed] access to weapons of
mass destruction” (“Remarks to the 51st Session”). As these statements illustrate, in his
understanding of ‘terrorism,’ President Clinton followed the discursive framing of the issue
as ‘new,’ propagated by independent groups relying on ‘weapons of mass destruction.’
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He even spoke of “terrorist networks” at times (e.g. “Interview”), thus clearly tapping
into discursivizations of the issue developed in the 1980s as well as more contemporary
adaptations.
Where he differed, however, from the dominant discursive construction of ‘new
terrorism’ was with regard to the role of Islam. He repeatedly stated that he did not
think an intrinsic connection existed between Islam and ‘terrorism,’ as the ‘new terrorism’
discourse would have it. Rather, he spoke of “the opportunity to beat back the forces of
radicalism and terrorism that unfairly ha[d] been identified with Islam by so many people”
(“Remarks at a Democratic”). Moreover, he declared that “even though we ha[d] had
problems with terrorism coming out of the Middle East, it [wa]s not inherently related to
Islam, not to the religion, not to the culture” (“President’s News Conference in Jakarta”).
During an address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1998, Clinton argued the
following:
Some people believe that terrorism’s principal fault line centers on what they see as an
inevitable clash of civilizations. It is an issue that deserves a lot of debate in this great hall.
Specifically, many believe there is an inevitable clash between Western civilization and
Western values, and Islamic civilizations and values. I believe this view is terribly wrong.
False prophets may use and abuse any religion to justify whatever political objectives they
have, even cold-blooded murder. Some may have the world believe that Almighty God
himself, the Merciful, grants a license to kill. But that is not our [America’s] understanding
of Islam. (“Remarks to the 53rd Session”)
Clinton’s phrasing here, his references to a “fault line” and “an inevitable clash of
civilizations,” constituted an unequivocal rebuttal of Huntington’s theses. This means that
the Clinton administration was, on the one hand, aware of the hegemonic construction of
‘new terrorism’ and exploited central tenets of it (like the supposed threat from WMDs)
whenever it proved politically expedient.29 On the other hand, Clinton also positioned
himself explicitly against its core claim that the ‘new terrorism’ was predominantly ‘Islamic’
in nature.
However, Clinton’s nuanced approach to ‘terrorism,’ particularly ‘Islamic terrorism,’
did not influence the administration’s discourse on ‘terrorism’ in a lasting way. This
becomes evident when considering the official annual government reports on ‘terrorism,’
29See S. Wright for an impressive analysis of how the Clinton administration came to discursively frame
the threat of ‘terrorism’ with ‘weapons of mass destruction.’ Wright, however, does not address the
theme of ‘Islamic terrorism’ or the larger, general discourse of ‘new terrorism’ of the 1990s in which the
fear of ‘WMD terrorism’ was embedded.
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in the 1990s entitled Patterns of Global Terrorism. Following the dominant discursive
interpretation of the issue, these reports constructed ‘terrorism’ in the 1990s as ‘new’
and predominantly ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’ in nature and adapted their framing of the
‘terrorism’ threat to fit the discursive mandate. In their framing, the reports also evoked
past constructions of ‘Arab’ and ‘Middle Eastern terrorism’ to further imbue the concept
of ‘Islamic terrorism’ with power.
Thus, the editions of Patterns of Global Terrorism in the 1990s singled out
‘Muslim extremism’ and ‘Islamic terrorism’ (used synonymously) from the very beginning.
The reports were littered with references to “[t]errorist and militant Moslem groups”
(Patterns 1991 3), “Islamic extremists” (e.g. Patterns 1992 15, Patterns 1993 16,
Patterns 1996 19), “[e]xtremist Muslim groups” supposedly at work in the entire Middle
East (Patterns 1994 13), and “Islamic militants and terrorists” (Patterns 1995 3). At
times, the reports focused on and praised different Middle Eastern governments as “publicly
committed to taking the necessary actions to counter terrorist threats, particularly from
religious extremists” (Patterns 1997 28). The multitude of these examples not only shows
the pervasiveness of the trope of the ‘Islamic terrorist,’ but also indicates that government
officials and ‘terrorism’ experts had fixated on ‘Islamic terrorism’ as the foremost threat
against the United States and its interests in the Middle East. As a side effect, this also
fixed the new threat geographically and maintained a narrative coherence with ‘terrorism’
reports from previous decades, suggesting that the Middle East continued to be a hotbed
for ‘terrorism,’ now of the religious kind.
The reports constructed ‘Islamic terrorism’ as the predominant menace of the decade
in unequivocal terms and represented it as embodiment of the ‘new’ kind of ‘terrorism’
confronting the United States. Patterns 1994, for instance, noted that “[t]errorism continued
to menace civil society in 1994. Although international terrorism declined worldwide, there
was an upsurge of attacks by Islamic extremist groups” and discerned “a trend in recent
years of a decline in attacks by secular terrorist groups and an increase in terrorist activities
by radical Islamic groups” (iii). Similarly, Patterns 1995 maintained that “[t]errorism by
extremist individuals or groups claiming to act for religious motives continued to dominate
international terrorism in 1995” (iii) and warned:
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Many of these terrorists – some loosely organized and some representing groups – claimed
to act for Islam and operated, increasingly, on a global scale. These transnational terrorists
benefit from modern communications and transportation, have global sources of funding,
are knowledgeable about modern explosives and weapons, and are more difficult to track
and apprehend than members of the old established groups or those sponsored by states.
(iii)
Patterns 1996 also found that “the trend continued toward more ruthless attacks on
mass civilian targets and the use of more powerful bombs. The threat of terrorist use of
materials of mass destruction [wa]s an issue of growing concern” (iii). The report for 1996
additionally argued that “[t]errorism by religious fanatics and groups manipulating religion,
especially Islam, for political purposes continued to dominate international terrorism in
1996” (Patterns 1996 iii). The annual ‘terrorism’ reports thus constructed ‘Islamic terrorism’
following the already established discursive conventions of the issue as ‘new,’ prone to use
‘weapons of mass destruction,’ and guided by extreme religious fervor instead of political
motives. It also tapped into discursivizations of ‘terrorism’ from the previous decade,
particularly notions of international ‘terrorism’ networks, thus exploiting this discurisve
continuity to make the claims appear as ‘logical.’
In this context, the reports eventually also began singling out Osama bin Laden
(spelled “Usama Bin Ladin”) and al-Qaeda, presenting bin Laden as a sponsor of ‘terrorism’
with the same power and influence as was previously accorded evil state sponsors of
‘terrorism’ (see previous chapters). He was mentioned for the first time in Patterns 1995
in the section “Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism” where Sudan’s official status as
‘state sponsor of terrorism’ was justified with his ‘terrorist’ activities in the country:
Khartoum also permitted Usama Bin Ladin, a denaturalized Saudi citizen with mujahedin
contacts, to use Sudan as a shelter for his radical Muslim followers and to finance and
train militant groups. Bin Ladin, who lives in Khartoum and owns numerous business
enterprises in Sudan, has been linked to numerous terrorist organizations. He directs
funding and other logistic support through his companies to a number of extremist causes.
(27)
This argumentation constitutes an inherent contradiction in the reports’ construction of
‘terrorism’ and ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ in particular. Patterns of Global Terrorism
defined ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ as “[t]he provision of funding, safehaven, and weapons
and logistic support to terrorists by sovereign states” and deemed it “crucial to the operation
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of many international terrorist organizations” (Patterns 1994 19).30 But the discursive
framing of ‘new (Islamic) terrorism’ as predominantly perpetrated by independent groups
without any fixed ties to friendly governments made the category of ‘state-sponsored
terrorism’ somewhat obsolete. Patterns responded to this problem by expanding the
concept to include “international terrorist financiers such as the Saudi dissident Usama
Bin Ladin” (Patterns 1996 iii), thereby developing the notion of ‘state sponsorship’ further
to include individual persons as facilitators of ‘terrorism,’ endowing them with global
power and influence. What is more, this rhetorical strategy successfully tapped into
notions of ‘terrorism’ sponsors (whether independent nations or individuals) as operating
in international networks. These ideas were first circulated during the Reagan years and
now updated so that they could be applied to bin Laden.
Thus, over the course of the decade, bin Laden and al-Qaeda were constructed as the
epitome of the ‘new Islamic terrorism’ targeting the United States and American interests
in the Middle East and beyond. For instance, Patterns 1996 recorded that “[i]nternational
terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin publicly threatened US interests in the Gulf, including
Kuwait, in September and again in December. US and Western establishments received
numerous telephoned and faxed bomb threats during the year” and that bin Laden had
“publicly called on his supporters to attack US interests in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf
states” (20, 21). In the report for the year 1997, bin Laden received his own sub-category
in the section on ‘state sponsorship of terrorism,’ which is noteworthy since the report
was published before the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa in the summer of
1998. There, he was described as “one of the most significant sponsors of Sunni Islamic
terrorist groups” (Patterns 1997 30), a characterization which constructed him as powerful
leader of an international ‘terrorism’ network comprising a multitude of Islamic ‘terrorist’
groups out to attack the United States. This clearly evoked central knowledge claims
about ‘terrorism’ from the 1980s and exploited them to full effect to assign meaning to
the present situation.
Patterns 1998, in response to the embassy bombings, listed bin Laden and al-Qaeda
in its “Appendix B: Information on Terrorist Groups,” a clear indicator that the group was
30The other annual reports for the decade all included similarly phrased statements. In the 1990s, Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria were officially designated as state sponsors of ‘terrorism.’
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now considered an established threat against the U.S. Moreover, the report for 1998 stressed
bin Laden’s far-reaching influence and power. Patterns 1998 acknowledged that “there
was troubling evidence of a growing collaboration in other countries between Egyptian
extremists [. . . ] and Usama Bin Ladin,” taking it as an indicator of “the global reach of
Usama Bin Ladin [. . . ] and his network” (23, 29). As the report made clear,
Bin Ladin leads a broad-based, versatile organization. [. . . ] The diverse groups under his
umbrella afford Bin Ladin resources beyond those of the people directly loyal to him. With
his own inherited wealth, business interests, contributions from sympathizers in various
countries, and support from close allies [. . . ], he funds, trains, and offers logistic help to
extremists not directly affiliated with his organization. (29)
The threat emanating from bin Laden was further enhanced in subsequent reports. Patterns
1999, for instance, mentioned bin Laden when discussing ‘WMD terrorism,’ writing that
“Usama Bin Ladin spoke publicly about acquiring such a capability and likened his pursuit of
those weapons to a religious duty.” The report for the year 2000 similarly warned that while
“[m]ost terrorists continued to rely on conventional tactics, such as bombing, shooting, and
kidnapping, [. . . ] some terrorists – such as Usama Bin Ladin and his associates – continued
to seek CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] capabilities” ()Patterns
2000. In this manner, the annual government reports on ‘terrorism’ constructed Osama bin
Laden as quintessential ‘new Islamic terrorist’ while simultaneously tapping into already
firmly established discursivizations of ‘terrorism’ as requiring the support of a wealthy
and powerful third party.
Overall, then, the political discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the mid- to late 1990s
confirmed the dominant conceptualization of the issue as a ‘new’ and unprecedented
threat. It also reflected and enhanced already existing concerns over so-called WMDs
and a supposed increased lethality and brutality in ‘terrorist’ attacks. With regard to the
perpetrators, however, it is noteworthy that President Clinton clearly did not follow the
discursively constructed threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’ as emblematic of this ‘new’ terrorism.
Nevertheless, his influence on the discourse was not substantial enough to challenge or
even change the dominant framing of the issue. This means that the political discourse on
‘terrorism’ essentially stabilized these constructions about ‘Islamic terrorism’ and helped
spread them further. The next section examines how these conceptualizations of ‘Islamic
terrorism’ were reflected and reworked in news and cultural discourses of the decade.
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4.5 “There Will Never Be a Last Cell! It’s Just the Beginning.”
– The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse in U.S. News Media and
Popular Culture in the Mid- to Late 1990s
Academic and political discourses on ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ also seeped into media and
cultural discourses, influencing how they framed the issue at hand. The American news
media regularly referred to scholars of ‘terrorism’ and government officials when reporting
on and analyzing violent incidents. Particularly in the latter half of the decade, these
cross-references worked to stabilize ‘Islamic terrorism’ as dominant discursive concept in
news media and cultural discourses. In this section, I discuss how the ‘terrorism’ reporting
in The New York Times evolved and increasingly focused on Islam in explanations and
characterizations of events and perpetrators. Then I examine how Hollywood productions
in the mid- to late 1990s engaged in a similar discursivization of ‘terrorism,’ foregrounding
Islam as motivating force behind ‘terrorism’ and constructing ‘Islamic terrorism’ as ‘new’
threat against the United States.
As the discussion above has shown, The New York Times reported less on ‘terrorism’
at the beginning of the decade and overwhelmingly linked it to ‘Arabs,’ the Middle East,
and Islam. However, as the decade wore on, the ‘Islamic’ component in conceptualizations
of ‘terrorism’ became increasingly dominant and eventually the main attribute to depict
the issue and the perpetrators. This becomes evident when comparing the reporting in
The New York Times on specific incidents which were constructed as acts of ‘Islamic
terrorism’ targeting the United States in the mid- to late 1990s, departing from previous
constructions which combined references to the perpetrators’ religion with their ethnicity
and origins.
Indeed, as Figure 4.4 visualizes, the spikes in reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the mid- to
late 1990s are also clearly related to concrete incidents of violence which were discursivized
as acts of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ against the United States. Thus, in 1993, of the 1,696 articles
on ‘terrorism’ which were published by The New York Times, 895 pieces referred to the
bombing of the World Trade Center that year, i.e. 53 % of the overall reporting. Two years
later, the Oklahoma City bombing dominated the news. 764 articles linked the event to
‘terrorism,’ i.e. 38 % of the writing on ‘terrorism’ that year. The embassy bombings in
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Figure 4.4: Reporting on ‘terrorist’ incidents in The New York Times, 1987-2000
Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 similarly impacted the coverage of ‘terrorism’ in The New York
Times. Taken together, articles mentioning either Tanzania or Kenya in connection with
‘terrorism’ made up 27 % of the overall writing on the topic for that year (although there
is bound to be some overlap with articles listed in both searches). Moreover, 1998 marks
the year when The New York Times began to report increasingly on Osama bin Laden.
While there were only 5 pieces which mentioned his name in connection with ‘terrorism’ in
1997, a year later, this number had increased to 209 articles, i.e. 12 %, suggesting that the
higher journalistic interest in his person was related to the attacks on the U.S. embassies in
Africa. The data thus not only indicates that these different incidents were understood as
acts of ‘terrorism’ but also that they constituted important events which seemingly proved
central knowledge claims of the ‘terrorism’ discourse, namely that ‘Islamic terrorism’ was
emerging as a new threat against the United States.
This becomes apparent when examining the reporting in The New York Times
about these incidents. Thus, when a bomb blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
in Oklahoma on April 19, 1995, The New York Times immediately informed its readers that
state officials assumed “that the bombing was a terrorist attack against the Government”
(Johnston A1). What is more, that same article reported on “the possibility that the
attack had been the work of Islamic militants, like those who bombed the World Trade
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Center in February 1993” (B8). Johnston further relayed to his readers that “[s]everal news
organizations, including CNN, reported that investigators were seeking to question several
men, described as being Middle Eastern in appearance, who had driven away from the
building shortly before the blast” (B8). Here, Johnston linked the “Islamic militants” of
the World Trade Center bombing to the “Middle Eastern” men connected to the Oklahoma
bombing, implying that what happened in Oklahoma the day before constituted an act of
‘terrorism’ committed by ‘Islamic terrorists’ from the Middle East.
In fact, many of his colleagues at The New York Times immediately drew parallels
to the World Trade Center bombing. John Kifner, for instance, commented on the fact
that “today’s bombing [. . . ] was similar in intensity to the World Trade Center bombing
in New York two years ago” (“12 Victims” A1). Another article stressed that “[t]he scene
was eerily like the surreal world in lower Manhattan in the hours after a van packed with
explosives blew up in the garage of the World Trade Center” (“Savagery” A22). The
same contribution, tellingly entitled “Savagery in Oklahoma,” went even further in stating
that “the gutted building and the cars burning in the streets were more reminiscent of
war-torn Beirut than a city in America’s heartland. A fate like Beirut’s Americans and
their Government must never tolerate” (A22). This constituted a clear reference to the
1983 Marine barracks bombing and evoked the subtext of ‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic terrorism.’
Some journalists went to considerable lengths to represent ‘Islamic terrorists’ as
prime suspects. Malcom Browne, for example, wrote:
Several experts [. . . ] saw similarities between the type of damage sustained here and the
damage done to buildings in London in two bombings carried out in 1992 by the Irish
Republican Army. This does not demonstrate a link between the bombings, they said, but
the I.R.A. is widely suspected of having coached Islamic fundamentalist terrorists in the
making and use of powerful bombs. (A25)
Browne took similarities between the Oklahoma bombing and similar attacks perpetrated
by members of the Irish Republican Army as evidence for “Islamic fundamentalist terrorists”
behind the events in Oklahoma. This suggests that the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’
had become the hegemonic model to explain incidents like the one in Oklahoma and that,
unconsciously or not, reporters of The New York Times attempted to construct events to
fit the prescribed narrative.
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This development reached an endpoint of sorts in 1998 with the coverage of the
almost simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, on August 7, 1998, which killed 224 people and injured more than 4,000 persons.
These incidents, the rescue efforts, and the investigation into possible culprits dominated
the headlines of The New York Times for days and the newspaper explained to readers
that these blasts were another instance of ‘terrorism’ targeting the United States. From the
beginning of the coverage, journalists referred to the bombings as “coordinated terrorist
attacks” (McKinley A1), “the terrorist bombing” (Weiner, “Experts” A1), “the terrorist
explosion” (McFadden, “Sergeant” A8), and announced that the United States was living
in “an age of global terrorism” (McKinley A1). An opinion piece published the day after
the bombings asserted that “[t]he deadly terrorism that struck United States embassies
in Africa yesterday stunned Americans. It came as an unwelcome reminder that, in a
terrorist’s eyes, the world’s most powerful country remains the world’s number one target”
(“Embassy” A14). Thus, the bombings were unequivocally explained as ‘terrorism’ against
the United States.
With regard to possible perpetrators, the suspicion came to rest immediately on
Osama bin Laden whom reporters constructed as dangerous ‘terrorism’ sponsor who
provided financial and logistical support to ‘Islamic terrorists’ all over the globe after
having declared a ‘holy war’ (or jihad) on the United States for religious reasons. James
McKinley labeled bin Laden a “Saudi Arabian Islamic militant” and informed readers that
the State Department had officially identified him as “a sponsor of terrorism” (A6), thus
linking Islam and ‘terrorism’ in the persona of bin Laden. His colleague Philip Shenon
told readers that bin Laden “ha[d] sworn to wage a holy war on the United States and its
interests abroad” and also quoted from the State Department’s description of the man
as “one of the most significant financial sponsors of Islamic extremist activities in the
world” (“Focus” A8). Shenon also confirmed to readers that the suspect “ha[d] close ties
to Muslim extremist groups in Sudan” (“Focus” A8).
Similarly, in his article, Tim Weiner extensively quoted Milton Bearden, “a retired
senior C.I.A. official who was the ranking officer for the agency in Afghanistan” as warning:
210
This [the embassy bombings] in all likelihood was not state supported, and if it is not,
‘Terror Inc.’ is beginning to creep in [. . . ]. Whether or not Bin Laden was in on it[,] there
may be an emerging linkage between Bin Laden, the Islamic Jihad guys and the Islamic
Group out of Egypt. If so, these people are close to becoming a state unto themselves.
(“Sophisticated” A8).
John Kifner, in turn, described bin Laden as “a multimillionaire Saudi businessman who
fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and [who] ha[d] a worldwide network of
Islamic terrorists” (“Wealthy” A11), unequivocally marking Osama bin Laden as aligned
with ‘Islamic terrorists.’ Indeed, similar to academic and political constructions, in the
writing of The New York Times, Osama bin Laden was presented as dangerous leader of
an international ‘terrorism’ network which operated much like the ‘terrorism’ networks
of the 1980s. An important difference, however, was that this ‘new’ type of ‘terrorism’
network did not require state support and was instead led by a wealthy individual with a
religiously motivated agenda. Osama bin Laden seemingly epitomized these ideas.
These constructions of ‘Islamic terrorism’ not only influenced journalistic writings
on the topic. In a similar development, Hollywood productions also evolved to focus on
‘Islamic terrorists’ as villains in successful movies in the latter half of the decade. In
the early 1990s, Hollywood productions still represented ‘terrorism’ as an amalgam of
stereotypes about ‘Arabs,’ Islam, and the Middle East generally. From the mid-1990s
onwards, however, these constructions increasingly shifted to focus predominantly on
religion in order to illustrate ‘terrorist’ motivations, marginalizing political explanations
of ‘terrorism’ or references to ethnicity and nationality. This effectively fortified and
spread the trope of the ‘Islamic terrorist’ who wanted to destroy the United States as
principal representative of ‘the West’ in a Huntington-esque “Clash of Civilizations.” These
narratives were most dominantly developed by two successful Hollywood productions,
Executive Decision, released in 1996, and The Siege, which hit the theaters two years
later. Both films performed well at the box office; Executive Decision had a budget of $55
million and made $122 million worldwide while The Siege cost $70 million to make and
earned $116 million across the globe (“Executive;” “Siege”). This suggests that audiences
worldwide continued to be interested in movies about ‘(Islamic) terrorism,’ meaning that
the issue maintained its powerful position in cultural discourses about ‘terrorism’ and
violence.
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When Executive Decision arrived in American movie theaters in 1996, these
discursive tendencies to construct ‘Arab terrorists’ from the Middle East as ‘Islamic’
was even more pronounced than in movies like Navy SEALs or True Lies from the
beginning of the decade. Executive Decision (1996), directed by Stuart Baird and starring
Kurt Russell, features a group of ‘Islamic terrorists’ who take over Oceanic Airlines Flight
343 en route from Athens to Washington, D.C., ostensibly in order to pressure the U.S.
government to release their leader El Sayed Jaffa who was captured in the beginning of
the movie. But ‘terrorism’ expert Dr. David Grant (Russell) suspects that this is a ruse
by Jaffa’s second in command, Nagi Hassan (played by David Suchet) who really wants
to detonate barrels of stolen Soviet nerve toxin DZ-5 in a suicide mission which would
eradicate not only the entire population of Washington D.C., but “half of the Eastern
Seaboard” (1:08:38), as Grant realizes soon. In order to stop Hassan and his group of
‘terrorists,’ Grant and a multi-ethnic special forces ‘counter-terrorism’ team find a way to
secretly board Flight 343 mid-air with the help of a special stealth aircraft provided by the
U.S. army and begin an operation to take out the ‘terrorists’ and regain control over the
hijacked plane. Once on board the plane, the team around Grant also realizes that Hassan
has hidden a remote-controlled bomb on board the plane, meaning that there is a ‘sleeper’
among the passengers who can detonate the nerve gas via a small hand-held electronic
device. Eventually, with the help of stewardess Jean (Halle Berry), Grant and his team
manage to take out the sleeper, kill all other ‘terrorists,’ and land the plane safely in D.C.
The ‘terrorists’ in Executive Decision are unequivocally depicted as ‘Islamic’ and
Hassan is represented as being on a divine mission from Allah to attack the U.S. From
the beginning, Hassan is characterized by Grant as “an extremist in every sense” (22:08),
a characterization the movie confirms in a later sequence which shows Hassan to have a
small Koran in the pocket of his jacket on board the hijacked plane. One scene shows him
reading in it, focused and calm, while another scene depicts him praying in a secluded
corner of the plane, again suggesting that Islam is the guiding force behind his ‘terrorist’
plans. Moreover, when the desperate crisis team back in Washington decides to free Jaffa
in hopes that he can persuade Hassan to give up his plans, Hassan tells Jaffa via phone
that “Allah has blessed us. [. . . ] All the people of Islam will embrace you as its chosen
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leader. I am your flame, the Sword of Allah – and with it I will strike deep into the heart
of the infidel” (1:20:05-20:23). Hassan’s speech makes it clear that he sees himself as on a
divine mission in the name of Islam. By characterizing the United States as “infidel,” the
conflict in the movie acquires a religious dimension – it is explicitly not about political
grievances. In fact, it was Hassan himself who set his own boss up for capture, feigning a
political motive so that U.S. authorities, believing that this was a hijacking for political
reasons, would allow the plane into U.S. airspace where Hassan can detonate the nerve
gas for even greater damage.
Hassan is not the only ‘Islamic terrorist’ in the group of hijackers. When he
eventually tells his men that their boss Jaffa has been freed by U.S. authorities, they
celebrate and cheer, jelling “Allahu akbar” repeatedly while the frightened passengers look
on bewilderedly (1:20:45-21:00). Only one of the ‘terrorists’ questions Hassan’s motives
and delivers a defense of Islam, arguing that “[t]his has nothing to do with Islam. This
is not Allah’s will. You’re blinded by your hatred, and I will have nothing to do with
your plan” (1:22:46-22:53). He is the only one in the movie defending Islam against the
connection with ‘terrorism’ and since he is one of the ‘terrorists’ himself, his words are not
convincing and undermined by his ‘terrorist’ status. Moreover, the man is immediately
killed by Hassan, indicating that his more benign understanding of Islam does not represent
a widely-shared view; rather, Hassan and the rest of the group have taken over Islam with
their ‘terrorism’ and its defenders are powerless to stop them.
Hassan is powerful and dangerous because he is a fierce ‘Muslim terrorist.’ Minutes
before killing the man opposing his plans, Hassan explains to him that “Allah has chosen
for us a task greater than Jaffa’s freedom. We are the true soldiers of Islam. Our destiny
is to deliver the vengeance of Allah into the belly of the infidel” (1:22:37-22:44). In fact,
Hassan is such a dedicated ‘Islamic terrorist’ that in the end, when Grant and his team
have defused the bomb and stormed the plane, he still kills the two pilots, hoping that
the plane will crash and the gas bombs will detonate anyway. The ‘terrorists’ in Executive
Decision, then, are constructed as ‘Islamic’ from the outset and the portrayal of ‘Islamic
terrorism’ is more overt than in earlier Hollywood productions.
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This development eventually culminated in the 1998 film The Siege, directed by
Edward Zwick and starring Denzel Washington as FBI leading agent and moral compass of
the film, Anthony “Hub” Hubbard, Annette Bening as CIA agent with a dark past, Elise
Kraft/Sharon Bridger, Tony Shalhoub as Lebanese-American FBI agent Frank Haddad,
and Bruce Willis as General William Devereaux. In The Siege, cells of ‘Islamic terrorists’
stage an escalating number of ‘terrorist’ attacks in the United States in order to force
the U.S. government to release Sheik Ahmed Bin Talal who, at the opening of the movie,
was accused of being the mastermind behind the bombings of the U.S. army barracks in
Dharhan, Saudi Arabia, and subsequently kidnapped by General Devereaux who conducted
this operation in total secret from the government itself. Over the course of the movie, it is
revealed that CIA agent Elise Kraft (her real name, it turns out later, is actually Sharon
Bridger) helped train these ‘terrorists’ during the Gulf War as part of a CIA operation to
overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq and have the Sheik govern in his place instead. But
“there was a policy shift,” as Kraft/Bridger sarcastically tells Agent Hubbard, and the
CIA mission was canceled, leaving the group around the Sheik in grave danger in Iraq.
Feeling guilty, Kraft/Bridger then helped many members of the Sheik’s group come to
the U.S., circumventing the ‘terrorist watch list’ on which the group was now placed and
not realizing that these men were planning to exact revenge on the U.S. through acts of
‘Islamic terrorism.’
Despite these plot ambiguities, the ‘terrorists’ in The Siege are unequivocally
depicted as ‘Islamic’ in nature. This becomes evident from the very beginning as The
Siege makes use of the technique of “remediation” and opens abruptly with original
footage of the historical bombing of the Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996, located near
the Saudi Arabian city Dhahran, which killed twenty people and injured almost 500
more (Ba¨chler 191). The footage shows the destroyed buildings and frantic rescue efforts
to retrieve mangled bodies from the rubble while news commentators report on “how
vulnerable U.S. troops are” (00:38) and explain that (fictional) Sheik Ahmed Bin Talal,
“a radical fundamentalist cleric” (00:49), has been named as the prime suspect behind the
bombings. These comments together with the image of the Sheik, bearded and wearing the
typical Middle Eastern headdress and thus marked as ‘Arab,’ already reinforce the notion
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that what can be seen on the screen constitutes ‘Islamic terrorism.’31 This is immediately
confirmed by the film as the next shot shows President Clinton, originally addressing the
Khobar Towers bombing, saying that “[t]he explosion appears to be the work of terrorists”
(00:50-00:53). Thus, The Siege already establishes within the first minute of film that
what audiences will see is a story about ‘Islamic terrorism’ targeting the United States by
activating the political discourse on the issue, inviting audiences to compare and link ‘real’
instances of ‘Islamic terrorism’ against the U.S. with the fictional attack on screen.
This first impression is further strengthened as the film continues. The next minutes
detail how the Sheik is kidnapped, ostensibly by American forces, while driving in a car
in the middle of the desert as the camera frequently cuts back to the continuation of
Clinton’s statement, promising quick and severe punishment for the perpetrators of the
bombings. But this positive representation of American ‘counter-terrorism’ capabilities is
immediately undermined as the next scenes show the Sheik sitting on a simple bed in a
cell, chanting to himself with a string of Muslim prayer beads in his hands. He is clearly
praying, quietly and persistently, and even the imposing presence of General Devereaux
in the room does not interrupt him. The film then zooms in on the Sheik’s white clothes
and head cover which slowly fade out into a glowing white screen which shows the film’s
title, The Siege. All this time, the religious singing continues and is eventually taken up by
another man, a muezzin calling his Muslim congregation to prayer. His singing is intercut
with short scenes showing a Muslim family praying at home and a large group of Muslim
men praying in unison in a mosque. Only then does the camera pan out to reveal that we
are no longer somewhere in the Middle East, but in Brooklyn, New York City.
The long opening sequence is important because it frames the violence in the movie
as ‘Islamic terrorism’ and suggests that the United States has become a primary target
in a Huntington-esque “Clash of Civilizations.” These early scenes already cast suspicion
over all Muslims by linking them visually to the Sheik and connecting them to Islam
through the religious chants. By revealing at the end that the praying Muslims, framed as
31Most critics have read the Sheik as resembling Osama bin Laden (e.g. Prince, Firestorm;
Schneider-Ludorff), but are usually writing after 9/11 where his appearance was well-known and
pictures of him circulated widely. I do not disagree with this reading but would also caution against
overstating this significance since The Siege was filmed before Osama bin Laden published his 1998
fatwa, declaring ‘jihad’ against America. In addition, the Sheik is barely mentioned again after the
opening sequence and functions as more of a tool to justify the actual plot of the film.
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potential ‘terrorists,’ are located in New York, the film implies that the enemy has already
invaded the American homeland and infiltrated the city’s neighborhoods. Moreover, as
Amata Schneider-Ludorff has pointed out, in these scenes “Islam itself is rendered a global,
threatening phenomenon that, seemingly above the laws of space and time, may move
from there to here” (87). The inclusion of the film’s title frame in this montage further
stresses that the film’s conflict arises out of a clash between the U.S. and ‘Islam.’ As
it appears in the film’s opening sequence, the United States is under (The) Siege from
‘Islamic terrorism.’
In the rest of the film, this clash slowly escalates. Different cells of ‘Islamic terrorists’
stage ‘terrorist’ attacks in the city in order to force the U.S. government to free the
Sheik. At first, they explode a bomb filled with blue paint in a bus in order to send
a warning to U.S. authorities. When the warning is not heeded, three suicide bombers
explode themselves in a bus, this time full of people. A third attack targets New York’s
upper class during an intermission in a crowded Broadway theater. The next incident is
set to take place in an elementary school where a lone ‘terrorist’ has taken a classroom
full of children hostage and wired it with explosives. It is only thanks to Agent Hubbard’s
courageous storming of the classroom and targeted shooting of the ‘terrorist’ that no
one is harmed. Finally, the last act consists of a van filled with explosives driving into
the FBI ‘counter-terrorism’ offices. In each successful ‘terrorist’ instance, the number of
casualties rises considerably; the bombing of the FBI building kills more than 600 people
and completely destroys the complex in images reminiscent of the opening footage of the
Khobar Towers bombing.
The Siege depicts these instances of violence as cases of ‘Islamic terrorism’ targeting
America. After the second bus bombing, the FBI team is able to reconstruct that one of
the suicide bombers was wearing an Islamic funeral shroud made of “[p]ure, unadulterated,
Egyptian cotton” (31:58-32:00). Agent Hubbard immediately understands that this is
“[w]hat they use in funerals. Guy was wearing a shroud” (32:03-32:08). Elise Kraft similarly
explains in the next scene that “[t]he funeral shroud is the final step in the ritual of
self-purification” (33:10-33:14). The implication is clear: These are ‘Islamic terrorists,’
driven by religious motives.
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Moreover, The Siege also features twice a scene of brown hands washing themselves
in a ritual manner, again a subtle coding of the events as ‘Islamic terrorism’ (Villinger
318). The first time, these hands are not only shown as purifying themselves in water,
but they also connect wires to make a bomb, turn car keys in the ignition, and drive
a black van through New York to eventually bomb the FBI building. The visual link
between ‘terrorism’ and Islam is further strengthened as these scenes are cut in-between
an important meeting at the Pentagon, which Elise Kraft/Sharon Bridger, Agent Hubbard,
and General Devereaux all attend to discuss how to best respond to the ‘terrorist’ incidents
plaguing the city. Kraft/Bridger hands out an official CIA report on ‘terrorism’ in the
Middle East to all attending the meeting and begins to explain that
I’m sure everyone here knows the traditional model of the terrorist network. One cell
controls all others. Cut off the head, the body will wither. Unfortunately, the old wisdom
no longer applies. The new paradigm is each cell operates independent of the other. Cut
off one head, another rises up in its place. (1:02:17-02:35)
The cutting back and forth in this sequence between Kraft/Bridger’s presentation and
the preparations of the suicide driver clearly link the CIA agent’s explanation of ‘new
terrorism’ to the ‘Islamic terrorism’ simultaneously targeting the FBI offices. The Siege,
then, clearly taps into already existing discourses on ‘Islamic terrorism,’ including notions
of international “terrorist network[s],” in its framing of the violence on screen.
What is more, the film also validates Huntington’s notion of a “Clash of Civilizations”
between “the West and the Rest.” One high-ranking government official tellingly claims
that “[t]hey are attacking our way of life” (1:09:19), effectively arguing that there can be
no peaceful resolution of the conflict. Likewise, towards the end of the movie, it is revealed
that Kraft/Bridger’s Palestinian contact, Samir Nazhde (played by Sami Bouajila), is not
as innocent as he has always maintained, but rather the last cell and tasked with blowing
himself up in the midst of a peaceful march against the government’s imposition of martial
law on the city. Samir has led Kraft/Bridger to a bathhouse under the assumption that
they will meet the last ‘terrorist’ cell there and persuade them to stop their plans. But
Samir has duped his CIA case officer about his ‘true’ nature. When Samir begins his ritual
washings in the water, the movie repeats the close up of brown hands in water – most
audiences will understand that this means that Samir is one of the ‘Islamic terrorists’
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before Kraft/Bridger does. When Kraft/Bridger states matter-of-factly that “you are the
last cell” (1:36:01), Samir grabs a gun, points it at her, and yells that “[t]here will never
be a last cell! It’s just the beginning” (1:36:33-36:38). His claims suggest that the ‘Islamic
terrorist’ attacks on New York City have little relation to the abduction of the Sheik after
all – it is rather about exacting punishment on the U.S. for “trying to tell the world how
to live” (1:37:40), meaning that these ‘Islamic terrorists’ attack America for its values and
power.
Understandably, the depiction of Muslims and Muslim Americans in The Siege
generated much controversy at the time. Mark Caro, reporting for the Chicago Tribune,
told readers that the Council on American–Islamic Relations’ “critique complain[ed] that
‘The Siege’ link[ed] Islamic practices to terrorism, such as by showing a character ritually
washing himself before a suicide bomb mission,” indicating that advocacy groups had grown
increasingly sensitive and, more importantly, vocal in their critique about Hollywood’s
linking of ‘terrorism’ and Islam. Similarly, Judith Gabriel wrote at the time that “scores
of major (non-Arab) film critics [. . . ] zeroed in on the not-so-subtle racism that lurked
menacingly, familiarly, throughout the film.” Judith Brennan, in turn, informed readers of
the Los Angeles Times that “the Washington-based Council on American-Islamic Relations
[wa]s protesting Twentieth Century Fox’s coming Edward Zwick film, ‘The Siege,’ as a
dangerous and stereotypical depiction of Muslim Americans.” Director Edward Zwick and
his team defended themselves by insisting that ‘Islamic terrorism’ existed in the ‘real’ world
and that it was acceptable for Hollywood movies to take the issue up again on film (Bay).
The widespread criticism regarding the representation of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in The Siege as
well as its defense, then, is telling since both sides did not dispute the existence of ‘Islamic
terrorism’ per se. This indicates that the concept of ‘Islamic terrorism’ had established
itself firmly in American discourses on ‘terrorism’ and that fictional representations had
become enmeshed with political reality.
The Siege thus marks an important moment in the discourse on ‘Islamic terrorism’
in the 1990s. While earlier productions like Navy SEALs and True Lies still represented
their ‘terrorists’ as ‘Arab-Islamic’ hybrids, Executive Decision and especially The Siege
did not need to explicitly address the ethnic component any longer in order to make the
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threat emanating from the ‘terrorist’ enemy palpable. Instead, these last two productions
could foreground the religious component, i.e. the fanatic belief in Islam, and it was clear
to audiences that the ‘Islamic terrorists’ they were seeing on-screen were ‘Arabs’ from the
Middle East because these attributes underwrote the concept of ‘Islamic terrorism’ itself,
activating and exploiting past discourses to empower the current one.
This focus on ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ as sole motivating force of the ‘terrorists’
culminated in The Siege, the only film in this cycle where the ‘Islamic terrorists’ are
actually successful. The ‘Islamic terrorists’ in The Siege manage to pull off not just one,
but several devastating ‘terrorist’ attacks in the United States, coercing the nation in
the process to (temporarily) suspend its ‘Western’ values and liberties. Tellingly, Agent
Hubbard passionately argues with General Deveraux against torturing a ‘terrorist’ suspect
in the film, reasoning that “[w]hat if they don’t even want the Sheik? [. . . ] What if what
they really want is for us to [. . . ] [b]end the law, shred the constitution just a little bit.
Because if we torture him, General. . . We do that and everything that we have bled and
fought and died for is over. And they’ve won. They’ve already won!” (1:23:12-23:40).32
Hubbard constructs the conflict as an American, morally superior ‘us’ against an ‘Islamic
terrorist’ ‘them’ and insinuates that ‘they’ have managed to destabilize American society
and its proud history of democracy and freedom – and that this is worse than the large
number of casualties the ‘terrorist’ attacks have caused so far.
While all four movies imagine the U.S. as under attack from ‘Islamic terrorism,’ in
The Siege the ‘Islamic terrorists’ have set up an elaborate organization within the country
and undermined the open, democratic society. In all four films, the ‘Islamic terrorists’ are
eventually defeated, but in The Siege, they wreak considerable havoc and kill unsuspecting
Americans in significant numbers first. In this regard, it is notable that The Siege also
departs from Hollywood conventions of how violence is portrayed on screen. After the
‘Islamic terrorists’ have bombed a Broadway theater, the film is explicit in its representation
of the injured and dead. As Hubbard and his team arrive at the scene, screams, crying,
and voices begging for help (“Please help me!” – “I just don’t want to die!”) can be heard
clearly. Scenes show bleeding, disoriented people stumbling out of the theater and even an
32For a discussion of the use of torture in The Siege, see Ba¨chler and Villinger.
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elegant woman in a daze walking down the stairs who turns and is revealed to be missing
half an arm. Audiences are largely accustomed to aestheticized representations of death,
injuries, and violence (Wilkins and Downing 427), and by breaking with these cinematic
conventions The Siege represents the violence of ‘Islamic terrorism’ as unprecedented and
unparalleled in its ferocity and escalates the threat emanating from it for American society.
In The Siege, ‘Islamic terrorism’ has successfully targeted the United States at home and
constitutes an exceptional danger to society, testifying to the power of the discourse on
‘Islamic terrorism’ at the end of the decade and the active role Hollywood films took in
shaping and distributing the discourse.
Overall, then, the discursive focus on ‘Islamic terrorism,’ which manifested itself
especially in the latter half of the 1990s, framed academic, political, journalistic, and
artistic accounts of the phenomenon, presenting the perpetrators as religiously motivated
fanatics who wanted to attack the United States as representative of ‘the West’ in an
escalating “Clash of Civilizations.” Constructed as particularly ruthless and lethal, ‘Islamic
terrorists’ were presented to the wider American public as formidable foes whose motives
and objectives were dismissed as vaguely ‘Islamic’ in nature and therefore unreasonable
and illogical, void of any political aspects. The discourse on ‘Islamic terrorism’ enjoyed such
a hegemonic status that when on a sunny Tuesday morning in September 2001 two planes,
hijacked by members of al-Qaeda, flew into the World Trade Center towers while another
one crashed into the Pentagon and a fourth plane was brought down by its passengers
in the fields of Pennsylvania, the framework of ‘Islamic terrorism’ already predetermined
how ‘9/11’ would be interpreted and narrated.
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Chapter 5
“Terrorism against Our Nation Will Not Stand” –
9/11, the “War on Terror(ism),” and the ‘Terrorism’
Discourse at the Beginning of the New Millennium
September 11, 2001, started out like any other work day in the United States, but by 8:35
p.m. the nation found itself embroiled in the beginnings of another “war against terrorism,”
as President George W. Bush declared in his televised address in the evening (“Address to
the Nation”). That same morning, members of al-Qaeda had successfully hijacked four
commercial airliners and flown two of them into the World Trade Center Towers in New
York City, another one into the Pentagon building in Arlington County, Virginia, while a
fourth – possibly en route to the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. – had been brought
down by its passengers in fields near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. After the coordinated
attacks were over, 2,996 people, including the 19 hijackers, were dead, over 6,000 people
were injured, the Pentagon building was severely damaged, and the World Trade Center
towers had collapsed, covering large parts of Manhattan in dust and debris. A New York
Times op-ed called September 11, 2001 “another date that will live in infamy” (Safire),
evoking Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous “Pearl Harbor Speech” and indicating already
that the events of the day would be perceived by the majority of Americans as a national
trauma of historic proportions, turning the incident into a “singular event” which would
spark significant developments in the ‘terrorism’ discourse (Foucault, “Questions” 77).
Indeed, as the previous chapter has shown, at the beginning of the new millennium,
the ‘terrorism’ discourse had established itself as the dominant frame through which
incidents of violence were interpreted. Hence, as politicians, academics, journalists, and
artists were making sense of the September 11 attacks and the “war on terror(ism)”
following in their wake, they tapped into discursive traditions and concepts from previous
decades in order to interpret and explain what had happened. The narrative which emerged
posited that the events constituted a heinous and evil attack committed by fanatical ‘Islamic
terrorists’ who had acted out of their irrational hatred and found justification for their
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deeds in the teachings of Islam. Unsurprisingly, then, for many discursive actors, war
became the only appropriate response to this ‘terrorist’ attack, a strategy which was in
part successful because it capitalized on ideas which the discourse on ‘terrorism’ had held
in various forms since the 1970s and 1980s.
The dominance of the ‘terrorism’ discourse was apparent from the very beginning
and it clearly shaped the political response to the attacks. Notably, on the morning of
September 11, 2001 President Bush spoke of an “apparent terrorist attack on our country”
within minutes of being notified that planes had crashed into the World Trade Center in
New York City (“Remarks”). A few moments later, Bush asserted, “Terrorism against our
nation will not stand.” At this point, information about what had happened, who had done
it, and why, was still scarce, yet the president had already chosen to think of and speak
about this “difficult moment for America” in terms of ‘terrorism.’ When the president
eventually addressed the nation in a televised statement in the evening, the ‘terrorism’
frame was also firmly in place. Bush opened his speech by stating that “[t]oday, our fellow
citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and
deadly terrorist acts” (“Address to the Nation”). The president’s choice to interpret the
attacks of 9/11 as a ‘terrorist’ attack not only foreclosed other possible meanings. It also
attested to the pervasive power inherent in the ‘terrorism’ discourse at the beginning of
the new millennium. In fact, the Bush administration had no other interpretative frame
available to make sense of what had happened since discourses framing (political) violence
as, e.g., crime against humanity were not nearly as influential as the ‘terrorism’ discourse.1
The ubiquitous presence of the discourse on ‘terrorism’ also comes to the fore in
the way the president constructed ‘terrorism’ itself. In his public statements on the matter,
President Bush continuously tapped into conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ from previous
decades, exploiting these knowledge claims for his political agenda and converging them
into one coherent narrative to fit his needs. In what follows, I analyze Bush’s speech before
Congress on September 20, 2001 as an example of how he framed ‘terrorism’ by activating
selected past discursivizations of the issue. For instance, he characterized the ‘Islamic
1See Silberstein for the first study to examine how political and media rhetoric constructed 9/11 as
singular event of such enormity that a “war on terror(ism)” became inevitable. See R. Jackson, Writing
for a more general analysis of the political discourse on the “war on terror(ism).” Other studies of George
W. Bush’s rhetoric after 9/11 include Kellner, “Bushspeak;” and Winkler, In the Name.
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terrorist’ enemy as operating in networks, an idea which was central to the ‘terrorism’
discourse in the 1980s and which was revitalized again in the late 1990s (see again Chapters
3 and 4). In his speech before Congress, the president claimed:
Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking, who attacked our country?
The evidence we [. . . ] gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist
organizations known as Al Qaida. They are some of the murderers indicted for bombing
American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and responsible for bombing the U.S.S. Cole.
Al Qaida is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money. Its goal
is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere. (“Address
Before a Joint”)
Here, Bush not only depicted al-Qaeda as consisting of “loosely affiliated terrorist
organizations,” tapping into already familiar notions of dangerous ‘terror networks.’ He
also painted al-Qaeda as a successful “terrorist organization[ ]” which had attacked the
United States in the past, thus openly forging a historical link between ‘terrorism’ of the
past and the present moment. Even more noteworthy, at a later moment in his speech,
the president openly decried the existence of “the global terror network” and vowed to
defeat it, language eerily similar to President Reagan’s statements some fifteen years
earlier. In fact, by describing al-Qaeda’s objective as “remaking the world and imposing
its radical beliefs on people everywhere,” Bush presented bin Laden’s organization as
extremely powerful, state-like entity which sought to spread its (religious) ideology by
force – a discursive strategy which clearly echoed claims in the 1980s that the Soviet
Union supposedly relied on ‘terrorism’ in order to advance communism in the Cold War.
This framing exploited previous discursivizations of ‘terrorism’ and transferred them onto
the current situation; characterizing bin Laden and al-Qaeda in this manner effectively
tapped into already established knowledge claims and made the president’s interpretation
of events appear ‘logical’ and appealing.
Bush then expanded on this notion of a “global terror network,” depicting al-Qaeda
and Osama bin Laden as “linked to many other organizations in different countries.” He
warned his listeners:
There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from
their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan,
where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent
to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.
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Bush constructed an image of al-Qaeda as having built a highly complex infrastructure
around the globe through which it sent its “terrorists” and recruits to designated training
sites in order to train them properly and efficiently in “the tactics of terror.” Afterwards,
the “terrorists” were deemed ready to attack any unsuspecting nation in the world, a
claim first popularized in the 1970s and 1908s.
What is more, in the president’s framing of the concept, these ‘terrorists’ did not
only operate in international networks, these groups were often also sponsored by ‘evil’
states or oppressive regimes, a notion which became central after the experience of the
Iranian hostage crisis and which now worked to imbue Bush’s claims with power. As the
quotes above show, Bush also asserted that the al-Qaeda network profited from the aid of
the regime in Afghanistan which he accused of deliberately hosting the ‘terrorist’ group and
providing training “in the tactics of terror.” Indeed, the president used his speech before
Congress to attack the Taliban for “sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists” and
demanded that the regime “[c]lose immediately and permanently every terrorist training
camp” in the country. By accusing Afghanistan of hosting and helping al-Qaeda, Bush
depicted the country as more capable and powerful than it really was, thus augmenting the
‘terrorism’ threat emanating from a Taliban-run Afghanistan and legitimizing a forceful
American response as necessary in the face of such a potent adversary.
Given the extent of the danger and threat supposedly emanating from this “global
terror network,” it is unsurprising that the president’s speech was littered with references
to war and military action. Bush described the ‘terrorist’ attacks as a form of war, insisting
early into his speech that “[o]n September 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act
of war against our countr.y” By framing the attacks as “an act of war,” Bush not only
amplified the capabilities of the al-Qaeda “terror network” to depict them as a quasi-state
with similar resources, he also legitimized a military response by the United States in turn.
Accordingly, the president repeatedly used the term “war” to describe the measures the
United States would take in order to counter the threat of “the global terror network.”
He promised the public, “We will direct every resource at our command – every means of
diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial
influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the
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global terror network.” Bush asserted, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it
does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped, and defeated.”
The president’s conceptualization of this “war on terror” is striking because it drew
on the central knowledge claim circulated by the discourse on ‘terrorism’ that ‘terror(ism)’
constituted a form of war and as such could only be fought effectively through war in
return, an assertion which had come to prominence during the Reagan administrations in
the 1980s. At the same time, however, President Bush adapted the discursive tradition
established by his predecessors because he did not conceive of his “war on terror” in vague
terms. Instead, the president outlined in his speech a clear agenda while also preparing
the nation for a long, potentially endless military operation requiring every resource of
the state. President Bush elaborated that “Americans should not expect one battle, but a
lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen.” This kind of action was necessary
because, in the president’s reasoning, the enemy was ‘terrorism’ itself; al-Qaeda and Osama
bin Laden were merely one prominent manifestation of it. Notably, the president did not
call his plans a ‘war against al-Qaeda,’ but a “war on terror,” indicating that he regarded
the phenomenon itself as the main antagonist. Similarly, Bush pledged in the speech that
“we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism” (emphases added),
voiding the agency of the “terrorists” and transferring it onto the concept itself. The
president spoke of the need to “defeat terrorism,” indicating once more that he was much
more concerned about the idea of ‘terrorism’ itself than about those who would use it.
In the speech, President Bush also outlined the reasons why ‘terrorism’ constituted
such a danger to the U.S. that a war against it was necessary. To support his argument,
the president tapped into ideas about ‘new terrorism’ which had been constructed in
the 1990s (see previous chapter). By referencing the embassy bombings in Africa in
1998 and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 (see quotes above), Bush already subtly
evoked discursive constructions of these events as instances of ‘new terrorism.’ He further
characterized this ‘terrorism’ as lethal and causing mass casualties, another central claim
of the ‘new terrorism’ discourse of the previous decade. For instance, Bush spoke about
“thousands of civilians” having become the victims of “surprise attacks” that September
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morning, effectively reminding his audience that almost 3,000 people died on September 11.
Similarly, the president’s description, quoted above, of ‘terrorists’ returning from the
Afghan training camps “to plot evil and destruction” suggested that these ‘new terrorists’
were predominantly interested in wreaking havoc on a large scale, a knowledge claim also
developed first in the 1990s.
Moreover, the president applied the same reasoning which had already circulated
in the 1990s that the ‘terrorism’ the nation was currently witnessing was ‘new’ und
unprecedented in its reach and impact. For instance, he claimed that “Americans have
known the casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning.
Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians. All
of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world
where freedom itself is under attack.” His observation that “night fell on a different world”
on September 11 effectively characterized what had happened as an event which had
changed the entire globe, marking the attacks as unparalleled in their nature and their
impact. Likewise, Bush asserted later in his speech that “we face new and sudden national
challenges,” once more portraying the attacks as unprecedented and, literally, “new.” This
insistence that 9/11 constituted a singular event clearly tapped into conceptualizations of
‘new terrorism’ developed in previous years and applied them successfully to the present
situation as a way of ascribing meaning to it.
Most importantly, however, the president subtly coded the ‘terrorism’ threatening
American security and stability at home and abroad as ‘Islamic.’ In his statements, the
president was careful to distinguish between a ‘good’ form of Islam and a ‘bad’ interpretation
of Islam which the ‘terrorists’ (erroneously) used to justify their deeds. As Bush noted
during his address to Congress,
[t]he terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by
Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics, a fringe movement that perverts
the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians
and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinctions among military and civilians,
including women and children.
The term “Islamic extremism,” of course, functioned as synonym for ‘Islamic terrorism’ and
was already in use in the 1990s, meaning that the term activated previous constructions
of ‘terrorism’ and reinforced discursive continuity. What is more, President Bush created
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a dichotomy between “peaceful” Islam and the “fringe movement that pervert[ed] the
peaceful teachings of Islam” to which the “terrorists” belonged in his view. He noted that
this “fringe form [. . . ] ha[d] been rejected by [. . . ] the vast majority of Muslim clerics,”
stressing that Islam in its entirety was not to blame for what had happened.
Throughout the rest of his speech, President Bush continued to distinguish between
‘good,’ virtuous Islam and ‘bad,’ ‘terroristic’ Islam. Hence, Bush explicitly used his speech
before Congress to “speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world.” He told
them:
We respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions
more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful,
and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The
terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy
of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy
is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.
Here, the president clearly differentiated between “good and peaceful” Islam and the
religious beliefs of the “terrorists.” President Bush sought to distinguish between versions
of Islam practiced by “Muslims throughout the world” and the “terrorists” who adhered
to a ‘bad’ form of Islam.
However, a closer look reveals that this rhetorical move only appeared to express
tolerance and a nuanced world-view. Both excerpts quoted above are notable for their
ambiguous language. The president’s assertion that “[t]he terrorists practice[d] a fringe
form of Islamic extremism that ha[d] been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast
majority of Muslim clerics” can also be understood to suggest that “Islamic extremism” is
a widespread phenomenon and only the “fringe form” practiced by the “terrorists” has
been “rejected by Muslim scholars.” Likewise, when President Bush insisted that “[t]he
terrorists [we]re traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself,” he also
suggested that Islam was vulnerable to such hijacking in the first place. Bush’s claim that
the “terrorists” belonged to “a fringe movement that pervert[ed] the peaceful teachings of
Islam” made a similar insinuation by implying that Islam could be easily “pervert[ed]” and
put into the service of ‘terrorism.’ This means that the president’s public insistence that
one should not condemn Islam in its entirety for facilitating ‘terrorism’ against the United
State functioned first and foremost as a rhetorical cover which protected the administration
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against charges of Islamophobia, discrimination, and the like. At the same time, however,
it enabled the administration to spread a conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ as motivated by
belief in Islam under the guise of distinguishing carefully between different forms of Islam.
This characterization of ‘terrorism’ in the wake of 9/11 as ‘Islamic’ in nature
exploited central knowledge claims circulated by the ‘terrorism’ discourse in previous
years, particularly Samuel Huntington’s warnings of an imminent “Clash of Civilizations”
(see previous chapter). For instance, the president’s contention that “[t]he terrorists’
directive command[ed] them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make
no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children” not only
characterized the “terrorists” as indiscriminate and cruel (“Address Before a Joint”). It
also depicted the conflict as one between ‘Islamic terrorists’ and “Christians and Jews,”
meaning “all Americans” who were subtly coded as representing the Judeo-Christian
alliance in conflict with Islam. Similarly, President Bush warned, “They [the ‘terrorists’]
want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out
of vast regions of Asia and Africa,” once more depicting the conflict in religious terms
and aligning Judaism and Christianity as markers of ‘Americanness’ against the ‘Islamic
terrorists’ of the Middle East.
Ultimately, then, President Bush successfully tapped into and activated specific
conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ which were established and circulated in the 1980s and
1990s in order to make sense of the events of September 11, 2001. He merged these different
knowledge claims about ‘terrorism’ into one coherent narrative which posited that the
attacks constituted an act of war which required a response in kind and maintained that
the ‘terrorists’ were motivated and guided by their belief in Islam which, in turn, put them
in clear opposition to superior ‘American’ values and ideals. The president then sought
to exploit this narrative in order to not only initiate a lengthy military campaign in the
Middle East, but also to pass policies regulating American life at home like the foundation
of the Department of Homeland Security or the controversial PATRIOT Act.
The president’s framing of the attacks as well as the need to fight a “war on
terror(ism)” in order to defeat the ‘terrorist’ enemy quickly became the dominant political
discourse as the other members of his administration adopted his approach as well. Vice
228
President Dick Cheney, for instance, consistently echoed Bush’s rhetoric and described the
perpetrators as ‘terrorists’ who had attacked the United States out of hatred and misguided
religious beliefs. He also supported the “war on terror(ism),” arguing, “The United States
has entered a struggle of years – a new kind of war against a new kind of enemy. The
terrorists who struck America are ruthless, they are resourceful, and they hide in many
countries. [. . . ] In Afghanistan, the Taliban regime and al Qaeda terrorists have met the
fate they chose for themselves” (“Full Text”). As this example shows, Cheney employed
the same kind of rhetoric as Bush, thus contributing to its dominance in American politics.
All other members of the Bush administration followed suit and, as the successful passing
of the PATRIOT Act and other policy initiatives showed, even Congress supported the
president’s construction of events and his course of action. As a consequence, the framing
of the 9/11 attacks as the beginning of a “war on terror(ism)” between the United States
and ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ became the hegemonic discursivization in U.S. politics.2
Before I continue, however, a quick word on terminology is in order. I use the
expression “war on terror(ism)” throughout this chapter because the Bush administration
(and many other discursive agents) employed ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ synonymously.
President Bush, for instance, sometimes called the military operation a “war against
terrorism,” as he did in the evening of September 11, 2001, and referred to a “war on
terror” in his September 20 address to a joint session of Congress. This oscillation between
‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ is telling because it suggests a conflation of the two terms with
powerful consequences. While ‘terrorism’ denotes a practice, ‘terror’ refers to a state of
mind which is, incidentally, often thought to be brought about by ‘terrorism’ (Schmid,
Introduction 2). The term ‘terror’ ultimately encompasses both the practice, ‘terrorism,’ as
well as its outcome, ‘terror.’ Geoffrey Nunberg even argued in a 2004 article for The New
York Times that “terror is still more amorphous and elastic [than ‘terrorism’], and alters
the understanding not just of the enemy but of the war against it.” In this way, the “war
on terrorism,” i.e. fighting a practice, ‘terrorism,’ through another social practice, ‘war,’
simultaneously also becomes a “war on terror,” i.e. using a social practice to eradicate an
2For studies focusing on the political developments in the wake of 9/11 and the “war on terror(ism),” see,
e.g., K. Booth and Dunne; Chomsky, Hegemony, Imperial, and Pirates; J. Collins and Glover; Feste;
Kellner, From 9/11 ; Lansford et al.; Little; Lustick, Trapped ; McAlister; and Rockmore.
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abstract idea and feeling. It abstracts the physical threat emanating from ‘terrorism’ to
the human body to include a deeply personal, intense psychological response. This charges
the concept of ‘terrorism’ affectively and makes it a powerful discursive tool because it
addresses both the fear of harm to the body as well as harm to the mind.
Equally important is the distinction between a “war against terror(ism)” and a
“war on terror(ism).” As Nunberg points out, waging a war against an enemy implies that
the enemy is a human actor. By contrast, the noun phrase “war on X” is usually followed
by an abstract concept which is, invariably, a negative social ill. Examples include the
“war on drugs,” the “war on poverty,” and, most recently, the “war on terror(ism).” I
agree with Nunberg here that “a ‘war on terror’ suggests an enduring state of struggle,” a
struggle which is coded as targeting both ‘terrorism’ as well as its effect. The elasticity of
both ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ make this a war against a broad, ill-defined social problem
and both the ending and the outcome of this particular war remain unclear. Moreover,
the oscillation between whether the war is waged against ‘terror(ism)’ or on ‘terror(ism)’
enables discursive agents like the president to either escalate or mitigate the threat level
emanating from ‘terror(ism)’ depending on the exigencies of the moment. References to
a “war against terror(ism)” suggest a clear political agenda and an impending military
confrontation, augmenting the sense of danger, while the phrase “war on terror(ism)”
evokes a generalized, more abstract political initiative which does not necessarily lead to
serious military engagement, effectively lessening the perceived threat from ‘terror(ism).’
In the rest of this chapter, I analyze how the discourse evolved in the wake of the 9/11
attacks and the ensuing “war on terror(ism)” while also tracing how the conceptualization of
‘terrorism’ itself was affected by these events. That ‘terrorism’ became the main discursive
frame through which one made sense of what had happened is, by now, widely accepted
and confirmed knowledge. I am therefore more interested in highlighting how the post-9/11
discourse on ‘terrorism’ has continued constructions and conceptualizations of the issue
from previous decades and exploited them for maximum benefit. Likewise, I want to explore
in this chapter the consequences this unprecedented dominance had for the ‘terrorism’
discourse-at-large and how it influenced the meaning of the term ‘terrorism’ itself. Thus,
in the first section, I turn to academic and political responses to 9/11 and the “war on
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terror(ism)” in the first half of the new decade. Then I examine how the news media and
popular culture engaged with 9/11, the “war on terror(ism),” and the issue of ‘Islamic
terrorism’ in its wake. In the third section, I investigate how the discourse continued to
dominate political and academic approaches to ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ in the latter half of
the decade before analyzing in the last section how the American news media and cultural
texts engaged with the discourse in those later years.
5.1 An “Age of Terrorism”? The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse in U.S.
Academia in the Early 2000s
The conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ advanced by the Bush administration in response to
9/11 was mirrored by other discursive fields. In this section, I analyze how the academic
community (re)confirmed ‘Islamic terrorism’ as dominant threat facing the United States,
perpetuating a particular set of knowledge claims about the issue. In particular, the
academic field, clearly influenced by the political discourse on the issue, put forth a
noticeably similar framing of the issue and, in the process, confirmed and expanded the
hegemonic position of the discourse, further muting critical voices and alternative framings
of the issue. As a direct consequences of the 9/11 attacks, the field of ‘terrorism’ studies
experienced a significant influx of new people and increased government funding, which
had complex consequences for the production of knowledge about ‘terrorism’ as well as the
architecture of the field itself (e.g. Duyvesteyn 30).3 The expansion of the field in the wake
of 9/11 and the ensuing “war on terror(ism)” harbored the potential for greater diversity
and heterogeneity with regard to views about the nature of ‘terrorism,’ but these hopes
were disappointed especially in the first years of the new millennium. Rather, the dominant
discourse about ‘Islamic terrorism,’ which had developed in the previous decade, further
cemented its hegemonic position, leaving little room for dissenting views and different
analyses. In this section, I analyze how the academic field of ‘terrorism’ studies approached
the concept of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in the aftermath of 9/11 and examine the effects this
had on the meaning of ‘terrorism’ itself.
3See also R. Jackson et al., Terrorism; Ranstorp, Introduction; and Schmid, “Literature.”
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As the previous chapter has shown, in the 1990s, the academic community
overwhelmingly agreed that a ‘new terrorism’ had emerged and was threatening the
United States in its manifestation as ‘Islamic terrorism.’ The events of 9/11 confirmed the
validity of the ‘new Islamic terrorism’ paradigm for many scholars who saw the attacks as
corroborating the knowledge claims produced in the previous decade and they subsequently
used this particular narrative to make sense of what had happened. Yet, scholars also
viewed the 9/11 attacks as an unprecedented caesura and a ‘terrorist’ attack of unparalleled
proportions, thus treating the attacks as discursive event which constituted a rupture
and break away from previous understandings of the issue. David Rapoport, for instance,
stated that “September 11, 2001, [wa]s the most destructive day in the long, bloody
history of terrorism. The casualties, economic damage, and outrage were unprecedented”
(“Four Waves of Modern Terrorism” 41). His colleague Yonah Alexander similarly opined
that “[t]he most devastating terrorist carnage ever recorded occurred on September 11,
2001” (Introduction 1). Brian Jenkins also asserted that “[t]he attacks of Sept. 11 ha[d] no
precedent in the annals of terrorism. [. . . ] We ha[d] crossed a threshold” (“This Time”).
As a result, the emerging narrative both stressed continuity between the previous decade
and the current historical moment while also, at the same time, insisting that 9/11 marked
a rupture and departure from previous interpretative paradigms.
These two dimensions existed in an uneasy tension since their inherent contradiction
could not be easily resolved. Bruce Hoffman’s work is, perhaps, the best example of this.
In 1998, Hoffman had written Inside Terrorism, a study which had quickly become an
authoritative and often-quoted text in the field (see previous chapter). In response to
the 9/11 attacks, Hoffman revised and updated his classic text, adding new chapters and
rewriting others because “it soon became clear to me that a more extensive treatment of
the trends and developments in terrorism that had unfolded since September 11, 2001,
was needed” (Inside Terrorism 2006, ix), suggesting that 9/11 marked the beginning of a
different kind of ‘terrorism.’ However, Hoffman then proceeded to argue that his central
claim from the 1998 edition, i.e. that “the nature and character of terrorism was changing
because new adversaries with very different rationales and motivations had emerged,” was
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“clearly validated” by 9/11 (Inside Terrorism 2006, ix), thus also constructing a continuity
between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 ‘terrorism.’
This tension between framing 9/11 as, on the on hand, a rupture and, on the other,
a continuation of ‘new Islamic terrorism’ was characteristic for post-9/11 scholarly texts
on ‘terrorism’ and reflected the larger struggle in the academic field over what the events
of 9/11 actually meant. Nevertheless, this tension was also successfully exploited by the
academic community because it allowed scholars to claim that they had been correct in
their assessment of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ all along. It validated the existence of the field
itself while also enabling the community to advocate for more funding since this ‘new’
phenomenon required more research to be fully understood.
Indeed, the great majority of scholars actually agreed that Islam was the principal
driving force behind ‘terrorism’ and offered different explanations for this claim. Most
scholars proceeded to outright cast Islam in its entirety as causing ‘terrorism’ against ‘the
West.’ David Rapoport’s wave model, for instance, was one such approach which proved
quite influential. Rapoport discerned four major waves of ‘terrorism’ in modern history:
the anarchist wave of the 1880s in Russia, the anticolonial wave from the 1920s to the
1960s, the New Left wave from the 1960s until the end of the 20th century, and, finally,
the religious wave which, in his view, began in 1979 with the Iranian revolution and could
possibly last until 2025 (“Four Waves of Modern Terrorism” 41). In his discussion of the
religious wave, Rapoport claimed that “Islam [wa]s at the heart of the wave. Islamic groups
ha[d] conducted the most significant, deadly, and profoundly international attacks” (51).
Rapoport also attested that ‘Islamic terrorism’ was predominantly aimed at the United
States and more ruthless in doing so: “From the beginning, Islamic religious groups sought
to destroy their American targets, usually military or civilian installations, an unknown
pattern in the third wave” (53).
Rapoport’s wave model was widely publicized in the academic discourse and
became a prominent explanation for ‘terrorism’ after 9/11 which laid the emphasis on
Islam as a whole.4 Rapoport’s model thus attempted to historicize ‘terrorism’ while
4Versions of the article appeared as “The Fourth Wave: September 11 and the History of Terrorism,” “The
Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” and “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism.” These
numerous publications in different academic outlets ensured that Rapoport’s claims were not only widely
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also acknowledging the particular dangers of ‘Islamic terrorism,’ a rhetorical maneuver
which reflected the underlying tensions characterizing much of post-9/11 scholarship on
‘terrorism.’ It effectively claimed that ‘Islamic terrorism’ constituted an exceptional threat
to American national security while also arguing that it followed a discernable pattern
which could be understood and appropriately managed.
Other scholars expressed their views more bluntly. Walter Laqueur, for instance,
warned that “[a] review of wars, civil wars, and other contemporary conflicts show[ed]
indeed a greater incidence of violence and aggression in Muslim societies than in most
others” (No End 19). In a clear nod to Bernard Lewis’ eponymous 1990 essay in The
Atlantic, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Laqueur contended that “[t]he roots of Muslim
rage [we]re known, and they [we]re unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future” (No End
212). He concluded from this, disparagingly, that “[i]n view of the time-honored tradition
in the Muslim world to put most or all of the blame of its failures on foreigners rather than
on their own shortcomings and not to engage in self-criticism, jihad against the infidels
ha[d] been the preferred mode of action” (No End 212). The eminent ‘terrorism’ scholar
thus consistently linked ‘terrorism’ to Islam, suggesting that the Muslim faith engendered
violence while implying that the Judeo-Christian traditions did not.
These sentiments were echoed widely across the academic field. Javier Jordan and
Luisa Boix, for instance, argued that al-Qaeda ‘terrorism’ could have serious “repercussions
[. . . ] for co-existence within societies with important Islamic populations” (1), implying
that Muslims everywhere were potential al-Qaeda recruits and ‘terrorists.’ Abdelaziz
Testas, in turn, analyzed “the factors behind terrorism in 37 Muslim countries” (253),
effectively presupposing a connection between Islam and ‘terrorism.’ Brynjar Lia discussed
how “selected works by leading jihadi theorists” addressed “the topic of training and
disseminated but also received the imprint of validity and importance from the academic community,
making his contribution a powerful discursive voice. Responses to Rapoport’s model include Rasler and
Thompson who confirmed Rapoport’s findings in their 2009 article by using data on ‘terrorism’ from the
ITERATE database. More recently, Parker and Sitter argued that the wave model proved inadequate and
proposed instead the medical metaphor of the ‘strain’ to describe the perceived dominance of different
types of ‘terrorism’ at different historical moments. Their article invited responses from Rapoport himself
(“It Is Waves”) as well as Townsend and J. Kaplan. These examples indicate that the wave model, even
though not uncontested, remained a central frame through which ‘Islamic terrorism’ was explained and
theorized.
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preparation for jihad” (518), presenting the connection between Islam and ‘terrorism’ as
deliberate and based on central tenets of the Muslim faith.5
The notion that Islam as a whole engendered ‘terrorism’ was, however, not
universally accepted. Many scholars disagreed with such a sweeping condemnation of Islam
and instead argued that one needed to distinguish between the ‘good’ elements of Islam and
the ‘bad’ ones which caused ‘terrorism’ and had to be condemned. Writing for the RAND
corporation, Cheryl Benard, for instance, listed the “ideological spectrum for contemporary
Islamic views” (16). She distinguished on the one end of the spectrum between “radical
fundamentalists,” “scriptural fundamentalists,” and “conservative traditionalists” who all
wanted to build an autocratic state based on conservative Islamic law and only differed in
their evaluation of ‘terrorism’ as a means to achieve this goal (17). The other end of the
spectrum featured “reformist traditionalists,” “modernists,” “mainstream secularists,” and,
finally, “radical secularists” who were more tolerant, rejected ‘terrorism,’ and considered
belief in Islam a private matter out of the jurisdiction of the state (17). Benard’s typology
is one among many different ones proposed by scholars which attempted to neatly separate
the disparate ‘kinds’ of Muslims into manageable categories in order to make assessing the
threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’ more practical.
Not all scholars favoring this approach developed typologies, but many equally
advocated against equating Islam in its entirety with ‘terrorism’ and violence against ‘the
West.’ John Esposito, for example, warned that “[i]mproving our understanding of the
faith of our fellow citizens and neighbors w[ould] require that we look[ed] at Muslims with
new eyes and judge[d] Islam by the totality and teachings of the faith, not just the beliefs
and actions of a radical few” (Unholy 120). Daniel Pipes stated in 2002, “I take a strong
stand on militant Islam, which I see as very different [. . . ]. I see militant Islam as a global
aﬄiction” (Militant xiii), insinuating that while “militant Islam” posed a considerable
threat to American security, ‘normal’ Islam was unproblematic. With statements like
these, many scholars in the academic community appeared to advocate a more nuanced
approach to the problem of ‘Islamic terrorism’ instead of sweeping condemnations and
generalizations – a discursive strategy which clearly mirrored political practice, indicating
5For more examples of articles discussing writings by designated ‘jihadist terrorists,’ see, e.g., Burki,
Moghadam, and Venkatraman.
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that ideas about ‘Islamic terrorism’ continued to travel successfully through the different
discursive fields.
However, as with George W. Bush’s rhetoric, it is important to be precise here. This
approach to praise ‘good’ Islam while condemning ‘bad’ Islam for causing ‘Islamic terrorism’
advanced by these scholars only seems to criticize the academic position advanced by
David Rapoport, Walter Laqueur, and others that Islam in its entirety caused ‘terrorism.’
For instance, Benard’s typology, discussed above, basically disparaged those groups of
Muslims who practiced their beliefs in one form or other and singled them out as (potential)
‘terrorists.’ Only the secular, i.e. non-practicing, communities were seen as compatible with
American interests. As a consequence, just as it did in the political field, the distinction
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam functioned first and foremost as a rhetorical strategy with
which authors could present themselves as tolerant and self-aware because they were not
universally condemning Islam as sole cause for ‘terrorism.’ Yet references to Islam were
used to explain post-9/11 ‘terrorism’ since these scholars did acknowledge that Islam
supposedly had this ‘terrorist’ potential. Thus, a noticeable amount of ‘terrorism’ scholars
arguing against equating Islam with ‘terrorism’ actually subtly reinforced the notion that
Islam in particular facilitated ‘terrorism’ against the United States and the rest of ‘the
West’ while couching it in pseudo-enlightened and quasi-tolerant terms. What this meant
for the academic discourse on ‘terrorism’ was that the seeming diversity of approaches
masked the fact that the core explanation for ‘terrorism’ – Islam allegedly caused it – had
become firmly entrenched since the 1990s and received a ‘boost’ by the events of 9/11.
The different arguments and explanations offered by scholars created the appearance of
healthy debate within the field, but in practice actually solidified the hegemony of the
‘Islamic terrorism’ paradigm.
This had consequences for the meaning attributed to the concept ‘Islamic terrorism’
itself. Ultimately, the ‘Islamic’ component in ‘Islamic terrorism’ came to refer to anything
remotely connected to Islam, such as a perpetrator’s assumed religious belief which, in
turn, was simply derived from his or her nationality as a citizen of a Muslim-majority
country. Likewise, the ‘terrorism’ element in ‘Islamic terrorism’ came to encompass many
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other forms of political violence like ‘insurgency,’ ‘jihad,’ or ‘militant extremism.’6 These
linguistic shifts further broadened the applicability of the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ to an
even wider array of situations involving Muslims and some form of violence. The two terms
‘Islamic’ and ‘terrorism’ existed in a quasi-symbiotic relationship, one constantly evoking
the other. ‘Islamic’ became the main characteristic for any sort of political violence while
references to ‘terrorism’ (or its synonyms) often directly implied an ‘Islamic’ nature. This
made the threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’ appear all-pervasive, omnipresent, and completely
out of control as it could be applied to practically any situation involving violence and
someone from a Muslim-majority country.
5.2 “Events Occur in Real Time” – The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse
in U.S. News Media and Popular Culture in the Early 2000s
Similar to the political and academic discourses on ‘terrorism,’ the American media and the
field of popular culture responded to the experience of the September 11 attacks and the
ensuing “war on terror(ism)” by applying previous discursivizations of the issue to make
sense of what had happened. In that process, the American media as well as cultural texts
not only reaffirmed already circulating constructions of ‘terrorism’ as ‘Islamic’ in nature,
they also contributed to the concept’s unparalleled dominance ever since. In this section, I
therefore analyze in more detail how The New York Times reported on ‘terrorism’ in the
early 2000s and, using the example of the successful TV series 24 (9 seasons; 2001-2010,
2014), discuss how cultural texts engaged with the issue of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ after 9/11.7
Like political and academic actors, The New York Times immediately framed the
attacks of 9/11 as instance of ‘terrorism’ against the United States. Figure 5.1 visualizes
the changes and developments in the reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times
since 1999. As becomes immediately obvious, the number of articles addressing ‘terrorism’
6Examples of scholars discussing the phenomenon of ‘Islamic terrorism’ by using related concepts like
‘Islamic extremism,’ ‘radical Islam,’ ‘jihad,’ ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ as synonyms include, e.g., Cook;
Jenkins, “Jihadists’ Operational;” Laqueur, No End ; Palmer and Palmer; Sageman, Understanding ;
Taylor and Horgan; and Wiktorowicz.
7For analyses of the media landscape since 9/11, see, e.g., Chermak et al.; Katovsky and Carlson; Monahan;
Nachtigall; Nacos, Mass-Mediated ; Redfield; and Zelizer and Allan. For examinations of how American
popular culture responded to 9/11 and the “war on terror(ism),” see, e.g., Croft; Denzin and Lincoln;
Dickenson; Dixon; Holloway; A. Martin and Petro; Prince, Firestorm; D. Simpson; and Spigel.
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Figure 5.1: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, 1999-2010
in some form or other skyrocketed in 2001. While there were 1,574 articles on the issue in
2000, the database records a record high of 10,898 pieces for the following year, a staggering
increase of 592 %. Indeed, in subsequent years, The New York Times continued to report
on ‘terrorism’ at a similarly elevated level, with 10,453 articles in 2002, 9,786 pieces in 2003,
and 9,074 publications in 2004. From 2005 onward, the overall amount of reporting on the
issue abated significantly, but the average of 6,378 articles per year for the first decade of
the new millennium (2000-2009) constituted an all-time high signaling the omnipresence of
the issue of ‘terrorism’ in American news media. (I continue the discussion of this particular
aspect in the corresponding section further below.) Generally speaking, these numbers
reflect the dominance of the ‘terrorism’ discourse in American news media and suggest
that it constituted the dominant paradigm through which journalists interpreted what
had happened. What is more, the discourse then cemented its hegemonic and powerful
position in American politics and culture in the following years.
Regarding the content of the pieces on ‘terrorism’ The New York Times the events
of September 11, 2001, obviously constituted the predominant journalistic focus. As
Figure 5.2 shows, the overall spike in reporting on ‘terrorism’ was related to a surge in
articles which also mentioned the World Trade Center and, once the term was coined,
9/11. Of the 10,898 articles on ‘terrorism’ published in 2001, 4,608 (or 42 % of all articles)
238
Figure 5.2: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in connection to the events of September 11, 2001
and the “war on terror(ism)” in The New York Times, 1999-2010
also contained a reference to the World Trade Center.8 For that same year, 5,838 pieces on
‘terrorism,’ i.e. 54 %, also mentioned 9/11, a further sign for how the events of September
11, 2001 dominated the reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times. Moreover, in
2001, 2,088 articles (19 %) referred to Osama bin Laden, the financier and planner of the
attacks, thus confirming previous discursivizations of him as dangerous ‘Islamic terrorist.’
Conversely, al-Qaeda was also increasingly linked to ‘terrorism’ in the reporting of The
New York Times. In 2001, 16 % of all articles on ‘terrorism’ already mentioned al-Qaeda.
A year later, that number rose to 24 % and to 28 % in 2004, indicating that the group
remained central to news reporting on the issue, particularly as the “war on terror(ism)”
wore on.
Similarly, the first two military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq in response
to the 9/11 attacks constituted another journalistic focus in the first half of the decade.
Articles which not only mentioned ‘terrorism’ but also Afghanistan regularly made up
between 13 % and 25 % in the newspaper during the years of the first Bush administration.
Journalists of The New York Times wrote about ‘terrorism’ in relation to Iraq even more
frequently; in 2003, the year of the invasion of Iraq, 56 % of all publications on ‘terrorism’
8The phrase “World Trade Center” has been put in quotation marks to ensure that the search of the
newspaper archives only shows articles which contain the entire phrase.
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also contained a reference to Iraq. In 2004, every second article featured both terms and a
year later, 37 % of all writings on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times still mentioned Iraq
as well, demonstrating that the political consequences of the 2001 attacks continued to
form a central tenet of the ‘terrorism’ discourse.
Moreover, references to ‘terrorism’ in connection to Islam, the Middle East, and the
‘Arab’ ethnicity of perpetrators remained central to the discourse. Indeed, as the graphs
in Figure 5.3 show, journalistic writings addressing ‘Islamic terrorism’ directly made up
between 13 % and 14 % of the overall reporting on ‘terrorism’ between 2001 and 2004.
Likewise, articles in The New York Times mentioning ‘Muslim terrorism’ constituted 11 %
to 13 % of the total writings on ‘terrorism’ while ‘Arab terrorism’ appeared in 13 % to
14 % of all articles on the issue. ‘Terrorism’ in relation to the Middle East was discussed
somewhat less frequently, making up 8 % to 12 % of all pieces on ‘terrorism’ published
in The New York Times during the first Bush administration. Taken together, articles
on ‘terrorism’ in relation to the perpetrators’ ethnicity, religion, and geographic origins
made up between 47 % and 49 % of all reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the years of the first
Bush administration, indicating that these conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ as ‘Islamic’
and connected to being ‘Arab’ and from the Middle East continued to remain relevant to
discursivizations of the issue.
Yet, while these numbers indicate that ‘Islamic terrorism’ in and from the Middle
East constituted a permanent topic in the newspaper’s reporting on violence, the terms
themselves did not feature too prominently anymore. The visualizations in Figures 5.2
and 5.3 also suggest that the link between Islam and ‘terrorism’ did not need to be made
overtly anymore. Instead, conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ as violence directed against the
United States and committed by Muslim fanatics were activated via references to concrete
incidents. This meant that instead of writing directly about ‘Islamic terrorism’ and tapping
into the powers of the discourse in this way, journalists activated these particular meanings
of ‘terrorism’ by, for instance, publishing articles on ‘terrorism’ in the context of 9/11, the
“war on terror(ism),” or Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Readers of The New York Times
were already familiar with constructions of ‘terrorism’ as predominantly ‘Islamic’ from
previous years and, given the discourse’s dominance at the onset of the new millennium,
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Figure 5.3: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East in The New York Times,
1999-2010
could be expected to infer on their own that the ‘terrorism’ that the newspaper was writing
about was supposedly motivated by belief in Islam. This shows that the concept ‘Islamic
terrorism’ functioned in the same kind of quasi-symbiotic relationship as it did in academic
and political discourses on the topic, pointing to the interconnectedness of the different
discursive fields. Evidently, then, conceptualizations of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ continued to
travel successfully through these different fields in the early 2000s to the point where direct
and overt references were not needed anymore.
These trends are also confirmed when taking a closer look at individual articles from
The New York Times from that time period. Indeed, the newspaper immediately used the
terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terror’ in its coverage of the attacks on September 11, 2001, pointing
to the power and pervasiveness of the discourse at the beginning of the new millennium.
The main headline of the next day read “U.S. Attacked: Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers
and Hit Pentagon in Day of Terror.” “A Day of Terror” even became the official title for
the sections in the newspaper dedicated to coverage of the attacks, indicating the perceived
singularity of the event as well as its significant psychological and emotional impact. Other
articles referred to “yesterday’s terrorism” (Uchitelle C1) or “the worst terrorist attack
in the nation’s history” when covering what had happened (Stevenson and Labaton C6).
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Clearly, the ‘terrorism’ discourse was already firmly in place when the attacks occurred,
meaning that journalists writing for the newspaper had a readily available interpretative
frame through which they could make sense of the events for their readers.
What is more, The New York Times connected the events of September 11, 2001
immediately to ‘Islamic terrorism.’ In an article on the front page, Serge Schmemann not
only called what had happened “the worst and most audacious terror attack in American
history” (1). Schmemann also discussed the possible identity of the perpetrators, writing
that
[n]obody immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks. But the scale and
sophistication of the operation, the extraordinary planning required for concerted hijackings
by terrorists who had to be familiar with modern jetliners, and the history of major attacks
on American targets in recent years led many officials and experts to point to Osama
bin Laden, the Islamic militant believed to operate out of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s
hard-line Taliban rulers rejected such suggestions, but officials took that as a defensive
measure. (14)
By identifying Osama bin Laden as “Islamic militant,” Schmemann suggested that belief in
Islam had motivated the attacks, framing them as ‘Islamic terrorism’ targeting the United
States. Moreover, the reference to “the history of major attacks on American targets in
recent years” created a sense of discursive continuity, firmly situating the attacks of the
day before into the familiar narrative from the previous decade which posited that the
United States found itself at odds with ‘new Islamic terrorism,’ of which Osama bin Laden
was the main antagonist.
Equally noteworthy, the newspaper collected evaluations and opinions from
acknowledged ‘terrorism’ experts and discussed them in several articles already on the
next day. Tim Golden opened his article provocatively, writing that “[i]t was, in the annals
of terrorism, an exquisitely choreographed operation” and that “the attacks represented a
new weapon in the terrorist arsenal, an ingenious marriage of old-school hijacking and the
ever-more-familiar suicide bomb” (13). Golden then proceeded to quote various “terrorism
experts,” “officials,” and “authorities” who surmised, for example, that the “terrorists”
must have trained how to fly a plane. Similarly, Erica Goode, in an article appearing on the
same page, cited “experts on the psychology of terrorism” as asserting that the perpetrators
were “perfectly sane people” (13). She related evaluations by, among others, Jerrold Post,
Ariel Merari, and Harvey Kushner, all prominent contributors to the established ‘terrorism’
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discourse since the 1980s and 1990s. In this manner, The New York Times became a space
in which a variety of discursive agents from different fields could freely present their views
which were then legitimized and disseminated by the newspaper. It not only validated this
particular construction of the attacks as an instance of ‘Islamic terrorism,’ but also, given
the interconnectedness of the different discursive fields, contributed to the coherence of
the narrative as it was being forged.
This general trend continued in the next months and years. When the United
States launched its war against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, The New York Times
again offered explanations and analyses noticeably in line with the Bush administration’s
narrative about the need to fight a “war on terror(ism).” The reporting also continuously
linked the (supposed) threat from Islam to the threat of ‘terrorism.’ For instance, Andrew
Sullivan’s op-ed piece in The New York Times Magazine on the day of the invasion argued
that “the religious dimension of this conflict [the looming war in Afghanistan] [wa]s central
to its meaning.” Even though Sullivan purported to see the scope of the conflict in general
terms as “a war of fundamentalism against faiths of all kind that [we]re at peace with
freedom and modernity,” his opinion piece subtly marked Islam as a threat and depicted it
as a religion prone to condoning violence and ‘terrorism.’ Sullivan repeatedly quoted “the
great scholar of Islam” Bernard Lewis to bolster up his claims that there existed “in Islam
a deep thread of intolerance toward unbelievers.” He distinguished between “the perversion
of Christianity” when it was used to condone “extreme repression, and even terror,”
from “bin Laden’s selective use of Islam.” The wording here is telling because it depicted
the use of “terror” in the name of Christianity as a “perversion” of the “expressively
nonviolent teachings of the Gospels,” implying that Christian ‘terrorism’ was misguided
and misunderstanding the central tenets of the faith. In the case of Islam, however, bin
Laden’s use of Islam to justify his deeds constituted a “selective use” of the religion’s
teachings, suggesting that there were elements in Islam which expressively approved and
even authorized violence and ‘terrorism.’
Not only in the Magazine but also in the regular paper, The New York Times
confirmed the central claims of the established ‘terrorism’ discourse. For instance, on the
first day after the invasion of Afghanistan, the main headline in The New York Times read
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“U.S. and Britain Strike Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps; Bush Warns
‘Taliban Will Pay a Price.’” This already suggested that the campaign would be ‘clean’
– and therefore ‘good’ and legitimate – because it targeted “terrorist camps” and other
military sights, but not innocent and defenseless civilians. Patrick Tyler’s accompanying
article equally maintained that “the United States and Britain launched a powerful barrage
of cruise missiles and long-range bombers against Afghanistan today to try to destroy the
terrorist training camps of Osama bin Laden’s Qaeda network and the Taliban government
that has protected it” (1). It linked al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, whose motivations
where already firmly established as ‘Islamic,’ to the Taliban and ‘terrorism.’ The rest of
the article extensively quoted President Bush and other top government officials justifying
the invasion as necessary to fight ‘terrorism’ and free Afghanistan from the oppression
of the Taliban. Tyler did not provide any mediating commentary or context for these
remarks, thus not only amplifying the unfiltered reach of a powerful discursive agent, the
U.S. government, but also framing it as uncontested truth claim about the need to fight
‘Islamic terrorism’ as a war.
Tyler’s article also subtly reinforced the notion that Islam played a central role in
the first episode of the “war on terror(ism).” He pointed out that “no Muslim government
[was] taking part in the attack – in contrast to the case a decade ago when Arab forces
helped to eject Iraq’s Army from Kuwait – Mr. Bush nonetheless stated that ‘we [we]re
supported by the collective will of the world’” (3). Here, Tyler conflated Muslims and
Arabs into one homogeneous agent and managed to imply that, since no major Muslim
nation had joined the coalition, this meant that the ‘Islamic world’ in its entirety did not
support the “war against terror(ism).” This phrasing evoked the notion of Huntington’s
“Clash of Civilizations” since it positioned ‘the West,’ lead by the United States, against
all these “Muslim government[s]” who were suspect for not wanting to fight ‘(Islamic)
terrorism’ as part of a global alliance.
As these examples demonstrate, journalists writing for The New York Times framed
the events of 9/11 and the ensuing “war on terror(ism)” as instance of ‘Islamic terrorism,’
testifying not only to the discourse’s dominance at the beginning of the new millennium but
also actively supporting its continued spread and power to ascribe meaning to historical
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incidents. By conceptualizing ‘terrorism’ in the wake of the September 11 attacks as
motivated by belief in Islam, U.S. news journalism reaffirmed previous knowledge claims
about the issue and provided a platform for other discursive agents to do the same. As
a result, ‘Islamic terrorism’ appeared as a pervasive threat facing the United States and
requiring a “war on terror(ism)” to defend the nation against its manifestations.
In a similar development, cultural texts after 9/11 also engaged with the issue of
‘Islamic terrorism.’ In the rest of this section, I discuss how cultural texts conceptualized
‘Islamic terrorism’ as a pervasive threat, using the TV series 24 as an example. 24,
created by Joel Surnow and Robert Cochran and produced for FOX, ran for eight seasons
from 2001-2010, was rebooted in 2014 for a ninth one, and constituted a core cultural
text for post-9/11 America since it actively participated in the struggle to conceptualize
‘(Islamic) terrorism.’ The series was popular with audiences, in large parts because of
its innovative approach. Each season of 24 chronicled one day, hour by hour, in the life
of ‘counter-terrorism’ agent Jack Bauer (Kiefer Sutherland) as he attempted to defend
the American homeland from devastating terrorist attacks and to capture the ruthless
‘terrorists’ before the clock ran out on a horrific doomsday scenario. The distinguishing
characteristic of the series is that “events occur in real time,” as Kiefer Sutherland’s voice
explained at the beginning of each episode. This meant that, commercial breaks included,
episodes lasted exactly one hour and detailed the actions of Jack Bauer and his colleagues
during that hour as they hunted the ‘terrorists.’ Time was of the essence and to add to
this sense of urgency, a clock featured prominently at the beginning as well as the end
of each episode and also began and ended each commercial break. Moreover, episodes
were edited in a manner which further contributed to this feeling of pressure. Split-screens
appeared regularly which showed simultaneously what different characters were currently
doing. Fast cuts between scenes and locations also indicated the high levels of stress under
which Bauer and his colleagues operated. As Sara Brady has pointed out, “[t]he entire
concept of the show enable[d] a constant ticking time bomb scenario” (112). The series
was extremely successful both commercially and with critics and won several Emmy and
Golden Globe awards. On average, 11.5 million viewers tuned in to watch Jack Bauer fight
‘terrorists’ and save America from utter destruction (Brady 112).
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24 was very much a product of its times, i.e. a series that engaged consistently with
the consequences of 9/11 and the “war on terror(ism)” and was generally seen as reflecting
the established discourse’s take on the problem of ‘Islamic terrorism.’ Originally developed
before the events of September 11, 2001, the first season featured Serbian warlords on a
personal revenge mission against Jack Bauer, meaning that ‘terrorism’ was not an issue
yet. But 24 responded to the attack on America by changing its rooster of villains and
the nature of the conflicts. Notably, from the series’ second season onwards, ‘terrorists’
from the Middle East became the main antagonists to Jack Bauer and his team. Season
2 (2002-2003) features a ‘terrorist’ group sponsored by three unspecified Middle Eastern
countries who planned to detonate a nuclear bomb in Los Angeles. In Season 4 (2005),
several sleeper cells are activated by Habib Marwan, a ruthless Middle Eastern ‘terrorist’
freshly arrived in the U.S., in an attempt to assassinate the current president as well as
launch another nuclear missile against Los Angeles. Season 6 (2007) shows how a series of
devastating suicide bombings shake the United States as the main ‘terrorist’ enemy Abu
Fayed prepares to detonate five nuclear suitcase bombs across the country. He successfully
explodes one of the five bombs before Jack Bauer and his team can stop him. In Season
8 (2010), the first female President of the United States, Allison Taylor, and President
Omar Hassan of the fictional Islamic Republic of Kamistan (IRK) meet at the UN in
New York City to negotiate a lasting peace agreement while IRK ‘terrorists’ attempt to
sabotage this diplomatic endeavor by assassinating President Hassan. In addition, the
IRK ‘terrorists’ have acquired nuclear rods and plan to detonate a ‘dirty bomb’ on U.S.
soil. Even Season 9 (2014) features fanatic ‘terrorists’ with ties to the Middle East in that
Margot Al-Harazi continues her dead husband’s plans to destroy ‘the West’ by taking
control over U.S. drones loaded with missiles and firing them on various destinations in
London. As these examples show, in 24, ‘terrorism’ from the Middle East threatening the
United States at home and abroad constituted a central theme.
Notably, in all of these seasons, ‘terrorism’ is only loosely defined as acts of violence
committed by ‘evil’ antagonists against Americans and American interests. 24 does not
offer more information on how it conceptualizes ‘terrorism’ and it does not really have to.
Jack Bauer works for CTU, the Counter-Terrorism Unit in Los Angeles, meaning that,
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per definition, he fights ‘terrorism’ against the United States. This indicates that in the
early 2000s, the discourse on ‘terrorism’ and the term itself had become ubiquitous enough
to not require further explanation. Audiences tended to accept the narrative premise
without requiring further set-up or information. Moreover, the series made recurrent use
of stereotypical markers of ‘terrorism,’ especially with regard to the villains. The ‘evil’
antagonists in most seasons of 24 are depicted as vaguely ‘Middle Eastern,’ meaning that
they are dark-skinned and have stereotypical ‘Arab’ names such as Syed Ali (Season 2),
Kalil Hasan and Omar (Season 4), Abu Fayed (Season 6), Farhad Hassan (Season 8), and
the Al-Harazi family in Season 9. They often also speak with an accent marking them as
non-American and therefore suspicious. These narrative elements code the conflict matter
unequivocally as ‘terrorism’ in nature and tie the threat to the Middle East and a vaguely
‘Arab,’ meaning non-white, ethnicity.
The series also works to connect the ‘terrorism’ committed by these Middle Eastern
characters to their faith in Islam. In Season 2, for instance, main ‘terrorist’ Syed Ali enters
a mosque to pray before continuing his mission. Jack Bauer and his colleagues follow him
there and prepare to capture him (Episode 11). As they arrive in the mosque, however,
they discover that Ali has set himself on fire, presumably to avoid capture. The man they
find is kneeling on the ground, burning brightly without uttering a word or moving at all –
an eerie picture welcoming Jack Bauer and his fellow agents as they storm into a room
usually used for children’s play and littered with toys and colorful kids’ drawings and
posters taped to the walls. This sequence works to establish clearly the religious fanaticism
of the ‘terrorists’ by suggesting that Ali was willing to burn himself alive rather than
be arrested by U.S. law enforcement and potentially forced to divulge his secrets and
‘betray’ his group. This notion of Muslims as fanatic believers and ‘terrorists’ is further
enhanced when, at the very end of the episode, Jack Bauer realizes that the burnt man is
actually not Ali and that it was all a ruse to allow Ali to escape and continue his mission.
It posits Ali as an incredibly charismatic, dangerous leader who can convince others to
sacrifice themselves for his cause and paints all Muslims as radical zealots who can be
easily recruited to become ‘Islamic terrorists’ against the United States.
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Notably, 24 not only represented ‘terrorism’ after 9/11 as predominantly ‘Islamic’
in nature, but also depicted it as successful in attacking the American homeland. In the
seasons under discussion here, the ‘Islamic terrorists’ strike the American nation directly
at home and succeed in detonating nuclear bombs in some form or other. Season 4, for
instance, opens with a train crash orchestrated so that ‘Islamic terrorists’ can rob a small
briefcase containing nuclear codes and manuals, enabling them to later initiate a wave of
meltdowns in nuclear reactors across the country. CTU agents are unable to stop some
reactors from melting down, meaning that an enormous amount of territory is radiated
and the number of Americans needing to be evacuated is too large so that many are left
behind, eventually dying of radiation poisoning. What is more, in Season 4, the ‘terrorists’
manage to shoot down Air Force One, almost killing the president on board, and to steal
the nuclear codes from the wreckage. As a consequence, Habib Marwan and his group
gain control over several nuclear warheads which they plan to unleash against the United
States. Only then does Jack Bauer manage to stop them. In Season 6, a series of suicide
attacks on buses and trains as well as in shopping malls has shaken the nation and at
the end of the fourth episode, Abu Fayed and his group detonate a small nuclear bomb
which wipes out Valencia, a large neighborhood in Santa Clarita, California, as Jack Bauer
watches helplessly with tears in his eyes. Subsequent episodes also depict the aftermath
of the attack, the human loss, and the danger from winds blowing the radiation to other
parts of the country. Overall, the series depicts the American home space as vulnerable to
‘terrorist’ attacks from ‘Islamic terrorists,’ reflecting and even furthering the general sense
of insecurity and anxiety circulating after the real-life attacks of September 11, 2001.
24 shows an American nation threatened from an enemy that has already
undermined the social fabric. Season 4’s ‘Islamic terrorist’ Habib Marwan received a
prestigious education in London and pretended to be an immigrant to enter the United
States. His sinister motives are only discovered when it is too late. Navi and Dina Araz,
together with their son Behrooz, have lived in the U.S. for years, but really form part
of Habib Marwan’s long-developed plans to attack the country from within. In Season
6, a family of white Americans defends their Arab immigrant neighbors from harm as
the neighborhood singles them out as possible ‘terrorists’ involved with main villain Abu
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Fayed. In a plot twist, however, it is revealed that the Arab son Ahmed does indeed
work for Fayed. Ahmed eventually takes his benefactors hostage and forces them to help
him deliver a crucial device to Fayed. The series thus depicts the ‘Islamic terrorists’ as
skillfully exploiting the openness of American society as well as American hospitality
and good-will, suggesting that the United States is engaged in a large-scale conflict with
‘Islamic terrorism,’ much like the Bush administration interpreted the events of September
11, 2001.
Perhaps aware that its portrayal of the ‘Islamic terrorist’ villains opened the series
up to charges of oversimplification, xenophobia, and Islamophobia, 24 also included
positive examples of Muslims and Middle Easterners throughout its seasons. For example,
in Episode 13 of Season 4, Jack Bauer is on the run from mercenaries out to kill him after
he escaped with important witness Paul Raines from the buildings of defense contractor
McLennan-Forster. In the previous episode, McLennan-Forster had tried to obscure Habib
Marwan’s work in the company by detonating an EMP bomb which crippled their computer
systems and plunged the entire neighborhood into darkness and chaos. Episode 13 finds Jack
and Paul taking shelter in a gun store owned by two Arab brothers with the mercenaries
on their heels as riots break out in the streets. The brothers had barricaded themselves
in their store in order to fight off looters. After Jack tells the two young men that he
has vital information about “the terrorist attacks” (15:24) which he needs to get to the
authorities before more attacks will occur, the two brothers confer and then volunteer to
help Jack and Paul fight off the approaching mercenaries despite the risk to their own
lives. The two brothers explain to Jack (and the audience) that “[f]or years we’ve been
blamed for the attacks by these terrorists. We grew up in this neighborhood. This country
is our home” (17:17-17:23). Here, the series goes to considerable length to portray these
dark-skinned young men with Middle Eastern roots as important part of American society,
clearly depicting them as ‘good’ Muslims who recognize the wrongdoings of their ‘bad’
counterparts. This distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims reflects similar notions
which circulated in the political and academic fields as well as the news media at the time
and stipulated that one could not condemn Islam in its entirety for facilitating ‘terrorism’
against the United States, demonstrating once more how discursive agents influence each
249
other in a reciprocal exchange of ideas. The inclusion of these token ‘good Muslims’ thus
enables 24 to continue its portrayal of ‘Islamic terrorism’ as pervasive and powerful under
the cover of nuance and tolerance.
In a similar vein, 24 reflects and represents other central ideas about ‘terrorism’
which circulated at the time, most notably the ideas that ‘terrorists’ operated in networks
and were often sponsored by governments hostile to the United States. As I have shown
above, President Bush took up these notions from conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’
developed in previous decades and made them central themes in his own framings of
the issue. In 24, these ideas appear as well, pointing to the continued dominance of the
‘terrorism’ discourse and the interconnectedness of the different discursive agents and
fields. Hence, throughout the series, it is usually revealed towards the end that the ‘Islamic
terrorists’ had received substantial support, weapons, and money from either the Chinese
or the Russians, long-established antagonists in American politics and culture.
In Season 2, for instance, it becomes apparent at the end that a conglomerate
of oil companies wanted to start a war in the Middle East by instigating a ‘terrorist’
attack on American soil which would force the U.S. government to respond militarily.
A war in the Middle East would make oil prices spike, leading to enormous profits for
the conspirators. In Season 4, it is ultimately revealed that the ‘terrorists’ around Habib
Marwan also received help from Chinese freelance agent Lee Jong, leading to another
action-filled subplot in which Jack Bauer storms the Chinese embassy to capture Jong and
bring him to CTU for interrogation. This sets off a narrative thread which runs through
subsequent seasons in which the Chinese government continues to hunt Jack Bauer in
revenge for his assault on the embassy in which a high-ranking Chinese official was killed,
eventually capturing him, extraditing him to China, and torturing him there for over a
year. In Season 6, ‘Islamic terrorist’ Abu Fayed receives vital support and guidance from
Russian agents who set up an elaborate scheme to use Abu Fayed as henchman to do the
dirty work for them. The Russians also provide the ‘terrorists’ in Season 8 with nuclear
rods to use against the United States. In this manner, 24 suggested that the real threat
did not emanate so much from obscure ‘Islamic terrorists,’ but from clandestine operations
sanctioned (and even explicitly ordered) by the Chinese and Russian governments, powerful
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political players wanting to de-throne the United States as global leader and hegemon by
relying on ‘Islamic terrorists’ to do their bidding. In accordance with previous discursive
traditions, the threat rather emanated from a ‘state-sponsored’ ‘terrorism’ network instead
of the ‘(Islamic) terrorist’ client groups.
Unsurprisingly, then, 24 has been overwhelmingly read as affirming the discourse
on ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ and the “war on terror(ism)” after 9/11.9 Indeed, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney confirmed they were both
fans of the show (Prince, Firestorm 239; Downing 72; J. Mayer). Jane Mayer also noted
that “many prominent conservatives sp[oke] of ‘24’ as if it were real,” suggesting that 24 ’s
representation of ‘terrorism’ and Jack Bauer’s fight against it affirmed long-postulated,
established conceptualizations of the issue. Famously, during a debate between Republican
presidential candidates in South Carolina on May 15, 2007, Tom Tancredo of Colorado
responded to a question on how he would handle a hypothetical terrorist attack as President
of the United States that he would be “looking for ‘Jack Bauer’ at that time, let me tell
you” (qtd. in Brady 108). 24 thus functioned as a powerful vehicle to communicate central
tenets of the established ‘terrorism’ discourse, in particular the need to fight it ruthlessly
as a “war on terror(ism)” against ‘Islamic terrorists’ out to destroy the United States.
Ultimately, the picture which emerges is that the ‘terrorism’ discourse cemented its
dominant position in U.S. politics, academia, news journalism, and popular culture in the
wake of 9/11 and the early stages of the “war on terror(ism).” Hegemonic conceptualizations
of ‘terrorism’ combined central ideas and themes which had circulated in previous decades,
framing it as ‘Islamic’ in nature, new and unprecedented, often financed by an influential
government which helped the ‘Islamic terrorists’ to organize themselves in international
networks. These ‘Islamic terrorists’ then presumably singled out the United States for
attack because of their own misguided, fanatical beliefs in Islam, forcing the nation to
respond militarily. In the rest of this chapter, I turn to how these knowledge claims about
9See the edited collection by Peacock (although admittedly of somewhat dubious quality), Downing, and
especially Zˇizˇek’s article in The Guardian. Many critics have focused on the depiction of torture in
24, usually arguing that it affirms claims by the Bush administration about its usefulness as a tool in
interrogation despite evidence to the contrary. See here especially J. Arnold; Brady; Dershowitz; A. Green;
Ha¨ntzschel; Howard; J. Mayer; O’Mathu´na; and Prince, Firestorm. Some critics have even suggested that
the show’s depiction of torture as an acceptable practice of interrogation has influenced how U.S. soldiers
treated prisoners in Iraq. See Brady, Ha¨ntzschel, and J. Mayer as well as the contribution “Is Torture”
published on the website of Democracy Now.
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‘(Islamic) terrorism’ developed as the “war on terror(ism)” became even more entrenched
in the second half of the decade.
5.3 “The Global Jihadist Movement [. . . ] Remains the
Preeminent Terrorist Threat to the United States” – The
‘Terrorism’ Discourse in U.S. Politics and Academia in the
Mid- to Late 2000s
In the second half of the decade, the discourse on ‘Islamic terrorism’ maintained its
hegemonic position and continued to dictate the ways in which (political) violence against
the United States could be interpreted. The Bush administration’s framing of the events
of 9/11 as an instance of ‘Islamic terrorism’ reverberated throughout the American public
sphere. The discourse posited that 9/11 had been committed by an evil ‘terrorist’ network
which had recruited fanatic ‘Islamic terrorists’ to attack the United States by tapping
into their misguided religious beliefs. This also served as rationale for declaring a “war
on terror(ism)” and, in the process, it had cemented a conceptualization of ‘(Islamic)
terrorism’ which merged discursive elements from previous decades into one coherent tale,
endowing knowledge claims about ‘terrorism’ with considerable power. In this section,
I therefore look more closely at how the discourse on ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ continued to
dominate political and academic engagements with the issue in the mid- to late 2000s.
The president and his administration were not the only discursive actors to tap
into notions of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in order to make sense of the 9/11 attacks and frame
the resulting policy decisions, especially the initiation of a “war on terror(ism)” with
first installments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Notably, the official government reports on
‘terrorism,’ entitled Patterns of Global Terrorism until 2003 and then renamed Country
Reports on Terrorism from 2004 onward, depicted the threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in a
similar manner, highlighting the extent to which the discourse dominated U.S. politics in
those years. Following the knowledge claims made by the Bush administration, the reports
also portrayed ‘terrorist’ groups as operating in international networks, receiving financial
and logistical support from state sponsors or powerful individuals like Osama bin Laden,
and, most importantly, as motivated by their religious beliefs. The reports also justified
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and legitimized fighting ‘terrorism’ through war. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2001, for
instance, warned that
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan became a major terrorist hub, a training ground and
transit point for a network of informally linked individuals and groups that have engaged
in international militant and terrorist acts throughout the world. Usama Bin Ladin and
al-Qaida terrorists provided the Taliban with training, weapons, soldiers, and money to
use in its war to defeat the Northern Alliance. The Taliban in turn provided safehaven
and logistical facilities to al-Qaida. (10)
Afghanistan was described as notorious ‘state sponsor’ of ‘terrorism’ acting in a symbiotic
relationship with bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. It created the specter of a sophisticated, professional
“terrorist hub” and “network” of ‘terrorist’ groups joining forces “to defeat the Northern
Alliance,” i.e. the U.S.-led coalition forces, and presented both al-Qaeda and the Taliban
as powerful forces relying on “international militant and terrorist acts throughout the
world” to attack the United States. These elements clearly echoed the president’s discourse
on post-9/11 ‘terrorism,’ also reinforcing his claims as ‘objective truth’ in turn.
Using notably similar language, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 claimed:
AQ [al-Qaeda] and its core leadership group represent a global action network that seeks
to aggregate and exploit the effects of widely dispersed, semi-independent actors. It
openly describes itself as a transnational guerrilla movement and applies classic insurgent
strategies at the global level. AQ applies terrorism, but also subversion, propaganda, and
open warfare, and it seeks weapons of mass destruction in order to inflict the maximum
possible damage on its opponents.
The notion of ‘terrorist’ groups like al-Qaeda as operating in “a global action network”
continued to be central to conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ in these government reports.
As the example also makes clear, this ‘terrorism’ was depicted as operating internationally
and, in a nod to previous discursivizations of the term, warned of the dangers of “weapons
of mass destruction” in the hands of ‘terrorists’ like al-Qaeda. This activated previous
framings of ‘terrorism’ (especially ideas about ‘new Islamic terrorism’ from the 1990s) and
made the reports’ observations appear ‘logical’ and ‘true.’ What is more, the excerpt also
aligned ‘terrorism’ with related concepts, particularly ‘war’ and ‘insurgency,’ suggesting
that the term’s meaning was becoming increasingly vague. In the reports, ‘terrorism’ came
to describe any form of violence directed against the United States, including the threat of
violence, as the term became emptier and even more widely applicable and powerful.
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References to religion, i.e. Islam, also appeared in the reports’ descriptions of
‘terrorism.’ Many reports labelled the perpetrators “Islamic extremists” (e.g. Patterns
2001, Patterns 2003, Country Reports 2004, and Country Reports 2005 ) and Country
Reports on Terrorism 2004 even warned of the dangers of “jihadist terror” and contended
that “[t]he global jihadist movement – including its most prominent component, al-Qa’ida
– remain[ed] the preeminent terrorist threat to the United States, US interests and US
allies” (6, 7). These expressions marked the ‘terrorism’ clearly as motivated by belief in
Islam, suggesting that the perpetrators were religious zealots who were part of a larger
global movement comprised of fanatic believers in Islam and who acted out the tenets of
their faith by attacking the United States.
In another example, Country Reports 2006 asserted that “Afghanistan remain[ed]
threatened by Taliban insurgents and religious extremists, some of whom [we]re linked
to al-Qaida (AQ) and to sponsors outside the country.” References to “Taliban
insurgents and religious extremists” functioned as synonyms for ‘terrorism,’ thus evoking
conceptualizations which explained ‘terrorism’ as committed by religious fanatics. This
notion was then connected to al-Qaeda, a group which had been firmly established as
‘Islamic terrorists,’ meaning that the reports could conjure the specter of ‘Islamic terrorism’
without actually having to directly use those terms. In a similar manner, the Country
Reports 2008 warned:
AQ continued its propaganda efforts seeking to inspire support in Muslim populations,
undermine Western confidence, and enhance the perception of a powerful worldwide
movement. Terrorists consider information operations a principal part of their effort. Their
use of the Internet for propaganda, recruiting, fundraising and, increasingly, training, [. . . ]
made the Internet a ‘virtual safe haven.’
Here, ‘terrorism’ was not only depicted as sophisticated operation which made use of
different venues and modern technology (once more tapping into ideas about ‘new Islamic
terrorism’ in the process). It was also clearly linked to religion by suggesting that “Muslim
populations” were particularly susceptible to becoming ‘terrorists’ themselves. Indeed, by
indicating that one of al-Qaeda’s goals was to “undermine Western confidence,” the report
subtly evoked the rhetoric of a “Clash of Civilizations” by presenting al-Qaeda and its
allied “Muslim populations” as opposite to the “Western” coalition. Hence, even though
the report stressed that “it [wa]s important to recognize that not all extremists [we]re
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Muslim,” it also maintained that “we c[ould] not ignore the large number of extremists
who ha[d] distorted Islam to promote terrorism” (Country Reports 2008 ), evoking familiar
distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam as a cover under which it could portray Islam
as motivating force behind ‘terrorism’ against the United States.
Lastly, the government reports engaged in important cultural and political work
because they justified and legitimized the ongoing “war on terror(ism).” The reports’ open
support of President Bush and his policies in the early 2000s (see especially Patterns 2001,
2002, and 2003 ) developed into a subtler framing of needing to fight ‘terrorism’ through
war in later years. In part, the mere existence of these reports indicated that ‘terrorism’
against the United States was a serious problem requiring extensive political attention.
The reports also carefully tracked the development and latest installments of the “war on
terror(ism).” They chronicled how Afghanistan and Iraq transformed from sponsors of
‘terrorism’ against the United States into valuable allies and modern states which rejected
‘terrorism’. Patterns 2003, for instance, reported:
In Iraq and Afghanistan, military force is being brought to bear against terrorists with
real success. The capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 was a major defeat for the
thugs and terrorists who supported him. Through Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United
States and its Coalition partners defeated the Saddam regime, effectively neutralizing a
state sponsor of terrorism and removing a government that had used weapons of mass
destruction against its own people. (vii)
Here, the report styled the invasion as necessary to defeat the Iraqi regime, a notorious
“state sponsor of terrorism” and stressed the positive outcome for both the United States
and Iraqi society. It implied that “military force” used against “terrorists” was the most
successful strategy, effectively approving the narrative of the “war on terror(ism).”
Similarly, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 framed the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq in explicitly militaristic terms and linked them to ‘terrorism.’ The report
explained that “[t]he Middle East and North Africa region continue[d] to be the region
of greatest concern in the global war on terrorism. Iraq witnessed extensive terrorism
and violence by foreign jihadists, former regime elements, and Islamic extremists” (57).
It effectively characterized the war in Iraq as fight against “Islamic extremists” and not
only activated conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ as religiously motivated (“jihadists” and
“Islamic extremists”), it also fixated the problem geographically in the Middle East, evoking
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past discourses on the issue and making the claim appear factual. Ultimately, the report’s
uncritical repetition of the phrase “global war on terrorism” suggested that it was the
‘natural’ response to the problem of ‘terrorism,’ a practice which recurred throughout
the other reports of the decade and which worked to stabilize the notion of a “war on
terrorism” as only possible response.
As this discussion demonstrates, the discursive constructions of ‘terrorism’ after
9/11 as ‘Islamic’ in nature proved so pervasive and powerful that they largely drowned out
critical voices. Alternative framings of the events were marginalized and silenced, meaning
that the conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ as ‘Islamic,’ operating in networks, sponsored
by hostile regimes, and unprecedented in its lethality, remained practically uncontested.
Eventually, however, as the decade progressed, a more organized and vocal opposition
coalesced around criticism of how the “war on terror(ism)” was conducted, taking issue
with the handling of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rationale behind invading Iraq
in the first place, and, when it was uncovered in the spring of 2004, the horrific torture and
abuse scandal against Iraqi prisoners of war at the hands of U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib
prison and other places.
The full extent of public dissatisfaction with the Bush administration’s “war on
terror(ism)” became apparent in the 2006 Midterm Elections where the Democratic Party
gained control of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Nancy Pelosi became Speaker
of the House, the first woman ever to hold this position. The New York Times called
the elections “a broad realignment of power in Washington” (Broder) and acknowledged
that “Democrats w[ould] now control the committees and the floor schedule” (Hulse).
‘Terrorism’ generally and the “war on terror(ism)” specifically were central issues in the
2006 elections, as surveys suggested: About four in ten voters viewed ‘terrorism’ and the
war in Iraq as key issues while almost six in ten voters opposed the war in Iraq (Zeleny and
Thee), suggesting that the sweeping victory for the Democratic Party also functioned as a
way to express opposition to the Bush administration’s leadership in fighting ‘terrorism.’
Yet, importantly, in these debates the framing of 9/11 as ‘terrorism’ and the
subsequent retaliatory military operations as “war on terror(ism)” were never questioned.
Rather, politicians and their constituents disagreed over how to conduct the “war on
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terror(ism)” and over who should be fighting when and where. But questions of why the
nation should go to war in the Middle East (i.e. to combat ‘Islamic terrorism’ against the
U.S.) and against what (‘Islamic terrorism’) it was fighting were not part of the debate.
This demonstrates just how powerful the discourse on ‘terrorism’ was; it was clearly the
single most dominant paradigm which not only assigned meaning to historic events, it
actively constructed, shaped, and even limited political policy.
Indeed, the discourse on ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ continued to dominate debates about
the issue not only in U.S. politics, but also in the academic field of ‘terrorism’ studies.
As we saw above, the academic response to 9/11 and the ensuing “war on terror(ism)”
focused almost exclusively on ‘Islamic terrorism,’ effectively establishing it as the dominant
interpretative frame through which to make sense of what had happened. Critical voices
challenging the hegemonic academic discourse on ‘terrorism’ were, as the preceding chapters
in this study have shown, regularly marginalized. After the attacks of September 11, 2001,
this suppression became even more pronounced. Indeed, the first attempt at formulating a
meaningful opposition to the dominant academic discourse developed only in the latter
half of the decade and then also mainly on European ground. This suggests that American
scholars disagreeing with the main claims of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse faced serious
difficulties in finding ways and venues to make their voices heard within their own country.
In the remainder of this section, I fill a gap in the existing research on the ‘terrorism’
discourse by discussing how, as the “war on terror(ism)” wore on, dissenting scholars slowly
formed a more coherent approach to the topic with the aim of providing an institutionalized
space to develop different forms of knowledge about ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ and to express
discontent with the Bush administration and its handling of the “war on terror(ism).” Yet,
as the analysis will also show, these efforts proved ultimately too weak to significantly
challenge the established discourse in any substantial way.
American ‘terrorism’ scholars with a more critical attitude towards the political and
academic approaches to ‘Islamic terrorism’ continued to voice their disagreement but were
noticeably sidelined and hindered at participating fully in the dominant discourse. For
instance, Martha Crenshaw, one of the few openly critical American scholars, expressed
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her doubts about the utility and analytical qualities of the ‘new terrorism’ concept in her
2003 article “‘New’ Versus ‘Old’ Terrorism,” arguing the following:
[T]he distinction between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ terrorism is not as fundamental as
proponents of the ‘new’ terrorism view would have it. Differences among groups and
over time do exist, but they may be attributable to a changing environment (processes
associated with what is termed globalization, in particular), specific opportunity structures,
and evolutionary progression, even learning. Observations about a ‘new’ terrorism often
lack a basis in sustained and systematic empirical research, and they tend to neglect
history.
A few years later, Crenshaw renewed her critique, maintaining that “[t]oday’s terrorism
[wa]s not a fundamentally or qualitatively new phenomenon but grounded in an evolving
historical context” (Explaining 53). With an eye to current debates, she also criticized
that “[d]efining jihadist terrorism as entirely new [wa]s a way of framing the threat so as
to mobilize both public and elite support for costly responses that ha[d] long-term and
uncertain pay-offs” (64). Crenshaw warned that the ‘new Islamic terrorism’ argument
simplified political reality and absolved its proponents from making sense of “a contradictory
and confusing reality” (64).
Crenshaw’s openly critical stance towards the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse shows
that the American scholarly community was not as homogeneous as it may appear at first
glance. However, it is also evident that her voice did not have a significant impact on
the discourse because it was considerably marginalized. Indeed, Crenshaw’s 2003 article
appeared in the Palestine-Israel Journal, a surprising choice considering that Crenshaw did
not mention Israel at all in the article and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
only once in passing. This suggests that Crenshaw may have had trouble finding a more
topic-based journal for her article and that this could be related to its critical nature.
Similarly, her study Explaining Terrorism was published by Routledge, a British-based
company, implying that American publishing houses were not as interested in printing her
often critical work.
She was not the only one; other scholars also criticized the knowledge produced
after 9/11 as well as the state of the field in general. For instance, in 2004, Andrew Silke
published the anthology Research on Terrorism in which he asserted that “[r]esearch on
terrorism has had a deeply troubled past” (Introduction 1). Silke concluded, “terrorism
can be avoided or prevented, and ameliorated when it does occur. To do all this, however,
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requires the right knowledge, the right understanding and a willingness to act on the
lessons already learned. Currently, we are lacking on all three of these fronts” (27). Silke’s
anthology was also important because it featured a foreword by Bruce Hoffman as well as
contributions by noted scholars such as John Horgan, Leonard Weinberg, Avishag Gordon,
and Louise Richardson, who all criticized the lamentable state of research, indicating that
a broad range of academics were concerned about the direction into which their field of
interest was developing.10 However, Silke is a British scholar working at a British university
and the anthology was published by Frank Cass, a British publishing house. This shows
that the more critical voices which contributed to the academic discourse on ‘terrorism’
were not only predominantly located outside the U.S., they also turned to British venues in
order to publish their views. Evidently, more critical approaches to the study of ‘terrorism’
were finding it challenging to participate in the field from within the United States.
Indeed, Britain proved to be a more hospitable space within which to organize
a more critical approach to ‘terrorism’ studies after 9/11. Starting in 2006, a group of
scholars around Richard Jackson began to break away from what they called “Orthodox
Terrorism Studies” or “Terrorology” to form “Critical Terrorism Studies.” In his 2005 study,
Writing the War on Terrorism (tellingly published in Europe by Manchester University
Press), Jackson had already called on his colleagues to “resist the [dominant] discourse
[on ‘terrorism’], to deconstruct it at every opportunity and continually to interrogate the
exercise of power” (188). Then, in October 2006, the University of Manchester hosted a
conference entitled “Is It Time for a Critical Terrorism Studies?” which brought together a
wide array of scholars on ‘terrorism’ known to be critical of the developments in ‘terrorism’
studies itself and the conceptualization of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ by the dominant discourse
at the time. Speakers included an international array of scholars like Richard Jackson,
Andrew Silke, Joseba Zulaika, Jeroen Gunning, John Horgan, and Marie Breen Smyth.
The conference ended with the official launch of the “Working Group on Critical Studies
on Terrorism,” sponsored by the British International Studies Association (Is It Time).
10Other examples of scholars and texts discussing the lamentable state of the field of ‘terrorism’ research
include A. Gordon; Sageman, “Low” and “Stagnation;” Silke, “Devil” and “Road;” and Zulaika,
Terrorism. Magnus Ranstorp edited a collection entitled Mapping Terrorism Research, published in 2007
by the British company Routledge, which equally criticized the sub-par state of ‘terrorism’ research.
Scholars arguing that the state of ‘terrorism’ research has improved in recent years include Crenshaw
and LaFree; Schmid, “Comments” and Introduction; and Silke and Schmidt-Petersen.
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Both the conference and the Working Group were indicators that dissenting scholars
were starting to organize professionally, establish networks of support, and generally
institutionalize their critiques of the status quo in the field. That these activities occurred
outside the U.S. and were initiated by European scholars, however, serves as an indicator
of the extent to which American criticism of the ‘terrorism’ discourse had become silenced.
With the help of established academic tools, i.e. conferences, working groups,
publications, and collaborations, this group of scholars slowly formalized a more critical
approach which would, in the years to come, attempt to challenge the hegemonic
conceptualizations of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ produced by their colleagues in the United
States. Following the conference in Manchester, Jeroen Gunning and Richard Jackson both
published articles advocating for the creation of ‘Critical Terrorism Studies.’ Gunning’s
contribution, entitled “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” and published in 2007,
argued that “a ‘critical turn’ in the field of ‘terrorism studies’ [wa]s necessary” (364). That
same year, Richard Jackson outlined “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” in
an eponymous article, describing “Critical Terrorism Studies” as “terrorism-related research
that self-consciously adopt[ed] a sceptical attitude towards state-centric understandings
of terrorism and which d[id] not take existing terrorism knowledge for granted but [wa]s
willing to challenge widely held assumptions and beliefs” (“Core” 244, 246). Both Gunning
and Jackson presented “Critical Terrorism Studies” as a serious alternative to the status
quo within the field by opening up a new space within which scholars could approach
the issue of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ from new directions. Incidentally, neither article was
published in any of the main ‘terrorism’ studies journals, another clear indicator that the
group of scholars coalescing around Jackson was forced to organize at the margins of the
field.
From then on, things developed at a rapid pace: Richard Jackson became the
editor-in-chief at the newly-founded journal Critical Studies on Terrorism whose first issue
was published in 2008 by Taylor and Francis, the British publishing house which also
issued Terrorism and Political Violence. Taylor and Francis constituted an established
channel of producing and circulating knowledge about ‘terrorism,’ indicating that “Critical
Terrorism Studies” was recognized by other discursive actors as alternative approach to
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knowledge production, but also that non-hegemonic conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ did
not enter the American market easily and had to turn to European venues instead, leading
to reduced visibility in the U.S.
In the introduction to the very first volume of Critical Studies on Terrorism, Marie
Breen Smyth and her colleagues positioned the journal as “one small part of a much
broader attempt to foster a more self-reflective, critical approach to the study of terrorism,
and bring in those who stud[ied] aspects of ‘terrorism,’ but [we]re uncomfortable with or
hostile to the (perceived) ontological, epistemological, and ideological commitments of
existing terrorism studies” (2). Even though the authors acknowledged that “one [wa]s
wary of creating a bifurcation between ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ terrorism studies since
all research on terrorism [wa]s in need of greater self-reflexivity” (2), their introduction
clearly worked towards positioning their own group of scholars as open opposition to the
established ways of creating knowledge about ‘terrorism.’ The first volume of Critical
Studies on Terrorism also featured papers by, among others, Michael Stohl, Adrian Guelke,
and Joseba Zulaika (also an editor of the journal himself) with William Douglass – all
scholars with a reputation of criticizing the state of the field and its discursive practices.
More key publications followed in the next years which further helped to institutionalize
“Critical Terrorism Studies” and to endow it with much-needed political capital.11
“Critical Terrorism Studies” set out with an explicitly established and carefully
argued agenda. As described by its most fervent advocates, “Critical Terrorism
Studies” aimed to merge two different approaches to the study of ‘terrorism’: (1) the
political-economical approach which viewed ‘terrorism’ as a strategy any actor could
use, including Western states, and approaches developed within anthropology, sociology,
history, and (2) an approach based on insights from area studies, which focused on
the importance of historical, social, and cultural contexts as well as primary research
(R. Jackson, et al., Terrorism 31-33). “Critical Terrorism Studies” scholars professed an
awareness that knowledge about ‘terrorism’ was created in a social process, contingent on
11See here particularly the anthology Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda edited by
R. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunnings in 2009, which featured notable contributions by these three schoalrs
as well as Ranstorp and Silke, all writers who were established as important and acknowledged ‘critical’
scholars of ‘terrorism.’ Other examples include Terrorism: A Critical Introduction, written by R. Jackson,
Gunning, and Smyth together with Jarvis in 2011, and the Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism
Studies, edited by R. Jackson and published in 2016.
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social and political changes, and therefore not neutral or objective (36). They encouraged
transparency about how scholars conducted research itself and also stressed the importance
of primary research as well as interdisciplinarity and pluralism in research (38-39). Jackson
and his colleagues advocated a broadening of the research agenda into hitherto neglected
topics in addition to focusing on “the field’s underlying ideological, institutional and
material interests” (43).
On paper, “Critical Terrorism Studies” offered a complex and nuanced approach
to ‘terrorism’ as a concept. It conceived of ‘terrorism’ as “a socially constructed cultural
object with wide-ranging effects across society” (R. Jackson et al., Terrorism 67). This
approach to ‘terrorism’ was remarkable since it openly acknowledged its constructed nature
and dependency on context. As Jackson and his collaborators suggested, ‘terrorism’ –
including the threat of ‘terrorism’ – was constructed through cultural, social, and political
practices (52). It operated on a discursive level, meaning that the discourse on ‘terrorism’
even had the power to restrict what could be said about it (70). “Critical Terrorism Studies”
was thus clearly indebted to Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass who proposed a similar
approach in their 1996 study Terror and Taboo (see again the previous chapter).12
In practice, however, “Critical Terrorism Studies” became first and foremost a space
in which scholars could voice and debate their critical views of the Bush administration, its
(disastrous) handling of the “war on terror(ism),” and, later, the Obama administration’s
policies against ‘Islamic terrorism.’13 Joseba Zulaika, for example, stated that “[t]he
ultimate catastrophic self-fulfilling prophecy of the War on Terror should be by now
obvious to everyone: the war in Iraq” and claimed that “the ascendancy of the War
on Terror as the single hegemonic agenda of U.S. policy c[ould] not be blamed on the
administration alone; one ha[d] to unmask the self-righteous fictions of the very culture
of counterterrorism that allowed for such massive deception” (Terrorism 194, 197). Lisa
Stampnitzky took issue with the Bush administration’s reversed definitions of ‘pre emption’
and ‘prevention,’ surmising that “the Bush administration’s use of the term appeared to
blur the distinction deliberately” (173). Ian Lustick’s study was already tellingly entitled
12Richard Jackson called Zulaika and Douglass’s work “the defining text on the discourse of terrorism”
(Writing vii).
13See, e.g., R. Jackson, “Culture;” McCrisken, “Obama’s Drone” and “Ten;” D. Murray; Pious; and
Zulaika, “Drones.”
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Trapped in the War on Terror and boldly declared in the opening of the preface, “The
government’s loudly trumpeted ‘War on Terror’ is not the solution to the problem. It has
become the problem” (ix).14 “Critical Terrorism Studies” thus offered a space for critiques
of the conduct of the “war on terror(ism)” and the ‘terrorism’ discourse-at-large.
However, a careful evaluation of the state of “Critical Terrorism Studies” more than
ten years after its initial inception indicates that the endeavor to change the approach to
‘terrorism’ in academia was not as successful as the initiators had hoped. This becomes
apparent already when looking at the number of scholars actively involved in “Critical
Terrorism Studies.” Richard Jackson is arguably the central figure in the field and its main
discursive force. Indeed, Jackson was involved in the writing and publishing of practically
all major “Critical Terrorism Studies” texts of recent years and tended to collaborate
with the same group of scholars (especially Lee Jarvis, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen
Gunnings), suggesting that beyond this small core group, there are few scholars seriously
involved in producing ‘critical’ knowledge about ‘terrorism.’ What is more, their articles
are rarely quoted by the leading ‘orthodox’ scholars in the U.S., thus excluding Jackson
and his collaborators from meaningful participation in the field. The established American
field of ‘terrorism’ studies effectively insulated itself from critical challenges to the way it
produced knowledge about ‘terrorism’ as well as the content of its knowledge claims itself.
The fact that more critically-minded scholars had to organize outside the U.S. ultimately
confirms that the discourse on ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ had achieved an unrivaled, uncontested
hegemonic position within American academia and politics. In order to complete this
analysis, I discuss in the next section how media and cultural discourses responded to the
hegemonic standing of ‘Islamic terrorism’ as well as the increasing criticism of the “war on
terror(ism)” from the mid-2000s onward.
14For more examples, see, e.g. Altheide, Brady, J. Collins and Glover, Croft, Holloway, and Mamdani,
Silberstein.
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5.4 “Islam’s Potential for Extremism” – The ‘Terrorism’
Discourse in U.S. News Media and Popular Culture in the
Mid- to Late 2000s
The discourse on ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ not only dominated how the issue was understood
and treated in the political and academic fields in the United States, it also continued
to predetermine the ways in which the U.S. news media as well as cultural productions
engaged with the topic. Reflecting the general dissatisfaction with the conduct of the “war
on terror(ism),” the news media became increasingly critical about the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, but ultimately did not question the overall framing of American foreign policy
as response to a threat of ‘Islamic terrorism.’ Similarly, cultural productions in the second
half of the decade engaged critically with the wars in the Middle East yet did not question
the overall validity of the ‘terrorism’ paradigm itself. In this last section, I examine how
The New York Times reported on ‘terrorism’ from the mid-2000s onwards before discussing
how Hollywood movies narrated and visualized the experience of the “war on terror(ism)”
and the notion of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ as a threat to the U.S.
Generally speaking, the reporting in The New York Times on ‘terrorism’ in the
second half of the decade was characterized by an intensification of the discursive trends
which had emerged in the first part of the decade (see again Figure 5.1 above). Thus, even
though the overall number of articles referencing ‘terrorism’ was cut into half, going from
9,074 articles in 2004 to 4,512 articles in 2005, what nevertheless remains clear is that
the issue of ‘terrorism’ not only continued to dominate newspaper coverage of (political)
violence, it actually expanded its hegemonic standing. Compared to the output of previous
decades, The New York Times still wrote about ‘terrorism’ to an unprecedented extent
during the years of the second Bush administration. Indeed, the ‘terrorism’ discourse firmly
maintained its dominant standing during the second Bush administration. On average, for
the period 2005-2008, there were still 4,624 articles per year, or about 13 articles per day,
which contained the word ‘terrorism.’ Evidently, then, ‘terrorism’ continued to be viewed
as central issue even in years when there were no high-profile attacks.
Interestingly, at first glance, the data appears to suggest that, particularly from
the mid-2000s onward, concepts related to ‘terrorism’ gained in popularity. As Figure 5.4
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Figure 5.4: Reporting on ‘terrorism,’ ‘fundamentalism,’ and ‘extremism’ in The New York
Times, 2000-2010
shows, starting in 2005, conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ as violence directed against
the United States and committed by Muslim fanatics were activated via terms used as
synonyms, predominantly ‘extremism’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘fundamentalism.’ The
graphs in Figure 5.4 show that increasingly more articles referring to ‘extremism’ were
published by The New York Times beginning in 2005. While there were 3,808 articles in
2005 which mentioned ‘extremism,’ that number rose to 4,573 pieces a year later (i.e. an
increase of 20 %) and once more by 11 % to 5,078 articles in 2007.
However, it is important to note that in the writing of The New York Times, the
term ‘extremism’ also appeared in a variety of other contexts which are distinctly unrelated
to issues of ‘terrorism’ and (political) violence. As Figure 5.5 shows, the majority of articles
which mentioned ‘extremism’ actually connected it to sport, style, art, and traveling.
Notions of, e.g., ‘Islamic extremism or ‘Arab extremism’ appeared less often, indicating
that the term was actually not more dominant than ‘terrorism’ when The New York Times
reported on violence and war.
This becomes apparent when adapting the graph for ‘extremism’ to only include the
hits in the database for ‘Middle East extremism,’ ‘Muslim extremism,’ ‘Islam extremism,’
and ‘Muslim extremism.’ As Figure 5.6 shows, then, ‘terrorism’ remained the most dominant
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Figure 5.5: Reporting on ‘extremism’ in The New York Times, 2000-2010
Figure 5.6: Reporting on ‘terrorism,’ ‘fundamentalism,’ and ‘extremism’ (adapted) in The
New York Times, 2000-2010
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concept in the reporting of The New York Times while references to ‘extremism’ and
‘fundamentalism’ only played a subordinate role. Nevertheless, in contexts of violence
in and from the Middle East, violence involving Islam, or any other conflicts which had
already been connected to ‘Islamic terrorism’ (like 9/11 or the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq), references to ‘extremism’ and ‘fundamentalism’ clearly functioned as alternative
signifiers for illegitimate violence against the United States committed by fervent believers
in Islam, tapping into discursive traditions already established in the previous decade
(see again Chapter 4). These terms effectively activated the ‘terrorism’ discourse without
having to use the actual word. Indeed, the discourse had clearly managed to diversify and
incorporate related concepts as synonyms into its fields of activity. What is more, this
suggests that the ‘terrorism’ discourse was starting to obscure its precise workings, its
powerful mechanisms of framing and constructing meaning, and receding into the shadows
where it could continue to dominate public debates about the issue while remaining unseen.
This would make efforts to unmask its workings more difficult for critics in the years to
come because framing the concept and pinpointing its uses and appearances were becoming
more challenging.
This dynamic is also confirmed when looking at a few examples from articles
published in The New York Times in the latter half of the decade. For instance, on
September 2, 2005 The New York Times published an article by Laurie Goodstein in
which the journalist observed that, in response to the July bombings of the London public
transport system, “American Muslim leaders [. . . ] [we]re rolling out campaigns to persuade
American Muslims – especially the young – to beware of preachers peddling extremism
and terrorism. They sa[id] that terrorism [wa]s a poison infecting Islam and that moderate
Muslims should take responsibility to root it out.” Goodstein then related that at “the
Islamic Society’s annual convention, [. . . ] organizers w[ould] mount a new campaign against
terrorism and extremism, with posters and pamphlets designed for use in mosques and
Islamic schools.” She also quoted Khaled Abou el-Fadl, “an Islamic jurist and professor of
law at the University of California, Los Angeles,” as admitting that “[e]xtremist Muslims
from abroad used to give speeches at American mosques” where they preached the use of
violence. Taken together, Goodstein’s article presented Islam as vulnerable to abuse by
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‘terrorists’ and ‘extremists’ who found it easy to incite Muslims to ‘terrorism’ against ‘the
West.’ What is more, the fact that American Muslim clerics were preparing a thorough
“theological rebuttal to Muslim extremists who cite[d] the Koran and Islamic texts to justify
violence” suggested that Islamic scripture did indeed condone violence against others.
In order to create this particular impression, Goodstein’s article relied on both terms,
‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ and used them both to depict the threat of violence by Muslim
believers, tapping into long-circulating notions about ‘Islamic terrorism.’ References to
‘extremism’ became another way to activate these discursive constructions, indicating that
the ‘terrorism’ discourse was in the process of diversifying its rhetoric.
Later that same month, on September 29, 2005, The New York Times published
an entry in its section “World Briefing” which noted that “[t]he police arrested 38 men
suspected of involvement in Islamic extremism in raids across the western state of Hesse”
in Germany (Plass). The short paragraph ended by informing readers that “[t]he action
came days after France said it had arrested nine men near Paris who were suspected of
being part of an Islamic cell planning terrorist attacks there.” This article may be brief,
but it is notable for mixing the concept “Islamic extremism” with the threat of “Islamic
[. . . ] terrorist attacks” facing Europe, suggesting that these terms were regularly used
together as quasi-synonyms which referred to the same signifier: illegitimate violence by
Muslim zealots against a ‘Western’ nation.
These discursive trends are observable in the writings of The New York Times in
later years as well. For instance, John Allen Jr. published in the newspaper an op-ed on
September 19, 2006 in which he discussed Pope Benedict’s openly critical stance towards
Islam and the pontiff’s latest public comments on Islam. Allen observed that “[t]he new
pope is tougher both on terrorism and on what the Vatican calls ‘reciprocity’ – the demand
that Islamic states grant the same rights and freedoms to Christians and other religious
minorities that Muslims receive in the West.” From the beginning of his opinion piece,
Allen presented as fact that Islam facilitated ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism,’ a recurring theme
throughout the rest of his article as well. Allen then claimed that “Roman Catholicism
under Benedict [wa]s moving into a more critical posture toward Islamic fundamentalism.
That could either push Islam toward reform, or set off a global ‘clash of civilizations’ –
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or, perhaps, both.” His wording here is noteworthy since it evoked long-established and
familiar discursivizations of ‘Islamic terrorism’ as engaged in a “Clash of Civilizations”
with ‘the West.’ Indeed, another sign for the power of the ‘terrorism’ discourse is that
Allen did not need to use the term itself, references to “Islamic fundamentalism” and
a looming “global ‘clash of civilizations’” sufficed to evoke the context. Similarly, Allen
commended the pope for having “challenged what he [Benedict] s[aw] as Islam’s potential
for extremism, grounded in a literal reading of the Koran.” The allusion to “Islam’s
potential for extremism” conjured once more ideas about ‘Islamic terrorism’ without
having to actually employ the word. Rather, the article exploited discursive constructions
of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in a subtle manner, portraying the threat in broad, all-encompassing
terms which covertly activated central knowledge claims of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse.
Another example is Jane Perlez’ article from August 20, 2007 in which she informed
readers about special education initiatives in England directed specifically at British
Muslims and which had been devised in response to the July 2005 bombings in London.
As Perlez told readers, this endeavor “represented something new in Britain’s mosques:
a government-financed effort to teach basic citizenship issues, in a special curriculum
intended to reach students who might be vulnerable to Islamic extremism.” She continued
that “the British government hope[d] that such civics classes, which use[d] the Koran
to answer questions about daily life, w[ould] replace the often tedious, and sometimes
hard-core, religious lessons now taught in many mosques across the land.” According to
Perlez, “British officials ha[d] been struggling with how to isolate the extremist Muslim
minority from the moderate majority,” a step deemed necessary by the British authorities
in order to be able to fight ‘Islamic terrorism’ effectively. Perlez’s article evoked the
specter of ‘Islamic terrorism’ by framing ‘extreme’ belief in Islam as a problem and the
main ideological source for ‘terrorism.’ It equally tapped into notions of a ‘good’ Islam
in opposition to a ‘bad’ form of Islam which relied on ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism,’ thus
relating the topic of her article within the discursive field of ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ without
having to make this connection overt. Rather, readers could be trusted to draw their
own inferences, even subconsciously, another sign for the power and pervasiveness of the
‘terrorism’ discourse.
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Ultimately, the news media continued to engage with the issue of ‘Islamic terrorism’
in the mid- to late 2000s much in the same way as it had done immediately after the
attacks of 9/11. The New York Times affirmed knowledge claims that ‘terrorism’ was
predominantly perpetrated by Muslim ‘extremists’ who acted out their hatred for the U.S.
More so than in previous years, however, these constructions were activated via indirect
rhetorical links (particularly the words ‘extremism’ and ‘fundamentalism’) instead of overt
references to the threat of ‘terrorism’ itself. This strongly suggests that in the second half
of the decade, the ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ discourse began to recede into the background –
without losing any of its dominance and omnipresence in public discourses on violence. As
the analysis of cultural texts in the rest of this section demonstrates, these developments
were not limited to media discourses on the issue. Hollywood movies engaged in a similar
vein with the threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in general as well as the “war on terror(ism)” in
particular.
Indeed, Hollywood also offered portrayals of the “war on terror(ism)” and the mid-
to late 2000s saw the release of several high-profile blockbuster productions which tackled
the issue of ‘Islamic terrorism’ and the American military engagements in Afghanistan and
Iraq. For instance, The Kingdom, directed by Peter Berg, released in 2007, and starring
Jamie Foxx and Jennifer Garner, follows the investigations of a special FBI team in Saudi
Arabia after a ‘terrorist’ attack on the U.S. compound in the country kills U.S. oil workers
and their families. An hour later, in a perfidious move by the ‘terrorist’ group, a second
bomb explodes on the scene, killing first responders and remaining survivors. The rest
of the movie concentrates on the FBI team’s efforts, at times only with reluctant Saudi
help, to find and kill the perpetrators, a group of ‘Islamic terrorists’ led by Abu Hamza
al-Masri, a notorious ‘Islamic terrorist.’
Already the opening sequence of The Kingdom leaves no doubt that the conflict
in the movie is between innocent Americans and fanatic ‘Islamic terrorists.’ Scenes show
the happy and relaxed American community in Saudi Arabia enjoying a warm and sunny
afternoon in the park of the compound. Children play a baseball match as their parents
and friends cheer them on. But these scenes are intercut with shots of a group of Saudi
men (recognizable because of the stereotypical red and white headdress as well as white
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flowing robes) observing the compound through binoculars, clearly waiting for something
to happen. The idyllic afternoon is indeed interrupted when ‘terrorists,’ dressed in the
same garb as the Arab soldiers guarding the compound, hijack a jeep and race through the
streets, spraying houses, parents, and their children with gun fire. A suicide ‘terrorist,’ also
dressed in a Saudi military uniform, explodes himself in the midst of fleeing Americans, his
last words praising Allah. Meanwhile, the mysterious Arabs on the rooftop (later revealed
to include Abu Hamza himself) observe the progress, with Hamza forcing his young
grandson to keep watching the scenes of death and destruction through the binoculars,
suggesting that Hamza is already grooming his young grandson to follow in his footsteps.
The Kingdom thus establishes from the outset that the heroic American FBI agents have
to fight against ruthless ‘Islamic terrorists’ who do not hesitate to cruelly and brutally kill
their victims, justifying their actions with their belief in Islam.
Another notable production of the time was Body of Lies (2008), directed by
Ridley Scott and starring Leonardo DiCaprio, Russell Crowe, and Mark Strong. The film
follows CIA agent Roger Ferris (DiCaprio) as he attempts to capture notorious ‘Islamic
terrorist’ Al-Saleem. Over the course of the movie, however, Ferris finds himself entangled
in inter-agency conflicts, making it harder to decide who is deceiving whom. In the end,
Ferris himself becomes a pawn in an elaborate scheme staged by his Jordanian counterpart
who uses Ferris as bait to lure out Al-Saleem. The movie ends with Ferris, dejected and
disillusioned, leaving the CIA behind to find Aisha, the Middle Eastern woman he fell in
love with earlier in the movie.
Body of Lies clearly takes a more critical stance towards the “war on terror(ism).”
As Robert Cettl has remarked in his review, the movie “updates the terrorist genre to
address the practical, intelligence and ethical concerns of the War on Terror as waged by
the Bush government” (51). This comes particularly to the fore in the development of the
character Roger Ferris throughout the movie. Ferries is initially presented as patriotic,
savy CIA agent who supports of the U.S. military operations in the Middle East. But
after experiencing repeated betrayal by his superiors as well as torture at the hands of
Al-Saleem and his group, Ferris becomes significantly more jaded and eventually abandons
the fight altogether, thus embodying the growing disillusion with the “war on terror(ism).”
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Yet, importantly, while Ferris’ character development in Body of Lies works as a foil
to criticize the conduct of the “war on terror(ism)” as well as the (ab)use of power in the
U.S. intelligence community, the movie does not question the ‘terrorism’ paradigm itself.
Al-Saleem is unequivocally labelled a “jihadist” throughout the movie, framing his actions
as ‘terrorism’ and the man as fervent Muslim. Indeed, at one point in the movie, Ferries
and his compatriots even stage a fake ‘terrorist’ attack, purportedly committed by an
‘Islamic terrorist’ group which is significantly more sophisticated and better financed than
Al-Saleem and his men. The intention is to draw Al-Saleem out of hiding by playing on
his vanity and ego so that he can be captured. This scene provides a point of criticism for
the secretive, at times morally questionable actions of the CIA in the name of combating
‘(Islamic) terrorism.’ The existence of ‘Islamic terrorists’ is, however, not put into question;
rather, the CIA knows the ploy will work because of the pervasiveness of ‘Islamic terrorist’
groups in the Middle East and beyond and because all ‘Islamic terrorists’ behave in a
predictable manner which can be exploited.
Ultimately, then, Hollywood productions of this kind affirmed the dominance of the
‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse and worked to spread it further. While some of these movies
expressed a markedly critical stance towards the conduct of the “war on terror(ism),”
illustrating the toll the military campaigns took on both the soldiers involved as well
as American standing in the world, they never questioned the veracity of the concept
of ‘Islamic terrorism’ per se.15 This indicates that the ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ discourse
continued to enjoy an unprecedentedly dominant position in American popular culture
as the first decade of the new millennium was drawing to a close. It clearly mirrored and
reinforced discursive trends and developments occurring simultaneously in U.S. politics,
the academic study of ‘terrorism,’ and news reporting. As the overall analysis in this
chapter demonstrates, at the end of the decade, the discourse on ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ had
not only firmly established its dominance and omnipresence in debates about violence,
foreign policy, and American engagement in the Middle East – it was clearly there to stay.
15Other examples of movies taking a critical stance towards the “war on terror(ism)” (to varying degrees)
include Charlie Wilson’s War (2007, dir. Mike Nichols), Lions for Lambs (2007, dir. Robert Redford),
and Hurt Locker (2008, dir. Kathryn Bigelow). Movies focusing directly on the events of 9/11 include
United 9 3 (2006, dir. Paul Greengrass) and World Trade Center (2006, dir. Oliver Stone).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse in the 21st
Century
Given the ‘terrorism’ discourse’s current omnipresence and dominance in U.S. politics,
academia, news media, and culture in the 21st century, it is an insightful exercise to recall
its much humbler beginnings. Indeed, as Chapter 2 in this study has shown, in the 1940s
and 1950s, ‘terrorism’ and ‘terror’ constituted two analytical concepts which were rarely
used in debates about political violence at the time. In the 1940s, for instance, American
presidents mentioned ‘terrorism’ on average 0.6 times per year. A decade later, this number
sank to 0.4 references per year, suggesting that ‘terrorism’ was not at all central to political
interpretations of international conflicts. U.S. presidents evidently did not need the term
when commenting on incidents of violence whether they occurred at home or abroad.
‘Terrorism’ as a term and concept slowly became more popular in the late 1950s
and early 1960s when it started to be used more regularly in analyses of political conflicts
around the world. As the discussions in Chapter 2 revealed, the term ‘terrorism’ described
the use of violence committed by rebelling forces in a larger political struggle, particularly
in (post)colonial conflicts over national sovereignty and liberation. Typical case studies at
the time were the struggle in Mandatory Palestine in the 1940s or Algeria in the 1950s and
1960s, indicating that the Middle East (geographical and imagined) was a point of interest
from the very beginning. The term ‘terrorism’ appeared in analyses of conflicts of this
kind and was used by journalists and scholars alike to refer to the tactics used by those
groups who openly resisted against the colonizing European regimes. As such, ‘terrorism’
was understood to be one of several strategies in the arsenal of ‘rebels’ and ‘insurgents.’
Notably, these early ‘terrorism’ analysts both in academia and journalism did not condemn
these ‘terrorists;’ rather, they often expressed understanding and sympathy with their
causes, not only suggesting that these ‘terrorists’ had legitimate political claims, but that
one ought to listen and actually attempt to negotiate a solution with the aggrieved party.
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Moreover, as my analysis in Chapter 2 has demonstrated, ‘terrorism’ was also used
to describe the actions of hostile states and regimes, meaning that in the contemporary
understanding of the issue, the use of ‘terrorism’ was not limited to non-state actors
alone. This is indeed noteworthy since the current usage of the term does not take this
perspective into account at all. In the 1940s, 1950s, and even 1960s, however, academic
and journalistic examinations of the political situation in, for example, the Soviet Union
regularly described the state’s behavior in terms of ‘terrorism’ and characterized Stalin as
‘terrorist,’ thus establishing a discursive link which would be active and productive for
decades to come. The supposed ‘terrorism’ in the Soviet Union was regularly denounced
by critics who used the term in these instances to characterize the use of violence by a
state against its own citizens as excessive and oppressive.
What these examples demonstrate, then, is that in the period from the 1940s to
the early 1960s ‘terrorism’ was not per se a negative label. In the vast majority of cases,
‘terrorism’ was positively connoted or, at the very least, used neutrally to simply describe
an action or strategy. It did not constitute an identity role to the extent it does today.
Rather, in the understanding of those times, people relied on ‘terrorism’ to achieve a clearly
defined political goal; ‘terrorist’ was not an all-encompassing characterization of who they
supposedly were. This precise usage of ‘terrorism’ as an analytical concept indicates that
the term itself had a specific meaning; ‘terrorism’ in the 1940s to 1960s constituted a
clearly defined signifier which circulated in strictly delineated public spaces and discursive
fields. Hence, while The New York Times reported on ‘terrorism’ in a fairly limited scope,
presidents barely mentioned the word, keeping it from becoming a public problem, and
the more systematic study of ‘terrorism’ in academia was still in its infancy. This meant
that, as a discourse, ‘terrorism’ had only a small reach and limited influence, operating in
specialized discursive fields with small audiences and few discursive contributors.
All this would, however, drastically change in the 1970s. The decade marked a period
of transition in which the ‘terrorism’ discourse began to develop a more coherent narrative
about the issue, spread into more public spaces, reached a bigger audience, and, ultimately,
started to become more dominant in American debates about (political) violence. Two
historic events in particular furthered the institutionalization of the ‘terrorism’ discourse
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in the United States: the “Munich Massacre” in 1972 and the Iranian hostage crisis which
lasted from 1979 to 1981. The coordinated attack by members of the Black September
Organization against the Israeli team during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich not
only shocked global audiences (TV news broadcast the hostage taking and subsequent
developments live, for the first time in history), it actually fueled and made visible
developments in U.S. politics, academia, news reporting, and cultural productions which
homogenized the ‘terrorism’ discourse and enabled it to enter the U.S. mainstream. These
incidents functioned as discursive events which problematized ‘terrorism’ for the first time
as an issue which could affect and threaten Americans directly.
The events in Munich sparked a variety of responses across different discursive
fields which ultimately helped the ‘terrorism’ discourse to become more widely spread and
more forceful than before. The Nixon administration, for instance, reacted to the growing
public concern over ‘terrorism’ after Munich by initiating several new policies meant to
create more knowledge about the issue and develop defensive measures against its threat.
Most importantly, Nixon founded the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT)
which became a first institutionalized space for designated ‘experts’ on ‘terrorism’ from
a variety of backgrounds to meet and discuss ideas. Moreover, from 1976 onward, the
government agency CIA began publishing an official annual report which presented and
analyzed threats of ‘terrorism’ against the United States. In the early to mid-1970s, then,
American politicians not only predominantly understood the events of Munich as a case
of ‘terrorism,’ they actively contributed to the construction of ‘terrorism’ as a threat to
the United States by developing policies and writing legislation meant to make the issue
knowable and manageable.
In part, these political initiatives also influenced the academic field. The political
demand for expertise on ‘terrorism’ helped to organize and institutionalize the group of
scholars working on the issue into a more coherent, structured field of research. The U.S.
government not only selected some scholars as official ‘experts’ on the topic as advisors
in committees like the CCCT, it also provided the field with recognition and funding.
The increased institutionalization of ‘terrorism’ studies as a field of academic research
also led to the foundation of several journals in the field while international conferences
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on ‘terrorism’ repeatedly brought together a core group of scholars who would become
the elite of the field in the decades to come. Research at the time focused on classifying
the issue at hand and scholars developed chronologies and typologies of ‘terrorism’ and
collected incidents and events designated as ‘terrorism’ in databases. All these practices
not only aimed at making ‘terrorism’ controllable by producing knowledge about it. They
also demonstrated to the American public that ‘terrorism’ constituted a serious threat to
American security and therefore needed to be taken seriously, effectively justifying the
existence of ‘terrorism’ studies in the first place.
Similar developments were visible in the American news media as well as cultural
productions of the time. In the case of The New York Times, for example, in the early
1970s, ‘terrorism’ became an official category for reporting in the newspaper, a step which
worked to institutionalize ‘terrorism’ as a topic of interest for the media and which helped
the discourse to reach a wider audience. This was also reflected in the increased volume of
articles addressing ‘terrorism’ in some form or other. On average, The New York Times
published 961 articles per year in the 1970s, a 31 % increase in reporting on ‘terrorism’
within a decade. This effectively confirmed to readers that ‘terrorism’ was indeed something
they needed to be concerned about as The New York Times began to frame and interpret
incidents of violence explicitly as ‘terrorism’ in greater numbers than ever before.
Likewise, American popular culture began to discover ‘terrorists,’ particularly
‘Palestinian terrorists’ as villains who threatened America (or Israel). Novels and films of
the decade repeatedly imagined the United States as under attack from generically ‘Arab
terrorists’ or, alternatively, specifically ‘Palestinian terrorists.’ These cultural productions
also constructed the Middle East as hub for ‘terrorism’ and violence and increasingly
linked nations and peoples living in the region to ‘terrorism’ against the United States.
In these texts, the U.S. was presented as vulnerable to ‘terrorism’ from the Middle East,
thus validating and furthering fears about the dangers of ‘terrorism’ in American society.
What is more, these cultural productions successfully fused images of the ‘terrorist’ enemy
with Orientalist stereotypes about ‘Arabs’ and the Middle East as backward, hateful,
lecherous, violent, and dangerous, thus actively constructing and circulating tropes of
‘Arab’ or ‘Palestinian terrorists’ in American discourses on violence and ‘terrorism.’
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All these developments in U.S. politics, academia, news reporting, and popular
culture had consequences for the meaning of ‘terrorism’ itself. Most importantly, the
term acquired an inherently negative connotation in the U.S., in large parts because of
American sympathies for Israel. Israel was widely seen as innocent victim of Palestinian
(or rather universal ‘Arab’) aggression, a view fueled by the strong cultural, political,
and economic ties between the U.S. and Israel. The “special relationship” between these
two nations predetermined to a considerable extent how violence coded as ‘terrorism’
against Israel would be interpreted: inherently negative. This also meant that sympathies
or understanding for the grievances of the ‘terrorist’ perpetrators, a marked characteristic
of the ‘terrorism’ discourse in earlier decades, all but disappeared from conceptualizations
of ‘terrorism’ in the 1970s. While ‘Jewish terrorism’ was understandable in the 1940s to
1960s, ‘Palestinian terrorists’ in the 1970s were no longer accorded this kind of empathy.
In a parallel development, ‘terrorism’ not only became a negative term expressing
condemnation and repulsion with the perpetrators and their use of violence, this violence
was now deemed illegitimate and immoral. The political and cultural context of these
‘terrorist’ incidents as well as the political agenda of the perpetrators was systematically
denied and erased. Instead, the ‘terrorism’ discourse of the 1970s posited that the usually
‘Arab’ or ‘Palestinian terrorists’ acted because of their hatred for ‘the West’ and were
driven by their base sentiments – conceptualizations and explanations clearly driven
by Orientalist stereotypes about ‘Arabs’ and the Middle East at the time. Indeed, the
‘terrorism’ discourse of the 1970s singled out the Middle East, presenting the (imagined
and geographic) region as hotbed of ‘terrorism’ against ‘the West.’
Since the discursive focus came to rest on these ‘Arab’ and ‘Palestinian terrorist’
groups, another element of meaning previously associated with the concept of ‘terrorism’
also faded away. In the understanding of the 1970s, ‘terrorism’ was predominantly
committed by non-state actors against a nation or legitimate government. While in
previous decades conceptualizations of the issue had allowed for the possibility that states
used ‘terrorism’ against their own people, this meaning component practically disappeared
in the 1970s. Now, ‘terrorism’ described illicit violence used by small groups fighting
either their own government or attacking another nation altogether; hence, ‘terrorism’ was
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also increasingly linked to ‘(guerrilla) war(fare)’ and ‘insurrection’ to mark the negative
connotation of the term and its more restricted applicability.
Thus, when a group of protesters scaled the walls of the U.S. embassy compound in
Tehran on November 4, 1979 and took the embassy staff hostage, the ‘terrorism’ discourse
was wide-spread and dynamic enough to offer a viable framing of the events to American
audiences. Indeed, it seemed to outright ‘prove’ earlier knowledge claims made by the
discourse that Americans were vulnerable to ‘terrorism’ from the Middle East (Iran,
actually a non-Arab nation, had long been incorporated into the imaginary Middle East
by American culture and politics) simply because of the positive values their nation
supposedly represented. The Iranian hostage crisis, which lasted for 444 days and played
out under unprecedented public and media scrutiny, ultimately laid the foundation for the
dominance of the ‘terrorism’ discourse in later decades.
President Carter almost immediately called the incident an act of ‘international
terrorism’ against the United States and then stuck to that rhetoric throughout the
remainder of the hostage crisis, indicating that the discourse already enjoyed an influential
position in debates about (political) violence in the late 1970s. News media outlets like
The New York Times followed suit and equally framed the crisis in Iran as ‘terrorism.’
As the analysis in Chapter 2 has shown, the experience of the Iranian hostage crisis also
affected the ‘terrorism’ discourse in another important way: It introduced two meaning
components which would prove central to conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ from then on.
First of all, it characterized the ‘terrorism’ of the Iranian hostage crisis as ‘international’ in
nature, meaning that it constituted a threat against the entire global community. It also
implied that these ‘international terrorists’ operated across state borders and/or joined
forces with ‘terrorists’ in other nations or regions. This considerably elevated the threat
of ‘(international) terrorism’ and effectively justified the significant amount of political
attention and media coverage given to the Iranian hostage crisis over such a long period of
time.
The other new meaning component comprised the notion that while states did not
engage themselves in ‘terrorism’ against other nations, they could nevertheless sponsor it.
Initially a rhetoric move to avoid charging the nation of Iran directly with ‘terrorism’ –
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an accusation which would have required a strong military response, possibly war, from
the United States – the Carter administration rather blamed the Iranian government
for supporting the ‘terrorist’ hostage takers. While it remained unclear what ‘sponsoring
terrorism’ actually entailed, the charge nevertheless carried political weight as it allowed
the president to present himself as astute analyst of the crisis and vocal critic of the Iranian
government without actually escalating the already very tense situation any further. In
the end, the successful framing of the Iranian hostage crisis as ‘international terrorism’
enabled the ‘terrorism’ discourse to adapt in ways that not only strengthened its standing
in debates about (political) violence but also increased its appeal and applicability, setting
it on the course to become the hegemonic discourse in debates about (political) violence.
Thus, when Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, the ‘terrorism’ discourse
had proven itself as a useful tool to ascribe meaning to historical events, making it easier
for the discourse to manifest its dominant position in debates about (political) violence
and America’s role in world politics. Indeed, this trend continued into the 1980s when
ideas about ‘terrorism’ seeped into public debates about the intensifying Cold War. As
the analysis in Chapter 3 has shown, particularly the first half of the decade was marked
by serious and wide-spread concern about Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorism’ directed against
the United States as another Soviet strategy in the conflict between the two global powers.
The narrative posited that the Soviet Union, at times directly and at times through loyal
proxies like Cuba, Libya, or Palestinian factions, organized and financed all major ‘terrorist’
groups across the globe so that they would attack (and defeat) the United States, deciding
the Cold War in favor of the Soviet Union.
As I have demonstrated in Chapter 3, different versions of this conspiracy theory
circulated through a variety of discursive fields. A ‘strong’ rendition of the narrative was
propagated by a small group of scholars, journalists, and even members of the American
legislative branch who all outright accused the Soviet Union of organizing, training, and
financing specific ‘terrorist’ groups in Moscow, Cuba, and the Middle East to do the Soviet
Union’s bidding. At the same time, a ‘softer’ version of the conspiracy theory circulated in
other areas of American public life which repeated only a few of its core claims and then
only in vague and ambiguous terms. Particularly President Reagan avoided accusing the
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Soviet Union openly, directly, and in detail of ‘terrorist’ activities. Rather, the president
remained noticeably imprecise, criticizing the Soviet Union for ‘sponsoring terrorism’
without explaining what this actually entailed in his view.
In this regard, the discussion in Chapter 3 has also illustrated that the status change
of conspiracy theories from legitimate to illegitimate, marginalized knowledge meant that
discursive agents who openly proclaimed and advocated conspiracy theories were risking
ridicule, stigmatization, and their influential speaking position in the discourse. Hence,
all proponents of the narrative of Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorism,’ whether they followed the
‘strong’ or the ‘soft’ version, studiously avoided using openly conspiracist language when
arguing their case. What is more, particularly texts propagating the ‘softer’ version of the
conspiracy theory purposefully relied on ambiguous language in order to appeal to both
conspiracy theorists and non-conspiracy theorists so that both groups could simultaneously
find their world-views confirmed.
Ultimately, the conspiracy theory fulfilled several important political functions.
First and foremost, it constituted a useful tool to further escalate the Cold War by making
the Soviet Union appear more dangerous and powerful than it really was. The rhetoric of a
‘good’ United States in conflict with a ‘terrorism’-sponsoring Soviet Union also reinforced
the ideological opposition between the two antagonists and justified and legitimized the
re-militarization of the United States both rhetorically but also practically since the Reagan
administration invested heavily in offense and defense measures. Lastly, the conspiracy
theory worked similar to other Red Scare tactics to unify the country, quell dissent, and
manage public opinion in favor of the Reagan administration’s escalation of the Cold War.
Yet, just as quickly as the conspiracy theory about a Soviet-sponsored ‘terrorism’
network had become popular, it also vanished again from debates about ‘terrorism’ and
American foreign policy. In the mid- to late 1980s, the Cold War began to thaw as both
the U.S. and the USSR instigated a more conciliatory approach to their relationship. This
drastic change in U.S. foreign policy eventually meant that the Soviet Union was no longer
considered to be the nation’s arch-nemesis, effectively robbing the conspiracy theory of its
main antagonist and collapsing the narrative all-together. Instead, the discursive focus
came to rest directly on ‘terrorists’ in and from the Middle East who were singled out
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based on their ethnicity (‘Arab’) and religion (‘Muslim’ or, alternatively, ‘Islamic’). No
longer seen as Soviet proxies and pawns, the discourse on ‘terrorism’ instead constructed
‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim terrorists’ from the Middle East as serious threat to U.S. interests
abroad and at home.
However, the depiction of these ‘terrorists’ was clearly influenced by previous
discursivizations of ‘terrorism,’ pointing once more to the power and continuity of the
discourse itself which had successfully incorporated meaning components developed during
the Iranian hostage crisis and the height of the Soviet ‘terrorism’ network conspiracy theory.
Thus, the ‘terrorism’ discourse posited at the end of the decade that these ‘Arab’ and
‘Muslim terrorists’ operated in international networks and at times enjoyed the explicit
support (both financially and materially) from ‘evil’ regimes in the Middle East, particularly
Qaddafi’s Libya. Cultural productions, the American news media, and politicians and
scholars alike represented the geographical and imaginary Middle East as hotbed of
anti-American ‘terrorism,’ thus vastly escalating the threat by suggesting an entire region
of the globe relied on and exported ‘terrorism’ in order to achieve its goals, particularly
the destruction of the United States as representative of progressive ‘Western’ values.
But the ‘terrorism’ discourse not only stabilized previous conceptualizations of
the issue, it also incorporated new elements developed throughout the 1980s. During
the Reagan administrations, ‘terrorism’ became a central political and cultural concern,
indicating that the discourse had become more dominant than before. Likewise, Reagan
noticeably moralized the issue, regularly calling ‘terrorism’ an “evil scourge.” This charged
the concept affectively and emotionalized the issue, making more objective analyses of
incidents deemed ‘terrorism’ much harder to undertake and defend since one ran the
danger of being accused of sympathizing with ‘terrorists.’ It also furthered the binary
opposition between the ‘good,’ explicitly ‘non-terroristic’ United States and its ‘evil,’
‘terrorist’ enemies.
Lastly, the ‘terrorism’ discourse was increasingly militarized during the 1980s.
Reagan was the first U.S. president to openly declare a “war against terrorism” and
consistently relied on militaristic language when talking about ‘terrorism’ in his official
speeches and statements. These sentiments were echoed by ‘terrorism’ scholars, journalists,
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and cultural texts like pulp novels who also tended to frame the American fight against
‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim terrorists’ as a form of war. At the end of the decade, then, ‘terrorism’
predominantly described illegitimate violence by ‘evil’ and depraved ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’
who used ‘terrorism’ to wage war on the United States. These conceptualizations of
‘terrorism’ effectively escalated the threat to unprecedented proportions and legitimized
a strong military response. It also stabilized the discourse’s standing in debates about
American foreign policy and its global role so that at the end of the decade, ‘terrorism,’
particularly the ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ kind, provided the hegemonic frame of interpretation
for incidents of (political) violence.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the ending of the Cold War in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, was in some ways a shock for the ‘terrorism’ discourse because
its tangible material consequences also affected its dominance and power: funding for
‘terrorism’ research was significantly cut, the demand for expertise on ‘terrorism’ abated,
and public and political declarations of peace and international goodwill and alliances (as,
for instance, envisioned in President George H. W. Bush’s “New World Order”) created
the impression that ‘terrorism’ was no longer a political and cultural problem. In the
early 1990s, despite its strong standing in earlier years, the discourse on ‘terrorism’ was in
danger of losing its relevance and hegemonic position in debates about (political) violence.
Indeed, as Chapter 4 of this study has illustrated, the early 1990s constituted a
phase of low activity for the discourse which also led to a lower standing of ‘terrorism’ in
public discourses. Newly-elected President Bush, for instance, spoke relatively little about
‘terrorism’ during his presidency and also refrained from using related concepts from the
field of ‘terrorism’ and political violence. Similarly, the academic community remained
fairly quiet; no major conferences were held and no significant publications appeared in
the early 1990s, suggesting that ‘terrorism’ scholars found themselves marginalized in
academic debates about political violence. Newspapers like The New York Times also
reported less on ‘terrorism’ and no major cultural productions in the early 1990s focused
on ‘terrorism’ as a threat to U.S. security abroad or at home; only a few minor ‘B-movies’
featured ‘terrorism’ plot lines.
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However, this would change again within a few years. While ‘terrorism’ may not
have been a central concern in the early 1990s, other ideas about the state of the world’s
trouble spots gained prominence. First and foremost, Samuel Huntington’s hypothesis
about an immanent “Clash of Civilizations” between “the West and the Rest” was widely
disseminated and discussed. Huntington’s claims that conflicts between ‘the West’ and
particularly ‘Islamic’ cultures (or civilizations) were inevitable because of the disparate
value systems were confirmed and supported by a variety of other significant scholars
of the Middle East, particularly Bernard Lewis. Importantly, these ideas about Islam
underwriting the claims about a “Clash of Civilizations,” i.e. that Muslims tended to
be fanatic believers, highly emotional instead of rational, cunning, and violent, not only
reactivated long-established Orientalist discourses about the Middle East, they also,
ultimately, reinvigorated the ‘terrorism’ discourse in the 1990s.
The mid-1990s thus saw the return of the ‘terrorism’ discourse to power, but with
an adapted discursive focus reflecting both the unpleasant experience of irrelevance from
earlier years and the wide-spread concerns over an immanent “Clash of Civilizations.”
Hence, the discourse on ‘terrorism’ in the mid- to late 1990s stipulated that ‘terrorism’ was
‘new’ and that ‘Islamic terrorism’ was the main manifestation one needed to worry about.
Clearly, claims by academics that the ‘terrorism’ of the 1990s was ‘new’ and different
compared to previous forms was the result of, at least in part, efforts to demonstrate the
continued relevance of ‘terrorism’ studies as a field worth funding. This ‘new terrorism’
was overwhelmingly conceptualized as relying on “weapons of mass destruction” and other
new technology which also meant that it was more indiscriminate and lethal than before.
At the same time, past meaning components remained active, alleging that these ‘new
terrorists’ continued to operate in international networks and still relied on sponsors who
could be either entire states or wealthy and ruthless individuals like Osama bin Laden.
‘Terrorism’ was also still characterized as a form of war.
The most dangerous manifestation of this ‘new terrorism’ was considered to be the
threat of ‘Islamic terrorism.’ The conceptualization of ‘new Islamic terrorism’ successfully
merged Orientalist notions of a “Clash of Civilizations” between ‘the West,’ i.e. the United
States, and “Islamic civilization,” i.e. the imaginary and geographical Middle East, with
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ideas about ‘new terrorism.’ It posited that these ‘new Islamic terrorists’ were religious
zealots who did not hesitate to kill great numbers of people with modern technology,
particularly “weapons of mass destruction,” in order to fight (and destroy) ‘the West.’
These ‘new Islamic terrorists’ were supposedly motivated by their faith in Islam; their
interests were allegedly purely religious and not at all political. Hence, the United States as
representative of ‘Western’ values and power was their prime target and scholars regularly
warned of the unprecedented threat emanating from ‘new Islamic terrorism’ since these
perpetrators were also seen as better organized and financed than previous ‘terrorists’ and
therefore capable of carrying out large-scale ‘terrorist’ attacks across the globe.
These ideas were seemingly confirmed by a series of high-profile attacks against
American targets at home and abroad, particularly the bombing of the World Trade Center
in 1993, the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, and the bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole moored in Yemen in 2000. When investigations revealed that these incidents had all
been carried out by Middle Eastern groups with ties to Osama bin Laden, the framing of
these events as ‘new Islamic terrorism’ became increasingly ‘natural’ and obvious. Political,
media, and scholarly explanations dismissed the possibility of political objectives behind
the attacks and instead explained that what had motivated the perpetrators was their
fervent belief in Islam. Indeed, the pervasive fear of ‘new Islamic terrorism’ successfully
attacking the United States at home and abroad was also reflected in an increasing number
of more and more successful Hollywood movies which visualized the American fight against
fanatical ‘Islamic terrorists.’ Likewise, the news media, as the example of The New York
Times illustrated, presented and circulated similar conceptualizations of ‘new Islamic
terrorism’ as main danger for American national security. Meanwhile, voices doubting or
criticizing the concept of ‘new Islamic terrorism’ were regularly marginalized and silenced,
assuring the practically unhindered dominance of the discourse on ‘new Islamic terrorism’
at the end of the 1990s.
Just how powerful the ‘terrorism’ discourse had become at the onset of the new
millennium became clear when President Bush (and all other central discursive agents with
him) immediately interpreted the September 11, 2001 attacks as ‘terrorism’ against the
United States. No other interpretative frame from the realm of ‘political violence’ could
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even remotely compete with the ‘terrorism’ discourse and offer an alternative interpretation.
Then, once more details about the perpetrators and their preparations were made public,
the discursivizations also stressed that the ‘terrorists’ had been ‘Islamic,’ i.e. Muslim zealots
who had chosen to attack the United States because of the ‘Western’ values the country
supposedly represented. For many, particularly in the scholarly community, the 9/11
attacks confirmed the knowledge claims made by the ‘new Islamic terrorism’ discourse in
previous years. Thus, as the analysis in Chapter 5 of this study has indicated, constructions
of ‘Islamic terrorists’ as evil, violent, dangerous, religious fanatics permeated American
popular culture, media reporting, the academic study of ‘terrorism,’ and the political
discourse on the issue, both spreading the discourse even further as well as cementing its
hegemonic standing in American society.
Indeed, in some ways, the Bush administration, along with other actors such as
journalists, scholars, and even artists, could not have interpreted the events of 9/11 in any
other manner given the discourse’s omnipresence and power when the attacks occurred.
President Bush’s decision to wage a “war against terrorism” in response to the attacks
not only testified to the continued, unrivaled dominance of the ‘terrorism’ discourse at
the beginning of the new millennium, it also further confirmed the discourse’s hegemony,
enabling it to become even more entrenched in American politics, academia, news reporting,
and popular culture. These dynamics made it more difficult than before to voice criticism
or introduce alternative readings and meanings of the events. As the discussion in Chapter
5 has also shown, criticism and opposition coalesced around the conduct of the “war
on terror(ism),” with the majority of Americans increasingly indignant over how the
administration was handling the war. Yet, importantly, the ‘terrorism’ paradigm itself was
never questioned, highlighting how forceful the discourse really was.
These dynamics also had consequences for the meaning of the term itself. Following
the discursivizations of ‘terrorism’ in the 1990s, ‘terrorism’ predominantly described
illegitimate violence by Muslim fanatics against the United States. In the wake of 9/11 and
the ensuing “war on terror(ism),” however, the term’s meaning became increasingly vague
and elastic as additional meaning components such as the recourse to “weapons of mass
destruction” were stripped away. ‘Islamic’ and ‘terrorism’ now existed in a quasi-symbiotic
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relationship with one concept automatically evoking the other. ‘Terrorism’ was usually
‘Islamic’ in nature and the word ‘Islamic’ appeared so often in the context of ‘terrorism’
that it displaced any other type of activity connected to it. The ‘terrorism’ under discussion
was thus unquestionably ‘Islamic’ and there were no other possible ‘Islamic’ activities than
‘terrorism.’ All this greatly increased the concept’s applicability to an ever-wider array of
situations and incidents, making the threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’ appear pervasive and
inescapable.
In this regard, Chapter 5 has also argued that the discourse has been undergoing
another noteworthy development. In the mid- to late 2000s, the ‘(Islamic) terrorism’
discourse began to slowly incorporate related concepts such as ‘extremism’ and
‘fundamentalism’ as synonyms for ‘Islamic terrorism’ into its activities. This meant that
not only was ‘Islamic terrorism’ constructed as serious threat to American national security,
but discursive actors also warned of ‘Islamic extremism’ and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ as
dangers for the United States. Yet, essentially, both these terms referred to the same signified
as ‘Islamic terrorism’ already did, i.e. illegitimate violence by Muslim zealots against the
United States who acted because of their religious beliefs. The ‘terrorism’ discourse had
evidently conquered and now controlled a discursive ‘territory’ of unprecedented size while
simultaneously diversifying its terminology to obscure the full scale of its reach.
These developments not only escalated the supposed threat emanating from ‘Islamic
terrorism’ further, but, importantly, constituted strategies to obscure and hide the
discourse’s precise operations. At the end of the first decade of the new millennium, then,
the discourse on ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ was preparing to move into the shadows, concealing
its manifestations and practices while continuing to predetermine, dominate, and control
how instances of violence against the United States were framed and constructed. It
made it much harder to unmask the methods and processes through which the ‘terrorism’
discourse ruled and further quenched criticism and opposition to its claims. Thus, when
George W. Bush handed over the presidency to Barrack Obama on January 20, 2008, the
‘(Islamic) terrorism’ discourse was so firmly entrenched in American politics and culture
that, as I discuss in the next section, it left the incumbent president little to no alternative
approaches to the issue.
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6.1 “We Will [. . . ] Relentlessly Confront Violent Extremists” –
The ‘Terrorism’ Discourse During the Obama Presidency
When on the campaign trail during his bid for the presidency in 2008, Democratic nominee
Barack Obama liked to present himself as offering a fresh, improved, and more informed
approach to the troubles of the 21st century, particularly the Bush administration’s ongoing
“war on terror(ism).” In a speech on July 15, 2008, for instance, Obama heavily criticized the
Bush administration for its disastrous conduct of the war in Iraq and the failed opportunity
in the wake of 9/11 to “deploy[ ] the full force of American power to hunt down and
destroy Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and all of the terrorists responsible
for 9/11, while supporting real security in Afghanistan” (“Remarks in Washington”).
Obama then offered a somber analysis of the last few years, denouncing that “[i]nstead,
we [. . . ] lost thousands of American lives, spent nearly a trillion dollars, alienated allies
and neglected emerging threats – all in the cause of fighting a war for well over five years
in a country that had absolutely nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks.” Clearly, then, at
the time that Obama was addressing voters across the country, public opinion had shifted
to such an extent that a nominee for President of the United States could openly criticize
and condemn the current administration’s handling of the “war on terror(ism)” without
being considered unpatriotic or ignorant. On the contrary, by denouncing the conduct of
the “war on terror(ism),” particularly the war in Iraq, Obama could position himself as
astute analyst and promise his audiences a more perceptive approach focused on solving
a disastrous situation which caused great human and material costs and international
embarrassment to the country.
Yet, while Barack Obama presented himself as fresh-faced alternative with an
entirely different set of values and political as well as social objectives, closer analysis
of his rhetoric actually shows that when it came to the issue of ‘terrorism,’ he agreed
with, continued, and even expanded many of the discursive trends and developments which
had emerged during the presidencies of his predecessors.1 Like George W. Bush before
him, President Obama conceptualized ‘terrorism’ as motivated by the perpetrators’ belief
in Islam, assumed that these ‘Islamic terrorists’ operated in international networks with
1See also McCrisken, “Obama’s Drone” and “Ten.”
287
third-party support, and never questioned the need to fight ‘terrorism’ as a war through
military operations in the Middle East and beyond. Moreover, during his presidency,
the discourse on ‘Islamic terrorism’ continued to expand its powerful standing while
simultaneously reducing its visibility. Direct and overt references to ‘(Islamic) terrorism’
abated in favor of synonyms (e.g. ‘extremism’) and key names and events (e.g. Osama
bin Laden, 9/11). These allusions and remarks triggered the discourse’s main knowledge
claims without having to openly mention and explain it every single time, indicating the
pervasive omnipresence of the ‘terrorism’ discourse in American society as the 21st century
wore on.
These discursive trends and developments could be observed regularly in the
president’s public speeches and statements. For instance, fairly early into his presidency,
Obama held a widely-noted speech on June 4, 2009 at Cairo University in which he reflected
on America’s volatile relationship with nations in the Middle East, covering a wide array
of topics including the “war on terror(ism),” the prospect for peace between Israel and
the Palestinians, the fight against ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ as well as human rights and
the role of women in society. The speech was clearly meant to mark “a new beginning” in
relations between the United States and the Middle East and, overall, President Obama
used a conciliatory tone, taking care to acknowledge that American behavior towards the
Middle East had not always been appropriate, stressing that his administration would
aim to correct several past mistakes and offenses like the use of torture in interrogation
(“Remarks in Cairo”).
The speech is also notable for how it addressed and framed the issue of ‘Islamic
terrorism.’ Even though the president repeatedly emphasized positive aspects about Islam
and recognized it as one of the major religions in the United States, he nevertheless also
subtly presented Islam as a motivation behind anti-American violence, ‘terrorism,’ and
‘extremism.’ Fairly early into his speech, Obama noted, for example, “We meet at a time
of great tension between the United States and Muslims around the world, tension rooted
in historical forces that go beyond any current policy debate. [. . . ] the sweeping change
brought by modernity and globalization led many Muslims to view the West as hostile to
the traditions of Islam.” Here, the president acknowledged the opposition between “the
288
United States and Muslims around the world” and portrayed it as a religious conflict by
grouping together Muslims in their entirety instead of casting it as a disagreement between,
for example, different sovereign nations. Likewise, his references to the hostility by “many
Muslims” to ‘the West’ because of the effects of “modernity and globalization” tapped
into familiar Orientalist discourses about a Huntington-esque “Clash of Civilizations.”2
In this context, President Obama also addressed 9/11, saying:
Violent extremists have exploited these tensions in a small, but potent minority of Muslims.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continued efforts of these extremists to engage
in violence against civilians has led some in my country to view Islam as inevitably hostile
not only to America and Western countries, but also to human rights. All this has bred
more fear and more mistrust.
The president depicted the events of September 11, 2001 as actions committed by a “small,
but potent minority of Muslims” edged on by “[v]iolent extremists,” clearly employing
the rhetorical strategy of his predecessor to distinguish between a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ form
of Islam. In effect, Obama continued to frame Islam as consisting of a ‘good’ part which
existed and thrived in American society and interpreted this as markers for American
tolerance, progress, and multi-culturalism while simultaneously denouncing the ‘extremist’
elements in Islam which bred ‘terrorism’ and violence in other parts of the world. Ultimately,
the president, in the rhetorical tradition of his predecessor, also suggested that Islam as a
whole was suspect because it easily motivated anti-American ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism.’
Equally noteworthy in this speech is that President Obama tapped into the ‘Islamic
terrorism’ discourse and its knowledge claims via indirect references. Hence, he spoke
about 9/11, immediately activating notions of ‘Islamic terrorism,’ without actually using
the word ‘terrorism’ itself. Thus, when addressing his audience in Cairo, Obama did not
use the words ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ at all, but he mentioned ‘extremism’ twice and
‘extremist(s)’ a total of nine times. Obama’s careful wording avoided using the highly
emotionalized and politicized word ‘terrorism;’ instead, he mobilized the discourse by
using coded language such as references to key events, particularly the 9/11 attacks, and
related concepts which functioned as synonyms, in this case the word ‘extremism.’ This
2Indeed, at a later point in the speech, Obama even spoke of “fault lines” (albeit between Sunni and
Shia Muslims and not ‘the West’ and Islam) and also disagreed with those who “suggest[ed] that it
[wa]sn’t worth the effort, that we [we]re fated to disagree and civilizations [we]re doomed to clash.”
This language clearly echoes Huntington’s rhetoric in The Clash of Civilizations, suggesting that the
president’s world-view was significantly influenced by these ideas.
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avoided directly offending his direct audience in Cairo while also signaling to the public at
home that Obama was not afraid to denounce ‘Islamic terrorism.’ As I have discussed in
Chapter 5 of this study, towards the end of the 2000s, the discourse on ‘terrorism’ began
to diversify by incorporating related terms and concepts as synonyms into its narrative
about ‘terrorism.’ Evidently, then, President Obama extended this practice into his own
presidency to great effect.
In the speech in Cairo, this effect was predominantly achieved via references to
‘Islamic extremism.’ For instance, the president maintained, “The first issue that we have
to confront is violent extremism in all of its forms. [. . . ] I made clear that America is
not, and never will be, at war with Islam. We will, however, relentlessly confront violent
extremists who pose a grave threat to our security.” Here, the president engaged once more
in the rhetoric of ‘good’ Islam vs. ‘bad’ Islam and then proceeded to directly link Islam
to the threat of “violent extremists,” clearly evoking the specter of ‘Islamic terrorism’
through this veiled reference. Similarly, he warned at a later point in the speech, “America
will defend itself, [. . . ] and we will do so in partnership with Muslim communities, which
are also threatened. The sooner the extremists are isolated and unwelcome in Muslim
communities, the sooner we will all be safer.” In this instance, the distinction between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam actually collapsed as “the extremists” (read: ‘terrorists’) were
depicted as indistinguishable from regular “Muslim communities” and as powerful enough
to infiltrate and control these social groups.
Indeed, President Obama’s speech in Cairo did not constitute an exception in this
regard. He regularly linked ‘terrorism’ to Islam and continued to conceptualize the issue in
the same vein as his predecessors as a form of war and as operating in international networks.
In his speech announcing the successful killing of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011, for
instance, President Obama reminisced about the impact of the 9/11 attacks, saying that
[w]e quickly learned that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Al Qaida, an organization
headed by Usama bin Laden, which had openly declared war on the United States and
was committed to killing innocents in our country and around the globe. And so we went
to war against Al Qaida to protect our citizens, our friends, and our allies. (“Remarks on
the Death”)
In this short paragraph, Obama characterized the September 11 attacks as an act of war
and justified the ensuing “war on terror(ism)” as necessary measure to defend and “protect
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our citizens, our friends, and our allies.” Moreover, in this important speech, the president
described al-Qaeda as international ‘terrorist’ network, claiming that after bin Laden
escaped into Pakistan, “Al Qaida continued to operate from along that border and operate
through its affiliates across the world.” In the president’s words, then, al-Qaeda functioned
as a highly skilled ‘terrorist’ group headed by bin Laden which had attacked the United
States simply because it wanted “to kill[ ] innocents in our country and around the globe.”
According to the president, al-Qaeda was organized as an international network with many
“affiliates across the world.” As these descriptions and characterizations make clear, then,
President Obama conceptualized the threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in the same vein as his
predecessors, ultimately confirming, maintaining, and expanding the discourse’s reach and
power.
The only difference to previous discursivizations of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is that the
direct discursive links between Islam and ‘terrorism’ were more muted than before. Obama
could easily tap into already firmly established constructions of ‘terrorism’ as ‘Islamic’ in
nature and assume that his audiences made this connection on their own, consciously and
unconsciously. Hence, references to “the 9/11 attacks” and “Al Qaida, an organization
headed by Usama bin Laden” sufficed to evoke the specter of ‘Islamic terrorism.’ These
events and people had been thoroughly and unquestionably turned into markers for ‘Islamic
terrorism’ in previous years, meaning that mentioning any of these terms automatically
conjured the sub-text of ‘Islamic terrorism.’ This illustrates once more the omnipresence
and dominance of the ‘terrorism’ discourse and indicates that the overt manifestations of
the discourse were increasingly camouflaged and its operations more and more concealed.3
The increasing invisibility of the workings of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse not
only affected the president’s language about the issue. They were also reflected in the
manner in which he continued the “war on terror(ism)” on a strategical, practical level.
Take, for instance, the aftermath of “Operation Neptune Spear,” the mission to capture
and/or kill bin Laden. The operation to find and execute the man who had orchestrated
the 9/11 attacks and who had become, at least for a while, the personification of ‘Islamic
terrorism’ afterwards was shrouded in secrecy. To this day, it is not entirely clear how the
3More examples of speeches in which President Obama spoke about ‘Islamic terrorism’ as threat to U.S.
security in this manner include, e.g., “Remarks on Accepting” and “Remarks at the State.”
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raid went down as the Obama administration put out a narrative of events which it then
had to correct several times for obvious logical fallacies (e.g. R. Booth). Moreover, two
SEALs who identified themselves as members of the mission team later published differing
accounts of the raid, further obscuring attempts to establish an accurate version of events.4
Then, in May 2015, the respected journalist Seymour Hersh published a long and
widely-discussed piece in The London Review of Books in which he claimed that
the CIA did not learn of bin Laden’s whereabouts by tracking his couriers, as the White
House has claimed since May 2011, but from a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer
who betrayed the secret in return for much of the $25 million reward offered by the US,
and that, while Obama did order the raid and the Seal team did carry it out, many other
aspects of the administration’s account were false.
Given the many different versions which circulated by then about how Osama bin Laden
had supposedly been killed, it became increasingly difficult to formulate an authoritative
account of what had happened. Rather, public debates became caught up in related issues
such as whether the order had been to ‘kill or capture’ or ‘kill and capture’ or whether the
mission had been lawful under contemporary legal framework.5 This meant effectively that
the framing of the assassination as victory over ‘Islamic terrorism’ was not questioned;
indeed, it did not figure prominently in debates surrounding “Operation Neptune Spear” at
all, suggesting that the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse remained fundamentally unchallenged.
In fact, these debates about aspects of “Operation Neptune Spear” effectively
clouded the visibility of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse and its power to shape U.S.
foreign and military policy. President Obama had ordered the killing of Osama bin Laden
as part of the United States’ fight against ‘Islamic terrorism,’ yet the order of events was
kept from becoming public knowledge. Apart from contradictory accounts by participants,
the White House refused to release any visual evidence of bin Laden’s death and classified
all documents relating to the decade-long search for bin Laden as well as material about the
raid itself. Requests for information by journalists through the Freedom of Information Act
were also regularly denied. This demonstrates that the Obama administration preferred to
operate in secret whenever ‘Islamic terrorism’ was concerned. The government worked to
4Chuck Pfarrer wrote Seal Target Geronimo in 2011. A year later, Matt Bissonnette’s book-length account
of the mission, entitled No Easy Day, was published. Pfarrer’s narrative severely contradicts the official
version of events while Bissonnette’s book, in turn, repudiates many of Pfarrer’s claims.
5For debates about the exact orders given to the SEALs, see, e.g., Hosenball and Spetalnick as well as
Scherer. For arguments surrounding the legal constraints of the mission, see, e.g. de Vogue and Longstreth.
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actively obscure and hide the conduct and extent of its practices meant to combat ‘Islamic
terrorism,’ exemplified by the confusion in the aftermath of the killing of Osama bin
Laden in May 2011. It also serves as example for how discursive constructions of ‘Islamic
terrorism,’ which became increasingly invisible, directly affected political policies, creating
a sort of feedback loop in which language and political practice continuously reinforced
each other, ultimately obscuring the workings of the ‘terrorism’ discourse and making it
harder (if not impossible) to lay bare its mechanisms of power.
The handling of “Operation Neptune Spear” was not the only political incident
which indicated that the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse was becoming less and less visible
while simultaneously expanding its power. On May 23, 2013, President Obama spoke at
the National Defense University and outlined his vision for the continued fight against
‘(Islamic) terrorism.’ In the speech, Obama argued that “we must define our effort not as
a boundless global war on terror, but rather, as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to
dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America” (“Remarks at
National”). Widely taken as a declaration of ending the “war on terror(ism)” (e.g. Harnden;
Shinkman), the president actually argued for a continuation of warfare against “violent
extremists,” coded language meaning ‘Islamic terrorism.’ Indeed, during his presidency,
drone warfare expanded and the United States became further embroiled in the imaginary
and geographical Middle East, particularly Pakistan, Yemen, and territory occupied by
the Islamic State. Drones were favored by the Obama administration precisely because
they promised controlled, targeted hits against the ‘terrorist’ enemy instead of lengthy
and costly military operations (McCrisken, “Obama‘s Drone” 106; Bowden, “Killing;”
Whetham 69). This has led the French philosopher Gre´goire Chamayou to claim that
“[t]he drone has become one of the emblems of Barack Obama’s presidency, the instrument
of his official antiterrorist doctrine” (14).
Obama’s choice to expand the use of drone technology in the war against ‘Islamic
terrorists’ is highly interesting since it points once again to the growing invisibility of
the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse in language and practice. Warfare by drones requires
significantly less personnel and can be conducted from within the United States, meaning
that no complex logistical programs need to be established to, e.g., transport troops
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Figure 6.1: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York Times, 2005-2017
into another country as is the case in ‘traditional’ war. This meant effectively that the
“war on terror(ism)” under the Obama administration was not waged publicly. Instead,
the president and a small group of advisors decided on a weekly basis which ‘(Islamic)
terrorists’ would be selected for assassination through drones (Chamayou 46-47; McCrisken,
“Obama’s Drone” 101-02). Neither the names of the human targets nor the selection criteria
were made public, indicating that while concern over ‘Islamic terrorism’ constituted a
central part of American foreign policy, it was no longer openly talked about.
During the Obama presidency, the discourse on ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ also continued
to dominate the news. As Figure 6.1 illustrates, the overall volume of reporting on
‘terrorism’ in The New York Times remained high during Obama’s terms in office. On
average, between 2009 and 2016, the newspaper published 3,296 articles per year which
contained the word ‘terrorism.’ While those numbers are significantly lower than in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, this still meant that The New York Times
published 9 articles a day which discussed the issue – an impressive number considering
that there were almost no high-profile attacks in those years. Evidently, then, ‘terrorism’
remained a central focus of American news reporting, indicating that the ‘terrorism’
discourse remained unchallenged in these years.
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What is more, the data suggests that ‘terrorism’ in the writing of The New York
Times was almost exclusively linked to the geographical and imaginary Middle East as
well as the region’s predominant religion, Islam. As Figure 6.2 outlines, most of the
articles on ‘terrorism’ published between 2005 and 2017 also contained a reference to
either Islam/being Muslim or an ethnic (‘Arab’) or geographical marker (‘Middle East’).
Of course, there is bound to be some overlap with articles including more than one of
these additional terms, but the overall tendency is nevertheless clear: Whenever The New
York Times wrote about ‘terrorism’ in those years, it referred to ‘Islamic terrorism’ and,
to a lesser extent, ‘terrorism’ involving the Middle East in some form or other. Indeed, as
the graphs in Figure 6.2 make clear, specifications of the ‘terrorism’ in question tended
to privilege religion over geographical markers, suggesting that the concept of ‘Islamic
terrorism’ continued to dominate journalistic writings on the topic. Of course, descriptions
of ‘terrorism’ as either related to Islam or the Middle East were closely interlinked as the
conceptual connection between ‘Islam’ and ‘the Middle East’ had always been a fixture
in Orientalist discourses, meaning that in the context of ‘terrorism,’ references to either
Islam or the Middle East also automatically evoked the other term. Overall, the data in
Figure 6.2 indicates that, as the years wore on, ‘Islamic’ and ‘terrorism’ continued to exist
in a quasi-symbiotic relationship with one term constantly conjuring the other, a clear
sign for the discourse’s on-going dominance in the American news media.
Similarly, a significant portion of the reporting on ‘terrorism’ in The New York
Times focused on perpetrators and places clearly linked to ‘Islamic terrorism’ without
actually having to use the word. As Figure 6.3 visualizes, the majority of the articles in
the newspaper which addressed ‘terrorism’ also mentioned bin Laden, al-Qaeda, Iraq, or
Afghanistan – all concepts already thoroughly linked to the notion of ‘Islamic terrorism’
during the Bush presidency. This meant that whenever journalists wrote about ‘terrorism’
in Iraq or Afghanistan or acts of violence committed by members of al-Qaeda, the discourse
on ‘Islamic terrorism’ remained active in the background. These terms ‘triggered’ knowledge
claims spread by the discourse via association. Ultimately, this has meant that the discourse
on ‘Islamic terrorism,’ whether in direct or indirect manifestations, has continued to inform
reporting on ‘terrorism’ in the American news media to this day.
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Figure 6.2: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in and from the Middle East in The New York Times,
1987-2000
Figure 6.3: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ in connection to the “war on terror(ism)” in The New
York Times, 2005-2017
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Figure 6.4: Reporting on ‘extremism’ in The New York Times, 2005-2017
Likewise, mirroring developments in political discourses on ‘terrorism,’ the concept
of ‘extremism’ began to appear in similar contexts in the writings of The New York Times.
The orange graph in Figure 6.4 depicts the overall amount of hits on the website of The
New York Times for ‘extremism.’ At first glance, then, it seems that ‘extremism’ was
actually significantly more popular than ‘terrorism’ as it generated higher numbers of
articles per year. However, it is important to be aware that the term was also used
extensively in contexts unrelated to ‘terrorism’ and (political) violence, so a direct
comparison of the graphs for ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ without further specification
would actually distort the results. Hence, Figure 6.4 also enumerates in more detail about
which kinds of ‘extremism’ the newspaper wrote in practice. As becomes immediately
evident, it was non-‘terrorism’ related topics such as arts, sport, travel, and style which
were overwhelmingly linked to ‘extremism.’ Issues such as ‘Muslim extremism’ or ‘Arab
extremism’ were covered less often by the newspaper.
Figure 6.5 shows that ‘terrorism’ has remained the dominant and most popular
term in news reporting on political violence in recent years. This becomes apparent when
we adapt the graph for ‘extremism’ by only taking hits into account which also mention
Islam, being Muslim, being Arab, and the Middle East. Nevertheless, whenever the term
‘extremism’ did appear in reporting on violence in the Middle East or in connection to
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Figure 6.5: Reporting on ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ (adapted) in The New York Times,
2005-2017
Islam/being Muslim, it clearly functioned as another ‘code word’ for ‘Islamic terrorism’ like
references to al-Qaeda or ‘terrorism’ in Iraq given that these specifiers were so thoroughly
constructed as markers for ‘Islamic terrorism.’ Evidently, then, the discourse on ‘Islamic
terrorism’ maintained its unrivaled, hegemonic standing in U.S. news reporting while
simultaneously concealing part of its appearances and visibility by increasingly popularizing
coded language, synonyms, and indirect references.
To sum up, as this brief analysis shows, the ‘terrorism’ discourse continued its reign
practically unchallenged into the 21st century and provided the single most dominant frame
through which politicians, journalists, and academics (see again Chapter 5) interpreted and
assigned meaning to incidents of (political) violence. Moreover, the concept of ‘terrorism’
itself had become inextricably entwined with the imaginary (and geographical) Middle
East as well as its peoples and Islam. After decades of forging these discursive connections,
these links have now become so strong that ‘terrorism’ automatically evokes ideas about
the Middle East and Islam. At the same time, mentioning Islam in the context of violence
ineluctably conjures the specter of ‘terrorism.’ The discourse on ‘(Islamic) terrorism’
has become so pervasive that it does not even need to use these exact terms anymore.
References to related concepts or events and people, nations, or groups thoroughly linked
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to ‘Islamic terrorism’ suffice to activate and exploit the power of the discourse. Meanwhile,
in a related development, the meaning of the term ‘terrorism’ itself has become increasingly
emptier and been stripped of most of its meaning components. ‘Terrorism’ in the 21st
century basically refers to illegitimate violence committed by Muslim zealots because they
hate the United States.
6.2 Coda: Trump and the Return of Race to the ‘Terrorism’
Discourse
Ultimately, the transition of power from George W. Bush to Barack Obama did not
significantly alter the discourse on ‘Islamic terrorism.’ However, it is not entirely clear
whether the same can be said about the presidency of Donald Trump whose stint in power
may indeed reshape the meaning of the term to some extent. At the time of writing,
President Trump has spent almost two tumultuous years in office and at least for the
first year, ‘terrorism’ was clearly very much on his mind. For 2017, the database of The
American Presidency Project lists 231 speeches and statements by Trump which contain
the word ‘terrorism,’ a surprisingly high number for a president in any given year (see again
Figure 1.1). By contrast, in 2018 (January 1 to November 17), Trump has only mentioned
‘terrorism’ 29 times, indicating that his focus has been elsewhere. Yet, as the discussion
of the trends in The New York Times above has shown, this does not mean that the
power and reach of ‘terrorism’ discourse are abating overall. Even though President Trump
speaks about the issue less frequently, the topic is still very much central to academic,
news media, and cultural discourses and will in all likelihood remain so for the foreseeable
future.
A closer look at the president’s statements and comments on ‘terrorism’ suggests
that when it comes to ‘terrorism,’ Trump may actually emphasize slightly different meaning
components than his predecessors. He has continued to frame ‘terrorism’ as committed
by Muslim fanatics but has also repeatedly tied to threat of ‘terrorism’ to the supposed
dangers of mass immigration, particularly from the Middle East. Notoriously, during the
presidential campaign, he “call[ed] for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering
the United States” (“Statement”). Trump continued, “Until we are able to determine and
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understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our country can not be the
victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense
of reason or respect for human life.” His statement, which stirred up great controversy
within the United States and beyond, linked the idea of “Jihad,” i.e. ‘Islamic terrorism,’
to uncontrolled immigration of Muslims into the United States.
Similarly, during his first “State of the Union” speech on February 28, 2017, Trump
reassured his audience, “We are also taking strong measures to protect our Nation from
radical Islamic terrorism. According to data provided by the Department of Justice, the
vast majority of individuals convicted of terrorism and terrorism-related offenses since
9/11 came here from outside of our country” (“Address” 28 Feb. 2017). Once more, Trump
connected the threat of “radical Islamic terrorism” to people who “came here from outside
of our country,” clearly meaning Muslim immigrants. He insisted in his speech that “[i]t
[wa]s not compassionate, but reckless to allow uncontrolled entry from places where proper
vetting c[ould] not occur,” suggesting again that the ‘terrorism’ threat stemmed from
uncontrolled immigration.
A year later, during the “State of the Union Speech” in 2018, Trump praised his
initiative to build a wall on the border with Mexico, claiming that “our plan close[d] the
terrible loopholes exploited by criminals and terrorists to enter our country” (“Address”
30 Jan. 2018). Again, Trump connected ‘terrorism’ to immigration, implying that the
‘terrorist’ enemy came from foreign countries. This theme recurred throughout the speech
as Trump stressed again and again that immigration aided and abetted ‘terrorism’ against
the United States. At a later point, the president warned, “two terrorist attacks in New
York were made possible by the visa lottery and chain migration. In the age of terrorism,
these programs present risks we can just no longer afford. It’s time to reform these outdated
immigration rules and finally bring our immigration system into the 21st century.” As
these examples demonstrate, in President Trump’s understanding of ‘terrorism,’ the threat
emanated predominantly from (Muslim) immigration and in his view, the most effective
way of fighting ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ constituted curbing immigration into the United
States.
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Trump’s fixation with the alleged threat of immigrant-‘terrorists’ entering the
country is noteworthy because it indicates that the ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ discourse may be
in the process of reshaping the meaning of the term. It signals that in the coming years,
race and ethnicity could become more prominent again in conceptualizations of ‘terrorism.’
This does not mean that religious indicators (‘Islamic’) will entirely disappear but rather
that framings of the term ‘terrorism’ will combine them with racial markers to construct
a ‘terrorist’ Other who is not only foreign and dangerous because of a distinct religion
(i.e. Islam) but also because he (or she) belongs to a different ethnicity or race (meaning
non-white and therefore suspect).
Interestingly, President Trump may not be the only discursive agent to advance
this changed conceptualization of ‘terrorism.’ Other actors and agents like, for instance,
the TV series Homeland, may be following suit.6 Homeland, developed by Howard Gordon
and Alex Gansa, began airing in 2011 to great critical acclaim. Homeland follows CIA
analyst Carrie Mathison (played by Claire Danes) as she works to defend the United
States against attacks by ‘Islamic terrorists.’ To complicate matters, Carrie Mathison
suffers from bipolar disorder which she tries to hide from her employers, but which, when
left untreated, sharpens her analytical skills so that she detects developments and finds
clues that her colleagues simply miss. Her illness becomes an important narrative device
and, as the series progresses, Carrie learns how to control and harness her disorder to her
advantage in solving cases and conspiracies.
Homeland deals extensively with ‘Islamic terrorism,’ especially the first four seasons:
The first three seasons narrate how Sergeant Nicholas Brody (Damian Lewis), held as
a prisoner of war by an al-Qaeda splinter group for eight years, returns to the United
States. Brody is hailed as hero and embarks on an illustrious political career; only Carrie
Mathison suspects that Brody was ‘turned’ during his ordeal by his captors and has really
been released by Abu Nazir (Navid Negahban) and his group as part of a larger plan to
attack the United States. Carrie’s concerns prove to be true and after she manages to
‘turn’ Brody again, the second season (2012) focuses on the CIA’s hunt for Abu Nazir, the
main ‘terrorist’ orchestrating a series of attacks against the United States. Season 3 (2013)
6For analyses of Homeland as well as its politics of representation, see, e.g., Bevan, Edgerton and Edgerton,
Castonguay, Koch, Mittell, Niehues, Steenberg and Tasker, and Takacs.
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culminates in Brody being sent to Iran in order to use his ‘terrorist’ status to assassinate
the head of the Revolutionary Guard. Ultimately, the CIA wants to replace the leader of
the Revolutionary Guard with another Iranian who has secretly been recruited by the CIA,
thus enabling the agency to steer Iranian politics, most importantly to improve its relations
with the U.S. The season ends with Brody’s hanging in a public square as murderer and
traitor, deemed necessary by American officials in order to catapult the CIA-controlled
Iranian politician into the country’s inner circle of power. In Season 4 (2014), Carrie works
as station chief in Kabul, Afghanistan, and later in Islamabad, Pakistan, attempting to
stop Haissam Haqqani (Numan Acar), a high-ranking ‘Islamic terrorist.’ However, her
efforts are in vain as Haqqani and his men eventually attack and storm the U.S. embassy,
killing several employees as well as acquiring “the list,” a small briefcase with detailed
information about all CIA informants in the area. In the end, Haqqani’s attack does not
have consequences. Instead, he strikes a deal with the CIA: the agency agrees to take him
off their ‘kill list’ if Haqqani stops supporting ‘terrorists’ in Afghanistan. Disillusioned,
Carrie leaves the CIA.
However, after these first four seasons, Homeland changed its focus away from
Carrie actively involved in fighting ‘Islamic terrorism’ in the Middle East. Season 5 (2015)
is set in Berlin, Germany, where Carrie now lives with her daughter, having severed all ties
with the CIA after the events of Season 4. She works for a German non-profit organization
which, among other projects, wants to raise funds for refugee camps in Lebanon for people
fleeing from the violence instigated by the Islamic State. This season is also notable for
portraying the threat of European ‘Islamic terrorists’ returning from the war in Syria and
trying to launch attacks in different European cities. A group’s attempt to blow up Berlin
Central Station is only stopped at the very last second. The season’s focus, however, lies
on the discovery that one high-ranking CIA agent is actually a double agent, reporting
to the Russian secret service, divulging secrets and actively disrupting CIA operations
and plans. Season 6 (2017) finds Carrie returning to New York City where she works
for another non-profit organization which defends Muslim and Arab Americans against
harassment and false charges of ‘Islamic terrorism.’ What first looks like a suicide bombing
by a fanatic ‘Islamic terrorist’ is ultimately revealed to have been a set-up, orchestrated
302
by Dar Adal (F. Murray Abraham), a high-ranking CIA official, who is plotting to keep
President-elect Elizabeth Keane out of office. While Dar Adal and his co-conspirators are
stopped in time, the season ends on a dark note as now-President Keane rounds up core
members of the intelligence community in a burst of paranoia and fear, instigating a severe
house-cleaning which leaves Carrie reeling and confused.
What this short overview suggests is that, as the series progresses, the meaning
of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in Homeland changes from an exclusive focus on religion as marker
for ‘terrorism’ to include race as indicating a character’s ‘terrorist’ status. In the first
three seasons, Homeland foregrounds the notion that ‘terrorism’ against the United States
is fueled by belief in Islam. Since being Muslim is not visible in a person’s outward
appearance, the fact that returned prisoner of war and white American Nicholas Brody
is really a dangerous ‘terrorist’ remains undetected until it is almost too late, turning it
into a dramatic device to create suspense and tension for audience pleasure. Until it is
unequivocally confirmed, the series hints at Brody’s status as ‘terrorist’ by revealing that
he converted to Islam during his years of captivity, inviting viewers to be suspicious of
Brody because of that fact.
By contrast, in later seasons, the ‘Islamic terrorists’ (or those tricked into looking
like ones in Season 6) are darker-skinned Middle Easterners, suggesting that race and
ethnicity are becoming more central to cultural constructions of ‘Islamic terrorists.’ The
plot of Season 4 is set in Afghanistan and the main antagonist is a brown Muslim
‘terrorist’ intent on driving the U.S. out of his country. In Season 5 and 6, the ‘Islamic
terrorists’ are non-white men either from families who immigrated into their host country
years ago or first-generation immigrants themselves, clearly echoing President Trump’s
conceptualizations of ‘Islam terrorism’ as linked to migration. As the series has progressed,
then, race and ethnicity have become increasingly important, complementing religious
markers of ‘terrorism’ and doubly Othering the ‘terrorist’ enemy who is suspect and evil
not only because of his religious beliefs but also because of his origins and skin color.
This recent development is noteworthy not only because it signals the discourse’s
continued vitality and productivity. It also suggests that the discourse may indeed be
returning to the spotlight after a few years of reduced visibility. Unlike religion, race is
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visually and indelibly inscribed onto the (‘terrorist’) body. While one can change one’s
religious affiliation (even secretly), one’s ethnicity remains fixed and constantly in view.
This means that if ‘terrorism’ is also tied to race, a designated ‘terrorist’ will forever remain
in that role. Following that logic, a ‘terrorist’ can never not be a ‘terrorist,’ thus stabilizing
the concept while also justifying extreme measures in the fight against ‘terrorism’ because
it makes the threat of ‘terrorism’ permanent and perpetual and contributes to a world-view
which divides based on race. Ultimately, the discourse’s expansion into debates about
immigration under Trump’s presidency indicates that ‘terrorism’ as a highly politicized
concept remains in robust health and continues to extend its power and reach.
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Chapter 7
Appendix
This appendix contains the data derived from my search of the online archives of The New
York Times. I conducted the search on December 6, 2018. All numbers refer to the amount
of hits a particular search term generated per calendar year (January 1 to December 31).
Year terrorism Afghanis-
tan
terrorism
Algeria
terrorism
al-Qaeda
terrorism
Arab
Israeli
terrorism
Arab
terrorism
1940 770 2 3 49 0 10
1941 665 1 3 12 0 10
1942 650 1 3 19 0 7
1943 598 0 4 21 0 6
1944 788 0 1 20 0 10
1945 763 0 1 61 0 19
1946 937 2 2 58 0 123
1947 861 3 3 34 1 160
1948 639 1 2 34 16 66
1949 586 0 1 24 15 28
1950 553 3 1 44 2 11
1951 559 2 2 51 1 19
1952 591 2 2 34 3 16
1953 603 0 2 41 9 28
1954 563 0 18 52 9 52
1955 569 0 60 30 10 41
1956 802 7 67 83 40 96
1957 717 5 95 86 20 59
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Year terrorism Afghanis-
tan
terrorism
Algeria
terrorism
al-Qaeda
terrorism
Arab
Israeli
terrorism
Arab
terrorism
1958 600 3 76 47 6 62
1959 527 0 38 56 5 29
1960 545 2 50 46 10 37
1961 724 4 92 84 8 41
1962 909 1 367 137 3 40
1963 630 0 32 62 7 35
1964 719 0 20 137 9 33
1965 722 3 10 93 12 32
1966 780 0 7 124 31 52
1967 826 3 7 117 70 115
1968 737 1 16 69 76 91
1969 720 0 13 77 119 137
1970 849 1 18 122 104 120
1971 748 1 14 87 33 49
1972 907 6 22 96 178 205
1973 1,050 1 17 264 159 185
1974 927 5 23 227 189 214
1975 919 1 12 157 133 169
1976 990 3 15 198 129 208
1977 1,145 2 23 216 130 192
1978 926 5 24 215 134 171
1979 1,153 16 11 227 184 226
1980 1,742 137 24 242 158 241
1981 1,715 64 24 74 99 178
1982 1,396 49 14 78 177 212
1983 1,293 43 8 62 106 145
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Year terrorism Afghanis-
tan
terrorism
Algeria
terrorism
al-Qaeda
terrorism
Arab
Israeli
terrorism
Arab
terrorism
1984 1,476 47 11 90 138 221
1985 1,752 64 29 167 208 324
1986 2,536 85 29 293 234 506
1987 1,490 61 9 94 91 180
1988 1,552 58 28 122 198 284
1989 1,500 58 19 94 123 188
1990 1,274 15 13 128 149 230
1991 1,430 33 16 133 105 209
1992 1,175 14 17 89 79 139
1993 1,696 65 44 190 158 298
1994 1,406 25 39 127 152 201
1995 2,002 49 86 124 110 215
1996 1,951 49 27 185 165 241
1997 1,684 24 38 146 154 218
1998 1,768 183 37 181 105 228
1999 1,859 91 26 173 72 159
2000 1,574 134 33 264 108 187
2001 10,898 2,690 78 1,731 401 1389
2002 10,453 1,972 63 2,527 703 1434
2003 9,786 1,230 71 2,243 389 1353
2004 9,074 1,358 86 2,702 274 1162
2005 4,512 644 57 1,193 154 651
2006 5,709 779 38 1,598 260 794
2007 4,764 762 52 1,332 138 480
2008 3,509 694 33 988 119 330
2009 3,505 888 22 1,115 147 365
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Year terrorism Afghanis-
tan
terrorism
Algeria
terrorism
al-Qaeda
terrorism
Arab
Israeli
terrorism
Arab
terrorism
2010 3,366 737 28 1,012 95 348
2011 3,189 671 39 1,027 101 485
2012 2,548 459 36 788 96 338
2013 2,686 418 74 790 75 305
2014 3,212 452 39 983 114 414
2015 4,045 447 59 1,120 93 536
2016 3,813 402 27 864 74 411
2017 3,269 363 24 698 64 402
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Year bad
terrorism
bin
Laden
terrorism
evil
terrorism
Iran
terrorism
Iraq
terrorism
Islamic
terrorism
1940 84 0 54 3 4 2
1941 55 0 41 13 12 1
1942 44 0 34 6 3 0
1943 54 0 30 3 4 0
1944 45 0 30 0 2 0
1945 106 0 60 14 3 1
1946 58 0 49 18 11 0
1947 57 0 53 11 30 4
1948 50 0 29 8 5 3
1949 34 0 32 6 4 6
1950 55 0 40 9 4 5
1951 47 0 39 34 11 11
1952 44 0 34 14 4 7
1953 49 0 50 6 3 8
1954 37 0 37 9 4 11
1955 52 0 30 6 2 10
1956 64 0 53 11 12 10
1957 53 0 34 7 12 7
1958 46 0 29 4 18 0
1959 48 0 40 2 14 1
1960 41 0 28 3 11 4
1961 61 0 29 9 8 1
1962 63 0 31 13 4 9
1963 52 0 27 6 10 7
1964 55 0 25 4 1 5
1965 69 0 38 2 7 5
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Year bad
terrorism
bin
Laden
terrorism
evil
terrorism
Iran
terrorism
Iraq
terrorism
Islamic
terrorism
1966 114 0 44 7 7 4
1967 109 0 58 10 9 7
1968 97 0 37 5 5 6
1969 84 0 35 4 13 3
1970 129 0 64 8 9 6
1971 128 0 47 2 6 11
1972 84 0 45 8 10 7
1973 178 0 76 14 21 10
1974 147 0 64 16 16 8
1975 124 0 47 38 23 17
1976 137 0 48 35 21 11
1977 155 0 71 42 16 38
1978 134 0 68 40 36 19
1979 182 0 83 158 30 69
1980 197 0 71 255 99 126
1981 143 0 76 160 64 74
1982 122 0 51 58 50 24
1983 132 0 63 85 35 59
1984 150 0 64 143 60 115
1985 155 0 70 147 55 104
1986 195 0 96 325 149 142
1987 140 0 81 359 129 88
1988 163 0 70 178 76 68
1989 158 0 65 197 64 75
1990 143 0 65 132 193 75
1991 153 0 64 161 326 78
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Year bad
terrorism
bin
Laden
terrorism
evil
terrorism
Iran
terrorism
Iraq
terrorism
Islamic
terrorism
1992 152 0 50 109 108 104
1993 171 0 57 131 146 305
1994 182 2 69 86 60 216
1995 219 0 124 111 88 321
1996 195 8 95 190 106 268
1997 179 5 83 161 115 228
1998 195 209 104 151 219 237
1999 228 151 113 104 135 227
2000 210 162 90 142 105 246
2001 1,018 2,088 407 458 517 1,571
2002 945 1,188 544 566 1,596 1,404
2003 890 676 361 739 5,508 1,265
2004 887 888 307 629 4,554 1,246
2005 505 418 180 351 1,657 786
2006 685 672 249 744 2,080 1,028
2007 584 536 214 594 1,783 868
2008 501 549 147 402 1,071 562
2009 441 362 128 396 711 601
2010 416 341 125 288 485 572
2011 405 1,248 146 279 502 571
2012 297 701 93 323 337 423
2013 345 362 127 274 384 478
2014 371 313 134 276 778 940
2015 430 251 158 457 1,231 1,818
2016 451 178 138 374 956 1,485
2017 475 143 189 440 728 1,170
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Year Jewish
terrorism
Kenya
terrorism
Lebanon
terrorism
Libya
terrorism
Middle
East
terrorism
Moslem
terrorism
1940 63 4 0 12 24 7
1941 35 3 3 21 29 7
1942 30 0 2 20 26 7
1943 41 0 0 9 15 4
1944 55 0 3 3 26 0
1945 62 0 8 4 39 9
1946 204 0 12 0 45 26
1947 273 3 18 2 52 40
1948 82 3 10 3 25 21
1949 29 1 1 3 21 12
1950 15 4 4 0 19 12
1951 33 0 7 4 30 21
1952 26 41 10 2 23 11
1953 31 48 3 1 16 17
1954 20 16 4 3 16 34
1955 16 16 2 3 31 34
1956 69 10 9 7 105 34
1957 51 5 13 9 74 68
1958 24 3 44 6 50 44
1959 15 5 5 3 28 31
1960 26 13 2 1 20 49
1961 61 14 2 2 35 56
1962 46 9 10 9 33 250
1963 32 17 3 1 27 14
1964 32 17 1 0 39 10
1965 27 9 4 1 38 13
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Year Jewish
terrorism
Kenya
terrorism
Lebanon
terrorism
Libya
terrorism
Middle
East
terrorism
Moslem
terrorism
1966 75 11 14 1 77 12
1967 78 5 13 2 111 22
1968 59 2 15 3 104 16
1969 68 0 33 2 99 14
1970 79 2 25 9 153 18
1971 52 3 7 7 65 38
1972 75 12 61 19 198 20
1973 143 14 57 32 214 26
1974 114 12 69 15 231 35
1975 109 7 71 25 180 38
1976 116 18 86 43 160 40
1977 147 34 35 26 188 48
1978 125 13 70 28 192 34
1979 194 15 72 36 261 69
1980 223 6 70 82 260 118
1981 122 20 94 161 183 66
1982 158 5 243 67 182 86
1983 77 5 330 27 299 88
1984 137 5 241 89 318 125
1985 148 3 374 86 543 156
1986 138 8 369 768 631 158
1987 100 6 212 99 311 124
1988 163 6 135 72 399 77
1989 98 8 153 84 310 8
1990 120 4 97 63 305 3
1991 96 12 106 57 434 6
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Year Jewish
terrorism
Kenya
terrorism
Lebanon
terrorism
Libya
terrorism
Middle
East
terrorism
Moslem
terrorism
1992 95 11 81 70 167 2
1993 174 3 107 52 299 5
1994 185 8 95 21 294 2
1995 191 7 52 28 322 3
1996 173 14 128 73 437 3
1997 189 10 63 50 246 1
1998 177 258 45 64 218 1
1999 155 88 50 48 159 0
2000 171 71 72 44 240 1
2001 440 247 176 100 948 4
2002 557 108 225 94 1072 3
2003 396 99 209 98 1,143 0
2004 348 80 155 219 864 1
2005 224 37 159 46 504 0
2006 263 64 476 59 1,098 0
2007 189 61 171 52 799 2
2008 213 65 138 42 582 0
2009 212 88 122 50 541 0
2010 207 77 87 28 458 1
2011 165 69 100 251 604 0
2012 158 41 116 192 494 1
2013 129 104 135 171 611 0
2014 183 61 153 167 859 1
2015 330 91 208 232 1,061 1
2016 220 68 136 196 849 1
2017 165 50 122 189 636 1
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Year Muslim
terrorism
Nazi
terrorism
terrorism
9/11
Oklahoma
City
terrorism
Palestine
terrorism
Palestinian
terrorism
1940 1 288 269 343 11 0
1941 0 262 107 245 12 0
1942 0 261 86 188 8 2
1943 0 234 86 179 13 1
1944 0 254 116 197 27 5
1945 0 231 252 225 34 4
1946 0 141 244 335 204 33
1947 0 83 128 176 287 49
1948 0 78 117 274 101 17
1949 0 35 109 255 24 5
1950 0 43 154 345 7 2
1951 0 45 158 309 13 6
1952 0 39 116 273 8 1
1953 1 36 111 304 11 1
1954 0 19 109 298 15 1
1955 0 24 88 256 15 2
1956 1 52 260 317 45 3
1957 0 38 225 319 17 4
1958 0 33 95 222 8 2
1959 0 35 99 173 7 2
1960 0 46 115 245 12 2
1961 0 58 151 261 6 1
1962 1 36 323 411 3 1
1963 10 32 215 274 12 3
1964 2 34 137 299 10 0
1965 5 39 189 236 7 0
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Year Muslim
terrorism
Nazi
terrorism
terrorism
9/11
Oklahoma
City
terrorism
Palestine
terrorism
Palestinian
terrorism
1966 2 89 361 408 14 14
1967 3 63 366 305 25 12
1968 2 44 191 197 20 16
1969 6 37 153 136 28 32
1970 5 64 342 228 32 45
1971 5 42 207 110 12 14
1972 3 32 231 180 47 89
1973 3 79 502 223 53 114
1974 4 49 448 200 117 147
1975 3 59 394 174 83 97
1976 5 64 436 137 54 108
1977 15 88 496 160 69 110
1978 4 84 470 103 65 114
1979 5 117 588 153 138 170
1980 11 119 664 257 95 162
1981 5 67 353 168 99 111
1982 1 59 314 267 162 231
1983 3 53 243 158 96 133
1984 7 54 244 199 95 124
1985 6 102 368 139 258 297
1986 10 76 470 177 173 301
1987 1 67 300 129 81 112
1988 14 53 316 148 280 309
1989 122 58 322 144 172 214
1990 78 49 310 131 136 174
1991 104 60 322 111 88 145
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Year Muslim
terrorism
Nazi
terrorism
terrorism
9/11
Oklahoma
City
terrorism
Palestine
terrorism
Palestinian
terrorism
1992 127 94 272 132 55 112
1993 337 73 360 120 129 241
1994 228 80 306 107 135 205
1995 337 116 485 764 114 207
1996 217 76 410 366 92 285
1997 137 92 383 468 59 303
1998 158 77 407 245 55 258
1999 175 101 513 175 33 145
2000 201 75 419 160 43 215
2001 1,376 149 5,838 467 190 926
2002 1,173 166 5,883 212 248 1,399
2003 1,097 142 3,646 144 233 929
2004 1,028 163 3,936 172 133 624
2005 597 128 1,997 162 86 442
2006 813 130 2,492 168 130 587
2007 612 127 1,902 183 99 385
2008 467 119 1,373 195 59 240
2009 512 93 1,284 217 78 297
2010 520 98 1,209 302 49 199
2011 537 78 1,204 366 57 200
2012 381 83 860 487 40 155
2013 432 94 857 439 37 144
2014 529 108 899 360 73 252
2015 979 150 1,059 228 66 227
2016 849 136 1,064 289 44 173
2017 822 197 913 214 42 130
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Year scourge
terrorism
Soviet
Union
terrorism
Syria
terrorism
terrorism
network
terror
network
Tanzania
terrorism
1940 3 60 11 13 13 0
1941 7 29 17 9 9 0
1942 3 23 8 17 17 0
1943 8 32 2 14 14 0
1944 6 30 2 14 14 0
1945 14 95 6 20 20 0
1946 7 127 10 5 5 0
1947 3 95 20 10 10 0
1948 2 113 20 14 14 0
1949 2 91 1 6 6 0
1950 3 94 3 12 12 0
1951 4 97 8 6 6 0
1952 4 73 5 13 13 0
1953 2 86 4 9 9 0
1954 3 61 4 12 12 0
1955 5 51 2 8 8 0
1956 7 212 18 16 16 0
1957 4 122 23 27 27 0
1958 5 100 15 23 23 0
1959 1 76 4 10 10 0
1960 2 82 5 10 10 0
1961 4 160 3 22 22 0
1962 5 128 14 41 41 0
1963 3 101 8 18 18 0
1964 1 77 3 17 17 0
1965 4 91 3 21 21 5
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Year scourge
terrorism
Soviet
Union
terrorism
Syria
terrorism
terrorism
network
terror
network
Tanzania
terrorism
1966 6 89 24 22 22 4
1967 5 111 34 20 20 1
1968 5 108 17 17 17 2
1969 4 90 23 17 17 1
1970 2 101 23 32 32 1
1971 6 98 13 25 25 2
1972 9 112 49 27 27 12
1973 7 149 40 41 41 4
1974 5 120 80 26 26 7
1975 5 111 40 45 45 10
1976 3 119 43 63 62 19
1977 2 139 32 67 66 13
1978 1 128 31 63 63 7
1979 8 161 45 71 71 13
1980 8 251 58 99 99 7
1981 4 316 59 83 76 5
1982 11 211 91 50 44 4
1983 3 224 113 71 60 3
1984 5 250 110 77 75 6
1985 25 263 167 109 97 2
1986 28 384 281 135 124 6
1987 2 227 79 92 88 2
1988 14 234 83 97 93 3
1989 15 259 88 79 75 6
1990 9 220 91 78 76 0
1991 10 227 115 92 89 3
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Year scourge
terrorism
Soviet
Union
terrorism
Syria
terrorism
terrorism
network
terror
network
Tanzania
terrorism
1992 5 111 68 66 65 3
1993 7 97 79 107 99 2
1994 4 68 92 72 69 12
1995 9 80 52 129 106 4
1996 8 70 129 126 100 6
1997 6 61 59 99 86 6
1998 7 83 39 172 143 228
1999 11 95 71 182 166 73
2000 7 89 63 189 170 60
2001 39 345 195 1,429 954 211
2002 39 270 225 1,113 826 52
2003 18 200 453 935 601 36
2004 27 196 223 950 638 39
2005 11 140 238 457 367 17
2006 11 156 341 467 411 29
2007 13 113 220 435 404 20
2008 11 112 156 345 318 23
2009 17 111 106 392 333 50
2010 25 79 71 428 371 50
2011 14 95 161 460 405 26
2012 19 67 257 307 266 14
2013 14 72 337 361 310 35
2014 15 87 743 363 309 13
2015 34 97 1,326 492 391 24
2016 27 98 1,061 509 441 11
2017 27 98 842 436 381 12
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Year Vietcong
terrorism
Vietnam
terrorism
war
terrorism
World Trade
Center terrorism
1940 0 0 527 2
1941 0 0 451 0
1942 0 0 473 0
1943 0 0 394 0
1944 0 0 447 1
1945 0 0 574 1
1946 0 1 478 7
1947 0 0 374 9
1948 0 0 283 1
1949 0 0 230 3
1950 0 12 264 1
1951 0 7 227 3
1952 0 4 215 1
1953 0 9 231 1
1954 0 15 179 2
1955 0 25 195 3
1956 0 8 338 2
1957 0 6 251 2
1958 0 12 223 1
1959 0 18 201 2
1960 0 16 207 35
1961 0 73 310 70
1962 15 65 366 84
1963 13 40 228 36
1964 86 154 277 61
1965 135 224 320 21
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Year Vietcong
terrorism
Vietnam
terrorism
war
terrorism
World Trade
Center terrorism
1966 138 270 382 159
1967 124 288 429 126
1968 82 208 313 48
1969 49 128 315 53
1970 51 198 376 87
1971 41 140 311 94
1972 38 179 329 113
1973 29 173 416 238
1974 16 77 371 262
1975 22 113 355 315
1976 1 71 364 373
1977 1 93 422 429
1978 3 77 356 241
1979 3 107 467 343
1980 3 101 615 472
1981 5 117 508 273
1982 6 69 485 237
1983 3 84 509 258
1984 2 86 582 258
1985 6 83 667 262
1986 6 110 832 273
1987 3 75 571 185
1988 2 91 531 169
1989 0 79 535 137
1990 1 61 503 140
1991 4 85 736 155
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Year Vietcong
terrorism
Vietnam
terrorism
war
terrorism
World Trade
Center terrorism
1992 4 54 498 161
1993 1 53 652 895
1994 2 54 554 346
1995 2 95 779 481
1996 3 59 668 297
1997 2 50 610 292
1998 1 61 691 264
1999 0 72 758 223
2000 1 54 684 216
2001 11 421 4,103 4,608
2002 7 331 4,012 2,942
2003 8 493 5,663 1,441
2004 26 545 4,668 1,125
2005 8 180 2,015 802
2006 8 256 2,820 1,033
2007 7 254 2,206 754
2008 2 171 1,691 654
2009 3 124 1,588 585
2010 2 100 1,309 681
2011 3 89 1,299 789
2012 1 71 977 427
2013 3 84 1,111 344
2014 0 106 1,344 418
2015 1 102 1,623 374
2016 2 105 1,399 386
2017 4 122 1,292 220
323
Year fundamen-
talism
extremism extremism
(adapted)
Arab
extremism
arts
extremism
Islam
extremism
1940 1,894 3,072 110 20 282 5
1941 1,650 3,096 135 25 226 2
1942 1,234 2,690 134 26 191 2
1943 1,238 2,690 122 37 161 2
1944 1,146 2,543 83 18 179 1
1945 1,560 2,557 114 28 164 2
1946 1,884 2,642 142 56 200 14
1947 2,009 3,042 181 90 205 11
1948 1,710 2,748 196 121 224 3
1949 1,774 2,896 157 72 256 4
1950 1,664 2,783 135 36 224 4
1951 1,606 2,815 220 68 190 22
1952 1,430 2,682 177 59 236 17
1953 1,386 2,594 142 48 241 10
1954 1,490 2,582 160 55 275 7
1955 1,248 2,276 167 68 237 8
1956 1,359 2,431 534 229 253 12
1957 1,306 2,337 465 184 241 20
1958 1,108 2,581 377 162 272 14
1959 1,146 2,434 155 54 288 9
1960 1,286 2,597 177 79 288 14
1961 1,178 2,598 193 96 345 3
1962 1,198 2,700 150 49 321 16
1963 1,034 2,334 149 63 238 7
1964 936 2,708 160 62 215 10
1965 975 2,415 124 41 312 8
324
Year fundamen-
talism
extremism extremism
(adapted)
Arab
extremism
arts
extremism
Islam
extremism
1966 1,088 2,789 200 62 418 17
1967 1,098 2,504 366 141 370 15
1968 1,213 2,631 249 79 380 11
1969 1,320 2,742 278 98 370 13
1970 1,300 2,766 498 191 386 7
1971 1,366 2,685 326 113 379 16
1972 1,357 2,786 299 108 421 13
1973 1,382 2,930 458 185 488 11
1974 1,372 2,806 564 237 424 19
1975 1,544 3,149 582 250 449 22
1976 1,450 3,155 467 210 463 18
1977 1,453 3,303 522 207 516 24
1978 1,125 2,474 437 174 414 21
1979 1,430 3,182 528 185 539 82
1980 2,229 4,989 836 289 1,079 142
1981 1,519 3,346 364 131 998 37
1982 1,672 3,322 377 127 865 27
1983 1,579 3,208 347 113 854 29
1984 1,708 3,400 411 133 923 69
1985 1,751 3,353 387 116 993 49
1986 1,860 3,488 375 116 932 47
1987 1,964 3,450 294 79 960 43
1988 1,869 3,471 431 135 962 55
1989 1,828 3,316 348 75 940 53
1990 1,787 3,311 562 152 918 62
1991 1,773 3,061 564 131 699 59
325
Year fundamen-
talism
extremism extremism
(adapted)
Arab
extremism
arts
extremism
Islam
extremism
1992 1,779 3,296 404 85 764 78
1993 1,639 2,954 431 65 756 97
1994 1,464 3,104 422 73 825 81
1995 1,615 3,197 422 74 809 62
1996 1,485 3,160 395 68 779 76
1997 1,538 3,149 358 66 864 70
1998 1,739 3,491 436 67 1,055 69
1999 1,820 3,738 387 67 1,164 66
2000 1,913 3,838 496 92 1,128 95
2001 1,849 3,812 961 185 1,092 273
2002 1,905 3,729 906 193 1,011 259
2003 1,772 3,542 791 189 983 180
2004 1,902 3,550 793 170 1,007 218
2005 1,758 3,808 849 190 1,162 225
2006 2,074 4,573 1,439 288 1,120 347
2007 2,409 5,079 1,383 225 1,134 389
2008 2,850 5,269 1,042 169 1,098 282
2009 2,914 5,665 1,160 217 1,149 296
2010 2,962 6,166 1,093 207 1,283 284
2011 3,089 6,741 1,554 383 1,383 324
2012 3,030 6,421 1,234 272 1,301 273
2013 2,350 5,174 1,188 228 1,000 262
2014 2,342 5,129 1,519 262 1,004 451
2015 2,195 4,691 1,868 274 1,011 643
2016 2,027 4,474 1,585 214 897 508
2017 1,939 4,235 1,533 209 791 491
326
Year Middle East
extremism
Muslim
extremism
sport
extremism
style
extremism
travel
extremism
1940 85 0 151 237 239
1941 108 0 120 172 199
1942 106 0 102 157 161
1943 83 0 112 161 182
1944 63 1 57 152 156
1945 84 0 101 144 156
1946 70 2 111 156 171
1947 80 0 113 190 198
1948 72 0 115 179 187
1949 81 0 122 234 211
1950 95 0 102 197 209
1951 130 0 119 210 224
1952 100 1 126 183 208
1953 83 1 105 182 214
1954 97 1 100 216 235
1955 91 0 87 140 219
1956 293 0 112 183 247
1957 261 0 85 208 225
1958 201 0 98 224 259
1959 92 0 109 217 280
1960 83 1 97 217 264
1961 90 4 128 224 265
1962 82 3 99 220 250
1963 65 14 104 191 226
1964 77 11 109 218 225
1965 68 7 130 226 219
327
Year Middle East
extremism
Muslim
extremism
sport
extremism
style
extremism
travel
extremism
1966 114 7 170 285 290
1967 197 13 145 285 260
1968 149 10 125 324 227
1969 160 7 146 322 241
1970 290 10 190 365 337
1971 193 4 133 360 301
1972 176 2 148 375 290
1973 255 7 208 441 335
1974 303 5 194 381 296
1975 305 5 215 378 303
1976 237 2 192 439 329
1977 283 8 222 497 385
1978 240 2 168 421 299
1979 256 5 274 511 378
1980 401 4 308 896 577
1981 192 4 193 600 416
1982 219 4 241 576 372
1983 205 0 212 585 392
1984 200 9 210 632 378
1985 216 6 239 601 409
1986 208 4 209 645 426
1987 169 3 222 631 426
1988 227 14 225 623 409
1989 166 54 200 589 413
1990 288 60 212 621 417
1991 315 59 216 486 371
328
Year Middle East
extremism
Muslim
extremism
sport
extremism
style
extremism
travel
extremism
1992 145 96 238 590 428
1993 155 114 185 600 370
1994 170 98 235 575 422
1995 166 120 261 524 411
1996 157 94 277 522 415
1997 155 67 273 563 388
1998 219 81 363 790 491
1999 169 85 381 787 593
2000 202 107 440 761 518
2001 258 245 370 730 608
2002 248 206 408 668 524
2003 263 159 387 652 516
2004 216 189 383 631 524
2005 247 187 404 798 613
2006 492 312 490 812 740
2007 473 296 518 875 731
2008 359 232 663 946 810
2009 375 272 622 925 820
2010 350 252 610 1,023 803
2011 516 331 665 1,137 940
2012 422 267 687 1,037 890
2013 456 242 541 901 744
2014 481 325 530 742 755
2015 486 465 405 733 774
2016 419 444 450 721 724
2017 347 486 377 589 780
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